

T H E
Practical Divinity
Geo. O F T H E *Barlie*
P A P I S T S
Discovered to be Destructive of
Christianity
A N D
M E N S S O U L S.

And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned who believed not the Truth, but had pleasure in Unrighteousness. 2 Thess. 2. 11, 12.

L O N D O N,
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M D C L X X V I.

A N

Advertisement.

I Have always thought, since I considered and understood what *Papery* was, that the knowing of it would be a sufficient Dissuasive from it, to those that regard God and their Souls. This perswasion, together with compassion for those that are seduced, and desire to secure those that are in danger, engaged me in this present Undertaking: Wherein I have discovered what the *Practical Divinity* of that Church is, how pernicious and inconsistent with the way to Salvation declared in the Scripture. I have herein the concurrence of some (few in comparison) of that Church, who are sensible of such Doctrine prevailing amongst them, as they say, is (a) *absolutely opposite to the Rules and Spirit of the Gospel*: Such as (b) *no man that hath never so little tenderness of his own salvation, but must conceive an horror at*: such as they call a (c) *Poysonous Morality, more corrupt than that of Pagans themselves*: and (d) *which permits Christians to do, what Pagans, Jews, Mahometanes, and Barbarians, would have had in execration*: such as is, in their Style, *the most palpa-*

(a) *Representation of Curez of Paris.* p. 3..

(b) *Pag.* 4.

(c) *Their Remonstrance.* p. 2.

(d) *Their Answer maintaining the Factum.* p. 8.

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ble (e) darkness that ever came out of the bottomless pit: such as (f) overthrows the Essential Points of Christian Religion, and the Maxims that are most important, and of greatest necessity, in order to the salvation of man. Of this they have given the World notice in several Discourses, (g) two of which I have seen (though unhappily not the latter, till I had gone through the greatest part of what I intended.) As to the extent of this Execrable Divinity, they declare, That whole Societies (h) would have these Extravagancies accounted Roman Traditions; that, The Church is overgrown with this poisonous Morality; that, (i) It is ready to be overwhelmed with the deluge of these Corruptions; that, The Church is filled with this most palpable darkness. Elsewhere they seem to fixe this Charge upon the Jesuits principally, as if they would have it thought not to reach much further; but withal tell us, that the Jesuits (k) are the most numerous and the most powerful body of men in the whole Church, and have the disposal of the Consciences of all the greatest. So that I can represent them no worse, than some of themselves do; and the worst that can be said, falls by their own acknowledgment, upon the most considerable part of their Church. That they should so far accuse the whole, cannot be expected (whatever occasion there be for it) so long as they think fit to continue in its Communion. But then, if we regard those who are so great a part of that Church upon the account of their numbers, and more

(i) Ibid.

(f) Ibid. p. 12.

(g) Provincial Letters, Jesuits Morals.

(h) Remonstrance of Curez of Paris.

(i) Answer maintaining the Façum.

(k) Ibid.

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in respect of their Authority and Influences the *Maxime* so branded, (1) are *Roman Traditions*; (2) the true *Doctrine of Faith*, the true *Morality of the Church*, not asserted by that Society alone; but equally (if not more) by *Catholick Writers of all sorts*; and those that quarrel therewith, are *factions spirits*. Herby so far as the testimony of *Adversaries* against themselves can clear a matter in question, there is evidence, both that the *Practical Doctrine* amongst them is pernicious and damnable; and also that it is common and generally followed.

I intend not here to impeach any *Maxime* peculiar to the *Jesuites*, but that *Doctrine* of the *Romanists* which is far more extensive, delivered by *Canonists* and *Divines* *Secular* and *Regular* of every sort, and in part by the *Canon Law* and their *Councils* (who sometimes glance at this Subject, though they make it not their business;) that which in most particulars, and those of greatest moment, is *ancient* than the *Society*; and in many points such, as the *Censurers* of the *Jesuites* *Morality* do not touch, but either approve themselves, or dare not condemn, lest they should involve the whole Church in the *Condemnation*. I cannot discern that the *Practical Divinity* of the *Jesuites* is more corrupt, than that of other *Romish Writers*, their *Contemporaries*. And those that view the *Moral Discourses* of both, and compare them, will (if I much mistake not) discern no other. I never yet met with any *Author* of that *Order*, so intolerably licentious, but might be matched, if not out-vied by others: there is no need to except *Escribar* or *Benny* (though most branded) nor do their keen *Antagonists* do it,

(1) Supra.

(2) *Defence of the Factum.*

(Rom.)

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when they speak of others, whom they know to be no Jesuits (n) as the most extravagant that ever were. There is no reason why the *Odium* which a Community incurs, should be appropriated to a party: nor that the *Society* only should be noted as the sinck, when the corruption is apparent every where. So far as the *Jesuits* are concerned herein, it hath been sufficiently exposed by others; upon which account I decline those of that *Order*, not putting the Reader, to rely upon any Evidence from their Writing. Onely because it is requisite to shew their concurrence in some Points, which otherwise might not pass for the Common Doctrine, I make use of *Bellarmino* freely (whom none can count a Corrupter of Popery, however Christianity hath been treated by him:) and of *Suarez* sometimes (whose Judgment alone is counted equivalent to a thousand others, by some (o) that are none of the Society.) I alledge beside; though rarely, one or two more of those *Fathers*, of like eminency and authority, in that Church: but none of them, save in such points wherein they have not been noted for extravagancies by others; or in such wherein those of other *Orders* concur with, or go beyond them. The greatest advantage I make of them, is, to represent the opinions of others, not their own; and most herein of *Suarez*, who usually gives an account of the *Common Doctrine* out of unexceptionable *Authors*. Those whom I principally rely on to make good the Charge, are the ancients and better sort of their Divines and Casuists (the strictest of them in points of Morality that I could meet with) such as are so far from being Disciples of *Ignatius*, that most of them are *Dominicans*

(n) Remonstrance of the Curez of Paris.

(o) Vid. Jo. Sanc. Disp. 44. n. 46.

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(most opposite of all *Orders* to the *Jesuits*, and said to be the least tainted with these Corruptions) and the greatest part of them were *Writers* before their *Order* was founded, or appeared to the World on this Subject. To these I have added other *Casuits* of this last Age, not that there is need to produce any worse than the former, but to shew that time hath made little or no alteration amongst them for the better.

The *Romanists* when they are ashamed of their Doctrine, or think the World will cry shame of it, are wont to *disown* it. It is like they may do so here, and tell us that these points not being determined by Councils, are not the Doctrine of their Church, but the opinions of particular Doctors. This serves them for a shift in other cases with some colour, but it will be absurd to offer at it here. For though this be not *their Doctrine of Faith*, which with some generals most about the Sacraments (reflected on in the sequel as there is occasion) is the business of their *Councils*: yet it is the *Practical Doctrine* of their Church, if it have any, and if they think their *Catholicks* concerned to be *Christians* more than meerly in opinion. And this under several Heads, I have collected out of such Writings, as are the proper place of it. Therefore to say that this is not the Doctrine of their Church, because the particulars are not found decided by Councils, is to tell us, that they are not charged with it, unless we can find it, where they know it cannot be found, and where with any reason, it cannot be looked for. It is no more reasonable, than if one who hath taken a purse, should plead, though it be found in his hand, that he is not to be charged with it, unless we can spy it in his mouth, when yet he never opens it. That Councils should give particular Directions for Conscience and Practice, in Cases

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innumerable, was never attempted, nor ever can be expected. Their Church leaves this to her Divines and Casuists; and that nothing may pass them but what is agreeable to her sense, no Books are to be published, but with the approbation and authority of such as are counted competent Judges hereof. So that the Doctrine of their authorized Writers, that especially wherein they commonly agree, is the *Practical Doctrine* of that Church, or else she hath none such, and consequently no care of the lives and consciences of her Members. And though this be not Infallible, or *de fide*, as they count the Decisions of Councils; yet is it as certain they say, as the nature of the subject requires; nor do they pretend to have any infallible Doctrine, for particular directions herein. Which yet may justly seem very strange to any man that considers that gross faults in Life and Practice are more infallibly damnable than errors in Faith and Speculation. Now upon this their Common Doctrine the substance of the Charge ensuing, and the principal articles thereof are grounded. As for the opinions of particular Doctors, wherein there is no such common concurrence, though they be not so certain as the other, yet they are (even the worst of them) *safe* in practice; any of their people may follow them without danger, and with a good conscience: for this (as will appear hereafter) is the common judgement of their Schools and Doctors, and so far the Doctrine of their Church. And if that Church did no farther own these opinions, common or particular, then under this character, this is enough for our purpose (when the question is of the danger of Popery in reference to mens Salvation) that she counts such rules of life *safe*, and publickly allows them as directions for practice, which tend to ruin Religion and mens Souls. If they were not counted *safe*, that Church which pretends

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to so much care of Souls, since all in her Communion are exposed to the *Danger*, would be concerned to give warning of it, and brand these *Maxims* as pernicious: but this was never yet done, nor ever like to be. These opinions, all, or the greatest part of them; were taught and published in that Church, before the *Council of Trent*, there was time enough in Eighteen years, to take cognizance of them and their pernicious consequence: Yet when they bestowed *Anathema's* so liberally, where there was occasion (and for the most part) where there was none; they thought not fit to bestow one *Curse* upon these Doctrines, how execrable so ever: yea some part thereof of worse consequence, had there an expresse Confirmation. Their Popes since, though they could see occasion to condemn such Propositions as the Five ascribed to *Jansenius*, and those of *Bains*, *White*, and many others: could not, by the help of a judgement counted infallible, discern any thing in the worst of these Doctrines, worthy of or fit for their Censure. The *Cardinals* of the *Inquisition* at *Rome*, and their *Setters* in other Countries, whose business it is to spie whatever (in Books particularly) is against *Faith* and *Good Manners*; see nothing of this nature in that which destroys both. No *Expurgatory Index* (what havock soever has been made by those Tools in their best Authors) hath, so far as I have observed, touched the Common Opinions here exposed. It's true, some others have been expunged, and I find above Forty Opinions of the late *Casuits* censured by *Alexander the Seventh*, and the Cardinals of their *Sacred Congregation* (p): but hereby more authority is added to those I in-

(p) Index Expurg. sub Alexand. VII. An. 1666.

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sist on; being thought good enough to pass untouched: which must therefore be counted sound Doctrine and *safe* for Practice in the Judgment of their *Virtual Church*, and the chief parts of their Church *Representative*.

There is no ground to expect that this Doctrine, as to the principal and most pernicious parts of it, will ever be condemned by any *Popes* or *Councils* of such Complexion and Principles as that of *Trent*, where it was a *Maxime* observed religiously, that no Determination should pass, which either in matter or form, would disoblige any considerable *Party* among them, *much less* all: the *Roman* interest is supported by such Politicks, and must be secured whatever become of Souls or Saving Doctrine. There are indeed some Dissenters amongst them (as there are elsewhere) who *complain* of their *Moral Divinity*; but they are such, whose power and interest, can reach little further than *Complaints*; and these are so far from being the Voice or Sense of their Church, that their Writings which exhibite such Complaints, are condemned at *Rome* (q) by the Supreme Tribunal (as they call it) of the Inquisition.

In short, by the known Custom and settled Order of the *Roman Church*, the people for regulating of their Hearts and Lives, are to be directed by their *Confessors*, their Confessors have their direction herein from their *Casuits* and Practical Authors: both Priests and People must believe this to be *safe*; because the Church hath made this provision for them, approves the course, and obligeth them to take no other. And thus that Doctrine, the deadly Venome whereof I here discover, must be conveyed from their *Casuits* to

(q) ib d.

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all sorts amongst them; nor must they fear any danger in it, unless they will question the wisdom and goodness of their Church. There can be no question, but that this Doctrine is thus far owned by the Church of *Rome*, whether it be delivered fallibly or infallibly, by Councils or without, is not at all here considerable: It is enough that such is the Conduct provided for Roman Catholics, and that it is to be followed without apprehension of danger, and cannot be declined by those that will keep the ordinary road of that Church, though it lead directly to destruction.

When no other shift will serve, to hinder those from being undeceived whom they would delude, it is usual with them, to make loud out-cries of false Citations, and that their Doctrine is misrepresented. I have been very careful to give no just occasion for this, being apprehensive that he who doth it, wrongs not them more than he doth himself and his Cause. The places cited I have viewed again and again, where there might be any doubt of misconstruction; and set down their own words where it might seem scarce credible that Christians and Divines (directing Conscience) should speak at such a rate; and where that would have been too tedious, have given their *sense* faithfully, so far as I could discern it, and directed the Reader where he may find and judge thereof himself. Yet, if notwithstanding all the care and diligence I could use, it hath been my unhappiness, any where to mistake them, upon notice from any I shall do them right: and am capable to give them further satisfaction, knowing well, that I am yet far from representing their Doctrine fully so bad as it is. Large Volumes might be fill'd with the corruptions of it, I have but pointed at some; and contented my self with few Authors in many particulars, where plenty might have been produced.

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ced. I designed briefness, and have waded much that was ready, lest I should be tedious: considering that some who are most concerned in such Discourses, will have nothing at all, when they think too much is offered.

I have been less solicitous about the Style, it doth not alwayes satisfie my self, so that I can allow others to finde fault with it: It may be thought sometimes *less grave*, elsewhere too *sharp* and *vehement*. I suffered it to be, what the Subject would have it; and the quality thereof now and then over-ruled me, somewhat against my own inclination. Onely I make nothing ridiculous, but find it so, and should scarce do it right, if I represented it otherwise than it is. Where I seem too sharp or severe upon any occasion, I found something in the nature of the Subject that forced me to it. And it is not easie (if it be congruous or just) to speak of what is monstrously extravagant, or pernicious, with such calmness as we treat indifferent things.

It will be enough for me, if (through Gods blessing) people will hereby be brought to understand, that *Papery* designs not to trouble them, either with the *reality* of Religion, or the happiness which Christ has intailed thereon. And that their *Practical Doctrine* is contrived accordingly, will, I doubt not, be hereby manifest to all such as have a mind to see, and are not willfully resolved to lose the way to Salvation, and their souls together, by shutting their eyes against so plain a discovery of so great a danger.

T H E

THE CONTENTS:

CHAP. I.



The Doctrine of the Romanists it is not needful to worship God really, in publick or private. True Religion will have God to be worshipped really. Real worship requires the concurrence of mind and heart. In their Divine Service they require no act of the Will, but an Intention beforehand to attend their service is enough, though they be not Attentive when they are at it. An intention to worship God there is scarce needful. Their intention may be effectual, though they act contrary to it. They may employ both Soul and Body about other things when they are at their Prayers. The act of the mind which they seem to require is Attention; but this need not be either Spiritual or Rational; So that they need not mind God in their Prayers, nor the things to be prayed for, nor the sense of the words they use; but only the pronouncing of them, nor need they actually mind that. The Churches holiness supplies their Defects, and makes those pass as such that pray devoutly, who pray not at all. All due Attention in Worship is not only unnecessary, but impossible in their way. As Attention, so inward Reverence and Devotion likewise is not necessary in their Service. Hereby their Worship is no better than a Prophane irreligious exercise; They seem satisfied with less Worship for God, than for their Images, Sect. 1. to page 27.

In the Mass by their Doctrine God may be less minded, than in their Canonical hours, where they tell us he need not be minded at all. No inward Worship requisite in the Mass. It is enough if their attendance there be but an humane act. Nay the use either of Sense or Reason is not there required. They may busie themselves in other employments

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while they are at Mass. They may sleep a while, or laugh if they be not too loud. Or talk of their worldly affairs all the while say some; others would not have their Discourse so serious: yea it may be immodest without transgressing the Precept. And lascivious or very prophane Tunes to the Organ at Mass may be a small fault. The Precept for Mass (the chief part of their Religion) may be fulfilled by mortal wickedness, Sect. 2. page 37.

Of their ends in Worship; They may lawfully Worship God for their own ends. Sin may be their end in Worshipping, and that without sin, if not principally intended. It is but a small fault to Worship God principally for vain Glory. He that comes to Mass or Prayer with a design to satisfy his Lust, or other mortal wickedness, satisfies the command of the Church, Sect. 3. to page 43.

How unnecessary Preaching is counted in their Church, and bearing the word in such circumstances, where it would be accounted needful, if ever, Sect. 4. to page 45.

In their Sacraments no good motions or actual dispositions (such as are necessary in real Worshippers) are required by that Church in any that Administer or partake thereof. This shewed as to Baptism and Penance the Sacraments for the Dead. Also in the other five for the living. In all, the precepts of the Church may be fully accomplished by impious and wicked acts, Sect. 5. & 6. to page 48.

Even as to the Eucharist (for which they profess they have the highest veneration) they may partake worthily, who are without any the least good act of mind or heart. And to shut out good motions from their Souls, on set purpose, when they are communicating, is but a venial fault; such as will not binder the effects of the Sacrament. Those vagaries which are inconsistent with Attention and Reverence, if they be not taken notice of, will be no fault at all; if they be deliberate, will but be slight ones. Not only Reverence and Devotion are accounted needless at this Sacrament; but Sobriety and the use of Reason. To communicate out of ostentation and vain glory is but a peccadillo. And all holy fervor being excluded by voluntary distraction; to employ their Souls vainly or wickedly, during the Celebration is no fault at all, in reference to the Sacrament. Those that communicate unworthily, to such a degree as is counted most horridly impious; do fully satisfy the precept of their Church for the Communion, Sect. 7. to page 52.

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Private Prayer rarely a duty with some, never a duty with others. Not at all by their common Doctrine, but by accident, in the Article of necessity, which many never meet with: so that many may never pray while they live, and yet be innocent. Some say there is no Divine precept for Prayer; Others who acknowledg a precept, will not have it oblige them, at such times and occasions when, if ever, it would oblige. Even in their Article of necessity when it comes, they have ways to excuse them easily from the obligation, and to make it no special sin to neglect this duty all their life, Sect. 10. to page 59.

Their Church obliges not any to private prayers, not to the least, or those of most account among them. When ever they use private prayer upon any account, as required by precept, or enjoined for penance (for Prayer passes commonly with them as a punishment), or voluntary as a work of Supererogation: there is no need by their principles to worship God therein. Seeing they are to Worship him no more any where, the World may judge what Religion they have; since that Worship is as essential to Religion, as a Soul to a man, Sect. 11. & 12. to page 63.

CHAP. II.

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They need not know what they are to believe. The knowledg of all the Articles of the small Creed, nor of the Trinity, and incarnation of Christ, scarce necessary for all Christians. Ignorance and error in points of faith may not only be innocent, but meritorious, Sect. 2. to page 72.

They need not know what they are to do. They may merit Heaven by following their Leaders out of the way. That's the most compleat and perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledg and judgment, when they obey their Leaders, as a Beast doth his owner, Sect. 3. to page 76.

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The knowledg of the Scriptures (to which their Doctrin^e and Worship is confessed to be repugnant) unnecessary in a manner for all sorts ; not only for the People and Monasticks, but their Confessors and Preachers. Their Bishops afraid to look into the Bible, lest it should make them Hereticks. Therefore very few of their Bishops in the Council of Trent (who decreed so many new Articles of faith) had knowledg in Theology. Their Popes commonly no Divines , many of them understood not Latine, though not only their Church-service and Laws, but their authentique Edition of the Scripture be confined to that Language. The People the further they are from knowledg the more excusable ; if they take no care nor pains to get it, Sect. 4. to page 87.

C H A P. III.

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How needless the Elicite acts of this love are. Some hold there is no command for this actual love (any inward act of it) that binds them, or no special command. Others who acknowledg a precept, will not have it to bind them upon any occasion, when, if ever, it would oblige. Not when they have sinn'd against him. Not when he expresses his love. Not when he discovers his infinite Excellencies to them. Not when they are to worship him. Not at any Sacrament, no not the Eucharist. It is too much to love God once a Week, or once a Year, or once in four or Five Years. One act of love once in a life may be enough ; yea and more than needs too, for when that time comes (if ever it come) when they will have any obliged to an act of love ; yet they then assign something else, which will serve instead of it, and so render it needless still. A love which is the issue of nature unsanctified may suffice. Or to love God less than other things, only more than mortal crimes, may be enough. Or to do nothing against this love, though there be no acts of it or from it, may be sufficient. Or external acts may satisfie. Or if a man believes that he loves God above all, though indeed he daes not,
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it may serve the turn. Or Attrition (which includes something repugnant to this love) with their Sacrament of Confession, may excuse him from loving of God at the point of death; though he never once loved him in his life before. How extremely pernicious and ridiculous this their Doctrine is, Sect. 3. & 4. to page 109.

C H A P. IV.

By their Doctrine no faith is necessary, but that which is neither justifying nor saving. That which they will have necessary for the ignorant is what they call implicit. A faith which they may have without actually believing any one Article of the Christian faith. And is consistent with the belief of what is quite opposite to the Christian belief. And is but such a faith as Jews, Turks, and Pagans have. This was not thought sufficient for Christians, till they were thought something like Asses, and so expressed by some of their great Saints and Doctors. How many ways they have to exempt the people from the obligation of all precepts for any other than this brutish faith, Sect. 1. to page 114.

The faith requisite in the more intelligent to justify them they call explicit. This, as described by them in its object, includes things uncertain impertinent, false, impossible, and ridiculous, as points that must be certainly believed unto justification. This of it self (as themselves say) deserves not the name of a vertue, is an idle dead thing, may be found in the worst of men, and in the Devils too. Yet it is with them the Christian, the Catholick faith, Sect. 2. to page 116.

They see no great necessity of faith. The Pope (the Head of their Church) needs it not. And the Body may make a shift without it, if any one among all the Members have it but. And one act of it in a whole life may serve. The ruder sort may be help'd to this act (which will serve once for all) by making the sign of the Cross, as their grave Divines direct them, Sect. 3. to page 119.

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CHAP. V.

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For mortal sins some teach there is no Divine command to Repent. And so to live and dye impenitently, will be no Transgression. No need of it any way, either as a duty injoy'n'd, or as a Medium, Sect. 3. to page 125.

Others who confess there is a command for it, will not have it oblige any sinner presently. No sin nor danger to defer Repentance. Nor will they have it needful at such times and occasions, which, if any, would be the necessary seasons for it. Not at solemn times of Worship. Not on days of fasting. Not when visited with great calamities. Not when sins are brought to their Remembrance. Not when they address themselves to their Sacraments, no not that of Penance, Sect. 4. & 5. to page 131.

No need to Repent till one be at the point of death. Nor is it so needful then, or any time before, but something else may serve without it. A Repentance without any sensible sorrow for, or actual resolution against sin is sufficient. Or a penitence merely natural may suffice. Or a slight remorse in the lowest degree possible, one act of it, dispatch'd in an instant, and never repeated, will be enough. Or if a man conceive that he truly repents, though really he does not, this may serve the turn. Or if he know that he does not repent sufficiently, yet if he signify that he would grieve more, and is sorry that he does not, this will be effectual. Or attrition with the Sacrament will unquestionably justify him. Attrition with them far distant from true Repentance. Several sorts of it. Any of them seem sufficient by the Council of Trent. The general concurrence of their Divines for the sufficiency of Attrition; yet the best sort of it confessed to be morally evil, Sect. 6. & 7. to page 144.

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When they have excluded true Repentance by Attrition, they reduce Attrition to nothing; yet will have it still sufficient. The least servile dislike of sin in the lowest degree, though it be gone in a moment, though it be merely natural, is enough. Or if there be but a dislike, that this dislike is wanting. Or a willingness to have it, in those who have it not. Or a mans thinking probably that he hath it, when he hath it not. Or a willingness without it to receive the Sacrament, will serve the turn. Yea even without their Sacrament of Penance, Attrition with the Eucharist; or extreme unction, or the Mass, or without any Sacrament at all, may procure pardon. What ways Attrition may secure them, when they cannot have a Priest, or the Rites proper to Priests, while they live, or after they are dead without them, Sect. 8. to page 148.

This Doctrine which makes saving faith, love to God, and true Repentance needless, is established by the Council of Trent. Their Sacrament of Penance hath no ground in the Word of God. And being taught to depend on it for pardon, and to neglect the things of most necessary importance to salvation; it proves a most damning Imposture. Their Doctrine thus making Repentance needless, plainly destroys Christianity, debauches the Lives, and ruins the Souls of sinners. And is one of the most pernicious Heresies, that ever was broached, Sect. 9. 10. & 11. to page 152.

C H A P. VI.

THeir Doctrine leaves no necessity of Holiness of life. It is enough to denominate their universal Church holy, if there be but one holy man in it. One act of charity, the least of all, may make one a holy man. Other Maxims of this tendency. How they destroy the necessity of holy life, by making it needless to exercise virtue, and avoid sin, Sect. 1. to page 154.

How they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary in general, more particularly hope (one of the three Divine virtues) fares no better, than faith and love. They leave themselves no good ground of hope. Their hope a Conjecture, founded upon a delusion. The precept for hope obliges not, but in the more grievous assaults of despair. So that not one of a Thousand in Popery need have any hope in God. No

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not any, since the command for it may be satisfied by other acts, Sect. 2. & 3. page 157.

Their Doctrine leaves no room for, no ground of Humility, no sense of sinfulness, weakness, unworthiness. 'Tis pregnant with Pride and Arrogance, Sect. 4. to page 159.

Brotherly love unnecessary by their Doctrine. No need of love to any, unless in necessity. Nor then, though the necessity be extreme, if we help them, though not out of Christian love. This extended not only to external, but spiritual necessities. If the acts whereby we should relieve their Souls be neglected, it may pass for a small fault. Those who have no Christian love, if they believe they have it, may be excused from sin. No precept requires any special act of love to our Brethren. No affirmative command for such love. 'Tis enough that we do nothing against them, Sect. 5. to page 162.

In destroying the necessity of those radical Graces instanced in before, they root out the rest. Particularly those that depend upon love to God, viz. Delight in God, desires to enjoy him, hatred of sin, sorrow for it as an offence to God, and filial fear. By their common Doctrine there's no special command for any fear of God. So that the want of all fear of God, filial or servile, is no special sin. Since they need not act out of love, they exempt themselves from all acts truly Christian, and any other Christianity than honest Heathenism. All exercise of virtues opposite to acts accounted but venially evil, is with them needless. The monstrous consequences of this, Sect. 6, 7. & 8. to page 164.

A special expedient, whereby they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary, is their turning the commands of God into Counsels, such as need not be observed. Such they count many of those excellent rules in Christ's Sermon on the Mount. These and many others specified. More instances in virtues, which concern our selves, God and others, in acts of temperance and contentment, in acts of Religion, and in acts of Righteousness and Mercy. Also Mortification, crucifying the World, self-denial, taking up the Cross and all growth in grace is but matter of Counsel. So is every degree of grace, above the lowest of all. Yea all commands for good acts are no more than Counsels, but only in the article of necessity. And all acts that have more than moral goodness. And all actions in a virtuous manner, and from a good principle. Exercise of virtue not necessary either in Worship, or common
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conversation. Not in those cases, where, if in any at all it would be needful. A way they have for any man to turn whatever precept pinches him, into a Counsel. There is no danger, nor any sin at all in rejecting the counsel of God. No not when Conscience dictates that it is good to follow them. No nor when God further calls thereto by inspirations or motions of his Spirit. They may be neglected out of Contempt. And with some abhorrence of them. They may boast and glory in such neglects. They may bind themselves by Oaths not to observe Gods Counsels. Sect. 9. to page 181.

No exercise of vertue necessary, but only during the Pope's pleasure, for if he should forbid vertue (as he hath done already in diverse instances) the Church would be bound to believe those vertues to be evils and so to avoid them. Further, their Doctrine encourages the continual practice of such wickedness, as is inconsistent with all holiness of life, reduced to three heads. Sect. 10. to page 183.

C H A P. VII.

MAny hainous crimes are vertues, or necessary duties with them. Their Blasphemies waived, because insisted on by others. Also a great part of their Idolatry. Their Plea in excuse of this Crime, from the distinction of terminative and transient worship, removed by their own Doctrine formerly opened. Sect. 1. to page 185.

Their Idolatry as to Relicks. These are to be Religiously worshipped, though many of them be ridiculous and loathsome, though many Thousands be confessed to be counterfeit, and great and detestable impostures be therein acknowledged. To worship false Relicks, or the Devil upon a mistaken belief, is meritorious. What worshipful things miscarriages in the Mass furnish them with, Sect. 2. to page 188.

They give Divine worship to Relicks, though they give it not the name. They give both name and thing expressly to vast multitudes. All which they count Relicks of Christare to have Christs honour. Among these they reckon all thidgs that were near him, or touched him on earth, even theearth, water, stones, &c. Not only the things, but persons that touched him, thereby become his Relicks, and are to have his worship. The Virgin Mary expressly, and Thousands more may have it by the same

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reason, they will not absolutely except the *Ass* on which he rode. Yea all be Relicks of such persons may have it. For they commonly teach that the Relicks may have the same worship with the person, whose they are. The best of their Relicks impostures, that which passes for the foreskin of Christ, his Shirt, Coat, Blood, the Crown of Thorns, Lance, Nails, Cross, and its Liquor. Their Relicks numerous beyond account. How they came to be so, their own Authors tell us. The Devil furnished their Church with some of them, and crafty knaves with others. Yet their whole Religion in a manner consists in worshipping such things as these, as some of themselves tell us. Sect. 3. to page 203.

Perjury necessary by their Doctrine. If a Prince swear solemnly not to prosecute his supposed heretical subjects; unless he break his Oath, he is in danger to be damned. No faith to be kept with Hereticks. Their Doctrine ruins all securities that Popish Princes, or Subjects can give to Protestants. These can with prudence trust to nothing, but what will keep them out of the Papal reach. Sect. 4. to page 205.

Robbery and Murder as necessary a Duty. To deprive Hereticks of Estate or life a meritorious act. All Papists Princes, or others, are bound in Conscience by that which is most obliging in their Religion, utterly to root out all they account Hereticks, and to seize on all they have. A decree of a general Council for it, which encourages the execution with promises of the greatest rewards, and enforces it with threatnings of most dreadful import. They must not be counted Catholics, unless they do it. It hath been effected or attempted in all Countreys where the Papists had power to do it, or but thought that they had it. The reason why they do it not in England and some other places, is, as themselves declare, because they have not yet power enough. Sect. 5. to page 210.

Sorcery and Conjurat[i]on part of their Religion. This manifested in their Sacramentals, where, by their own rules there is a tacit invocation of the Devil. Their excuses here insufficient. Even their mode of praying too like conjuring. Sect. 6. to page 215.

The chief act of their Religion is to destroy Christ, by Sacrificing him daily in the Mass, which they maintain they do truly and really. Sect. 7. to page 220.

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C H A P. VIII.

THeir Doctrine tends to destroy holiness of life, by encouraging the continual practice of all sort of wickedness under the notion of venials. *What hatred of God. What acts of Infidelity and Idolatry. What distrustful cares. What irreligiousness in all Religious exercises. What use of Witches. Or dealing with the Devil. VVhat irreverence towards God in adjuration.* Sect. 1. to page 213.

What impious Swearing, almost at every word. In horrid terms. Without offering to break off this ungodly custome. Binding themselves by Oaths, and threatening God, that they will sin against him. And never comply with his will, in things which he commends to them as most excellent. What fraudulent Oaths. What Perjuries of all sorts, both as to assertory and promissory Oaths, not worse for being most frequent and customary, Sect. 2. to page 221.

What Blasphemies. Out of levity, passion, or inconsiderateness. Or from wicked custome, and contempt of a mans own Salvation. The more habitual and customary Blaspheming is the better, Sect. 3. to page 223.

What Prophaning of holy time. Where it is manifest, that little or nothing at all of Religion need be made Conscience of amongst them; even at the only time set apart for the acts and exercises of it, Sect. 4. to page 228.

What irreverence in Children to Parents. They may be ashamed of them. And curse them as Parents may curse them again. VVhat unaffectionateness. They may desire the death of their Parents for some outward advantage. Or by accusations procure their death. VVhat disobedience in all things out of negligence or sensuality. And in matters of greatest importance as to this life. Or in matters which concern their Salvation. Parents have no right to oblige their Daughters not to be VVhores, Sect. 5. to page 231.

VVhat Murder of Soul or Body. As to acts inward and outward. VVhat hatred. VVhat outrageous anger. VVhat revenge. Desires of the death, not only of Enemies, but nearest Relations, because they are poor, or not handsome, may be innocent. Actual killing them without deliberation is no fault; when not fully deliberated (when ordinarily

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many things may binder it from being so) is but little worse , Sect. 6. to page 233.

What uncleanness. Fornication in its own nature not evil with some. Adultery one of the lesser sins. To seek or receive hire for whoredom scarce a fault, even in a Nun. The conjugal act before marriage venial. And also to lye with one contracted privately, after a publick contract with another. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force, need not cry out, nor make any resistance, but may take natural pleasure in the act. How excused when drawn to it by courtship. Those who are disposed to Fornication may innocently be invited to it. Self pollution may be desired or delighted in as past or future for a good end. To venture upon the occasions. To use hot, provoking meats. Carnal touches. To expose themselves to place, company, sights, perswasions, opportunities that are insnaring. To use filthy discourse, or a tempting garb, all venial, Sect. 7. to page 238.

What Stealing in all sorts, Children, Servants, Wives. Mortal theft is so stated that they may make it venial when they please. They may steal little or much. Of these many instances. What cheating in false measures. Or the quality, or substance of what they sell. They may promote the cheat with lies, or worse. And defraud those who intrust them. Their Church-laws allow cozening, so it be but as to half of the worth of the commodity, Sect. 8. to page 245.

What lying. They may lye merrily and do it customarily out of mere pleasure in telling lyes, yea out of malice. They may lye when ever it will be for their advantage, if it do no great mischief, or they do but think so. To tell lyes for their Religion is piety. No sort of lyes mortal but by accident, when they do great mischief, as speaking the truth may do. Nor in many cases when they do such mischief. They may use lyes in commerce, and confirm them with Oaths, both together. may be but venial. Also in Courts of judicature. How both judg and witnesses may lye there. They may bear false witness in favour of one another. They may delude the Court by equivocation or mental reserves. Even a Priest may swear he knowes nothing of what he has heard in confession, with this reserve, he knows it not as man, but as God. They have lyes in their Divine Office. Abundance of such stuff or worse is confessed to be there. Nor would they have all purged out, lest none of their old service should be left. They may tell lyes in the Pulpit. But some of them

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them would have such rank ones avoided as the hearers may smell out. They may do it even in Confession, and delude the Priest with lyes in much variety. And he may delude them likewise, pretending that he absolves them, when he neither doth it nor intends it. Since they have such liberty to lye every where when can they be trusted? Sect. 9. to page 259.

What perfidiousness venial. How they may be perfidious for delight, or advantage. They may make promises outwardly, without intention to be obliged. Yea they may deny with Oaths too, that they promised. Internal promises though made in the form of a vow, or with an Oath added, oblige them not. How easily they may excuse the worst perfidiousness. The firmest promises bind not, but under venial guilt, unless they be in writing, or with an Oath. Nor then if they intended not thereby to be obliged; Sect. 10. to page 264.

What Hypocrisie. To make false shews of Sanctity for a good end is no sin. Bare Hypocrisie venial, though one delight to play the Hypocrite. Yet when it is for a bad end, though the fault be doubled 'tis venial still. They reverence Hypocrisie as a holy art. 'Tis amongst the commendations of their great Saints, and recommended by them to their Religious. If they feign more holiness than they have, to edifie others, 'tis rather meritorious then faulty. Their Church much concerned for the honour of Hypocrisie, Sect. 11. to page 268.

What Calumniation. How many ways they have to ruine the Reputation of others without mortal guilt. Amongst others, if one speak ill of them or their Church, though truly, they may charge him with false crimes. A small fault for one to defame himself, Sect. 12. to page 271.

What Flatteries venial. To praise one for the virtues he never had, or the good he never did. Yea to applaud him for his sins, to gain something by such flatteries. Cursing may be their usual practice. It is scarce any fault, when used for honest Recreation, Sect. 13. to page 273.

What capital sins are with them venial. All covetousness unless injustice be added. Yea and with injustice too. They allow them to gain unrighteously. They may gain out of excessive desire of Lucre, and make it their principal end, and turn it into a Trade. They need not restore what they win by unlawful or what they call Diabolical games. But the loser may steal it from him that wins. Or refuse to pay, though he have sworn to do it, his Oath may be easily dispensed with. They may

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may take hire for acting the most abominable wickedness or unjust judgment, or false depositions, or murder, or consulting with the Devil. But then they must be sure to do the fact. No restitution to the poor a duty. Hard heartedness and unmercifulness to the poor venial. Pure Prodigality a less fault than covetousness, though this be next to none, Sect. 14. to page 280.

All Pride venial, but such as is scarce to be found in the Christian World. The numerous issue of this Queen of mortal sins (as they stile it) to which they are so favourable. To ascribe what they receive from God to their own merits, is confessed to be mortal pride; yet they make it part of their Creed. Arrogance commonly a venial fault, Sect. 15. to page 283.

Ambition venial, unless one would be honoured for a crime, or counted a God, Sect. 16. to page 284.

Vain glory regularly a venial, it imports nothing contrary to the love of God or man. It may be their principal end in all things ordained for the honour of God. Otherwise their whole Clergy, they say, would be in a dangerous condition. They may take livings and spiritual promotions principally for honour, or temporal profit. So we have an account, why they may make Religion, all along, subservient to a worldly interest, Sect. 17. to page 287.

Loathing of Spiritual and Divine things venial, unless it be on such an account as rarely happens. All in a manner that is requisite for a true Christian may be abhorred without mortal guilt. Rancour and indignation against any, who would draw them to spiritual, and Divine things, a venial, Sect. 18. to page 290.

Anger though extravagant and revengeful may be venial. That more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do and be innocent. Disdain of others. Audaciousness; immoderate fear; or wrath. Fool hardiness. Incontinent desires, and lust. Love of the flesh or the World, venial. Envy scarce any worse, Sect. 19. to page 293.

Intemperance comprising Gluttony and Drunkenness in its own nature a venial. When they play the Epicures like Dives and resolve to give up their whole life to Gluttonous pleasures, it is but near to a mortal sin. When it proceeds to beastliness, and the Glutton so burdens nature that 'tis forced to ease it self, by vomiting, or other nasty loathsome ways, it is still venial. When he eats, till he vomit on purpose, that he may be ready

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ready to eat again, it is no worse. Drinking till the house in the Drunkards fancie run round, is venial. Nor will it be worse till reason be totally drowned. The rare vertues of Drunkenness, compleat drunkenness will make any wickedness, then acted to be no sin at all. And half-drunkenness will make it to be but a venial, Sect. 20. to page 297.

The multitude of particular crimes which issue from these seven Capitals need not be taken notice of as mortal. They have no warrant from Scripture to count any sin venial. Yet they venture to reduce to this account what the law of God forbids, not only when it is of less, but greatest importance. To make a sin mortal requires so very much, that the sinner may easily miss some of it, and so venture upon it, without fear that it is deadly. This declared particularly. They shew them a Way to pass any mortal crime, as venial. How they represent venials as so very harmless, that all have encouragement enough to practise them continually all their life, and even when they are dying. Though some few of them may make any look like Monsters, in the judgment of a sober Pagan, Sect. 21. to page 305.

CHAP IX.

They conclude many crimes (inconsistent with holiness of life) to be no sins at all, and so warrant all to live in the practice of them.

Some particulars of this nature before insisted on, here only pointed at. It is no sin to quench the motions of Gods Spirit, drawing them to the observance of his Will, any way. Yet may they invite others to wickedness when they are ready for it. They may lawfully deal with the Devil divers ways, Sect. 1. to page 306.

It is sufficient to pray with the mouth, without the heart, Sect. 2. to page 308.

How it is no sin to worship the utensils of worship. Or the word Jesus pronounced, or written. Or the accidents of Bread and Wine in the Eucharist. Or the picture of the Manger, Thorns, or Spear which touched Christ. Or the Ass he rode on, or the lips of Judas for kissing Christ, though to betray him. Or the imaginary blood of a Crucifix. Or to worship any person whatever as the image of God, or any other Creature in the World, Toad, Serpent, or a wisp of Straw. Or the
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- apparition of the Devil himself in a beam of light, or the form of a Crucifix, Sect. 3. to page 314.*
- Perjury no sin. When one takes an Oath and intends not to swear. Or swears and intends not to be obliged. Or swears in another sense, than he knows is intended in the Oath. So they may use equivocation, or mental restrictions in swearing. And think this lawful either to gain some advantage, or to avoid any damage. Many instances of such artifice of words or inward reserves, which they may use to elude Oaths. They may swear with such ambiguities or reserves, when they are swearing not to use them. No Oath can be contrived, which they may not thus elude, Sect. 4. to page 322.*
- The irreligion of the Roman Church palpable, in the observance required of the Lords Day, and others set a part for holy employments. When the people are discharged from Religious duties at other times, nothing is injoined them on these days, but presence at Mass. At Mass they need neither mind God nor Divine things. It would be no sin to employ themselves in servile works on these days, if it were but the custome. Nor to give them no observance at all after Mass. This may be dispatched before Sun rise. These days are not prophaned by any acts of wickedness. So that all the Religiousness which that Church requires of their Catholicks, when they make the best shew of it, is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery, Sect. 5. to page 328.*
- In reference to those whom they count Hereticks, all relatives are discharged from their respective duties, Subjects, Wives, Children, Servants, yea debtors too. It is no murder to kill a Heretick or those that are excommunicated, Sect. 6. to page 329.*
- Upon what occasion they may kill one another. A man may with impunity kill his Wife taken in Adultery, or his Daughter, or Sister, or his own Mother: and this though they be big with child. A woman married or unmarried being unlawfully got with child, may procure Abortion; not only to secure her life, but her state and credit. It is lawful to cut up an honest Mother quick, and she bound to procure it, that the child in her womb do not want Baptism. They may without sin kill any one assaulting them unjustly, not only to secure their life, but to avoid a wound or a blow (a Priest may do it while he is Celebrating) though the Aggressor be frantick or in drink, or asleep. Or though he have had intolerable provocation, and be the sufferer. They may kill an innocent*

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to escape themselves. They may kill one before he actually assaults them (though his Soul be like to perish with his life) if they know he is prepared for it , or does but design it. So the Adulteress may prevent her Husband, and kill him first, with the poison or weapon prepared for her. They may kill one to secure their Goods, or recover them, when they may be recovered in a legal way. Yea though they be of small value, worth but three or four Duckets, yea but one Crown or less. They may kill men for their Reputation. If he sees one approach to assault him he may kill him, rather than retire. A blow with a Cudgel, or a light Switch, yea or a box on the ear, is a just ground to kill him that gives it; yea or does but offer at it. They may kill men for ill language, though they allow it to be as common, as any they speak. Yea for an affront by mere signs, though he that gives such an affront runs for it. They speak favourably of Duels. But allow them to kill men more privily, and by surprise, when they impeach their Reputation publicly or privately; yea or do but threaten to do it. Jesuits scarce so extravagant here, as some of other Orders. If the civil law did but give so much liberty to murder, as their rules for Conscience, no man near them, could have security for his life, Sect. 7. to page 337.

How indulgent their doctrine is to uncleanness. They oblige them not to avoid such occasions of this sin by which they very frequently fall, unless they fall thereby in a manner alwayes. Diverse instances. What liberty they give to unclean thoughts. Obscene words. Lascivious writings. Filthy Songs. Such ditties sung to the Organ at Mass. Offered to God in the person of the Church for divine praises. This was the custome every where in Caietan's time, and since. As intolerable obscenity in their penitential confessions. What licence they give to use such things as provoke lust. Also to immodest touches, and shameful sights. No need to be resolute in resisting Temptations. How servants may minister to the lust of their Superiours. Actual whoredom hath excessive encouragement. The Pope builds Stews for prostitutes. They pay him a weekly tribute for liberty and accommodation to drive their Trade. This condemned as most abominable to God and man, even Barbarians: but the Pope consenting to it, it is no sin, not indecency for his holiness to be maintained by the hire of whores. Many things concluded by their Divines in favour of them. How punctual in deciding, at what rates all sorts of women may set

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themselves to sale. They oblige them not to restitution, but when their Religious make use of them, who are to have it gratis. Publick prostitutes compelled by law, to commit lewdness with any that will hire them. Hence the people (instructed in their Religion) know not that such Fornication is a sin. He that keeps a Concubine at home is not to be denyed the Communion. Nor will they oblige him to put her away, if that would impair his Estate, or Delight, or his Reputation, yea or hers either. It is enough if he promise not to sin with her, though he keep not promise. Adultery no sin in diverse cases. For the Clergy, Adultery, nor unnatural uncleanness not so much a sin as Marriage. Burning lust, innocent. Better to burn than to marry, whatever the Apostle with their Adversaries say. The admired chastity of their votaries consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by Marriage. Their Priests have been allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly Rent for it. And those were to pay it who took not the liberty, because they might. Votaries incur excommunication for laying aside their habit, but not if they lay it aside to commit Fornication more readily. Priests in no wise to be obliged by Oath to forsake their Concubines. Extremely few chaste, by their own confession, of those innumerable many that profess it. A Priest not to be deposed for Fornication, because there are very few not guilty. Priests who keep many Concubines not irregular. How they favour Sodomy. Married persons may practise much of it together. Their Clergy may add it to the uttermost, and be neither suspended, nor irregular, unless they make a Trade of it, and do that so publickly and notoriously, as they can scarce do (by their description hereof), if they had a mind to it. Mere mental Heresie a greater crime than Sodomy with them. Yea petty Thievery a more hainous sin, with some of them expressly, and in consequence with most. Sodomy hath ecclesiastical immunity. All sorts of Religious places amongst them, are Sanctuaries for Sodomites, all sorts of uncleanness having such free and favourable entertainment in their Church, no wonder if it be the sink of the Christian World, Sect. 8. to page 360.

It is no sin to take from Protestants or any counted Hereticks, all they have. All their Estates are confiscated immediately, before any Declarative sentence, from the first day of their pretended Heresie. Though the Papists make not seizure presently, yet those Hereticks are in the inter-
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rim responsible for the mean profits. And they cannot any way alienate or dispose of their Estates. All Wills, Sales, Contratts for this purpose are null and void. All may be taken from the purchaser, without restoring the price he paid. Children though R. Catholicks loose their portions. Liberty given to all to spoil and bereave them. All rules of righteousness which concern propriety are void here, Papists owe them no observance. 'Tis no sin to burn their houses. To deprive a Protestant Prince of his Throne. To draw his Subjects into War against him. To betray Garrisons to the Romanists. To pay us no debts. To detain what is deposited with them in trust. There can be no lawful Parliament among Protestants. No King. No Peers. No free-holders. No laws that are valid can be enacted. No Aids or Subsidies can be granted. The fundamentals of the government in England, and other such like Countreys, quite blown up by their principles, Sect. 9. to page 365.

'Tis no sin with them to bear false witness against Protestants, when their life or estate is concerned. Or to use fraud and deceit in bargains to cheat them of all they have. Or perfidiousness in promises, compacts, &c. They leave little that can be sin in Papists towards themselves; less towards Protestants, Sect. 10. & 11. to page 367.

An averfation and contrariety to God and holiness, a propensness and inclination to all ungodliness and unrighteousness in the horriddest instances; when it is habitual, reigning, impetuous, active is no sin at all in the temper and habit; no nor in the acts and motions, without consent, Sect. 12. *ibid.*

What expedients they have to justifie all sin in the World, or make it no sin. The Popes power herein. If he command vice, their Church is bound to practise it. He can make sin to be no sin. He may dispense in all positive laws, and in the divine law (and against the Gospel) at least where God can dispense, particularly with Oaths and Vows, such as are best, and most inviolable. With the observance of the Lords day, so as to turn it into a working day. With all publick worship amongst them, both Mass and Divine service. And against the universal state of the Church. He can discharge them from righteousness towards men. Take from any man his right. Dissolve marriages. Legitimate Adultery. License persons to be married for a while, and not during life. Authorize incest, (dispensing with marriage betwixt any but

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Parents and Children) and Sodomy. He can dispense with any Divine law when the reason thereof ceaseth, and can declare it to cease when he pleaseth. If he should err in dispensing, yet he that makes use of his licence to sin, sins not. He can free any from the obligation to fruits meet for Repentance. Thus can he discharge all from acts of Religion, Righteousness, and good works, Sect. 13. to page 376.

He is excused from sin, who ventures on it upon some probable reason, though it seem but probable to him out of affection to the person that offers it, and there be more reason against it, Sect. 14. to page 377.

Customs will excuse from sin, and make it no sin. Diverse instances. The sense of Scripture must be conformed to the customs of their Church, and vary from what it was, as they change fashions, Sect. 15. to page 380.

He sins not who does what is sinful, following the judgment of a grave Doctor. One such Doctor may suffice (as multitudes of their Divines conclude). And will secure him in following his opinion, though both less safe and less probable. This granted to be the common Doctrine of their Church. So it is unreasonable to except against our alledging the opinion of particular Doctors against them, since their common Doctrine allows any to follow the opinion of particular Doctors, as to belief or practice. Hereby a way is opened to leave no conscience of sin amongst them, Sect. 16. to page 384.

Their directions for the scrupulous of like tendency. He sins not who breaks the law in a strict sense, if he observe it in some benign sense. He may make the interpretation himself, and so such as will please him, or choose that of others which is best for his purpose, though he fear it is not probable, and it be false indeed. Or when the observance of the law is very difficult or incommodious. And ordinarily he is like to judge it so. Or when the observance of it is ridiculous, as the observing of the Divine rule has been (by their acknowledgment) long since in their Church. Or when there is apprehension of danger in complying with it. Or when he observes it but according to the common usage of good Catholics, when amongst the most eminent of their Catholics, it is confessed, there is little or no worship of God, no regard of good life, Righteousness or Godliness. Their devices for justifying so much wickedness (to the excluding all holiness of life) were founded, Sect. 18. to page 390.

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CHAP. X.

Good works not necessary by the Roman Doctrine. This shewed in Fasting, Prayer, Alms-deeds, to which they reduce all good works. They do not, they need not fast on their fasting days. Their Church requires the observance of none of those things, which they say are necessary to the being of a fast. They may eat a Dinner, a full meal at noon, may be excessive therein, so as to transgress the laws of Sobriety, and to excite and cherish lust, instead of repressing the flesh; and yet fulfil the precept. They may break their fast in the morning (and yet keep it) with Ale, Wine, Bread, or other things. They may eat a Supper too, and that excessive great, as big as custom will have it, when they tell us, it is their custom to sup with notorious excess. They may sup out of sensuality. And may take their supper in the morning. And drink and eat every hour. The quality of their fasting meat most delicious. They may drink at any time and Wine too (though that is confessed to be more contrary to a fast than flesh). They may drink it till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast. Nothing Religious in their fast. Neither Religious ends nor employments. And so it can be no good work nor necessary in their account. Those that have tyred themselves with Gaming or Whoring are excused. Yet this piece of mockery passes with them as satisfactory and meritorious, Sect. 1. to page 397.

Their praying no good work. The people pray not in the Mass. They neither express nor conceive any Petitions. Nor concur with the Priest, but by presence and posture of the body, as an image may do, or by virtually wishing the Priests prayers may succeed, which they may do, when they are asleep. Nor do their Priests pray better in their publick service, unless the bare pronouncing of the words (which is all they count necessary) be praying. How far they acknowledg this, Sect. 2. to page 401.

Acts of mercy or charity not necessary with them, but in two cases, which seldom or rather never occur, at least together. One is when they have superfluities both in respect of nature and state, but, they say, it cannot easily be judged, that any secular person (no nor Kings and Princes) have.

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The conclusion where from the premises in brief, is inferred, that the practical Doctrine of the Romanists tends to ruine Christianity, and the Souls of all that follow it.

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A Catalogue of some Books Printed and Sold by Nat. Ponder at the Peacock in the Poultry near Cornhil, and in Chancery-lane near Fleet-Street.

Exercitations on the Epistle to the *Hebrews*; also concerning the *Messiah*: wherein the promises concerning him to be a spiritual Redeemer of mankind, are explained and vindicated, &c. With an Exposition of, and Discourses on the two first Chapters of the said Epistle to the *Hebrews*, by *John Owen D. D.* in *Folio*.

Exercitations on the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, concerning the Priesthood of Christ; wherein the Original, Causes, Nature, Prefigurations, and discharge of that holy Office, are explained and vindicated. The nature of the Covenant of the Redeemer, with the call of the Lord Christ unto his Office, are declared: and the opinions of the *Sacianians* about it are fully examined, and their oppositions unto it, refuted: with a continuation of the exposition on the third, fourth, and fifth Chapters of the said Epistle to the *Hebrews*, being the second Volumn, by *John Owen D. D.* in *Folio*.

PNEUMATOLOGIA: Or, A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, wherein an account is given of his Name, Nature, Personality, Dispensation, Operations, and Effects: his whole work in the old and new Creation is explained, the Doctrine concerning it vindicated from Oppositions and Reproaches. The nature also, and necessity of Gospel-Holiness; the difference between Grace and Morality, or a spiritual Life unto God in Evangelical Obedience, and a course of Moral Virtues, are stated and declared, by *John Owen D. D.* in *Folio*.

A discourse of the Nature, Power, Deceit, and Prevalency of the Remainders of *Inward-Sin* in Believers; together with the ways of its working, and means of prevention, by *John Owen D. D.* in *Oct.*

The unreasonableness of *Atheism* made manifest; in a discourse to a Person of Honour, by *Sir Charles Wolsley Baronet*, *Third Impression*.

The Reasonableness of *Scripture-belief*. A discourse, giving some account of those Rational Grounds upon which the Bible is received as the Word of God, written by *Sir Charles Wolsley Baronet*.

Anti-Sozzo, sive Sherlockismus Enervatus: In Vindication of some Great Truths Opposed, and Opposition to some Great Errors Maintained, by *Mr. William Sherlock*.

Introduction.

THe danger of Popery in points of Faith hath been sufficiently discovered to the world, by the Divines of the Reformation; but their Doctrine which concerns Life and Practice, hath not been so much insisted on. And yet there is as much occasion for this; for here the mischief is as great; an unchristian heart and life being at least as damning as erroneous belief: and hereby the great Apostacy and degeneracy of the Papal Church is as apparent: and herein they have proceeded with as much disregard of Christ, and the souls of men. Their *design* in this, seems to have been, not the promoting of Christs interest (for that is manifestly prostituted;) but the securing and greatning of a Faction, which under the profession of Christianity, might be false to all its realities. And their rule is the corrupt inclinations of depraved nature; to which they have thoroughly conformed their practical Divinity; which easeth it of the duties for which it hath an aversion, how much soever enjoined; and clears its way to those sins, to which it is disposed, as though there were no need to avoid them. This *Rule* serves their design with great advantage, but souls are more endangered hereby, and their principles become more pernicious, because they are so taking. *Perfwade* a man, that he may safely neglect the duties, which he owes to God, his own soul, and others; and may gratify the *lusts* he is addicted to; and give him the maximes of Religion,

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and the Authority and Conclusions of Divines, and the Teachers whom he trusts, for it: and he will *like* that Religion, because he *loves* his sin, and is in danger to follow *both*, though he perish for it eternally. And indeed this is it which makes the condition of Papists deplorable, for though the principles of their *belief*, as it is Popish, be mortally poysonous; yet there might be some Antidote in the *practicalls* of Christianity, retained, and followed, by those who are unavoidably ignorant of the danger of their more speculative errours; and so some hopes of such: but their *Practical Doctrine* being no less corrupted, the *remedy* it self becomes *poyson*, and their condition, who freely let it down, hopeless. Whether their errours in matters of Faith be directly fundamental, hath been, with some of their Opposers, a question; but those who well view their *practical Doctrine*, may discern, that it strikes through the heart of Christianity, casting off the vitalls of it as superfluities, and cuts of those who will believe and follow it, from the way of life: not onely by encouraging them, with security to live and die in all sorts of wickedness; but also by obliging them to neglect, as needless, the greatest, and most important concerns of Christians, without which God cannot be honoured by us, nor Salvation attained. This will be apparent, by observing what is determined in that Church, by those who have the conduct of their lives and Consciences, concerning the Worshipping of God, Christian knowledge, Love to God, Faith in Christ, Repentance from dead works, and Holiness of life; as to the Exercise of Christian Vertues, the Abandoning of sin, and the Practice of good works; of all which in particular the following discourse gives an account.

CHAP. I.

Real Worship of God not necessary in the
Church of R O M E.

THere is nothing wherein the Honour of God, and the Happiness of men is more concerned, than *Divine Worship*. Religion provides for these great ends, by obliging us to worship God: this it doth indispensably, and can do no less, without abandoning it self; for this is essential to it, (a) and gives it *being*. And the *truth*, and *goodness* of it depends as much thereon; for no Religion is true and saving, but that which obligeth to worship God really. Now worship is not real, unless mind and heart concur in it: whatever it hath without this, it wants (b) its life and soul; and is no more worship really, than a picture is a man. Hence Christ brands those, who draw near to God with their lips, without their hearts, for hypocrites *Matth.* 15. 7, 8. *Mark* 7. 6. Such as pretend to be what they are not; and to do, what really they do not: who are but worshippers in shew, and fiction; no more so indeed than the Stage-Player is the Prince, whose part he acts. The *Romanists* seem to acknowledg all this, and therefore ought not to deny, but that it is as necessary, that God should be really worshipped; as it is needful, that he should have any honour in the world, or that there should be any true Religion amongst men, or Salvation for them. Yet notwithstanding, *their practical Doctrine makes it needless to worship God really*. That this may be fully and distinctly manifested, let us observe *First*, what they count requisite in *Divine Service*, and in their *Mass*: the former is their worship for every day, (which goes under

(a) *Religio est Virtus per quam homines Deo debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent* — Tullius dicit 2. Rhet. quod religio est vivans, quæ superiori cuidam naturæ (quam divinam vocant) cultum ceremoniamque affert. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 81. Art. 1.

(b) Nam spiritus interior adorationis, qui est ipsa vita et anima adorationis exterioris, appellatur quoque ipsa veritas adorationis. Vasquez de Adorat. l. 1. Disp. 1. cap. 2 p. 18.

the name of *Canonical hours and the divine office*) and is the proper Service of their Clergy and Monasticks: the latter is for holy-daies, and is common to the People with the *Religious*; and the only publick Service they are ordinarily obliged to. Afterwards we may reflect upon, what else passeth under the notion of worship in publick; and also take some notice of their devotions, or religious employments, in private.

For the first of these their *Divine Service*, if there were any thing of religion or religious worship counted needful amongst them, it would be required of their Clergy, and those whom by way of eminency they call Religious, in their Divine office especially (if any where): but by their doctrine it is not needful for them to worship God really there; unless he can be said to be worshipped where both himself and all that concerns worshippers indeed, may (as it may by their leave) be quite neglected, and no way actually minded. They seem, at least some of them, in their discourses of worship, and prayer particularly, to require as necessary thereto, both an act of the mind and of the will (*attention* and *intention* they call them): but proceed with them a little, and you will find the former of these, quite lost in the latter; and the latter, as they order it, dwindling into nothing. It is the common determination of their Schools and Doctors, that *actual attention* of mind is not necessary when they recite their *Canonical hours*, that is, they need not mind God in their service, nor the *matter* of it more than the object, nor the *sense* of what they say, nor the *words* they use; not any of these need be actually minded. A purpose or intention to do it is sufficient, though that purpose be not at all performed. This is the Doctrine of their great *Aquinas* (c) concerning Prayer in general, whom the (d) rest commonly follow. *Attention is not necessary all the while, but the vertue of the first intention, with which a man comes to prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as it falls out in other meritorious acts.* And this first intention also is enough to make the prayer prevalent.

(c) *Ad hunc effectum (viz. mereri) non ex necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum: sed vis prime intentionis, qua aliquis ad orandum accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit.* 2.2. q. 83. art. 13.
 (d) *ut officium ipsa attentio comitetur actualiter, nec in officio, nec in aliis orationibus, vel bonis operibus requiritur.* Sylvester. sum. v. hora n. 13. Edit. Lugdun. An. 1572.
 D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, affirmat (impetrationem) non pendere ex actuali attentione, sed virtutalem ad illam sufficere, et videtur certa sententia. Suarez lib. 3. de orat. vocal. c. 5. n. 5.

So he explains his main conclusion, viz. (e) *Prayer ought to be at least attentive in respect of a previous intention.* So that they may be attentive enough, by virtue of this first intention, though they do not at all mind afterwards what they are doing, when they should be worshipping: Which is just as if they should say, a man that goes to Church, with an intent to join in their service, but falls fast asleep when he comes there, serves God effectually, and is attentive enough, by virtue of that former intention, though he sleep all the while. It seems it is sufficient in the Church of Rome, and effectual even to a degree meritorious, to worship God as one that is asleep may worship him, if he falls asleep after a good intention. However hereby it is manifest that with them it is not needful to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service, but only to intend some such thing. If there be a purpose of worship, though God be never worshipped indeed, by their doctrine, it is enough for him. I suppose his Holiness would not think himself well served at this rate. The common women at Rome are to pay him a *julio* a head, weekly for the liberty he gives them to drive their trade; now if instead of payment, they should alledge an intention of it, and declare this is all they are obliged to, and that they ought to be acquitted upon that account, though they never laid it down, he would think himself not paid hereby, but scorned; he looseth his sacred Reverence, and is affronted into the bargain: yet at this rate will he have God served by Roman Catholics. Well, but if God need not be worshipped but in purpose only, and the intention may serve without the act: yet sure it must be an actual intention, or at least a purpose to worship God. If it be not the worship of God, that they need intend; divine worship is clearly abandoned, both in deed, and in purpose: if it must not be actual, there need be actually no thought of worshipping God. But I cannot discern that they count either of these necessary. They declare plainly that an actual intention is needless; in this they generally agree, though they differ in the termes, by which they use to express it. They call it an habitual, or a vernal, or an implicit intention; in opposition to that which is express or actual: So that actually either to worship God, or to have an intention of worshipping him, is more than needs.

(e) *Attentare saltem in prima intentione, oportet esse orationem, si meritoria, si impetratoria sit futura, mentemque spiritualiter refectura. Ibid.*

But since they will not have it actual, let it be what sort of intention they please otherwise; yet sure the thing intended should be the worshipping of God: So that they may be said to worship in *purpose*, though they think it needless to do it in *deed*. Whether they count this necessary, may be best discerned by *their* own expressions, which they use in some variety. Commonly they say (f) a *virtual* intention may serve. Now this is not an intention indeed, to worship God, but supposeth a former act, by virtue of which, one is said to have an intention, when really he hath none. As they call that a *virtual* attention to worship, when a man had a purpose to attend; though he do it not at all: Answerably, a *virtual* intention to worship, will be a purpose or thought to have such a purpose; though he never have it. Let those, who can, apprehend, how they may be said to worship God so much as in purpose, by virtue of a purpose to worship him, which they have not, but only intend to have, without effect. But it may be, there is no such intention needful with them, for *custome* may serve, to this purpose, Soto: (g) *The precept for attending the performance of divine service canonically, includes two things: First, that at the beginning of Prayer every one mind what he is going to do. — But for this former it is enough, that it be done by virtue of some former intention and custome: as if one when the sign is given for Prayers, go as is the custome, to the Quire — by this he satisfies the precept.* Now this he may be accustomed to do, without any thought of God, or of worshipping him: yet by virtue of that *custome*, wherein God is quite neglected, he will have their *virtual* intention to worship him: all the intention that they require, that is, plainly none at all; unless by virtue of neglecting God, he may be said to mind him.

Or an *habitual* intention may serve, they sometimes tell us. Sylvest. (h)

(f) *Ad horas Canonicas recte pronunciandas requiritur propositum intendendi & attendendi, & sufficit virtuale.* Martin. Navar. Manual. Confess. cap. 1. num. 13. ut c. 25 n. 105. Edit. Antwerp. an. 1608. Jac. de Graffys. Decision. aurear. l. 2. c. 51. n. 4. Edit. Antwerp. an. 1596. Sylvest. Sum. v. hor. n. 14.

(g) *Preceptum attentionis in divino officio Canonice persolvendo, duo includit: videlicet, ut orandi initio quisque attendat quid agere aggreditur — quia vero ad prius membrum satis est, ut virtute alicujus precedentis intentionis & consuetudinis fiat. ut si quis dum signum ad horas datur, ad chorum de more vadit, — per illud satisfacit precepto.* De Justitia & jure. Lib. 10. quest. 5. art. 5. Edit. Lugdun. an. 1582.

(h) *Quantum ad intentionem vel attentionem, quilibet ad officium obligatus tenetur in principio officii habere intentionem satisfaciendi, ita quod officium ab intellectu & non ab imaginatione proficiatur secundum, Petr. de Pal.* expresse

expresseth it thus, after *Paludanus*, He is bound in the beginning of the service, to have an intent to perform it, so that the service may be from his reason, and not from his imagination only. i. e. he must go about it like a man, and not like a beast. But least it should seem too hard for a man to go about their service, with an intention so much distinguishing him from a Brute; he adds a favourable gloss. (i) *This is to be understood*, saith he, *either in act, or habit, or vertue*. So that if it be but an habitual intention, it may suffice. (k) *Navarre* explains it by this conditional (and others with him) *if one be asked, why he takes his Breviary, he would answer, that he doth it to say Service*. (l) Now hereby we are told, that, rather an *habitual* than a *virtual* intention, is expressed, and they acknowledge that such an intention is not sufficient (m) for a *humane act*; much less therefore for an *act of worship*; Since then they think, that such an intention will suffice; a purpose to worship God is not needful with them: unless they can make *divine* worship of that which is less than *humane*; or will have the Brutes to be Catholick worshippers. They tell us also that this *habitual* intention, is in those that are asleep. (n) So *Scotus* the first founder of this distinction (and herein that which they call *virtual* agrees with it; indeed *Aquinas* (o) saw no cause to distinguish them, and (p) others who affect *Scotus* his subtilty, use the terms as if they were distinct, yet confound them in their instances). And thus when all the worship which they think needfull, is shrunk up into an *intention*; yet that *intention* is no other, than they may have in a dead sleep, when they dream of no such thing. So that their souls need be no more concerned in worshipping God, either when they are at service, or

(i) *Quod intelligi actu, vel habitu seu virtute*. Sum. v. hor. n. 14.

(k) Ibid. c. 25. n. 106. *Juxta ea quæ post alios presertim Majorem scripsimus*. vid. Jac. Graff. ibid.

(l) *Navar explicat virtutalem intentionem per illam conditionalem: quia si interrogaretur quare accipit Breviarium, responderet se id facere ad recitandum. Veruntamen hoc modo magis explicatur habitualis quam virtualis intentio*. Suarez. l. 3. de Orat. c. 3. n. 6.

(m) *Actus autem humanus non potest esse ab intentione tantum habituali ut omnes supponunt & per se constat*. Idem l. 4. de horis. c. 26. n. 3. *Actus inde procedens non est humanus, & deliberatus*. Bellarm. de Sacramentis l. 1. c. 27. p. 92. edit. Lugd. an. 1599. (n) *Nec habet tantum intentionem habituales, quod talem habet dormiens*. Scotus m. 4. dist. 6. quæst. 6. *qualis etiam in dormiente inesse potest*. Bellarm. ibid. (o) 3. quæst. 63. art. 8. (p) *Macor. Navar. Soto, Graff. g.*

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when they are addressing themselves to it, than if their Church were in mount *Celius* with the seven sleepers: When they are coming to it (as we see here) they need have no more purpose to worship God, than if they were asleep: and when they are at it (as we said before) they need no more attend to what they are a doing, than if they were not yet awake. They say also an (*q*) *implicite* intention will suffice; which is, as they explain it, when a man hath not expressly any thought of praying or worshipping God, when he is to read service; but only intends (*r*) to accomplish the *precept* of the Church, or to perform his *task*, or to do as he is *wont* to do. As when a man first takes Orders or enters into a Monastery, understanding that the Church enjoins all in that capacity dayly to recite their canonical hours; if he then have an intention to perform this task, to do as the Church requires, or as others of that quality are wont to do, and accordingly say his hours as the fashion is, though he have not once a thought of God or worshipping him all his life after, either when he is going to service, or when he is reading it; yet that first intention may suffice; yea it is of such sufficiency, that any other act of mind or heart, either in worship, or in order to it becomes needless: it is of such admirable efficacy, that by virtue of it, they can worship God, when they mind no such thing as God, or worshipping him, no nor ever intend it otherwise. Let us suppose that they thought it requisite to renew this *implicite* intention frequently, yet would it not necessarily amount to a purpose of worshipping God; for not only their *task*, and what they are *wont* to do, but the *precept* of the Church, may be (as we shall hear them by and (*s*) by declare) accomplished by acts of *wickedness*: which sure cannot be acts of *worship*, nor a design to do them, an intention to serve God. Yea, they may satisfy the Churches injunction for Divine service, though they have an express intention not to fulfill it, all the

(*q*) Jo. Macor. Navar. in Suar. de Orat. l. 3. c. 3. n. 6.

(*r*) Certum imprimis est, satis superque esse, si in principio accedatur ad recitandum cum proposito implendi præceptum, etiamsi in discursu orationis in mentem non veniat, satis enim est quod non retrahatur, quia manet virtus prioris attentionis. Præterea ut censetur quis accedere ad recitandum cum proposito implendi præceptum, satis est quod ex consuetudine quadam velit illam attentionem tanquam expletivam sui muneris & obligationis, vel quod in actu exercito (ut sic dicam) velit eam facere, ut solet, quia eo ipso vult illam ut impletivam præcepti. Ita sumitur ex Macor, Navar. & alijs. Idem. l. 4. de hor. c. 26. n. 6.

(*s*) Soto. Canus. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Covarruv. Bonacina. infra.

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while as^(t) (*Arragon* & their Divines of greatest Reputation determine.) So that if the Church did enjoin them to worship God, yet no intention to worship him would be needful, because they can satisfie the Church with a *contrary intention*: Finally a *sinful* intention will serve their turn: This passeth for their common Doctrine.^(u) If a man intend principally his own praise or worldly advantage, and so design to serve himself, and not God; this cannot with any reason be counted an intention to worship God: yet such a design will suffice for the worship they require, and it will be substantially good in their account, only a little tainted with a venial speck, which though it may hinder it from being meritorious of Eternal glory: yet he that never otherwise intends to Pray or Worship cannot be Damned, and so will be Saved notwithstanding. In short, the Lord requires the *heart* in Worship, without this, nothing else can please him, nothing in his account will be a real honour or worship of him, but only in appearance and fiction. The *Romanists* teach, that God need not have any thing of their hearts in their Service, not any one act or motion thereof, while they are at it, only some sort of intention before, while they are going about it; but this no act of will or *heart* neither, but only a virtual, or habitual, or implicate *something*; they have minced it so small, that an ordinary eye cannot discern in it so little, as a purpose to serve God; yea in fine, they have reduced it to that which is worse than nothing: and if the heart must be cumbred with any such thing, as an intention about serving God, yet a *sinful* intention may serve: this satisfies their holy Church and her Precept fully; she doth not, she cannot require any more for God, what burthens soever in other cases she lays upon the Consciences of men. But though the *heart*, and every act of it be thus discharged from any concern in their service, yet it may be, they will have the *mind* more engaged. One act thereof, and but one (mental *attention*) they seem to require; and its true, some of them make shew of calling for it, but as soon as ever it appears, it is dismissed immedi-

(t) In Suarez Ibid. n. 8. & Tom. 3. disp. 88 Sect. 3. There are near 30. Doctors produced for this by John Martinez de Prado, a Dominican. Tom. 2. Theol. Moral. c. 30. q. 8. Sect. 1. n. 1.

(u) *Hæc est communis sententia* — *Omnes fatentur* Idem Sua l. 3. de Orat. c. 3. n. 5. vid. infra.

ately, as needless; for they conclude generally, that a *purpose* to attend will serve, though they attend not, and this purpose too by their handling (as we have seen) comes to nothing, or worse. But suppose they did (though they do not) account an intention to worship God needful, and that actual, express, and well qualified, yet they confess (x) *an intent to worship, or wait on God, is not to worship him really*: no more than a man is Sober when he is Drunk, because he intended to be Sober. But they leave us no ground for this supposition, yet ascribe as much to their *intention*, and more, than the best imaginable will bear; after they have reduced it to as bad, as nothing. However since all the worship they count necessary is included in this *purpose*, and all their pretensions depend on it; they are concerned to have it thought to be something, and they will seem cautious about it, as a thing material, so this *proviso* they lay down. (y) *It must not be changed into a contrary purpose*, if that should fall out, it will lose its wonderful virtue, and not make those worshippers, who mind not what they are doing, when they should be praying. But there is no great danger of this, nor need they be solicitous about it: for (as they tell them) they *change* not their purpose, though they do nothing that they intended; or do what is quite contrary to it, *viz.* Though if they purposed to attend, yet they attend not at all, but turn their minds to other things, if they act cross to the supposed intention; yet so long as they assume not a contrary purpose, they must be thought to mind what they are about, though they mind it not one moment: And there need be as little care, as there is danger of changing their purpose, for (z) *carelessness cannot do it*. It cannot be changed, unless a man designedly, and on set purpose, will turn his mind from what he is about to other things. Since then a Person who doth not mind God, or any thing that concerns his worship, when he seems engaged in it, doth not worship God at all, as is evident in it self, and they confess it, in case

(x) *Licet velle attendere, non sit attendere in re, ut vere dixit Cajetanus. Suar. de Orat. lib. 3. c. 4. n. 7.*

(y) *Facillimum huic precepto obedire, nam nihil aliud exigit, nisi quod quis animo vacandi Deo horas inchoet, & in contrarium animus iste non mutetur, dum exolvit divinam officium. Cajetan. Sum. verb. horæ Canon. Edit. Lugdun. An. 1545.*

(z) *Mutari autem in contrarium est impossibile, ex inadvertentia. Cajetan. Ibid.*

he mind not this on *set purpose*: therefore though he doth not worship God at all, yet he worships him as much as the *Romanists* require; unless he wills not to worship him on *set purpose*: yea though he *voluntarily* mind nothing that concerns a worshipper; though he deliberately, and willingly let his mind run upon other things: yet so long as he is so regardless of God, and what he is about, as not to take notice of this extravagancy, he fulfills the precept of the Church, and minds Divine service, as much as is required. (a) Thus *Cajetan*, *Soto*, and others; so that by their Doctrine, if they do not worship God, and voluntarily neglect it, yet they do as much as the Church enjoins, so long as they take no notice, that they do not worship him. And as they may voluntarily employ their minds about other things, when they should be worshipping, so may they on *set purpose*, butie the outward man about other Employments, when they are saying their service. They can perform their best Devotions, while (to give their own Instances) they are (b) *washing themselves, or putting on their Clothes, or mending Pens, or laying the Closh, or making Beds, or anything else, which requires no more Attention.* Nor dare they count this a venial fault, because the (c) *Dominicans* are enjoined by the Rules of their Order, to say their service, while they are doing something else. That which would spoyle the Devotion of others, gives no impediment to theirs, and good reason, for how can that be disturbed, that is not; or lessened, when it is already nothing? This

(a) Si quis advertit se cogitare hæc vel illa, quæ debent esse extranea tunc a sua meditatione, sed non advertit quod ab officio Divino distrahitur; quamvis voluntarie ea meditetur; non tamen voluntarie animus ab officio Divino distrahitur: ac per hoc animus vacandi Deo a principio officij habitus, non est mutatus in contrarium. *Cajetan. ibid* Et si ultro & voluntarie alia cogitet (ut bene ait *Cajetanus*) quousq; inspiciat se distrahi, semper reputatur inadvertenter divagari, atq; adeo excusatur ab omissione præcepti de attentione, impletq; adeo subinde orandi mandatum. *Soto ibid. p. 341. Sic explicant Caieran. Soto præsertim Medina vide & Gabriel. in Suar. 3. Thom. Tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 3.*

(b) Hujusmodi sunt lavare manus, se induere, pennam temperare, aut id genus similia, qui quidem actus quandoq; non sunt peccata neq; venialia (verbi gratia) in ordine Prædicatorum. *Jac. de Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 51. n. 10. Talis est actio vestiendi se, vel lavandi manus & ora, vel sternendi mensam, aut lectum. Fill. Tract. 23. n. 260. vid. Soto ubi supra vid. Bonacin. Divin. Offic. d. 1. q. 3. p. 2. Sect. 2. n. 12.*

(c) vid. infra.

is to worship God after the Roman mode, when neither body nor mind is taken up with the service, but both deliberately employed about something else.

But that by their principles they need be no better worshippers, will yet be more manifest, if we view their Doctrine concerning *Attention* more distinctly. *Aquinas*, and *Bonaventure* (whom the rest follow) give an account of three sorts hereof, according to the Severals which may be minded in prayer.

(d) The first is Attention to the *Words*, so as not to err in pronouncing them.

The second, To the *sense* of the Words.

The third, To the *Person* prayed to, and the *things* prayed for.

Bonaventure calls Attention to the first *Superficial*; and that to the second *literal* (we may as well call it *humane*, or *rational*); That to the third *Spiritual* (*Divine* or *Christian* Attention others call it.)

Now (which is to be observed, as that which unvails the whole mystery) they hold, *that any one of these is sufficient*; not only the third, or the second, but even the first, though it be the worst, and of least importance. So (f) *Angelus*, (g) *Silvester*, (h) *Cajetane*, (i) *Bellarmino*, (k) *Tolet*. So (l) *Aquinas*, *Soto*, *Navar*, so all of them, it is (they tell us) (m) *the common Doctrine Universally recei-*

(d) Sciendum tamen quod triplex est attentio, quæ orationi vocali potest adhiberi: una quidem qua attenditur ad verba, ne aliquis in eis erret: secunda qua attenditur ad sensum verborum: tertia qua attenditur ad finem orationis, sc. ad Deum, & ad rem pro qua oratur. Aquin. 22. q. 83. a. 13.

(e) Opusc. de process Religionis l. 7. c. 3.

(f) Quocumq; istorum modorum adfit intentio, non est inefficax oratio ad satisfaciendum. Et igo dico nec ad impetrandum vel rescipiendum. Sum. Angel. v. oratio. n. 11.

(g) Quæcumq; harum adfit, oratio non est censenda inattenta Sylvest. sum. v. orat. n. 6.

(h) Una istarum attentionum sufficit. Cajetan. sum. ibid.

(i) Qualibet vero harum trium sufficit Bellarm. de bon. Operib. l. 1. c. 18. p. 1026. Edit. Lugd. An. 1599.

(k) Secunda attentio non est necessaria — Tertia etiam attentio non est necessaria. Tolet. In struct. l. 2. cap. 13. p. 449.

(l) Consequenter D. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, & sæpe Navar. asserunt, quæcumq; ex dictis attentionibus sufficere ad probitatem Orationis & implendum præceptum Suar. de Orat. vocal. l. 2. c. 4. n. 18.

(m) Communis est, quia Omnes dicunt minimam attentionem sufficere. Idem ibid. n. vtd.

ved. And this clears all, and leads us directly through their reserves and concealments, and the ambiguity of their expressions (apt to mislead an unwary eye, and abuse a charitable mind, loth to think them so bad, as they speak themselves) into the open view of their irreligious (not to say Atheistical) Doctrine. This makes it very evident, that, with them it is not needful, either to *worship* God, or *intend* it. For since they agree, that any one of the several sorts of *Attention* is sufficient ; the first, which concerns the *bare words*, is enough in their account ; and the other are needless. It is not requisite that they should mind, either the *things* to be prayed for, or the *God* they should pray to, or the *sense* of the words they pronounce ; it will suffice that they mind the words *to them senseless*, and therein the empty and insignificant figure and sound. Now words without *sense* are in themselves neither good nor bad ; no worship, sure, can be imagined in them, they are no better, (but less tolerable) in the mouths of men, than the sound of Bruits. And the mere figure and sound of Letters, can make men no more worshippers, than *Conjurers* ; yet such is all the worshipping or praying that they count necessary. But if they had a mind to Supererogate, and their Catholicks were to do more than their Duty, *i. e.* Act as becomes *Men* in their service, taking the *sense* along with the words : yet the third sort of *Attention*, which concerns *God*, is still unnecessary, there need be no application of the mind unto God in their prayers ; Surely in any Religion, but that which will have men abandon both Sense and Reason in matters plain and obvious to either ; God would not be thought to be *worshipped*, when he is not at all *minded*. By their common Doctrine now mentioned (wherein all sorts of their *Authours* conspire) first their minds, may in their Divine service, not only depart from God by natural, or inadvertent vagaries, but they may dismiss them from God on set purpose. For they may voluntarily, and upon deliberation decline in their service, what is *more than enough* ; and the attendance of the mind upon God in prayer, is plainly with them, *more than enough* : seeing they declare, that their attending to the bare words alone is *sufficient*. If they mind but to pronounce the words intire, no more is needful, God may be left out of their minds, during their whole service : and they may be as much without God in their worship, as others are said to be without him in the World, deliberately and out of

of choice. They leave us not to rely for this upon consequences, how evident and undeniable so ever, they sli^k not to declare (*) that they may without sin voluntarily abandon the better sorts of *Attention*, viz. both that which is *Rational*, and that which is *Spiritual*: this will be no fault at all, if done upon a reasonable account, for example, if any one decline these (n) *that he may not tire his head therewith, or any thing of like nature*. It seems reasonable with them not to trouble their heads with minding God, or what becomes men in their worship of him. The reason is, because (o) *they are not obliged to serve God as well as they can*: it is a received maxime amongst them, that they (p) are not bound to do their best (q) The *third* sort of *Attention* is better than the *second*, and the *second* is better than the *first* (that is worst of all): but when there are better and worse wayes of serving God before them, they may choose the worse. The *worst* attendance of all it seems is good enough for God, even that wherein he is not at all regarded. This Doctrine is so common, that I find but two who demurr on it, and one of them (Cajetan) but drawn in by consequence. Only Navar though he, as the rest, counts the first and worst sort of *Attention* sufficient: yet thinks it may be a venial fault to retain it, so as voluntarily to exclude, or hinder the better. Yet both (r) these hold, that they may voluntarily want the *better*, and may without fault turn their minds from God to other things, so long as they observe it not, or if they do observe it, yet so long also, as they do not

(*) *ut adverterem sufficere attentionem ad verba, vel ad sensum verborum — ex quo fit ut recitans divinum officium, non teneatur meliorem attentionem querere, sed satisfacere quamlibet ex dictis eligendo.* Bonacin. divin. off. disp. 1 q. 3. p. 2. sect. 2. n. 5. cum multis aliis.

(n) *Inferitur primo quancumq; attentionem ex dictis sufficere, ut oratio sit honesta. Et siquidem voluntaria omisso melioris attentionis, sit rationalis, ut si quis nolit attendere ad perfectiorem, ne caput defatiget, vel quid simile, non impedit quo minus honesta sit. vid. Suarez. de orat. l. 3. c. 4.*

(o) *In eo modo orandi nullum est peccatum per se loquendo, & ex vi naturalis legis ob solum defectum voluntarium melioris attentionis — quia homo non tenetur orare meliori modo quam potest. &c. Idem ibid.*

(p) *Vid. Melch. Canum Prelec. de poenitent. part. 3. p. 841. Edit. Colon. Agripp. an 1605.*

(q) *Angel. sum. v. Orat. n. 11. Sylvest. sum v. Orat. n. 6. Navar. ibid c. 25. n. 105. Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 51. n. 9. Milanus Theol. Pract. Tract. 3. c. 8. n. 14.*

(r) *Cajetan. supra Navar. c. 25. n. 106.*

reflect upon it as a Vagary. And both maintain (s) that any one may pray whilst he is dressing himself, or is taken up with any other like employment. *And such action though it be consistent with the worse Attention, yet undoubtedly (they say) it hinders the better, especially that which is spiritual and elevated.* So that herein, these Authors are either reconciled to the common opinion, or fall out with themselves. And that such employments (though inconsistent with spiritual Attention, i. e. with minding God) are lawful while they are at their service, is not only the sense of these two *Casuits*; but to deny it is against the usage of all the Pious (it seems the Roman Piety is without regarding God, even in his worship) All the *Dominicans* are particularly obliged to it (as we saw before) and have a visible demonstration for it from the (t) ancient form of their Dormitories. Thus one way or other all agree, that God may voluntarily be neglected in their worship without sin.

Secondly, as it is not necessary by their Doctrine to worship God, so neither is there any necessity to intend it. When they have encouraged all, even their *Religious*, not to pray at all; by assuring them they need not mind God at all, whilst they should be praying to him: yet they would persuade them notwithstanding that they may pray, by virtue of a former intention. The vanity of this is shewed already (where we prove both, that this is not enough, and that indeed they require not so much) but because it is the only pretence, that such can be worshippers of God, who think it needless to mind him, even in the most solemn addresses amongst them; it will not be amiss to see it again pass quite away, by their own Doctrine. What must be deligned in that previous intention (upon which not only the efficacy, but the reality of their prayers, and solemn worship depends)? must they in-

(s) *Quod possit quis sine peccato orare dum se induit, aut aliam similem actionem exercet*—que actio licet admittat inferiorem attentionem, tamen sine dubio impedit perfectiorem, & maxime spirituales & elevatas—non licere tales actiones exercere—est falsum, & contra usum omnium piorum, & Cajetan. & Navar. etiam fatentur. Suarez ibid. n. 12.

(t) *Dixerim forsan venialiter, quoniam non semper est peccatum, immo in ordine nostro preceptum nobis est, ut surgentis officium virginis dicamus: & ut antiqua indicet dormitori; dispositio: inter induendum se fratres illud inchoabant.* Socio ibid. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. Graff. ibid. l. 2. c. 5. n. 19.

tend, when they are going about it, to mind the *things* they are to pray for, or the *God* they should worship or the *sense* of the words they utter? No, as it is not necessary to mind any of these, when they are at the'r worship; so neither is it needful to *intend* it before-hand: it will be sufficient if they do but intend to mind, the *senseless pronounciation of the words*; and neither God nor any thing else which becomes Christians, or Men in acts of worship; nothing but what Bruits or Birds are capable of, the mere uttering of the words. This is very manifest by their common Doctrine, now before us, concerning attention in Prayer. *Attendance to the words without the sense is sufficient*, but they need not purpose before-hand, to have any sort of Attention more than that which is *sufficient*: for they will not imagine there is any need of a purpose to do that, which is not needful to be done; and they declare expressly this is all which is requisite, that they come to their service with a purpose to have any sort of Attention, that is (*u*) *sufficient* (telling us withall, that attendance to the bare words will *suffice*.) So that in the issue the worship of God (his and our greatest concern in this world) is reduced to this. There is no need to mind God, and so not to worship him at all, either actually, or virtually; since it is neither needful to do this, nor intend it. He is not worshipped in that remote and minute way, which they call *virtual* (which is not indeed the doing of it, but a purpose only to do it), but by *virtue* of a former intention; where this intention is not, it can have no *virtue*: but with them there need be no *intention* to mind God, and so by their Doctrine it is not necessary to worship him one way or other.

Thirdly, since with them it is not needful to mind any thing in their service, for which they can be counted worshippers, nothing but the *words*; it will not be very material, to take notice what *attention* they must give to these: yet seeing the *senseless* recital of the words, is all that they would have them mind in *Divine service*; one would think,

(u) *Attentio necessaria consistit in habendo a principio horarum proposito actuali, vel virtuali ad eas attendendi, & postea actualiter, aut virtualiter attendendo aliqua attentione sufficienti, quæ est triplex, &c. Navar. ibid. c. 25, n. 165. Vid. supra. Ad implendum præceptum orandi vocaliter prædicti auctoris afferant, sufficere attentionem ad litteram. S. Thom. Cajetan. Sorus. Gabriel. Navar. Vázquez Opusc. Moral p. 444. dub. 3. that*

that this should be attended to purpose, at least *actually*. No, it is enough, if their Attention be but *virtual*, i. e. (x) if they have a purpose to mind them, when they are going about their worship, and change it not while they are at it, though then they mind them not (for as they generally hold, that Attention to the words is sufficient ; so none question (y) but a virtual Attention thereto will serve.) It may seem strange that one should be said to attend, when he attends not, but they will satisfy this with something that is as odd : they would have them think their heedlessness is excused, by being more heedless : and so the more careless they are in their worship, the better. For if they mind not what they are doing, when saying Divine service ; (z) yet if they do this without reflection, and take no notice that they mind it not at all ; they therefore mind it well enough. Such is the *Attention* which the strictest of their Authours require and judge sufficient ; even such as is as good as none, and about that which is nothing worth. Now this Doctrine hath such an Atheistical aspect, that they (who profess themselves to be, and would have the World think that they are worshippers of God) seem concerned not to expose it commonly bare-faced. And indeed they give it some disguise, when they declare so much for *Attention of mind* in worship, as that which is of the substance of worship, so essential thereto, that without this it is no worship of God, no praying at all ; but a mere clamorous noise, yea a mocking of God, and taking his Name in vain. (a) The Jesuits forbear not frequently to acknowledge this. Who would not think hereupon, that they count it most necessary for the mind to attend God in worship ? Oh ! but the Vizour falls off, when we understand, that attention of mind to nothing else, but the bare words, stripped of their sense, and all respect to God, is enough with them, and that *virtual*

(x) Est autem attentio illa verborum — virtualis, cum incipit animo dicendi officium, & attendendi, & postea non mutat animum, quamdiu non attendat Toler. ibid. l. 2. c. 13.

(y) Actualis vel virtualis intentio sufficit ex omnium sententia ad implendum præceptum hoc Suar. de hor. l. 4. c. 26. n. 3. D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, &c. Supra Bonacin. tom. 1. divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 15. Communis Doctorum sententia.

(z) Cajetan. Soto. & alij. Supra.

(a) Vid. Vasquez. de Adorat. l. 2. disp. 8. c. 12. n. 361. & c. 15. n. 356. Suarcz. de orat. l. 3. c. 4. n. 4. & n. 5. & l. 4. c. 14. n. 12.

only, and in purpose, though they never actually mind so little. They themselves assure us that the attending to the words only (if that were to be done *indeed*) is no attending God: for they make these distinct things, and will have one of them suffice without the other: and it is against the resentments of all Religion, and common sense too, that God should be said to be worshipped, when he is not at all minded. And therefore in fine, when they teach (as the best of them do, so that it passeth for their common Doctrine) that *superficial* attention in their service is sufficient: they declare plainly enough, that in the Church of *Rome*, there is no need to worship God, no not for their Religious, in that which they call Divine service.

But if we would have a plainer acknowledgment hercof than is needfull, we may have it from those who declare, that no *Attention of mind* is needfull in worship, and these are the greatest part of their *Ausbours*, which I find alledged in this question (taking none into the account neither, but those that are ancienter than the foundation of the Society). They determine without distinguishing that all attention is needless *actual*, or *verthul*. If the words are pronounced intire, and no external action admitted, to hinder *that*; it is no crime with them, if as nothing else; so neither the bare words be further minded, but the thoughts be quite dismissed from them. *Sylvester* the Master of the Sacred Apostolical Palace, and their prime Champion against *Luther*, in his Book Dedicated to *Pope Leo the Tenth*, determines expressly, (b) *That to pray with attention in their Canonical hours, is not required by Gods Law*. If he had said, the Church had not required it, he had spoke within compass; and said no more than many others before and after him: but he sayes that too, for having told us that *Hoftiensis*, *Antoninus*, *Summa roselle*, do all hold, that the Church injoyns not *attentiveness*, but only *saying* the service, he adds, (c) *that they say true, as to this, that attention is not under the precept of the Church*. Of the like perswasion are *Durandus*, *Paludanus*, *Ange-*

(b) *Attente orare in horis Canonicis, non est de jure divino Sum. v. horx. n. 13.*

(c) *Sed isti licet verum dicunt, quantum ad hoc quod attentio non est sub præcepto*
Idem. ibid.

Ius de Clavasio, and others. (d) For attention, as they say, is not a command of their Church, but a counsel only, which may be neglected without sin. Others, who make the best of it, deliver it thus. (e) The Church doth not command internal acts, no more than judge of them, therefore requires not attention in worship: the precept is fully accomplished without it, by the external act alone; the want of attention is no fault, unless upon the account of the natural precept; and in reference to that, it is no worse than venial. They are herein opposed by some later Casuists and Jesuits (however these come to be counted more licentious.) But the differing parties fully agree, in making it needless to worship God. For both hold, that they need not mind either God, or the matter, or the sense of the words in their service, either actually or virtually: and both conclude, that the words without the sense (and all else for which they can be considerable) need not be minded actually. All the difference is about a virtual attention to the bare words, whether the want of that (which is no attention indeed) be a mortal crime. It is just, as if when they had concluded it lawful to murder a Man, they should fall into a hot debate, whether it were a deadly crime, to disorder his hair. But so it becomes those who make no scruple, to destroy Religion Body and

(d) Clericum qui distracto animo, horas recitat non peccare mortifere aiunt Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus, Sylvester, & alij quidam non improbabili ter: quia attentio (in cap. dolentes de celebr. miss.) est in consilio. quia cum ecclesia internos animi actus non pariat, mentis attentionem non videtur precipere. Victorel. add. Tol. l. 3. c. 13. Glossa tenet quod sufficit dicere ore, licet non corde, & cum ea concurrunt multi Canonistæ. Sum. Angel. v. Oratio. n. 9.

(e) Evagatio quæ est advertentis & solum secundum actum interiorem, licet sit temeraria & gravis forte: non tamen est mortale, nisi propter contemptum quoniam ecclesia non habet judicare de interioribus actibus mere. Propter quod Minister ecclesiæ licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet, non videtur transgressor præcepti ex natura facti. Angel. sum. v. horæ: n. 27. Sic & Sylv. sum. v. hor. n. 13. Non tenetur autem quovis præcepto esse attentus, sed sine culpa mortali potest evagari, etiam a proposito Idem. ibid. n. 14.

Non est peccatum mortale sine attentione recitare etiamsi ex pura negligentia, & cum advertentia fiat (ita) Hostiensis Jo. Andr. Anchoranus, Antoninus citans Umbertum & alios. Rosell. Summa Pisana. Angelic. Durandus, Paludanus, Sylvest. Turrecremata, Medina in Suarez. l. 4. de horis Can. c. 26. n. 1. & 2.

Qui officium divinum voluntarie distractus recitat præcepto satisfacit. Joh. Valerus alledges for this Aquinas, Paludanus, and Twenty other Doctors, vid. Acacium de Velaico To. 2. res. mor. v. hora. ref. 54.

Soul; to make a zealous stir about the sleightest appurtenances of it. Something must be done with some shew of Conscience too about its appendices, that the world may not think, they retain *nothing* of it amongst them. And yet how palpable is the irreligion of these Sophisters, who will have it a damnable crime, to neglect their *empty words*; but no fault at all, wholly to neglect the *Great God*, even when if ever, the whole Soul should attend him. Here is evidence too much, that the Church of *Rome*, so far as we can know her sense by her Doctors the most, and best of them; if she think it fit, that God should be *worshipped*; yet thinks it not needful, that he be *mind-ed*. i. e. though it be convenient to *pretend* worship; yet it is not necessary to worship him *indeed*. *Medina* is so ingenuous as to tell us, that since the Church requires not *attention* in their service, (f) *she doth not oblige them to pray, when she enjoyns them to say their Canonical hours*. So that all in the Church of *Rome* are discharged, from any obligation to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service; they need not pray, when they are at their Church-prayers. Not only he, but all of them must acknowledge this, who will yield to that Reason or Authority which they count best. Their Law saith, (g) *God is not prayed to with the mouth without the heart*. And (h) *it is a natural and evident principle (as themselves tells us) that vocal pronouncing of the words, is not prayer, unless it be done with some attention*, whereas most of them say no attention is requisite in their service; and that *virtual attention* which the rest are for, themselves say, is no attention indeed; no more than the purpose is the act, when not performed. But what then becomes of their pretences to Worship or Devotion, may they be wholly without this? *Medina* easily resolves this difficulty; (i) *though he who useth their service, hath no Devotion, yet the Church in whose words he prays, and whose Minister he is, brings her Devotion*. So that the Church brings Devo-

(f) *Præceptum Ecclesiæ non obligat homines ad orandum cum præcipit 7 horas recitare. de oratione q. 16. ibid.*

(g) *Nec oratur Deus ore sine corde C. Canranes d. 97.*

(h) *Naturale & evidens principium est quod vocalis prolatio, non est oratio nisi cum aliqua attentione fiat Suar. de horis Can. l. 4. c. 26. n. 13.*

(i) *Quod si Minister non apponat devotionem, Ecclesiæ apponit, cujus verbis orat & Minister est ibid.*

tion still, though none in the Church, no not the Clergy, not the Religious: have any. The Church prays effectually, in the words of those who say service, though these should Blaspheme God in their hearts, while they utter the words of a prayer; and they pray in the person of the Church by their common Doctrine. So (k) that though they be in mortal sin (suppose Atheists or Debauchees) their prayers prevail in regard of the Churches Holiness. Happy persons they are, as ever any were in a dream; who can pray effectually when they pray not at all; and be Devout with anothers Devotion, and why not saved too by the Churches Holiness? But then since this is applicable to all particular persons, what is that Church, by which they may have such advantages? it must be something not made up of particular persons, something abstracted from subsistence, and refined above the grossness of any reality: and the structure, their Devotion and worship must be answerable, and as much beholding to imagination for a being. Not to disturb their fancies further, it is enough that they acknowledge (what cannot be denyed) that they are not obliged to worship God in their Divine service; being there is no worship without attention, and no attention with them necessary; or only that which is in effect none.

But it is no wonder they make *attention* at their Divine service *not necessary*; since being in *Latine*, it is to far the greatest part concerned in it, *impossible*. The first sort of it, which they call *superficial* Attention, none are capable of effectually, but those, that are well acquainted with that language: so as not only to understand, but duly pronounce it: which few of their *Monasticks* are, indeed it is not the talent of many of their Priests. *The lowest degree of attention, (l)*

(k) Si ille est in statu peccati mortalis, nihil meretur, vel satisfacit, & tamen vere implet præceptum, & munus suum, solvendo pensum orationis suæ, verèq; impetrat, seu impetrare potest, non tam attenta conditione personæ suæ, quam spectata ecclesiæ sanctitate in cuius nomine orat. Suar. ibid. c. 18. n. 9. vid. Bellarm. de missa. l. 2. c. 27. p. 837. quatenus nomine ecclesiæ offertur prodest quia sanctitas ecclesiæ supplet recitantis defectum Bonacin. de offic. divin. d sp. 4. punct. 1. n. 3. dignitas orationis sumenda est ex dignitate ecclesiæ, cujus nomine offertur & recitatur, non ex dignitate improbi Ministræ S. Thom. Navar. Nugnus. Soro. Medina. Covarravias & alij apud Carolum Macignum. Bonacin. ibid. punct. n. 12.

(l) Prima puta attentio ad verborum prolationem, infimus est attentionis gradus: quem habere non potest, nisi qui linguam norit de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 340
fath

saith Soto, none can have, but he that knoweth the tongue. The second, which they call *literal* attention, fewer can arrive at, it is only for expert Divines. (m) To attend to the sense is not for all Latinists, but only for those that are expert in Divinity (saith the same Author) which is so far from being the attainment of Monasticks, and common Priests; that many of the chief of their Clergy cannot pretend to it. It was necessary for them to conclude (since they will have their own way, what ever the Scripture saith against it), that it is no sin for the Clergy not to understand what they say when they say Service, (n) though they confess they can have no relish of what they understand not. As to the third, which they call *spiritual* attention, they cannot mind the things prayed for, who know not what they are; and apprehend nothing of the contents of their prayers: Mor can they mind the God, that is to be prayed to, when they know not whether they pray to God or no: for they understand not to whom the prayer is directed, to God or to a Creature; to an Angel or a Saint; to a Man or a Woman.

Now seeing attention to what they do at their service, is impossible to most, and unnecessary to all: it may seem superfluous, to shew, that with them Reverence and Devotion is also unnecessary. (And what Religious worship there can be without these; let those who have any tolerable notion of Religion judge.)

For Reverence and Devotion are included in attention, or necessarily depend on it, and unavoidably fall with it. No man will imagine, that there can be any Devotion or Reverence toward God, when he is not so much as minded, when he is not before their eyes, when the mind is voluntarily turned from him, and wholly taken up with thoughts, which are inconsistent with observance of him. And this is the plain import of that *non-attention*, which they allow in their service. When the mind departs, the heart followes it (since (o) it moves by its conduct, and acts not otherwise) and when these are

(m) *Secundus autem gradus puta ad sensa attendere, non omnibus Latinis congruit, nisi Theologiæ peritis. ibid.*

(n) *Indignum enim est, ut altissima tractet mysteria, & eorum ignarus existat: nullum enim gustum inde potest percipere. Tolet. ibid. l. 1. c. 93.*

(o) Bellarm. *de Baptismo*. l. 1. c. 11. p. 244.

gone, (p) the man is *morally* absent: and worships God no more, nor hath any more Devotion or Reverence for him, (if these be so much as moral acts) than if he were not in the place where he is worshiped. And seeing (as (q) themselves tell us) outward acts in worship are not considerable, but as signs of inward motions: all external shews of Devotion, or Reverence, when there is none of these in the Soul, will be but hypocritical significations, denoting that to be there, which the Lord discerns is not there: and so tend to affront him, instead of approaching him with Reverence, Worship or Devotion. But there's no need of a proof, where the thing is confessed: they tell us plainly, that neither Reverence, nor Devotion is necessary.

Reverence (saith de Grassis in his time the grand Penitentiary at Naples) consists in this, that the body be in a composed temper, otherwise it signifies an incomposed mind, they ought therefore reverently, and humbly to pray, for such prayers penetrate the Heavens. But this is only counsel and advice, it is not commanded, as he tells us immediatly, (r) such Reverence saith he is not required by any precept, though the service be said irreverently, yet the command is satisfied. Here is encouragement enough for irreverence inward, or outward. All the danger follows; (s) but possibly it may be a venial fault, if the irreverence be great according to Pope Innocent. And if great irreverence will in the Popes judgment, prove but a small fault, they may venture on great as well as little freely: for neither Pope nor Penitentiary, thinks any much concerned to avoid a venial sin. Sylvestér tells us (t) that irreverence is not *always* mortal. But it will ever be so, or when? It is not so

(p) Opus ergo advertere ut dicatur moraliter præsens esse rei quæ sit. Tol. ibid. l. 6. c. 6.

(q) Cum exterior cultus sit signum interioris cultus. Aquinas. 2.2. q. 94. art. 2. ea quæ exterius aguntur sunt signa interioris reverentiæ Angel. sum. v. adora. n. 3. sine quo (sc. submissionis effectu) nota exterior non est adoratio & cultus. Valsequez de adorat. l. 1. disp. 8. c. 12. n. 361. Nec signum nisi ex effectu tali (interiori) nasceretur, adorationis opus esset, sed commentitium, seu irrisoris potius nota judicaretur. Idem. ibid. c. 15. n. 396.

(r) Non tamen talis reverentia est de præcepto, ita ut si minus reverenter officium dicatur, tamen præcepto satis fit.

(s) Verum possit esse peccatum veniale quando magna est irreverentia, juxta Innoc. in c. 1. de celebr. miss. Ibid. l. 2. c. 52. n. 10.

(t) Nec valet dici quod est ibi irreverentia, quia ipsa semper non est mortalis. Sum. v. Bap. ism. 3. n. 6.

when instead of worshipping God, (u) they take his name in vain, how severe so ever the terms be, in which the Lord hath forbidden this, and thereby signified the hainousness of it. Yea that irreverence to God which is injurious to his Divine Majesty and Excellency may not be big enough to be counted mortal: (x) unless it be so outrageous as to destroy the Majesty of God, or some of his perfections, it may be venial. The little account they make of Reverence is the more considerable, because as themselves describe it, (y) it compriseth all love and observance of God.

For Devotion, Aquinas tells us, (z) as to the fruit of spiritual Devotion, he is deprived of it, who doth not attend to the things he prays for, or doth not understand. So that Devotion is lost (by the Oracle of their Schools,) on a double account: Both when prayer is not attended, as it needs not be with them; and when it is not understood, as it cannot be. He that is negligent both as to Attention, and Devotion offends venially. (a) Thus Cardinal Cajetane, after he had told us that Devotion consists in every holy affection. So that he who through negligence wants all holy affection (what ever is included in Attention or Devotion) incurs but a slight fault. And it may be, not so much. (b) There ought to be Devotion (saith Cardinal Tolet) and he sets it out by love to God, and desires of seeing him; but adds, if this be wanting without contempt, it is no great sin. Whether he thought it a little one, he saith not, but if he had so hard thoughts of it, the Jesuite is more severe then those of other Orders. Grassius

(u) Qui orat sine attentione, & qui laudes Deo canit, nihil de illo cogitans, in vanum nomen Dei assumit, ac non propterea mortaliter peccat. Suar. de juram. l. 3. c. 16.

(x) Irreverentia quæ fit Deo non implendo promissionem juratam, non destruit aliquod attributum Dei in se, etiam in affectu hominis, ergo non est unde illa irreverentia ex suo genere tanta sit, ut minui non possit usq; ad venialem culpam ex levitate materia Ibid. n. 17.

(y) Consistit reverentia. 1. in dilectionis affectu. 2. in obtemperationis obedientia, &c. Angel. sum. v. reverentia.

(z) Quantum ad fructum spiritualis devotionis, privatur qui non attendit ad ea quæ orat, seu non intelligit. Comment in 1 Cor. 14. fol. 100.

(a) Qui vero negligenter se habet circa executionem attentionis & devotionis venialiter peccat. Sum. v. hor. Can.

(b) Debet esse devotio, ut animus noster inflammetur amore dei, quem laudamus; & ardeat desiderio videndi quem fide cernentes preconij extollimus: quamvis si hæc desit absq; contemptu, non sit peccatum mortale Ibid. l. 2. c. 13.

after

after he had described Devotion, concludes, (c) *he that wants Devotion, sins not*, not so much as *venially* it seems. Lopez and Metina in him, censures (d) that opinion as *false and cruel, which will have actual Devotion requisite for receiving of the Eucharist*; though that Devotion be no more, than an actual consideration, that they are there to receive Christ. Indeed they generally count Devotion needless there, where, if ever, it would be counted requisite. To (e) *be destitute of it & attention to, at the Eucharist, is either but a small fault, or none at all*. Sylvester saith *inward Devotion is not enjoined by the Church*, (f) but as to outward Devotion, he will not exempt it from the command; and what that is he, lets us understand by the *undevoutness* which is forbidden. (g) *When they make sport with one another for a great part of their worship, so as to scandalize others, and disturb the Priest*. It seems they may be as *Devout* as their Church would have them, when they play the wagg one with another at Divine service, so that their sport be but thus qualified. If it be not so *uncivil* as to offend the people; or so *boisterous*, as to disorder the Priest; or so *long*, as to take up a considerable part of their worship: Their Church who requires no *inward Devotion* at all, will not burthen them much, we see, with that which is *outward*. So little Devotion serves their Masse, their Divine service requires no more. (b) *Devotion* there, saith he, is not

(c) *Qui autem hac (sc. devotione) caret, non peccat. ibid. n. 11.*

(d) *Quarto animadvertit contra opinionem Cajet. asserentis ad dignam sumptionem hujus Sacramenti requiri actualem devotionem, h. e. actualem considerationem qua considerat actu se suscipere Christum; ut ejus fructum percipiat, sine qua actuali devotione peccatum mortale esset Christi corpus sumpsisse: falsam esse & durissimam hanc opinionem. Lopez. Instruēt. par. 1. c. 11. q. 80.*

(e) *Facilimum est homini, ita distrahi, ut nullam actualem attentionem, vel devotionem habeat; aut omnino sine culpa, aut certe ex levi culpa, quæ non satis est ad impediendum fructum Sacramenti* Suar. in 2. Thom. tom. 3. disp. 63. sect. 3. vid. Durand. Paudan. Antonin. Soto. Ledesma. Catharinum ibid. lect. 2.

(f) *Interior tamen devotio, quæ in attentione consistit, non cadit sub humano præcepto. Sum. v. Miss. 2. n. 6.*

(g) *Qua aliqui pro notabili parte missæ nugantur cum socio scandalizantes alios, & sacerdotem vexantes. ibid.*

(h) *Ibid. v. negligentia. Si ista negligentia esset circa omissionem horarum, esset mortalis: secus, si circa omissionem devotionis in dicendis horis, quia illa devotio non est sub præcepto.*

commanded. Others amongst which the same *Ambour* names *Hosienfis*, *Antoninus*, and *Summa Rosellæ*, hold, that in the Orders for Divine service (i) the bare saying of it, is commanded, but all that consists in Devotion, is no more than Counsel. (Which by their principles may be neglected without sin.) The ground of their perswasion is considerable: to injoyne Devotion (say they) (k) had been to lay a snare for men, and impose intolerable burthens on them. So that it seems the Church had been wicked, and unmerciful; if she had but obliged their Clergy and Religious, to be *Devout* in their worship. And by this reason, neither God nor Man can make *Devotion* a Duty, to any sort of *Roman-Catholicks*. Hereafter we must not wonder if they neither injoyne, nor observe it. And though their reason may be singular, yet the opinion is the common Doctrine, since all are discharged from *Devotion*, or *Reverence*, who are not obliged to *Attention*. Such therefore, and no other is the worship which the Church of *Rome* makes needful for the Clergy and Religious. Such as it can be, without *Attention*, without holy fear or affection: it is not the thing they call it, it deserves not the Name of worship, or the Title of Holy or Religious: it must be a prophane and irreligious exercise, it can be no better without *Reverence*, and without *Devotion*; it cannot but be without these, whilst it is without *Attention*, which they oblige all to neglect, by declaring it needless. *Durandus* maintained that Images are (l) not to be worshipped properly, but only *Abusively*, that is, as they explain it, though worship be exhibited before, or about the Image, yet the mind of the worshipper is far from it. This his opinion is now damned, as little less than Heretical; being in their account, no less than a denial, that, any worship is to be given to an Image. Yet this *Abusive worship* is all that they make necessary for the God of

(i) Alij dicunt quod sub præcepto ibi cadit horas dicere: cætera vero, quæ in devotione consistunt, suadendo dicuntur. ibid. v. hora. n. 13.

(k) Quem sensum primo videtur habuisse Host. & sequitur eum tanquam benigniorem Archi. & sum. Rosel. quia Ecclesia non iniicit laqueum, nec homines alligare debet oneribus importabilibus.

(l) Quod est incidere in opinionem Durandi ab omnibus damnatum, dicentis, imaginem non proprie, sed abusive adorari, non enim alia ratione illam vocavit abusivam adorationem imaginis nisi quia licet fiat coram ipsa vel juxta ipsam, tamen animus adorantis, ut scilicet, longe est ab ipsa. Suar. Tom. 3. disp. 81. sect. 8. p. 1075.

Heaven: for requiring no Attention of Mind, no Devotion of Soul in their service, they allow both mind and heart to be far from him, while they do something *before* or *about* him, which they call worship. So that what worship they count intolerably too little for a senseless Image (not to say a detestable Idol); they think enough in conscience for the true and living God. I have not observed that any Idolaters in the world, were ever so gross and stupid, as by their avowed Doctrine, thus to advance, what they look upon as a mere Image; and so to debase what they took to be the true God. However hereby it appears, that they count no *worship* at all needful for God; since worship without the heart, will by their Doctrine serve the turn: which (*m*) in reference to an Image is, with them, no *worship* at all. It is not *true* honour or worship, but *fictitious* and *mockery*. This is their own Character of such worship when Images are concerned, and under it I leave their *Divine service*.

Sec. 2. Let us in the next place view their *Masse*, this is for the people (*n*) and is the only publick worship enjoined them, in any of their dayes for worship. They call it (*o*) *the chief part of their Religion*, and this summons us to expect, that herein, if at all, they will shew themselves *Religious*, and worship God *indeed*; however they think not themselves obliged to it in their *Divine Office*. But all expectation hereof is quite blatted when they tell us, (*p*) *that less attention is required at the Masse, than at their canonical hours*; yet so they commonly determine, and their reason is, (*q*) *because prayer is a more*

(*m*) *Quamvis exterior actus rationem adorationis non habeat, nisi ut est ab interiori, seu ut manat a predicto affectu, nam si ab illo non oritur; non est adoratio, sed irrisio potius, seu fictio quædam Idem. Tom. 1. disp. 51. sect. 1. p. 757.*

(*n*) *Sola missa communiter est in præcepto. Cajetan. sum. v. sect. Est communis sententia, vid. infra.*

(*o*) *Bellarmin. l. 1. de Missa c. 1. p. 679.*

(*p*) *Attentionem vero quæ necessaria est sub præcepto ad audiendam Missam, dicimus non esse tantam quanta est in officio Divino. de Grass. ibid. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8. Neq; in audienda missa requiritur tanta attentio, sicut in recitatione horarum. Lopez. ibid. c. 52. p. 271. Ut Soto, & Navar. etiam annotant, minor attentio in missa necessaria est, quam in horis Canonicis recitandis:*

(*q*) *Quia oratio est actio magis rationalis, quam illa moralis presentia, quæ necessaria est ad implendam præceptum de audienda missa Suar. Tom. 3. disp. 88. sect. 3. Ex quo fit majorem attentionem requiri ad horas quam ad missam. — Ita Nugnes. S. Antoninus, Navar, Sylvester, Grassius, Sotus, Angelus, Barthol. ab Angelo, Henric. in (& cum) Bonacin. de Sacrament. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 1. n. 20.*

rational act, than that moral presence required at Masse. So that their hearing *Masse*, is a less *rational act*, than that which is performed without *understanding*: and requires less *Attention* of mind, than that, to which none at all, is actually needful. And we can not yet apprehend how that can be Divine worship; which is so far from being *reasonable service*: or how God can be thought to be worshipped; when the Soul which is to worship him, doth not take any notice of him. The *servant of servants* at Rome would not think himself honoured, if the holding out of his Toe, were not regarded by such as have access to him. But *Roman-Catholicks* may, it seems, mind God less at their *Masse*, than one that minds him not at all; and yet worship him well enough, after their mode.

Besides all inward worship is clearly discharged, for when they teach, that the *Masse* is for the people the only worship on the Lords dayes, or any other day set a part for worship: they tell us expressly, no *inward worship* is the duty of those dayes. external worship alone is commanded: (r) So *Aquinas Cajetan*, (s) so *Navarr*, so *de Grassijs*, so *Lopez*, *Dominicus a Soto* also, who asserts it with many reasons, amongst which this is one, because the Church requires no other than this external worship, and if God had required more, the Church had not been *fida Divini juris interpret*, a faithful expounder of the Divine Law, which rather than they will yield they will admit any thing, though it be, that God should never have any true worship amongst them.

Particularly and expressly they deny all acts of *Contrition* for sin to be the duties of *Masse*-dayes. So (t) *Sylvester*, (u) *Summa Rosella*, (x) *Melchior Canus*, and all the other Authours (y) last mentioned.

(r) *Ex præcepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultum externum ei exhibere Petr. a S. Joseph de 1 præcept. art. 5.*

Aquinas 12. q. 121. art. 4. *Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 305. Navar. cap. 13. n. 2. Lopez c. 52. p. 166. de Grass. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. ibi. Covarravius. ver. resol. l. 4. c. 19. n. 6.*

(s) *Cum ergo Ecclesia cultum hoc præcepto inclusum perinde suo statuto exprimeret — Et hoc suo præcepto ad cultum nos tantum arçer, palam est jure Divino non esse illuc alium contentum; quoniam alias nisi illum explicaret, non fuisset fida juris Divini interpret. So: o. de Just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.*

(t) *Sum v. Dom. n. 8. (u) v. Feriz. (x) Præc't de pœnitent. pars 4. p. 864.*

(y) *Cajetan. ibid. Soto. ibid. Navar. c. 13. n. 17. Lopez c. 52. p. 171. de Grass. ibid.*

Like-

Likewise all acts of Love to God (z) Bellarmine, and in him Aquinas, so (a) Navar and Pope (b) Adrian, &c (c) Graffis and Soto (d) who would maintain this with many arguments, one of the chief of them (he calls it *ingentissimum argumentum*) is, (e) that this would be to enslave Souls, and cast them into grievous straits, if so harsh a duty as an act of love to God were enjoined so frequently. Another is (f) that all the commands of God as to the substance of them, may be fully accomplished without love to God, and therefore this.

It is good Divinity with them, That we are not bound to worship God out of love. The Masse saith Navar (g) which we are commanded to hear on those dayes (and nothing else) may be heard well enough without any such act of love: So Bellarmine, (h) we are not bound on these dayes by any particular precept not to sin, or to have any act of contrition, or any act of love to God: what, not one act of love to God? no, he will prove it, one of his arguments is, (i) because the Church hath determined the time and manner how Divine Law is to be observed in keeping this command: but the Church no where requires inward acts; she thinks, it seems, that God may be served sufficiently with the Masse without any sense of sin, or love to God. And thus all those other graces and affections that flow from Repentance, or love, or necessarily depend thereon; as filial fear, spiritual desires, delight in God, &c. will be no duty on their Masse-dayes, their Masse hath nothing to do with them. Confessions of sin there may be well enough without Godly sorrow; and Petitions without desires; and Praises without

(z) De cult. Sanctorum l. 3. c. 10. p. 1609. (a) Cap. 11. n. 19. & c. 21. n. 7.

(b) Ibid. (c) Ibid. (d) Ibid.

(e) Eset enim hoc Christianorum animos irretire, & in arctissimas angustias conjicere: nempe quod tam crebro ad rem tam arduam teneremur. ibid.

(f) Eiusmodi præcepta non obligant ad charitatis modum, sed possunt quantum ad substantiam operis, extra charitatem impleri ibid.

(g) Nam missa quam in illis diebus præcipimur audire, velle audiri potest, siue tali amore actu concepto, unde rari vel nulli se hujus omissionis accusant. Cap. 11. n. 7. fest. de vid. Suar. l. 2. c. 16.

(h) Non tenemur in diebus festis ex præcepto peculiari, ad non peccandum siue ad actum contritionis, vel dilectionis Dei. ibid.

(i) Ecclesia determinavit tempus & modum observandi jus divinum de observatione præceptorum: at Ecclesia nusquam præcipit actus illos interiores. Ibid.

complacency or ingenuous gratitude: because all is well enough without *love* to God, or *grief* for offending him; and that, on all these dayes wherein they are obliged to hear *Masse*.

If you would see any thing of the worship of God in the *Masse*, it is as if you look for the life and nature of a man in a Picture: and such an one, as will not so much as shew you his colour or figure, but very rudely.

The precept for observing *Masse-dayes*, as *Sylvester* (a) tells us, requires not the *end*, that is, *waiting upon God*, nor *what is necessarily requisite thereto*, but the hearing of *Masse*: *Not waiting on God, but hearing Masse!* These are distinct things, and disjoyned in the sense of the *Roman* Doctors, the one is commanded, the other is not; so that they may duly hear *Masse* all their lives: and yet not wait on God one moment, the former they must do, the latter they are not obliged to regard, nor any thing that necessarily belongs to it. (b) *Navar* asserts this, and would prove it by reason and the Authority of *Aquinas* herein generally followed. In short, if there be any worship required in the *Masse* it is merely *external*, and that disjoyned from the *inward* service of the Soul, is, but a mere shew or vizour of worship, as they themselves confess in their lightsomer intervals. well, but is it worship in any sense? is there any thing Religious required of the people herein? for this they tell us it is enough, if it be an *humane* act, no more is enjoyned, (c) *the precept obligeth not, but to hear so, that it may be an humane act*, saith (*) *Soto*, and (d) others, and if it suffice that it be a *humane* act, it needs not be Religious. Let it be deliberate, that is enough to make it a humane act; and then though there be no Religi-

(a) Non est simpliciter de sine i. e. ipsa vacatione circa Deum, vel necessario requisitis ad illam: sed de abstinentia a servilibus, & auditione missæ v. Dominic. n. 8.

(b) Quamvis finis hujus præcepti sit, ut homo Deo vacet, ipsaq; fruatur, & in eo quiescat, ut docuit. S. Thomas: quando tamen finis præcepti est aliud a re præcepta, tunc non cadit sub præceptum sicut idem S. Thomas Communiter receptus. c. 13. n. 2. p. 198.

(c) Neq; tale præceptum obligat ad aliam actum interiorem, quam ad illum qui propter exteriorem est necessarius, scil. vere audire missam ea attentione, ut sit actus humanus Soto. ibid. p. 51.

(*) Præceptum audiendi missam non obligat nisi taliter, audire ut sit actus humanus, Idem. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341.

(d) Sat est, quod sit actus humanus. Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8. Satius est, sit actus humanus. Lopez. c. 52. p. 271.

ous motion or intention in it, the precept is fulfilled. *Sylvester* confirms us herein, the precept (saith he) is given unto men, and therefore the work must not be the issue only of the imagination, which is common to us with Beasts, it must proceed from deliberation, which requires some attention. (a) So that there is something more required of one that goes to Masse than of a Beast; but that is before he comes there, if he advance but to it as a man, he may be excused even from humane acts, when he is at it, he needs neither exercise his understanding nor his senses. He needs not (b) understand it, that is far from being a duty, they have made it impossible, it's no sin either for Priests (c) or people not to know what they do; so-reasonable is their service. The Latin makes it unintelligible enough, but if it were in a Language less known, if in (d) *Mosarabike* or *Greek*, those who are present without any but their Mother-Tongue, fulfil the precept. As (e) *Victorel* tells us after *Soto* and others. He needs not see (f) what is done, he may do all that is requisite in the Masse blindfold. He needs not hear it, as (g) *Cajetane* and others tells us, and this is much, he is injoynd only to hear Masse, and yet doth all that he is injoynd if he hear it not, if not one syllable of it reach his ears: it seems with them, to hear, is not to hear. Just by the same figure that they say they worship God, when in truth they do not worship him at all.

(a) *Præceptum datur hominibus, ideoque oportet ut non procedat opus ex sola imaginatione quæ communis nobis est cum bestiis sed ex deliberatione quæ attentionem requirit, Sec. v. hora n. 13. vid. Angelus v. hor. n. 27.*

(b) *Nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est vel ex longinquo missanti adesse Navar. c. 21. n. 8.*

(c) *Clerici vel laici qui Divinis intersunt, si non intelligunt quæ dicunt, non peccant Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 51. n. 12.*

(d) *Si audiret missam Mocaravem, compleret. Lopez. c. 41.*

(e) *Qui Græcam missam audiret, satisfaceret præcepto, etiam si non intelligeret. Addit. ad l. 6. c. 7. Tol. instr. vid. Bonacin. de Sacram. d. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 12. & ibi plures.*

(f) *Non est videre ea quæ in missa aguntur. Tolet. l. 6. c. 6.*

(g) *Utrum autem audiatnr vel non, utrum sit missa propria vel non, sub præcepto non cadit. Cajet. sum. v. Fest. p. 306. Navar. c. 21. n. 8. supra de Graff. l. 2. c. 34. n. 8. Satis est præsentem esse missa, ad impletionem præcepti, licet non audiat sacerdotem secundum Sotum. Lopez. ibid. Bonacin. ibid. n. 20. ibi S. Auton. n. Nugnus, Narar. Sylvest. Henric; Graff. Sor. Angelus Barthol. ab Angelo.*

He needs not be *sensible* of any thing about it, to hear Masse faith Tolet is not to use any of his senses about what is done in the Masse. And if this be their worshipping God, a man may worship him as much as the Church of Rome requires, not only without Reverence and Devotion, without heart and affection: but without the use of *sense* or *Reason*. A Bruit may do more at Masse, than they require their Catholicks to do, no wonder that Church enjoyns no Attention, Devotion or Reverence, nor counts them needful (as we have already manifested) for can there be any pretence to require these, when both sense and understanding are superseded? or can there be any thing that deserves the name of worship without these?

They themselves cancell and overthrow all their own Pleas and pretences for their offering God any thing of worship in the Masse. For, they say, he doth not worship there, who is not present, and they cannot deny that in God's account he is absent whose mind is not present; and yet they justify (a) voluntary departures of mind and heart, when they should be worshipping, and those who would not seem to do this, do it really; when they conclude it no fault to employ themselves about other things when they are at Masse. They allow them (b) to say *their hours* (and so neglect the Masse, out of a neglect of their Divine office) or to recite *what is enjoyn'd them by way of Pen-nance* (and so prefer a punishment before the chief part of their Re-

(h) *Secundum Anticinum, non est necesse sentire & distinkte audire verba missæ, &c.* S. Ivest. v. miss. 2. n. 6. *Audire Sacrum* — non est — uti aliquo sensu erga ea quæ in missa aguntur. l. 6. c. 6.

(a) *Sponte inter sacrum audiendum, vana cogitantem præcepto satisfacere* — affirmant. Sylvest. Jo. Medina, Paludanus, Azor. in Victorel. addit. Tol. l. 6. c. 6.

(b) *Vera resolutio est* — posse quem eodem tempore satisfacere præcepto de audienda missa, & de dicendis horis Canonicis, aut alijs votis, juratis, vel in penitentiam injunctis, modo non adeo uni rei intendat, ut alteri necessariam attentionem adimat, quod fieri potest, cum nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis. Navar. c. 21. n. 8.

Vid. Adrian. de satisfact. q. 7. Medina. tract. 2. de pœnit. Cajetan. v. fest. Soto. 4. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 1. Lopez. c. 52. in Victorel. *ibid.* besides the Jesuites, Tolet. Suarez. Sa. Azorius. Comitulus, &c.

So they may hear 3 Masses at once, when said in one Church at the same time, and thereby satisfy, when their Penances is 3 Masses, as Bonacin. and in him Rodriguez, Grassius Sconii, and others, de Sacrament disp. 4. q. ult. p. 11. n. 13.

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ligion) or other *voluntary performances* (so they may do what they will, rather than mind what they are about.) They know they cannot do two things at once, especially in Divine worship, which should take up the Soul. Though in their worshipping, where the Soul is not concern'd they may attend a hundred acts at once; as much as they are obliged to mind the *Masse*, that is, *actually* not at all. They admit them also not only to (c) read, or write what they please; but also to *sleep* part of the time: so that they take not too long a *Nap*. It should not last above a third part, or half the *Masse* (for that is (d) *pars notabilis*) if it be but less than that, it passeth for nothing. (e) Or if they be too brisk to sleep, they may entertain themselves with familiar (f) chaff. *Medina* (g) concludes, that he who is at *Masse* may spend the *whole time* in discourse about other things, Merchant affairs, or making Bargains, and yet fulfil the precept. They must it seems demean themselves at *Masse* altogether as Religiously, as at the *Exchange*; and no more is required. *Suarez* would have the Discourse *neither so long, nor so serious*, there should be some intermissions to attend. But what attention can be mean? He (with the rest) tells us, that to the *Masse*, less attention is requisite than to their Divine office; and to that office, he and they say, a *virtual* intention is sufficient, and this is the *least* of all that can be: So that to the *Masse*, *less* attention than the *least* of all, will suffice, and this to common apprehension is *none at all*. Others of them (as we saw before) will have no attention of mind needful for their office; and so with them, *none* will serve the *Masse*. Their Catholicks may have their choice here, and satisfy their Devotion at *Masse*, either with the attention of this Doctor and some other late Authours, *which is none at all*: or (if this seem too much) with

(c) Peccat mortaliter — in aliqua ejus parte notabili colloquendo, pingendo, scribendo, dormiendo Niv. c. 21. n. 6. parvitas in omni materia excusat a mortali n. 2.

(d) Secundum Archidiaconum præceptum non observat, qui partem notabilem amittit, puta medietatem aut tertiam partem: secus qui modicam, Sylv. v. miss. 2. n. 1.

(e) Modicum enim pro nihilo reputatur. Cajet. v. Fest.

(f) Nonnulla modica misceantur colloquia, Lopez. c. 52. p. 271.

(g) Medina docet, si quis missæ interest semper tamen confabulatur, aut alia negotia futura cum mercatoribus tractat, nihilominus implere præceptum. in Suar. tom. 3. disp. 18. sect. 3. Respondetur autem ex Cajetano una cum Scro, quod sufficiat missæ esse præsentem, unde qui longe stat, eam non audiens, vel cum alio loquens, non propterea est præcepti transgressor. Corradus in Resp. quest. 198.

that of their ancienter Doctors, *which is less than none*. And what must they attend to, who need neither *hear*, nor *see*, nor *understand* what is said, or done? It would puzzle one as subtle as himself, to tell one how he can attend to that, which is neither offered to his senses, nor his intellect. And therefore the *Jesuite* though he seems more strict, yet herein is less rational, than *Medina*, and not so consistent with himself or their common Doctrine. Also he would not have the Discourse at Masse so grave and serious, as that of Merchants, *(b) it should be more light*, more idle than that about Trade and Business. It seems the levity of the *Stage* suits with the Masse better than the seriousness of the *Exchange*. Answerably if their *(i) Discourse be not decent*, nor the Subject of it very modest, the Masse will comport with it, and the Churches precept will bear it without a breach. And no wonder, since it hath been the custome of that Church (as many of their *(k) Writers* inform us) to sing, not only prophane, but filthy Songs at high Masse; and that to the Organ, that the people might not only be refreshed by their own private immodest Discourse, but edified more effectually this way, by the lower voice of the Church. And how, we learn by a grave Cardinal (though little herein more rigid than others) who tells us, that the *(m) hearers were thereby excited, to what was prophane and filthy*, as experience witnessed. And still notwithstanding any pretence of Reformation, *tunes to the Organ at Divine service or Masse, though lascivious and very prophane, will pass for a small fault (n)* (in the judgment of those who seem most

(b) Qui voluntarie confabulatur — non satisfacere, nisi vel confabulatio esset discontinua, partim scil. loquendo, partim attendendo ut communiter fieri solet: vel non de re seria, sed levi, &c. Idem. ibid.

(i) Soto in 4. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 3. dicit quod licet indecentia sint colloquia inter audientiam missam, non tamen propterea fit transgressor precepti. Ibid.

(k) Cornelius Agrippa, de vanit. Scient. cap. 17. Cajetan. Sum. v. Organ. Soto. de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 2. p. 336. Navar. Cap. 13 n. 87. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 263.

(m) In cujus signum, audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa profana seu turpia, ut experientia testatur: ita quod non est infirmitati locus. Cajetan. ibid.

(n) Canticus — ratione soni quia est lascivus aut valde secularis — potest esse venialis culpa, vel ratione materie minimæ, vel ex bona intentione vel inadvertentia. ut Cajetanus dixit in Suar. de horis Can. l. 4. Cap. 13 n. 17. materia parva — si organista loco lyrie eleison, cantilenam profanam organo canat, Villalobus in Dian. v. Blasph. n. 4.

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severe in the case) if either the matter be slight, or the intention good, or the Actors inconsiderate. Heres provision enough, that the Scenes in their Masse may not be dull and heavy. Yet further they may laugh, and be pleasant, and when the Musick (which sounds not alwayes) doth it not, they may make themselves merry in the height of their worship. But this with some caution, (o) their talk, and laughter may break out into such noyse, that possibly it may prove a sin of irreverence. Here is some shew of danger, but it will vanish presently; For if it should be a very loud extravagance, and the irreverence great; (p) yet great irreverence may, with them, be but a small fault, and they have the authority of a Pope to warrant this. Nor must this seem strange to us, since they will not have all contempt (q) of God criminal; that which is material may be venial; and it is not formal, unless besides the contempt of God, there be also an intention to contemn him. Such is the most solemn worship in the Roman-Church, and so is God worshipped amongst them; and that not by the unwarranted presumption of those, who direct their worship and guide their Consciences. Here we may see in the Masse the Religion of Roman-Catholicks, they call it (r) the chiefest, the best part of their Religion, that we may not look for any thing better amongst them, nor any thing Religious, if it be not found here, yea it is all (better and worse) that the people are obliged to in publick (and in private their Church doth not trouble them with any.) He that views it well, and believes he hath a Soul, and that there is a God; must have little, or no regard of either, if he do not bleis himself from it, as a thing which hath nothing of Religion, but the name, and that merely usurped. A Religion which

(o) Sed possent voces & risus in tantum prorumpere, quod esset peccatum irreverentia & scandali: Lopez. c. 52. Soto in 4. dist. 13. quest. 2. art. 1.

(p) Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 52. Supra.

(q) Contemptus ille qui continetur in irreverentia Dei per se, & ut talis est, non semper est formalis sed materialis, qui non semper sufficit ad malitiam mortalem. Nos autem loquimur de contemptu formali, quo ipsa Dei irreverentia intenditur, Suar. de juram. l. 3. c. 12. n. 4. & c. vid. Cajetan. sum. v. Contempt. vid. Bonacin. de legibus disp. 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 10. l. 15.

(r) In qua (sc. missa) præcipua pars Religionis nostræ, Bellar. de miss. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 679.

needs nothing, by the Doctrine of its chief Professors, that is either *Godly*, or so good as *humane*: no regard of God at all, so much as in one thought of him; nor any act of Reason, yea or of sense either about any thing *Religious* or *Divine*; yet allows a free exercise of both, about that which is prophane and *irreligious*. He that counts this Religion indeed, must stifle the common notions of Religion and Christianity: and he, that understanding it, makes choice thereof; had need first be very indifferent, whether he have any Religion, or none. Had the ancient Fathers talk'd after this senseless, lewd, extravagant rate, concerning the worship of God, how would *Celsus*, *Porphyrie*, and *Julian* have Triumph'd over them? nay, they might justly have challeng'd them to have instanced in any one that bore the name of a Philosopher, that ever treated of the worship of God with so little Reverence and Discretion. Had such loose and wild Doctrines been broach'd by the first Teachers of Christianity, the Heathens need not have rais'd so fierce a persecution against it, they might with ease have hiss'd it out of the World.

But this is not the worst, they encourage that in the Mass which they cannot but condemn as wicked; and maintain that the precept for hearing Mass may be satisfied by such wickedness. *Melchior Canos* to this Objection (that the Command of God, or the Church, cannot be fulfilled by sin) answers according to the opinion commonly maintained amongst them. (a) *That he is no Transgressor of the precept, who to the Act enjoyn'd, and good, in its kind, adds something sinful.* He supposeth that the Act commanded by the Church, is some way good; but withal, that the precept may be satisfied, though it be done wickedly, and that by their common Doctrine. Whether the circumstances may be venially or mortally wicked, he saith not, but leaves us to understand it of either. *Dominicus a Soto*, tells us expressly, that though what is added to the Act (b) enjoyned, be a mortal wickedness, yet the Precept may thereby be satisfied substantially. With these Divines of

a) *Nos cum communi opinione in praesentia teneamus, non esse transgressorem praecepti, qui a tui bono ex genere suo quem lex praecipiebat, apponit aliquam malam circumstantiam, Relect. de pœnit. part. 4. p. 936. vid. Bonacinum de legibus disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9. n. 1. ibi. S. Thomas, Soto, Navar, Medina, & plures alij.*

(b) *Quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfaciens praecepto quantum ad substantiam. Ibid. l. 10. q. 5. a. 5.*

greatest reputation amongst them, concurs *Navarre*(c) no less renowned (and none of them *Jesuites*) the opinion of *Antoninus* (which he is disproving) *presupposeth*, saith he, *that by a sinful Act, especially if it be a mortal sin, the Command of the Church cannot be fulfilled; but that this is false we have largely proved.* He would have us know that he hath fully demonstrated, that the Precept for hearing Mass, may be intirely accomplished by *deadly crimes*. This is the judgment of the most eminent Doctors amongst them, such as are not of the Society; and (if they will believe *their famous Bishop of the Canaries*) the common Doctrine in the Roman Church: and by this, the world may judge what a Church it is, what her Religion, what her Worship, what her Precepts for it are: When all that it requires for that worship, which is the principal part of her Religion, may be satisfied by acts of wickedness, such as are mortal and damnable to the Worshippers, and most (of all others) dishonourable to God, whom they pretend to worship: And let those that are seduced, or may be tempted by Seducers, seriously consider, whether they can wisely trust their souls to such a conduct, or be safe in such a communion, where there is no more tenderness for the salvation of souls, than to be satisfied with such a worshipping of God as will confessedly damn them.

Señ. 3. Thus much for the *manner* of *their* publick worship, all of it, who ever amongst them it concerns; whereby it appears that they count it not necessary that God should have any *real worship* from them. This will be further manifest by what they teach concerning the *end* of it.

They maintain, that it is lawful for *their* Clergy and Monasticks too (who profess perfection) to serve God for *their own* ends, *viz.* to get preferment, or compass a dignity, or gain some wordly advantage, and so to prostitute the Honour and Worship of God to such low, earthly, fordid designs, as *Religious* persons would never appear to own; but that *Irreligion* is grown too monstrously big for its vizard. He that riseth to their morning Service for this end, that he may have his daily devidend, if it be not principally for this, he sins not. So *their glossa celeberrima*, the two Popes *Urbane* & *Celestine* determine that it is law-

(c) Non tamen est tenendum illud Antonini---quia presupponit, malo præsertim mortali non posse adimpleri præceptum, quod esse falsum, late probavimus. c. 21. n. 7.

ful for *their* Clergy to serve God in their Churches for this design, and hope to get Ecclesiastical dignity in (d) *Navarre*. But then this great Casuist, (of so high esteem amongst them, that he was sent for from *Spain* to *Rome*, to give advice and direction to the old Gentleman there, that cannot erre) understands (after (a) *Aquinas* & *Jo. Major*. as he pretends) the principal end to be something else than others do. It is not that which so much moves the Agent, as that without it he would not be drawn to act by any other end and accordingly he will have the premised testimony to be understood. (b) So that one of their Perfectionists, who riseth to morning prayer for this end, that he may have his dividend; & would not stir (c) out of his Bed to attend the Worship of God for God's sake, or any other end befitting a Religious person, if the consideration of his daily allowance did not rouse him: yet he serves God so well herein, as that he is sinless, and not so much as venially tainted. Likewise the Clergy who address themselves to the Worship of God, moved thereto, more by hopes to gain preferment and dignity than any respect to God, yet they sin not. That is, they worship God well enough, though they respect themselves and their own ends more than him: or which is all one, though they serve themselves rather than God whom they are to worship. They are all concerned to maintain this: for he tells them, if (d) such acts of *Vertue*, or *Worship*, were *Vicious*, all their acts in a manner would be stark naught,

(d) Glossa illa celeberrima ait peccare quidem eum, qui surgit ad matutinas preces principaliter propter distributiones quotidianas, non autem illum, qui surgit principaliter ut Deo inserviat, & minus principaliter, & secundario, ut eas lucretur. --- Urbanus Papa & Coelestinus determinarunt licere clericis servire Deo in Ecclesijs ob spem ascendendi ad dignitates illarum. Imo Gelafius dixit eos ad hunc ascensum spe maioris commodi compellendos. --- Glossa recepta dicit expresse per illum textum, licere clerico servire in Ecclesia aliquid querendam aliquam dignitatem, modo principaliter ob id non serviat. &c. cap. 23. n. 101.

(a) Ut probavimus non est bona definitio illa Bartoli, qua definit causam principalem esse causam qua cessante cessat effectus id. ibid.

ut aliquis finis sit principalis non sufficit quod ille non fieret sine illo, sed oportet, quod pluri vel tanti aestimetur, ac alius finis, propter quem ille fit. id. c. 17. n. 209. &c. 20. n. 11. p. 459.

(b) Per supra dictos textus & glossas, quae habent locum etiam in his, qui non servant, Ecclesijs vel praelatis, nisi sperarent beneficia. c. 23. n. 101.

(c) Surgens ad matutinas ob distributiones, alias non servetur. ibid.

(d) Alioquin enim omnes fere actus nostri essent vitiosi; quia paucissimi sunt pure propter solum Deum, & solum virtutem, &c. ibid. p. 590.

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since there are extremely few amongst them that are purely done for God. They are a Church in the mean time that worthily profess godliness, since nothing is done, or needs be done by them, even in the worship of God, for him, so much as for themselves; and indeed Sylvester deals ingenuously when he tells us plainly, without the cover of any pittiful shift (e) that it is no sin to serve God principally for their own profit.

Moreover, and yet worse, They teach it is no sin to worship God for an end that is in it self a sin, if it be not principally intended, it is lawful by their doctrine to Preach, to Pray, say Mass, &c. for praise of men (though Christ will have those that design'd it as (f) Cajetane notes, even when he is excusing this to have no better reward:) or for vain glory (though they reckon this amongst (a) capital crimes) only he must not make so wicked a thing his chief end, and then he is innocent enough, though sin against God be his design in worshipping him. It is no sin, yea, it is meritorious to do these things, viz. to Preach, and say Mass, and to do other things of like nature principally for God, and secondarily for vain glory and praise of men, aptly directed as our end. Thus Navarre determines after their great Saint and Doctor, Aquinas. Now he had taught us before, that these acts of worship are but done secondarily (and so unlawfully) for these criminal ends when they so much sway a man, as that he would not worship God unless he were excited by them; and that vain glory is not his principal end, even when he is so much influenced thereby, as that he would not Pray or Preach, &c.

(e) *Licetum est etiam aliquid operari principaliter propter propriam utilitatem.* Sum. v. charitas. n. 5. and that of Navar is plain enough, diximus quod falsum est, esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum principaliter ob bona temporalia cap. 13. n. 14. p. 555. & c. 13. n. 14. Solet circa hanc voluntatem inquiri, an debeat esse honesta; & specialiter, an voluntas consistendi propter humanum motum, scilicet inanem gloriam, vel commodum temporale, sufficiat ad valorem Sacramenti: nam in ceteris Sacramentis certum est sufficere; in hoc affirmant Soto. dist. 18. q. 3. art. 3. Navar. c. 21. n. 40. Negant enim illam voluntatem ex illo fine, esse peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum: quod non repugnat valori Sacramenti. Quae sententia per se loquendo, vera mihi videtur. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. sect. 3. n. 4. p. 273.

(f) Sum. v. praedicat. p. 480.

(a) Aquinas. 22. q. 132. art. 1. (in eo) Gregorius. 31. Moral. numerat inanem gloriam inter 7. vitia Capitalia. ibid. art. 4.

(b) Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est facere illa (viz. concionare, missam celebrare, precari & id genus alia) principaliter propter Deum, & secundario propter vanam gloriam, vel laudem humanam, in finem aptum relatum per ibi dicta post S. Thomam. c. 23. n. 13.

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if this were not his motive, this in the judgment of others, as he acknowledgeth is to make sin his *principal* end, and to advance wickedness above God, even when he pretends to worship him. But let us not interrupt this great Doctor in his way, it is foul enough as himself makes it; for hereby a man may serve God, and that *meritoriously* (after the Roman mode) though he never would let him have an act of worship, if pride and vain glory did not set him a-work. He would never Pray or Preach, &c. if he were not more moved to it by *sin*, and out of regard to some *wickedness*, than out of respect to *God*.

Further yet: They hold it is but a *venial* fault to worship God *principally* for vain glory, and other designs of like quality. *Aquinas*, as he is represented by *Sylvester* determining that it is no mortal sin to serve God principally for vain glory; *if that be ones chief end actually only, and not both habitually and actually*. *Sylvester* declares it as his own persuasion, *that it is both against Aquinas and the Truth, to hold it is a mortal sin, when those things which are ordained for the glory of God, are used principally for a mans own glory*. He instances in the Sacraments, saying Mass, the Scriptures and Preaching.

(a) Cardinal *Cajetan* declares himself thus in one instant, which involves the rest: *It is but venial to Preach for vain glory, or hopes of a gainful almes*, signifying, that he means such vain glory as Christ condemned in the *Pharisees*, when he told them this was like to be *their reward*.

(c) *Ex quo inferit quod mortale est predicare aut missam celebrare, & hujusmodi, propter inanem gloriam, quod verum est solum ut dicit S. Thom. Si in ea ponatur ultimus finis, ita quod ipsa intenditur principaliter actu & habitu, secus si actu tantum, ut iste intendit Sum. v. vana gloria. n. 2.*

(d) *Ex quibus patet, quod Sum. Ang. contra. S. Thom. & veritatem dicit, quod est mortale, quando ea que ordinata sunt ad Dei gloriam, facit ad gloriam suam, ut Sacramenta & Scriptura Sacra. ibid.*

(a) *Veniale autem si vane propter gloriam aut spem questuariae elemosynae predicaretur, receperunt enim mercedem suam. Sum. v. predicat. p. 480.*

Navarre

(b) Navarre affirms, that to Preach, or say Mass, or Pray, and such things as are instituted for the Honour and Worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls, for vain glory principally, or more than principally, is but a venial fault; and that such as gain-say this (who are but two) have been confuted by others, and by himself after them. These are the chief of their Doctors, whom the rest commonly follow, (and none of them Jesuits) who unanimously assert this. Now it is not necessary with them, for any man to avoyd a venial sin, since by their doctrine a world of them can never damn a man: and therefore it is not necessary for any Papist, to worship God otherwise, than *principally* for vain glory, or ends equally criminal, *i. e.* it is not needful for them to worship him at all; for no man can imagine, that he is worshipped, when he is in the highest degree dishonoured and affronted: and what greater affront can be put upon him, than under a pretence of worship to debase the great God, and thrust him lower in our designs, not only than our selves and earthly trifles, but lower than *sin*, the vilest thing on Earth, yea, or in Hell? and this is evidently done when vain glory (a capital sin) hath the preheminance of God in addresses to him, and is regarded as principal: when the Lord of Heaven and earth hath no regard at all, or only in a lower place. It is not worshipping of God, but a horrid impiety, for men to serve themselves instead of God; but more intolerably impious to worship *sin*: and that hath the worship and is honoured in the place of God, which hath the highest advancement, and is *principal* in Religious addresses; yet no better than this is all the worship, which by the *Roman* Doctrine is necessary from their Catholics.

(b) Peccat, qui res principaliter institutas ob honorem Dei & cultum ejus, & salutem animarum, principaliter, vel æque principaliter ob vanam gloriam facit: quale est concionari, missam celebrare, precari & id genus alia secundum Abulensem & Angelum, quod post nos efficaciter confutavimus, dicentes esse solum veniale. c. 34. n. 13. p. 554.
Dicendum est intentionem bonam simpliciter non esse de substantia orationis vocalis. Itaque si quis habet intentionem orandi, & ex illa proferet verba de se sufficientia ad orandum, & consentanea laudi, vel reverentiae divinae, licet hoc faciat ex intentione laudis humane, vel alicujus commodi temporalis in illud principaliter intiendo, vere orat, quamvis non bene orat. Hæc est communis sententia. — Talis oratio est sufficiens ad implendum præceptum ecclesiasticum recitandi horas, ut omnes fatentur. Suar. de orat. l. 3. cap. 3. n. 5.

In short, whereas by their Doctrine of *non-attention* formerly examined, it is so evident that they discharge themselves from all real worship, as they have no colour to hide it, no shift to evade it; but a supposal of some prævious intention to serve God, when they are addressing themselves to their service: this their last reserve they themselves ruine, by their Doctrine concerning the *end* of worship. For they teach (besides what is premised) that a man who comes to Masse, or Divine service; with a purpose not to worship God, but to serve his Lusts, doth satisfie the Precept. (a) *We are not obliged* (saith Soto) *to hear Masse but only so, that it may be a humane act, which it may be, though there be a sinister intention in it.* Yea though the thing intended be a sin, and that highly criminal, for he adds (b) *if one attend prayer, though he do it for vain glory* (that is a small matter to stick at) *yea though it be with a purpose mortally wicked, yet he fulfills the precept substantially.* Such are the commands of the Church of Rome for her most Sacred worship, they may be fully satisfied by deadly wickedness, there needs no purity of heart or hand for her Devotions; a design damnably evil will serve the turn. *That of Antoninus* (saith Navarre) *is not to be maintained, that he doth not satisfie the precept, who comes to Church principally to look on a handsome Woman, or to talk with her, or for any other sinful thing.* If a man in going to Masse, designs to satisfie his curiosity, or his lust, or any thing else which is wicked: that Church is so good natur'd, she will be satisfied with it, and think

(a) *Præceptum audiendi missam non obligat, nisi taliter audire, ut sit actus humanus: qualis esse potest, etiamsi aliud simul ad sit finis propositum.* de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5.

(b) *Quod si quis attente oret, quamvis id faciat adjunctam habens vanam gloriam, imo quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfacet præcepto, quantum ad substantiam: ita ut non teneatur officium iterare.* Ibid.

(c) *Non tamen est tenendum illud, S. Antonini, scilicet, cum qui ecclesiam a lit principio, liter ad videndum, aut alloquendam feminam pu'chram, aut ob aliud quodvis illicitum, non satisfacere huic præcepto.* cap. 21. n. 7. with him concurs Medina. *Addendum hoc est pravam intentionem adjunctam voluntati audiendi missam, non esse contrariam implementationi hujus præcepti.* Itaque quamvis quis eat ad ecclesiam ex libidinosa intentione videndi feminam, vel etiamsi officio missæ cum eadem intentione assistat, tamen si non excludat voluntatem implendi hoc præceptum. & sufficienter sit attentus, implet illud. Ita Medina in Suarez. tom. 3. de sp. 88. Sect. 3.

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her precept for worship well observed, and you must believe (if you can) that she is a good *Christian-Church*, that will have Christ worshipped at this rate. He adds reason for it, a (d) *man may come to Church for a wicked end, and yet hear Masse well enough there.*

(*) *Bonacina*, instances in several sorts of wickedness, whereby the command for worship may be fulfilled. This is one amongst the rest, if a man go to Church on purpose to gaze on, or to lust after Women lecherously, he satisfies the precept, and for the general Rule vouches not only *Sotus*, *Navar*, *Medina*, and others of greatest Reputation in their Church; but also their Angelical Saint *Thomas*.

I need not censure these things, let those that are impartial consider the premises, and see if this be not their sense, that the people in the Papacy, by its order, do not, or are not obliged to give God any real worship in publick: and by their leaders, are taught and encouraged instead of worship, to present him with *grosse wickedness*. If the measures of Religion may be best taken by its *worship*, what can any indifferent person judge of Popery; where a service so palpably *irreligious*, is the best and the most excellent worship they have? if this were duly considered, I think it alone, might be sufficient to reduce those, that are deluded; and to secure those against Temptations, who are not yet ensnared.

SECT. 4. There is another publick exercise which Christ makes as necessary, as any Evangelical service what-ever, and that is *Preaching and hearing* the word of God. But the Romanists are not of his mind, in this. (e) *The Masse is commanded, but not Preaching* saith *Sylvester*, and he one of the order of Predicants. Accordingly hearing Masse is commanded, but hearing Sermons is only matter of *Advice* (saith (f) another) which may be neglected without imputation of sin, and if observed, is an act of *Supererogation*.

(d) *Potest quis malo fine ecclesiam adire, & bene in ea missam audire. Ibid. p. 469.*

* *Qui ecclesiam adit causa videndi, vel etiam concupiscendi libidinosæ feminas--satisfacit. De legib. Disp. 1. q. 1. p. 9. n. 1.*

(e) *Cum missa sit sub præcepto, non prædicatio. Sum. v. Domin. n. 8. Audire missam est in præcepto; audire autem concionem non ita. Suar. 13. tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 1. vid. v. 2. de test.*

(f) *Audire prædicationem in festis non est de præcepto simpliciter, patet per prædicta; ac etiam nullo jure cavetur, sed solum de missa, Sum. Rosell. Dominic. n. 4.*

They conclude it no *duty* in such circumstances where it would be counted necessary, if ever; it is no duty on the Lords day, (g) or any other time set apart for the publick worship. Masse must be heard then, but no need to hear a Sermon. If it were any mans *duty* in their account, it would be so in that case, when one wants the knowledge which is necessary to Salvation, and hath opportunity to get it by hearing: but even then they declare him not obliged. *Sylvester* propounds the case in these terms. *(h) Doth he sin mortally, who is ignorant of those common things, which are necessary to Salvation; and may hear Sermons, but doth not?* he answers. *He so sins, who omits it out of contempt, or with notorious scandal, but not-alwayes, when it is out of negligence; because according to Aquinas, negligence is not mortal, unless something be omitted which is under precept, or with contempt.* Adding, such negligence may possibly be a mortal sin, *but when it is so, it cannot be determined.* It seems no man can tell when it will be a crime, for a person damnably ignorant, to neglect the means of instruction; but more briefly, and positively he resolves it elsewhere, that he is not commanded to hear a Sermon upon the Lords-day; although he be ignorant of those things which are necessary to Salvation, because he may otherwise satisfie the precept for learning.

(g) Jac. de Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. 15. Sotus & Covarruvias. Navar. c. 21. n. 1. *Missæ audienda diebus festis ex præcepto, non tamen concio, non preces fundendæ; non exercendus alius altus cultus divini, ex præcepto. (excipe diem paschatis, quo sumenda est Eucharistia)* Viñorel ibid. ad. l. 4. c. 25. p. 693.

Dico nullum esse præceptum, quod obliget in rigore, ac per se ad audiendam concionem in die festo. Ita supponunt ut clarum Doctores Omnes, & constat ex communi usu, & sensu fidei. Item quia nullibi extat hoc præceptum, præterea est optimum argumentum, quia si fideles tenerentur audire concionem sacram, pastores ecclesiæ tenerentur providere, ut omnibus diebus Dominicis & festis fieret concio in ecclesia. Pastores autem ad hoc non tenentur, nec de facto ita fit. Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 16. n. 6.

(h) Queritur, utrum peccet mortaliter, qui ignorat communia necessaria ad salutem, & potest audire prædicationem, & non audit? Et dico quod sic, si hoc facit ex contemptu vel ex scandalo notabili: non autem semper si omittit ex negligentia, quia secundum S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 54. negligentia non est mortale, nisi omittatur aliquid, quod sit sub præcepto vel ratione contemptus. v. prædicat. n. 6. quando hoc fit, non potest sermone determinari. Ibid.

(i) Etiam si talis habeat ignorantiam necessarium ad salutem, quia alias poterit implere præceptum de addiscendo. v. Dominic. n. 8.

Señ. 5. As to the *Sacraments*, and the worship in them, the dispatch may be quick, there are none considerable here, but Baptism and the Eucharist, for their other five are not of Divine appointment, nor the worship of God, but their own inventions, and therefore how needful so ever they count them, thereby they make no true worship necessary. But indeed none of them are in their own account necessary to Salvation, save only *Penance*, and that we shall meet with hereafter. What worship they will have in the *Eucharist* is sufficiently discovered, by what they are satisfied with in the *Mass*, where we have found them contented with none at all, or that which is worse than none. Neither do they account this Sacrament simply necessary, for although it be required that they Communicate once a year; yet that is but by humane Law or Custome as they teach. (k) *The Sacrament of the Eucharist saith Canus, is not a Sacrament of necessity.*

For *Baptism*, if they account any worship necessary, it must be either in respect of the *Administrator*, or the *Baptized*, as to the former none with them is needful. (a) For by their Doctrine it may be validly Administred by any Man, or Woman, or one that is both; yea or by a Child, by those also that are strangers, or enemies to all Christian worship, by *Jews, Pagans or Infidels of any sort*, by such as worship not the true God (as *Sylvester* tells us out of *Aquinas, Paludanus* and their Churches Law.) By such as believe that Baptism is good for naught, and minister it in scorn. By such as believe that it is not a Sacrament, that it hath no spiritual vertue, and intend not, while they Baptize, to Administer a Sacrament, but only think to do, as the Church does; al-

(k) *Sermo est de Eucharistiae Sacramento, quod non est Sacramentum necessitatis. pars. 5. relist. de pœnit. p. 892. Many of them count it not necessary by vertue of any Divine Precept, and so not requisite jure divino. Est prima opinio negans esse præceptum jure divino quam tenuit, Alexander A'ensis, D. Thomas Carthusianus, Palacius, Bonaventura, Gabriel. Sylvester, Ferrariensis, Cajetan. in Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 69. Sect. 1. p. 879.*

(a) *Sum. v. Baptism. 3. n. 1. Secundum omnes Doctores præcipue. S. Thom. & Pet. de Pal omnis homo dare potest Baptisma — si sit clericus aut laicus, vir aut mulier, aut interque simul i. e. Hermaphroditus.*

Etiamsi esset infidelis, i. e. Judæus aut paganus.

Dicit S. Tho. quod quavis ille qui non credit baptisma esse Sacramentum, aut habere aliquam spirituales virtutem, non intendat dum baptizat conferre Sacramentum, tamen intendit facere quandoque quod facit ecclesia; etiamsi illud reputet nihil esse.

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though they account that to be nothing at all, so (b) Aquinas, and Pope Innocent saith it will be effectual, though the Baptizer neither know nor believe what Baptism is, but counts it a trifle, though he neither know what the Church is, nor minds to do what the Church doth, but means to do the contrary. No other worship is necessary upon the account of the Ministers, but what might be expected from such as these. Nor any more upon the account of the persons Baptized. For as to the Adult (there being no pretence in reference to infants) they think it sufficiently administered by force, to those who would not endure it, but for fear of death (c) if they did not yield: to such as make all the resistance they can (d) and offer foul injury to the Sacrament, and defile the water: to those who receive it, not for the purpose for which it is intended, but for quite (e) other ends than ever it was designed for: yea to those that are Frantick and never had the use of Reason, or are (f) stark madd, and that in the height of their madness: to those also (g) that are fast asleep, if they had a mind to it when they were waking. Since they think it duly administered, to such as these, they cannot count any worship necessary herein, upon the account of the partakers, but what such as these now mentioned may offer.

SECT. 6. For fuller and more particular satisfaction, it is observable, that they divide their Sacraments into some for the Dead, and some for the Living: those for the Dead are Baptism and Penance. As to these two, some count no disposition requisite, (b) but only a willingness to receive them. Others (who would seem to be more severe)

(b) Ibid. n. 2. Innocentius dicit, quod baptismus habebit effectum, etiamsi baptizans nec sciat nec credat, quid sit baptismus, sed hoc reputet triffum, & etiamsi non sciat quod sit ecclesia, nec gerat in mente facere, quod facit ecclesia: immo si gereret contrarium scilicet non facere quod facit ecclesia sed tamen facit & formam servat, &c. (c) Id. ibid. 4. n. 10. Si consentit quis per minas vel penas habendo voluntatem coactam, coactione conditionali, eligendo scilicet potius baptizari quam mori vel aliud pari. & n. 3. Si oporteat eos ligari. (d) Vel etiam si faciant injuriam Sacramento, ut mingendo in aquam vel hujusmodi et (e) n. 10. Si Baptizetur infidelis non quia credat sed ut sanetur, vel careat fœtore, aut vexatione diabolica.---aut propter questum, ut faciunt crebro Judæi. (f) Si vero usum rationis nunquam habuit, Baptizatur in intentione parentum &c. (g) Si autem usum rationis habuit aliquando, sed non quando baptizatur, propter phrenesim vel amentiam vel dormitionem & hujusmodi, requiritur intentio que præfuit, tempore usus rationis. n. 3. (g) Dicit de dormientibus quod ratione perculsi baptizari possunt, si prius in iis apparuit voluntas baptismi: sicut de amentibus dictum est. (h) Scotus quem sequitur Sylvester sum. v. confess. 1. n. 24. count

count *Attrition* sufficient ; (which is a slender dislike of sin, not as it is an offence to God, but out of some other consideration *Humane, Natural, or Servile.*) And the lowest degree of this possible ; and that dispatch't in a *moment* ; and this moment need not be, while they are at these Sacraments, *but either (i) before or after.* Their Penitents (*) may make their Confession with laughter instead of grief ; yet have as much grief at their Sacrament of Penance as they require, this is past doubt with them. So that it is their common Doctrine that no *good act*, or motion at all, no not so little, and low as that of *Attrition* (much less any ingenuous Reverence or Devotion ; any act of grace or holy affection) is needful, while they are at the Sacrament, either of *Baptism*, or their *Penance*.

The Sacraments of the *living* are *their* other five, *Confirmation, Orders, Matrimony, extreme Unction, and the Eucharist* : these they say were instituted for the increase of Grace, this is their proper effect ; and that they may have their effect, there is not requisite in the partakers any *actual disposition* at all, not the least inward act or motion that is good ; no, not so little as that of *attrition*, which in their account is of all others (k) *the least and lowest disposition.* And well may they count it so, since the best sort of it, with them, is but the issue of *servile fear* ; which, as such, is below the least degree of *moral goodness* ; and so far from being supernaturally good, that it is *morally evil*, as we shall see hereafter. All that is needful, is only that the partakers be in a *state of Grace*, (such as a Priest may put a sinner into who is impenitent, and never truly contrite) though he shew it not by any act in the Sacraments where, if ever, it should appear.

(i) Suar. tom. 4. dis. 20. Sect. 4. n. 19. Sylvest. ibid.

* Judicandum non erit dolore carere ob risum. potuit enim domi de illis dolere, & postea ad Sacramentum accedens, actualem penitentiam non adducere. At ad valorem & fructum percipiendum Sacramenti confessionis non requiri actualem dolorem, sed virtualem sufficere veram esse sententiam quis dubitet ? Jo. Sancius select. disp. 31. n. 8.

(k) Est minima & imperfectissima dispositio qua in ordine supernaturali requiri potest.

(1) *That the Sacraments may confer an increase of Grace, they only require an habitual disposition, i. e. that they be received in the state of Grace: this is the judgment of Aquinas and Scotus, whom the rest generally follow.* So that to partake worthily of these Sacraments, no actual disposition, no act of reverence or devotion, not any inward motion (such as should be in true worshippers) is more required or expected than in the senseless Statues which they idolize. Their souls need act or move no more as worshippers of God herein, than if they were neither Christians nor men; than if they were so far from having grace, as to have no souls. Yea, these *Sacraments* may be valid, and duly celebrated, as their Church requires they should be; while the partakers are, not only void of all *good motion* towards God; but while their souls are in motion *against* him, and all that is divine and sacred. Their minds and hearts may, during the celebration, be taken up with acts, not only of folly and vanity, but of pride, or lusts, or revenge, or infidelity, or atheism, or what is most contrary to the most holy God and his worship, and yet partake as well as the Church requires. (m) *For the precepts of their Church, concerning the administering of the Sacraments, and all other things by her enjoined, may be intirely satisfied by acts of wickedness.* So notoriously holy is that Church, by the report of her chief Writers.

Señ. 7. If they count any of their Sacraments more worthy of holier treatment than that now mentioned, it will be the *Eucharist*; for this they count more worthy than the rest, and have it in such veneration, as not only to worship Christ in it; but to worship *it* even as Christ himself; and therefore here, if ever, they will judge it requisite to shew themselves worshippers indeed. Yet for all this, what-ever

(1) *ut Sacramenta conferant augmentum gratiæ solum requirunt habituales gratiæ dispositionem, id est, quod in statu gratiæ recipiantur. Hec est sententia D. Thom. Scoti & aliorum in Suar. tom. 3. disp. 7. Sect. 4.* All that is required to put them into this state, and free them from conscience of mortal sin, (and so to give them all the disposition necessary for the *Eucharist*, and so for the other Sacraments) is their ritual confession: yet even this they may neglect lawfully, or without any great fault, as divers amongst them (and those Dominicans) determine. Cajetan. *sum v. communio. Fumus v. Paludanus, Sylvester in Ledesma de Eucharist. C. 11. Jo. de la Cruz de Eucharist. q. 5. concl. 2.* (m) *Præceptum adimpleri potest per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum ita S. Thom. Medina, Navar, & alii in Bonac. supra.*

Nam alia præcepta tum sacramentorum tum in aliis materiis, impleri possunt per actum peccaminosum Suar. ibid. disp. 70. Sect. 3. after Corduba, Soto, Covarruvius, whether it be less or more wicked, is all one, disp. 88. Sect. 3. worship

worship of this Sacrament they count needful, they conclude no true worship of Christ necessary; no, not so much as the least inward act of reverence, devotion, or honour: for this is their common Doctrine, (n) *that besides the disposition of habitual Grace, there is no precept so rigorous as to require any actual disposition for the worthy receiving of this Sacrament, so as that the omission of it can be a mortal sin.* In this all their Divines agree: so that any one may partake worthily of this Sacrament, and be free of mortal guilt, without any actual reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, while he is communicating. This one *Maxim* (wherein they all concur) quite stifles the spirit of Christianity, and bereaves it of its life and soul; it leaves nothing that can honour or please Christ, or be of any advantage to souls, needful in any Christian duty. For no good motion of mind or heart, being needful in the celebrating of this Sacrament, which requires it *more*, they cannot imagine it necessary in any other duty, of less consequence. And the want hereof being but a venial fault, there is no more necessity to have it, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which they make nothing of. In this very case, they hold that (o) *a venial sin, even in the act of communicating, will not hinder the effect of the Sacrament.* Yea, it may not be so much as a venial fault, if the vagaries of the mind, which exclude attention and reverence due to such a re-

(n) *Præter dispositionem gratiæ habitualis, nullam actualem requiri ex rigore præcepti ad dignam sumptionem hujus sacramenti, ita ut illius omisso peccatum mortale sit.* In quo conveniunt omnes Theologi. Et a fortiori patet ex eo, quod supra diximus, ad effectum hujus sacramenti nullam actualem dispositionem requiri. Ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1.

Those who seem to require some actual devotion, yet count it but a venial fault to want it, Alexander, Antonin, Sylvester, Paludan, Cajetan, in Vasquez in 3. tom. 3. disp. 206. c. 1. Not only attention and devotion are accounted needless for Communicants, but sobriety, and the use of reason: for they teach, that not only young children, and such as are half fools; but also persons so frantick, as it will be necessary to have them bound, and those also who are possessed of the Devil, and whom he has seized on for their enormous wickedness, may partake of this Sacrament, and have it duly administered to them, and that even when they are blaspheming. Jo. Sanc. disp. 38. *Imo licet arreptus quis sit a demone ob mores depravatos, & quia vivet in lenocinio, — non minus talibus ministrare tenebitur parochus Eucharistiam, n. 7. præterea ministrare tenebitur parochus licet videat obfessum sive insanum blasphemantem, n. 8.*

(o) *Peccatum veniale actu concomitans sumptionem hujus sacramenti, non impedit gratiæ & charitatis augmentum; ita de Thom. Alensis, Gabriel. Adrian. Soto, Ledesma, Victoria, Corduba, Concil. Trident; sess. 13. (7. Suar. ibid. disp. 63. Sect. 3.*

ligious act (p) be *natural*. But will it not be more than so slight a fault, *voluntarily* to abandon every good motion in the celebrating of this Sacrament? No, to decline every *good act* of mind or heart, and that voluntarily, it can be no worse, (q) *if it be without contempt, it will be no mortal fault; & that also in the judgment of all their Divines.* But though there be not any good disposition in the soul towards Christ; in partaking of his *Supper*, yet is it not necessary that vile and wicked dispositions should be excluded? No, there is no more need of this than the other. The mind and the heart may actually entertain such as are sinful; without any more danger than it rejects those that are good. It is but a slight fault (r) to *communicate out of ostentation and vain glory*; and so to nourish pride while he should be feeding upon Christ; and to design his own honour without any act of reverence for Christ: he may *let his thoughts run out upon vanity, or entertain his soul with vain delights*, without the least motion of love, or delight, or desire for Christ, without the least act of Faith in him: and may be pleasing himself with sin, in stead of grieving for it; when he hath the greatest advantage to look upon him whom he hath *pierced*. And all this he may do without any guilt, that need be repented of, or regarded. This is all the worship and honour that it is needful their souls should give to Christ, even in the *Sacrament* of his body

(p) *Excusabitur tamen homo, ab hujusmodi culpa veniali, si fortasse ex naturali tantum distractione hujusmodi attentionem omittat, ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1.*

(q) *Talis culpa (scil. voluntaria carentia actualis dispositionis) non est mortalis, secluso contemptu ex omnium sententia, ibid. disp. 61. Sect. 3.*

(r) *Dicendum videtur, si peccatum veniale sit aliquando circumstantia ipsius actus communicandi, peccatum esse veniale sic communicari v. g. si quis communicat propter ostentationem seu vanam gloriam; vel certe si actu sit in ipso peccato veniali, ut in vana aliqua cogitatione aut delectatione, & ea ratione accedat distractus, & sine debita attentione & devotione, ibid. disp. 66. Sect. 1.* Ostentation and vain-glory are here counted venial faults, because they are directly opposite to the act of communicating: and so is outward irreverence, vain prating, and gestures, inconsistent with modesty, while they are at the Sacrament, for the same reason. But other sins, not so opposite to the act, as studying a lye, or revenge, or detraction, (or uncleanness, or any the like in venial degrees) while they are communicating (though the distraction there be voluntary, and all holy fervour be thereby hindered,) are no faults at all in reference to the Sacrament. Jo. Sanc. disp. 23, alluding for it Scotus, Richardus de Sr. Viſt. Major, Adrian, Margarita Casuum, Soto, Marcella, Ledefma, Vivaldus, Coriolanus, and divers others, B. 20. 21.

and

and blood; who will have others cursed to hell, and burnt beforehand, for not giving divine worship to a Wafer. But this is not all, their Church will be satisfied with greater indignity offered to Christ than this: for they teach, *that those who communicate unworthily, to such a degree as they count sacrilege*, (and that so hainous, as they question whether it be not as tolerable, to cast that which they count their God, to be devoured by dogs; or throw it into the dirt to be trampled on; and (*) many of them are positive, that it is greater wickedness than murder or adultery, or that uncleanness against nature, which is most abominable) (u) *do fully satisfy the precept of the Church for this Communion*. Thus Soto, Corduba, Covarruvius, and others alledged by them. And this is all derived from their St. Thomas, that Maxim of his so generally received. (x) *The Law commanding an act, enjoins the substance of it, but not the manner*. By which we must understand, that the Church would have the thing done, but regards not *how* they do it, whether as Christians or as Atheists. She is indifferent as to devotion or sacrilege in her Catholicks, having something else in design, than to be concerned in the honouring of God, and the happiness of men, which so much depends upon the manner of worshipping. It is too plain to be denied, that such a treatment of holy things (to use their own words) is not at all *for the worship of God*, or the salvation of souls, but opposite to both; yet their Churches precept is intirely thereby fulfilled. So that if God have no worship, and men no salvation, yet the Church is satisfied. This and other outward acts must be visibly done, that the World may not think but they have something like Religion amongst them: but though in stead of the

(t) *An hoc peccatum sit gravius homicidio — aut adulterio, vel omnibus peccatis contra naturam: quidam enim Theologi ita existimant, ut Gabriel. Petr. Soto, Ledefina, Dominic. Soto, Suar. ibid. Sect. 2.*

(u) *Dicendum est eum qui voluntarie suscipit sacramentum Eucharistiæ, etiamsi indigne sumat, implere præceptum communicandi; etiamsi alias peccet mortaliter per sacrilegium indignæ sumpcionis. Ita tenet in specie Corduba in genere Soto, Covarruvius, qui alios referunt, ibid. disp. 70. Sect. 3.*

(x) *Ratio autem sumitur ex principio generali quod tradit D. Thom. 1.2. q. 101. art. 2. quia lex præcipiens actum, præcipit substantiam ejus non autem modum. Ibid. vid. Bonacin. and in him, besides the principal of the society, (Azorius, Valencia, Suarez, Sanchez,) A quinas, Soto, Navar, Medina, qui vero indigne, & sine devotione communicat tempore Paschatis, satisfacit præcepto de leg. d. 1. q. 1. p. 9. n. 2. & 3.*

worship due to the Divine Majesty, they perform the acts of it in such a manner, as no less dishonours and provokes him, than the crying sins of Murther or Sodomy; their Church hath full contentment, it's all she requires.

Thus we have surveyed the *Church-service* amongst the Romanists in the several parts of it, and cannot discern any *real* worship therein, to which they are obliged: but rather that all such worship of God in in publick is by their rules and orders rendred either impossible, or unnecessary.

Sett. 8. Let us inquire in the next place, whether they count it needful that God should have any worship from them in *private*: and this we may discover by what they determine concerning *Meditation, reading the Scripture, and private Prayer*. For Meditation, the Casuists speak little of it, nothing at all (that I have met with) of its necessity: it is like they reserve it for their contemplative persons, as a degree of perfection, to which others need not aspire. (*) The Perfectionists themselves may wave it, but when they will be so over-good as to supererogate, and do better than God commands them; if they judge it necessary at any time, sure it would be on those days, when such acts are most proper and requisite. But they conclude it no duty upon the *Lords-day*, or any other devoted by them, as they pretend, to the observance of God. For they generally agree that no inward worship is then required, and (a) *meditation* is discharged by name: now if they need not think of God on his own day, or any other, wherein a particular observance of him is requisite, it is ground enough to conclude, they do not count it needful to think of him at all. Who can imagine that they judge it necessary to think of God at any time, who count it needless to have God in their thoughts, when they are at his worship?

(*) Si patres, theologi — meditationem laudant & consulunt, non tamen docent esse omnibus præceptam.

(*) Ecclesiastici, Clerici, religiosi non tenentur ex vi sui status & juris divini, ad hunc meditandi, recogitandi, aut mentaliter orandi usum, vid. Suar. de Orat. ment. l. 2. c. 4. n. 7. Navar. Enchirid. de Orat. l. 20. n. 61.

(a) Neq; præcipitur cultus divinus internus qui in meditando & colendo Deo consistit. Navar. Manual. C. 13. n. 2. Non præcipitur cultus divinus interior, qui in meditatione interiori de Deo consistit, Lopez. C. 42. p. 266.

Señ. 9. As for the reading the *Word of God* in private, they are so far from esteeming this a duty, that they will scarce excuse it from a crime: all that can be obtained for it, is only a toleration, (as a thing that passeth under an ill character,) and that but in some places, and there but for some persons; with more restriction and caution than the publick Stews are tolerated by their holy Bishop in *Rome*. So much friends are they to the *Word of God*, or so little do they judge it a friend to them; they are the best Catholicks in their account, who do not desire to look into it, or to understand from God what he would have them to be: they think it advisable (*b*) that no mortal should be acquainted with more of the Scriptures than is in the Mass; where they can understand nothing, and need hear nothing of it at all.

Señ. 10. For private Prayer, it is either *vocal* or *mental*: (*a*) that which they call vocal, they generally count not necessary by any Law, either of God, or Nature, or the Church; and so all praying with Families is quite cashiered from the rank of Christian duties; there, to call upon God's name together they are not concerned, though some think the Heathen are: they count it not a duty to say so much as the (*b*) *Lords Prayer*, (if they understand but otherwise what is to be prayed for:) this is the common opinion in *Suarez*; nor do they think an (*c*) *Ave Mary* (though these are the Prayers most in request with them) more needful: they are not obliged to say it, when the publick sign is given at night for that purpose; nor need they use any vocal prayer at all, no, not so much as on the solemn days for worship. (*d*)

(*b*) *Consl. de stabiliend. Rom. sede p. 6.*

(*a*) *Vid. Suarez de Oration. l. 3. cap. 6. n. 3. 5. 8. ut ibi Medina. Uldericus dicit-- ad orationem vocalem ex divino præcepto non tenetur; sed ex statuto Ecclesiæ, quæ ministris suis missas, & horas canonicas indixit, vel etiam ex injunctiõne confessoris-- & hoc sequitur. Sum. confes. & Pila. in Sylv. v. Orat. n. 8. ut Angelus Sum. v. Orat. n. 19. (b) Videtur tamen sufficere si quis sciat-- quod debemus a Deo petere omnia bona corporis & animæ, & hujusmodi, licet nesciat Pater noster idem v. scientia, vid. Sum. Angel. v. scientia, & Suarez ibid. n. 8.*

(*c*) *Idem multo magis dicendum est de salutatione Angelica vel Salve Regina, idem, ibid. n. 11.*

(*d*) *Diebus autem festis neq; est obligatio ad orationem vocalem, n. 13. nec in principio aliquarum actionum n. 14. nec hora prandii, ne clericis quidem, n. 16. Nec quando datur signum publicum-- consuetudo recepta est ratione devotionis, non obligationis, ibid.*

But

But is *mental* prayer a duty when the other is not used? So it seems; but the question (as in all affirmative precepts) is when? (e) *Lessius* thinks it should not be put off above a month or two, that would signify too much neglect of our Salvation. It seems those that pray but once in two months do not much neglect it; but this *Jesuit* is too strait laced; that opinion is probable enough, saith one of the greatest Casuists of this age, which (f) assigns 3 times for prayer, once when we come to the perfect use of Reason (suppose (g) when they think him capable of fasting, about 21 years of age); and again at the point of death, and in the interval, when we are obliged to love God (that is once in five, or once in seven years). But is not this *Jesuit* too severe also? It may be those of other Orders will not oppress us so much, or wish us so unlike to Atheists, as to have us pray once in seven years. The *Jesuits*, though accounted most licentious, yet seldom exceed, and sometimes fall short herein of their other Divines. *Sylvester*, a *Dominican* of greatest reputation amongst the Casuists, thus determines the question after *Aquinas*, (b) *When one first comes to the use of Reason, he should pray for Gods assistance, (videtur)* he is not peremptory that he must, and speaks but conditionally too; for he adds, *If he be thus inspired*, otherwise he is not determined to that time. When then? (a) *Why the providence of God moves him to it, when it is necessary*. Thus he leaves it, and finds no other time, when a man is obliged to pray once for himself, but when he sees his soul in greatest danger, (b) which it may be

(c) *Addit Lessius obligari nos, ut non multo tempore abstinemus ab oratione: ut verbi gratia, ad mensem unum vel alterum: alioquin esset signum magnæ negligentiae propriæ salutis in Fill. t. 23. l. 2. n. 44.*

(f) *Videtur tamen salis probabilis ea sententia, quæ tria tempora assignat: primum est circa initium morale perfecti discursus, secundum articulus mortis: tertium aliquoties in vita: ut diximus de præcepto claritatis. idem. n. 43. vid. tr. 22. c. 9. n. 290. & tr. 6. c. 8. n. 208. in unum intra annum non videtur obligare, quolibet septennio est probabile.*

(g) *Communiter theologi tenent quod usque ad vigesimum: alij vigesimum primum excusantur (a jejunio). Secundum alios ad 25. annum. sum. Angeli. v. jejunium. n. 15.*

(b) *Quod tempus videtur determinatum, quantum ad instant quo quis incipit uti ratione in quo tenetur se dirigere & ordinare in Deum: & ut videtur, ejus auxilium precari, si hoc sue menti inspiretur. sum. v. orat. n. 8.*

(a) *Alias vero determinate non potest, sed divina providentia ad hoc movet, quando est necessarium. ibid.*

(b) *Quum homo videt seipsum in gravi tentatione, & periculo animæ suæ, ibid.*

he will never see. Their common doctrine is yet worse, thereby we are not bound to pray, but in the Article of Necessity; and that is, when we are in such extremity, as there is (c) *no other remedy for us*: if we judge that we can any way else obtain what we would have, we need not pray: The Law of God, or Nature makes it not then our duty. They help us to understand this by two instances, the one to shew when it is requisite to pray for our selves; the second, when for others. (d) *When a man falls into most grievous temptations, to Impatience or to Lust, if there can be no other remedy against it, but the grace of God, to be obtained by prayer, then it may be his duty.* But it seems, if he can rid himself of it any other way, or but think he can, then though the temptation be never so violent or dangerous, he needs not pray. (e) *The other is, when a man at a distance sees two ready to fight a Duel, and makes account there is no remedy, but the help of God for parting them, then he is to seek it* (which is not the case of one in a thousand). Yet if perhaps he can any otherwise more help them than by praying, he may let it alone. So that private prayer needs not be their daily practice, nor used as a Christian exercise in ordinary; but in extremity only, and cases otherwise desperate, and as the last remedy, and when there is no other indeed, or in their apprehension; it will not be

(c) *Idem dicendum est de illo qui preces ad Deum facere prætermisit eo tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium sue salutis aut proximi esse videbatur. Tunc enim lex divina naturalis ad id nos obligat, ut probavimus sequuti mentem Paludani & Sylvestri*

(d) *ubi posuimus exemplum de illo qui in gravissimam temptationem impatientie aut libidinis injectus, judicat nullum aliud remedium ad victoriam superesse, præterquam speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum.* (e) *Et de illo qui eminus intuens duos in duello confecturos manus, existimat nullum aliud esse remedium nisi speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum ad dirimendum illud duellum injustum, in his enim casibus id a Deo petere tenetur. Navar. cap. 13. n. 18.*

Lex naturalis quæ obligat aliquam preces ad Deum fundere & tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium sue salutis aut proximi esse videtur secundum Sylvestrum. Eadem obligat ad idem positum in tentatione impatientie, aut libidinis, cui videtur nullum aliud superesse remedium nisi oratio, &c. Lopez. c. 52. p. 272.

Est communis sententia, quod obligat solum pro articulo necessitatis. Duplex autem necessitas communiter proponitur: prima est propria ipsius hominis, ut si aliqua tentatione vehementer pulsatur, quam sine auxilio divino vincere non potest. (c) Alia est necessitas proximi ut si quis videat aliquos ad duellum properare, nec possit eos aliter impedire. — D. Tho. Paludar. Sylvest. Navar. Abulens. vid. Suar. l. 1. de Orat. c. 36.

(f) *Nisi forte posset aliter melius, quam per orationem suffragari Sylvest. ibid.*

a duty, but in such circumstances as do very rare'y, if ever, concurr. They are not to use it as their common repast, but as physick; not for prevention neither, but when they are already surpris'd with extream danger. And if such extremity occur not once in seven years, they need not pray for so many years; nay, perhaps it may not befall them, or they may not be apprehensive of it, while they live, and then they need not pray at all. This is not my inference only, it is their own, and acknowledged to be the consequence of their common doctrine. (g) Thereby there is no divine precept for prayer, which can oblige any directly; only by accident it may happen sometimes to be a duty, but such an accident as few may meet with. Its said expressly, that from thence it follows, (h) *that many may pass their whole lives, without ever praying to God, and this without any great fault.* It should be said, without the least fault, for where there is no obligation, there is no duty at all; and then no sin great, or little in the want of performance.

This is some of their Churches sense, but they speak it more fully, who tell us, *that mental prayer is to be reckoned amongst Counsels* (i) (which none are obliged to observe) and this by the common consent of Aquinas and their other Doctors. And accordingly, that there is (k) *no Divine Precept, or of natural Law, of it self, obliging to mental prayer, meditation,* (some peculiar engagements or occasions set apart wherein mental prayer is not concerned) and this is counted so certain, *that to teach the contrary is temerarious, because against the common use and sense of the whole Church.* So that they are not far from the sense of the Church, *who* (without excepting publick or private, men

(g) One of their greatest Divines, having acknowledged this to be their common Doctrine, thus argues, *Hoc est obligare quasi per accidens propter necessitatem contingentem & ext. insecam — qui nunquam sentiret illam vehementem & urgentem tentationem nec videret proximum in simili necessitate, nunquam teneretur orare, (h) possent ergo multam totam vitam sine oratione transigere, absque gravi peccato, Suar. l. 1. de Orat. cap. 30.* (i.) Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.

(k) Nullum invenitur præceptum divinum, seu naturalis juris obligans per se ad mentaliter orandum, meditandum, seu recogitandum. Quod ita censeo verum, ut contrarium ne temeritate doceri non possit, quia est contra communem usum, & sensum totius Ecclesie. Suar. de Orat. l. 2. c. 4. n. 5.

tal or vocal) *deny* (l) *that there is any Divine Precept in special for Prayer.* And these are not only their modern Divines, but some of the Ancients also, particularly *Alexander Alensis* (m) (the Prime of all their School Doctors) *in strictness seems to deny, that there is any proper command by Divine Law for Prayer, taking it properly, but only in a most large sense, as any pious act, or good desire may be called Prayer.* And those who would not seem to like this in general, yet allow it when they come to particulars, since they teach, that the Precept obligeth not at any such particular time, or occasion, when it would oblige, if ever. There is no command they tell us, which binds them to pray in private at *any set time* (n) *what ever.* They are not obliged to Pray when they first come to the use of Reason (o) : Nor on *common days* afterwards, not the least Prayer, not a *Pater Noster*, not once a day, no, not at their Meals, (p) even their Clergy need not do it. Nor on *Holy-days* neither, (q) no, not when they have quite neglected their service in publick. (r) Nor on their *Fasts*, though Scripture still joyns these, as all Christians, who minded Religion, were wont to do of old. Their Fasts are no more Religious for Prayer or any holy exercise, than the abstinence of their Cattle. Nor to prepare themselves for sacred or solemn employments, for their Sacraments of Penance, or else for the Eucharist (though this would but trouble them once a year), (s) *not at the beginning of any service or undertaking what-ever.* To pray at such times and occasions is *meer matter of Counsel*, (t) which none can be blamed for neglecting : Nor when a man hath *Vowed*, and solemnly promised to God, and *sworn* too, that he will pray, even then *If it*

(l) *Quidam negant dari præceptum divinum speciale de oratione, Ibid. t. c. 28. n. 1.*

(m) *Alex. Alensis in rigore videtur negare proprium præceptum jure divino datum de oratione proprie sumptis, sed solum largissime prout pia operatio vel bonum desiderium dicitur oratio. Ibid. l. 28. n. 2.*

(n) *Idem Ibid. t. 1. c. 30. n. 4. (o) Ibid. n. 9. (p) n. 5. & 7. (q) l. 3. c. 6. n. 16. n. 12.*

(r) *Antonius, Adrian. infra. Navar. cap. 21. n. 7. Bonacina de Sacrament. d. 4. q. ult. p. ult. n. 16. ibi. Barthol. ab Angelo & alij communiter. Qui non potest aut non vult, missam eo die (sesto) audire, non tenetur recitare alias orationes.*

(s) *Nulla obligatio orandi in principio aliquarum actionum, Suar. ibid. 14. (t) Hæc omnia esse consilia, n. 15. & 16.*

be but a little prayer, (u) it will be but a small fault to omit it, for all this. In short, which compriseth all, there (x) can be no certain time assigned (unless the hour of death) in which, by any precept of Religion, we are bound to worship God, or seek his help by an act of prayer, as in like case is said of an act of contrition and love to God. So Bonacina. No time for Prayer certain, none determined; but as they conjecture, perhaps, it may be a duty, when they apprehend themselves under grievous and dangerous temptations, and judge there is no remedy but prayer. This, or none at all, is the time for it by their common doctrine; and this is in effect to say, it is a duty at no time, for no person. For those under temptation may not apprehend it dangerous, or a remedy needful; as all will be ready to do, who either regard not temptations, or are pleased with them, or what they lead to. And neither these, nor any else can judge there is no other remedy but prayer; if they believe their doctrine, which offers them divers other remedies, and those more relied on than this. To mention none else, almost any of their Sacramentals (of which they have multitudes) will serve their turn, even a little Salt, (y) conjured after the mode of holy Church, may do it. Thus we see these Catholicks secured from all divine obligations to pray while they live. But they have another way to do it; for, if any apprehend themselves in dangerous temptations, and also that there is no other remedy against it but prayer, they determine; (z) that if such be ignorant that it is then a duty; or if they know it, but do not consider it, they are excused from sin, though then they neglect to pray. Now the people may well be ignorant, that they are in such case ob-

(u) *A mortali excusantur* — qui preceationem Angelicam, & alia similia parva pollicentur, etiamsi iuramento, aut voto id ipsum confirmassent. Navar. c. 18. n. 7. Secundum alios.

(x) *Non potest aliud certum tempus assignari in quo ex precepto religionis teneamur Deum colere, & auxilium ab eo per actum orationis implorare, ut in simili dictum est de actu contritionis & charitatis*, Bonacina, tom. 1. divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12.

(y) *Exorciso te creatura salis, &c.* I conjure thee Creature Salt — that thou maiest be hallowed — to drive away all the temptations of the Devil.

(z) *Quando tentationes ingruunt cum periculo succumbendi, tunc enim medium ad peccatorum veniam & auxilium impetrandum adhibendum est — quanquam a peccato divini excusantur, ignorantes, vel non advertentes ad hanc obligationem*, Bonacina divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12. ibi Medina. Navar. Malderus, Sylvester, & alij.

liged

liged, when *their* learned men scarce know it. And for those that do know it, the violence of the temptation (and the case supposeth it violent) may leave no place for consideration. However, no man considers this or other things, unless he will : and so it will be no sin to neglect prayer at that time, when only they count it a duty, unless he list. Yea, (a) *though the ignorance, or inconsiderateness be culpable, and through his own default; yet the neglect of the duty, which is thereby occasioned, they can excuse from sin.* Besides, if (b) *they should both know and consider that prayer is then their duty, yet they teach that the omission of it is then no special sin : i. no other sin then that which they should seek to avoyd by praying.* Whereby they plainly declare that there is in their account no special precept for prayer, no, not in that case wherein alone they would have it thought a duty, otherwise they would judge it a special sin then to neglect it.

Sett. 11. But though their Catholicks be thus sufficiently eased of all Obligations to private prayer, all their lives, by vertue of any Divine command, it may be there is some precept of the Church for it. Can she be content that they should live so much without God, or any acknowledgment of their dependance on him, more like Atheists than Christians? yes there's not any thing for private addresses to God amongst all her precepts; she is too indulgent to trouble them with any such thing; she requires not of them the *least* prayer, or such as are accounted *best*, not so much as a *Pater-noster*, there is no Ecclesiastical precept for this, to make it so much as a *venial fault*, not to use it, sayes (c) *Medina*, not a *Salve-Regina*, no nor an *Ave-Mary*. They have indeed a special respect to this last, and prefer it Ten to one before any other

(a) *utrum excusetur a peccato, qui præceptum aliquod non implet ob inadvertentiam, vel ignorantiam, quæ ipsius culpa contigit? — Respondeo excusari a peccato. Idem de peccat. disp. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 18. ibi Clavis Regia & alij.*

(b) *Scientes vero & advertentes graviter peccant, utpote negligentes medium ad vincendas tentationes — omisso tamen orationis tunc temporis non habet malitiam distinctam ab eo peccato quod cavere tenemur. Idem. De divin. offic. d. 1. q. 2. p. 1. n. 12. ibi (besides the chief of all the Jesuites). Medina, Sylvester, N var, Malderus.*

(c) *Nullum esse de hac re præceptum etiam Ecclesiasticum vel sub veniali, Medina de Orat. q. 10. in Suar. de Orat. l. 3. c. 6. n. 7. Solum tradidit Christus formam, non vero dedit præceptum obligans ad exercitiũ, n. 5.*

(though they might use this every minute, without ever praying once to God all their life.) And *Pope John* the 22. ordained, that thrice every Evening the Bell should sound, that every one might say an *Ave-Mary* thrice; and since it is grown a custome (and a Church custome usually stands for a Law with them) that not only at Evening, but at Noon and Morning too, a Bell should sound for the same purpose. So that this, if any, is under injunction: There is a fair shew for it, but it is no more than a shew, for they assure us, *this is only a (d) voluntary Devotion, and hath nothing of Obligation in it.* Those that never use this and such prayers, *it is*, they say, *a shrewd sign, they do not live well, but the omission thereof, is no special sin* with respect unto any precept either of God or the Church.

And is not this a very pious concession, that they are pleased to grant, that for a man never to say his prayers is a general bad sign, that he does not live as he ought, though they will by no means allow it to be any special sin? Oh! the Piety and tenderness of this Mother and head of all Churches!

If for all this, any of them should conceive themselves obliged to pray sometimes; or if without such opinion, they should find some season for private prayer, though God (as they dream) and the Church (as they know) hath prescribed none: as when a Confessor enjoys it for Penance; or out of voluntary Devotion, when they have a mind to Supererogate, and do better than God requires, upon which accounts, some of them may be found now and then very busie with their Beads: yet in these cases, there is by their principles no more need to worship God in their private, than in their publick prayers, where (as we have shewed) they account no actual observance of God at all necessary: As for the prayer enjoyed them by way of Penance, these are not necessary for them, but as their punishment; and then they pray not, for that is an act of the Soul, but this a suffering of the outward man. The Church as (they say) it cannot judge of inward acts, so it cannot order them to be penal. And the Male-factors here being their own executioners; as there is no need,

(d) *Consuetudo recepta est ratione devotionis, non obligationis --- si hæc nunquam recideret, magnum indicium est, ipsum non recte vivere, etiamsi omisso illa speciale peccatum non sit.* Idem. ibid.

so there is no fear, that they will punish their Souls; but leave them untouched, unconcerned, what ever their lips, or fingers, or Beads may suffer, by that grievous penalty of praying. But it were well, if God did not suffer more by such abuse of his name and worship, than those malefactors, who count it a suffering to do any thing like his service. And it sounds not well, that prayer must pass for a punishment. It is as *Damascen* defines it, and they after him, *the ascent of the mind unto God.* (e) Now is the approach of the Soul to God a punishment? One would think the Devils should think better of it; for the misery of Hell is distance from God, without hopes of having access to him. But they can solve the difficulty well enough; for they mean not do any such thing as praying in the case, but only to suffer some thing, which they call so. Their care and pains is about their Beads, not their Souls: if they keep but count, and bring in the full tale which the Confessor enjoins: though in as many *Crowns* and *Rosaries*, as there are *Ave-Maries*, in each Ten thousand times over, they have not one thought of God, nor the least motion of mind or heart towards him: yet they give full satisfaction, and undergoe all they were adjudged to.

In their *voluntary* prayers, there is less of worship required than the other, if there can be less than none. For (f) when they need not use such prayers, unless they please, they may do it as they list: it being no duty enjoined, the manner of performance is arbitrary, and wholly at discretion. Hence those who think something (of some sort) of attention requisite in commanded prayers count none at all necessary in these; no not that which is *Superficial*, not so little of that as they call *verbal*. So that if herein, they mind nothing at all, wherein worshippers at prayer are concerned, not so little as the bare words; yet they acquit themselves well enough, yea if this neglect of all be wil-

(e) *Oratio in genere sumpta est a sensu mentis ad Deum & hoc essentialiter includit Idem. ibid. c. 4. n. 4.*

(f) *Orationes voluntariae -- cum penitus omitti possent, consequitur quod evagatio mentis Tollens attentionem non inducit peccatum mortale. Graff. part. 1. l. 2 c. 51. n. 11.*

ful, (g) and the mind not only run of its own accord, but be sent away and employed about something else on set purpose; it will but be at worst a slight fault.

Sect. 12. In this fashion they would have us suppose that God may be worshipped, when there is neither inward nor outward Observance of him. Inward he hath none, when the mind is departed from him, and the heart with it. Outward he hath none, unless merely in shew, when the mind directs it not to, and designs it not for him: which is never done, when he is not minded. In fine by the Doctrine of the *Romanists* (to say nothing of the Idolatry or Superstition of their service) it is unnecessary that God should have any real worship either publick or private: unless God can be said to be truly worshipped, without the love or fear of God, without acts of wisdom or affection, without Reverence or Devotion, without sincere or honest intentions; or with designs of wickedness; without knowing what they do, or heeding what they are about; without mind, or heart, yea or body either, unless in mere shew, this is apparent by the premisses. The people (as they think) worship God well enough at this rate; their leaders teach them, no more is needful; their Church by confining their service to an unknown Tongue, makes it necessary for their Divines thus to teach, and unavoydable for the people to worship no otherwise. Now what a Church is this, or of what Religion that makes the real worship of God, and of Jesus Christ to be needless, and takes an effectual course, that he should have none? Let those who are of their Communion, or tempted to it, consider it seriously, and in the fear of God. Is it the way to Salvation to be without Religion? is there any Religion indeed, where it is made needless to worship God really, when worship is as essential to Religion, as a Soul is to a man? They may by joining with them, greaten a party and promote the interest of a faction, which carries on other designs under Religious pretences,

(g) *ubi autem libere & citra obligationem oratur, Sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare distractio etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adfit, nunquam erit mortalis.* Soro de just. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. in fin. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. c. 51. n. 11. Gabriel. ibi. Angel. v. hor. n. 27. Bonacin. de divin. offic. disp. 1. q. 3. p. 2. Sect. 2. n. 7. ibi. Maldarus & alij.

without regard of God, as to his worship and honour, or to the Souls of men, as to their happiness, and the true way to it: but if they follow the conduct of the *Roman Doctrine*, and worship of God no otherwise than these would have them; they may be of the *Roman Profession*, and yet of no Religion. If a man have a mind to trouble himself with none of the realities of Christianity, and yet to pass for Religious enough, in the opinion of so much of the world as is Papal, and will hang his Soul upon so common Reputation, Popery is contrived to allure and gratifie him; and he may safely venture on it, if Damnation be not dangerous, or if he can escape it by an opinion or shew of worshipping God, and being Religious without reality.

CHAP. II.

Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their Doctrine.

SECT. I. **K**nowledge is the foundation of almost all that is saving: of Faith, Holiness, Obedience, Worship: it is the groundwork, without which scarce a stone can be laid in the whole structure of Salvation. No saving faith without it, *Rom.* 10. 14. There can be no love to, or hope in an unknown object. There can be no fear, no desire of what we know not. There can be no true worship of God, unless that of the *Samaritans* was such, who worshipped *they knew not what*. There can be no obedience without knowing whom, what, why, and for what end we obey: in brief without knowledge there is no eternal life, *Job.* 17. 3. nothing but ruine and eternal destruction, *Hosea* 4. 6. 2 *Thess.* 1.

Yet for all this, Popery decries knowledge, as that which is unnecessary for the people, and extolls the want of it, as that which is essential to their faith (a) (*Bellarmino* faith *faith is better defined by* igno-

(a) *Per hoc fides distinguitur contra scientiam, & melius per ignorantiam quam per notitiam definitur.* l. 1 de justis. c. 7. p. 706. Sect. judicium.

rance) as that which is the Mother of their Devotion (so others declare it:) as that which is the excellency of their obedience; none comparab'e to that which they call *blind obedience*, as *Cardinal Cusanus* tells us. (b)

It sufficeth the people to know that their Church hath knowledge; and their sight is good enough, in that their Teachers have eyes, so one of their *Authours*. *In matters of faith, the people ought not to see with their own eyes, but the eyes of their Superiors.* They need not know *what they pray for*, nor *what they are to believe*, nor *what they are to do*.

1. They need not know what they are to *pray for*, or to whom, or whether they pray or not; all is muffled up in an unknown Language, and they are to venture at they know not what, nor how, nor whither. * No wonder if they direct the Lords prayer to Saints, Male or Female; and say our Father, to the Virgin Mother: and in like manner direct *Ave-Marie's* to Christ, as if they took him to be a Woman, or to be with Child (and with himself too) to be *the fruit of his own Womb*; or to be his own Mother, which the words so applied signifie. This ignorance is the dam of such Devotion, such as is both horrid and blasphemous to the highest degree of horror. And yet their great Clerks will countenance it. The wisdom of their Church hath thought it fit, that they should not be so wise, as to understand what they do, when they are serving God. The Counsel of *Trent* fulminates a Curse against those, who hold that the Masse ought to be celebrated in a known Tongue: that is, they curse those, who approve not that mode of service, which the *Apostle* condemns as (b) Barbarous, 1 *Cor.* 14. such as is not fit for God or man, they curse those who will not offer a blind Sacrifice; or blindfold. As if

(b) *Consummatia ut perfectissima obedientia. (infra) **

(a) *Laicos ad dogmata fidei quod attinet, non proprijs sed praelatorum suorum oculis, videre oportet.*

(*) *Vid. Navar. de Orat. c. 10. n. 36. & c. 12. n. 32. Spotsw. Hist. l. 2. p. 92. Molanus Theol. pract. tr. 3 c. 9. n. 6.*

(b) *Omnis Sermo qui non intelligitur barbarus judicatur. Jerom. in 1 Cor. 14.*

In Navar de horis. Canon. cap. 13. n. 4.

They are directed to address themselves to God or the Virgin Mary thus. Grant O Lord, or Lady what I ask, though I know not what.

one under the Law ought not to have seen, whether that which he offered, were a Hogg, or a Sheep; whether he Sacrificed a Lamb, or cut of a Doggs neck; whether he presented an Oblation, or offered Swines blood. They think not only the people, but even the Clergy unconcerned, to know what they say, when they speak unto God. (c) *The Clergy* (saith *Jacobus de Graffis*) *or the Laity when they are at Divine service, if they understand not what they say, they sin not.* It is so far from being their duty to serve God as *Christians*, that they need not act as *Men* in his service. If the words be but said, though with no (d) more understanding, than Mag-pyes are taught to sound them: it's as reasonable service as their Church requires; what God requires, with them is no matter. They expect not, that any should understand their service, but expert Divines, as (a) *Soto* tells us. Now it is a very small part of their Clergy that pretends to be Divines, and a small part of those few that are expert therein; it is an attainment which most of their Bishops fall short of: their common Priests are sufficiently qualified with the art of reading, nor need they be masters of that neither, the Masse-book is almost taught to read it self. For in the Missals established by *Pius* the 5th. and recognized by *Clement* the Eighth, every syllable is diversely marked, whether it is to be sounded long or short. What do we speak of Clergy or Priests? it is not necessary for their Popes to be able to understand, or to read their common prayers, themselves spare not to divulge this. It is manifest, saith *Alphonsus a Castro*; (*) *That many Popes are so illiterate, that they are utterly ignorant of the Grammar.* It seems, he may be universal Pastour, and the Teacher of the whole World, who hath not learned his Grammar: and the infallible Guide of all mortals, who understands not his own language, wherein the Articles of faith, their Lawes,

(c) *Clerici aut laici qui Divinis intersunt, si non intelligunt quæ dicunt, non peccant* l. 2. c. 51. n. 12. p. 291.

(d) *Qui hoc sit intelligere debemus uti humana ratione, non quasi avium voce cantemus. Nam & meruli pſitari & corvi & picæ & hujusmodi volucres, sepe ab hominibus docentur sonare quod nesciunt, scienter autem cantare non avi sed homini, divina voluntate concessum est.* Augustin. in ps. 13. exposit. secunda p. 103. t. 8.

(a) *Supra. l. 10 q. 5. art. 5.*

(*) *Cum constet plures Papas adeo illiteratos esse ut Grammaticam penitus ignorent.* l. 1. adevsi. Hæref. cap. 4. Edit. Paris. 1534.

Ceremonies, and Church-service is delivered. And is it not very much that two things so different as ignorance and infallibility, should have the good hap to meet together in the same person.

Señ. 2. Secondly, They need not know what they are to *believe*, they tell us they are obliged under pain of Damnation, to believe whatsoever the visible Church of Christ proposeth, as revealed by Almighty God. Now their Church proposeth for points of faith so revealed, not only what they have in Scripture; but what they have by Tradition, or by the custome of the Church in former ages; or by the consent of the Fathers; or by the decrees of Councils, or by the determination of Popes & *Cathedra*, whereby points of faith become infinitely numerous, beyond all account, which the learned amongst them can give, either to satisfy themselves or others. Yet all must be believed, and that under pain of damnation, when as it is but a very small part of them, that can be commonly known. The Articles of the Creed called the Apostles, are not the hundred part of those points, that must be believed by all, that will not be damned: and yet they generally conclude, that it is not necessary for the people to know all of those few Articles. How to believe the rest (and it may be five hundred times more) which they know nothing of, nor ever once came into their thoughts, they must make what shift they can.

However, they need not know all the Articles of the small Creed, as the chief of them teach. Not all faith *Aquinas* (a) but what is sufficient to direct to the last end. Not all faith (b) *Scotus*, but the grosse things, as, that Christ was born and suffered, and others belonging to Redemption. Not all faith *Sylvest* (and many with him) (c) but those particularly, for which the Church bath publick Solemnities. Not all faith *Bonaventure* (d) but those which we have notice of by the Church-Solemnities, or acts of the Priests, and these in him are

(a) Nec tamen necesse est cuilibet explicite credere omnes articulos fidei, sed quantum sufficit ad dirigendum in ultimum finem. dist. 25. q. 2. art. 1. vid. Sylvest. v. fides.

(b) Maxime ad illa quæ sunt grossa ad capiendum, sicut quod Christus natus est & passus, & alia quæ pertinent ad redemptionem vid. Sca. Clara, probl. 15. p. 94.

(c) ut quæ solemnizantur in ecclesia quantum ad omnes Catholicos. v. fides. n. 6.

(d) Quas cognoscere potest ex ipsis solemnitatibus, quas ecclesia celebrat, & actibus sacerdotum. 3. dist. 25. n. 26.

four, that of the Nativity, Passion, Resurrection, and Remission of sins, to which he adds another, which the sign of the cross teacheth, and wherein (e) *Angelus* followes him; so that the half and more, needs not to be known; for they reckon fourteen in all.

Others there are who require not this little, nor think it needful to know these Articles more than implicitly, that is without understanding them; so *Gulielmus Parisiensis*, and *Altiſſodorenſis* in (f) *Bannez*, *Summa Roſellæ*, after others holds (g) it enough for the simple, and perhaps all discerning people to believe, that God is the Rewarder of the good, and Punisher of the evil. A compendious Creed truly, and that which will never trouble the Conscience of a Turk, or a Heathen, the knowledge and faith of a Barbarous infidel is enough, it seems, to make a Papal Christian. Accordingly others teach, that such as are educated amongst Catholics, and are ignorant of the Trinity; are excused from the explicate knowledge thereof, especially if they want a Teacher; so *Bartholomew*, *Medina*, and *Immanuel* say, who gives this reason for it. *We cannot say, that an infinite number of Christians, otherwise good people do perish, that scarce know any thing aright of the mystery of the Trinity, and incarnation; yea judge perversly of these points, if you ask them.* And yet without the knowledge of the incarnation of Christ, there is no knowledge of the Creed, or of the

(e) De unitate & Trinitate quam ex signatione noscere possunt, cum dicant in nomine Patris & filij, &c. item de nativitate, passione & resurrectione quæ fæta prædicant: & remissione peccatorum quam ex actu presbyterorum noscere possunt. Sum. v. fides. n. 7.

(f) If a man were demanded whether Christ were born of the Virgin, and whether there were one God and three persons, he might suffice ntly answer I know not: but I believe as the Church holds. Bano. in 22. q. 2. art. 8. Sect. dabitur.

(g) Dicens quod simplicibus, & forte omnibus laicis discernentibus & adultis, sufficit credere Deum esse præmiatorem omnium bonorum & malorum omnium punitorem. Alios autem articulos sufficit credere implicite, credendo scil. verum quicquid ecclesia Catholica docet. Post. dic. l. 1. in Sylv. v. fides. n. 6.

Baptista Trovamala herein followed *Peter Caspille* and says this is *fidei mensura ad quam quilibet tenetur & quæ sufficit simplicibus & forte omnibus laicis*. Sum. Roſel. v. fides. n. 1.

(h) Quid enim dicemusne perire infinitam Christianorum, alioquin bonorum, multitudinem, qui de mysterio etiam Trinitatis, & incarnationis, vix quidquam novunt recte, immo perverse sentiunt, si interrogas? v. fides. n. 1. Ita *Ferr. Medina*. l. 1. c. 14. Sect. 2.

Gospel. *Sanctia (i) Clara* is of the same mind too, and quotes others for it.

So that by this Doctrine a man needs not know the persons in the God-head, nor the incarnation of Christ, upon which his Birth, Life, Death, Resurrection and Intercession depends, which are the sum of the Gospel. Yea, he may not only be ignorant of these Truths, the knowledge of which (if of any) is necessary to Salvation: but he may have false and perverse apprehensions of them, and yet be secure from perishing. According (k) to *Soto* and *Metina*, he that is ignorant of the Incarnation, and Trinity, because he was educated in the Mountains, without a Preacher to instruct him, will be saved, if he dye in grace (which they suppose he may have without knowledge) for an implicit faith (that is, without knowledge) will then serve his turn. *Secundum Doctores nobiles*, as noble Doctors conclude, saith *Lopez*. So that, they may have eternal life, without knowing the true God or Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent. Ignorance hereof will be invincible, that is, both inculpable in it self, and sufficient to justify the criminal issues of it, if they want a Teacher: that is, not only, if it be not possible, but if it be (l) difficult, or inconvenient to have one.

(m) The Cardinals of the Inquisition at *Rome*, will have such Confessors allowed, who hold, that persons are capable of absolution (and so supposed to be in a state of Salvation) how palpable soever their ignorance might be of the mysteries of faith; nay, though out of pure negligence, they know nothing of the mystery of the most blessed Trinity or of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. *Medina* teacheth, that if one when he is dying, acknowledge that he hath been very negli-

(i) *Deus, natura, gratia* Problem. 15.

(k) In 4^{ta} sentent. Sum. fol. 75. p. 2. quando quis laborat ignorantia invincibili fidei explicita incarnationis & Trinitatis, quia cum esset educatus in montibus, caruit predicatore, ipsum de ipsa instrueret secundum veram sententiam, cum sola fide implicita hoc est sine explicita salvabitur, si moriatur in gratia, ad quam assigquendam secundum Doctores nobiles sic ignoranti explicitam (atque est cum cæteris requisitis fides implicita) *Lopez*. c. 7. p. 45.

(l) Vid. *Sylv.* v. ignorantia. n. 5 & v. impossib. Impossibile dicitur. 1 quod simpliciter fieri non potest. 2 quod fieri potest sed cum difficultat. Juridico dicitur. 1 quod non potest fieri iuste. 2 quod non potest fieri commode.

(v) Addit. to provincial Letters. p. 100. &c. c. 2. n. 17.

gent to learn Christian Doctrine, and would not hear it, and thereby, *wants the knowledge of the mystery of the incarnation, and Trinity, and the Articles of faith*: yet to deny him Absolution would be impious. So (n) Lopez reports him, and himself (o) sayes, such an one is to be Absolved. Here is encouragement more than enough, to live and dye in gross ignorance, and those who have a mind to continue, without the knowledge of God under the name of Men; or of Christ, under the profession of Christians, have a general warranty by their Doctrine to do it.

For, the former sort of their Divines, who seem to require a knowledge of some Articles, do indeed make no more knowledge necessary, than those who require it not. For when they explain themselves, commonly such a knowing is sufficient, as is without understanding, a dark conceit, that *such things there be*, though they apprehend not at all *what they are*. Such mysterious subtilties their Doctors are pleased with: as, they have a sort of faith without knowledge, or any thought of what they believe; so a knowledge without understanding.

(p) Scotus thinks they have sufficient knowledge of the Trinity (Three persons and one nature) who can neither apprehend what a person, or a nature is. Accordingly Bonaventure saith, (q) the people may know the Trinity, by crossing themselves, since they do it in the name of the Father, &c. And by the festivals they may know the rest which is necessary to be understood. And when it is argued, that there are few but such as are expert in Divinity, who know how to distinguish, and number the Articles of the Creed, and therefore if all were bound to know them distinctly, and explicitly (*id est*, to know what they mean) few or none would be saved, which is an extream cruel saying; he in his answer grants (r) it all.

(n) *Instruct.* c. 7. p. 45. (o) p. 50. *Talis est absolvendus.*

(p) *Quis non possit concipere quid est natura & quid persona, non est necesse quod habeat actum explicitum, de articulo pertinente ad essentiam, & personarum Trinitatem distinsile, sicut habent clerici literati, sed sufficit talibus credere, sicut ecclesia credit.* vid. Sta. Cla. ibid.

(q) *Possunt nosse ex ipso actu consignationis, consignat enim in nomine patris, &c. Cognoscere possent ex ipsis solennitatibus.* ibid. n. 25.

(r) *Ibid.* n. 27.

(s) *Bellarmino* seems to make some knowledge of the Articles of the Creed necessary, but what it is, he signifies elsewhere, when he tells us that experience witnesseth *that the greatest part of the faithful, and in a manner all the Countrey people, are so far from understanding the mystery of the Trinity, and the Incarnation, and other such points necessary to Salvation, that they scarce apprehend anything besides the mere sound of the words, and yet are deservedly counted believers.*

So *Cardinal Tolet* requires in those that are to be absolved, a kind of acquaintance with some prime Articles of faith; but signifies, it will be sufficient if hearing them rehearsed, (t) they can tell us, which is an Article, and which not, and this they may do by the sound, though they understand nothing of the sense. (*) *De Grassijs* is confident, that a Confessor may make an ignorant person understand all that is necessary to Salvation, by making the sign of the Cross. And *Angelus*, who would have 3 or 4 Articles of the Creed to be known; yet concludes, if one (u) can answer of this or that Article decently, *quod sic*, it is so; it will be sufficient for him; *though he know not the Creed.*

Sylvester pretends to make more knowledge requisite than *Rosella*, but yet he determineth, (x) *That mere want of knowledge is no sin; that it*

(s) *Et sane ita esse, experientia testatur, cum maxima pars fidelium, vel propter aetatem puerilem, vel propter sexum muliebrem, vel propter ingenij hebitudinem, vel propter improbitiam literarum, & scientiarum, quales sunt pene omnes rustici, non solum non intelligant mysteria Trinitatis, & incarnationis, & similia necessaria ad salutem, sed vix quidquam animo concipiant, praeter sonum verborum; & tamen inter fideles merito numerantur.* De iustif. l. 1. c. 7. p. 705.

(t) *Sciat respondere esse mandatum vel articulum, quae sunt; non autem esse, quae non sunt.* Instruit. l. 3. c. 17.

(*) *Decif. p. 1. l. i. c. 24. n. 3. vid. infra.*

(u) *Idem possit dici de a'quo qui nescit Credo parvum, tamen si interrogaretur Deus est unus? responderet, quod sic---& sic de ceteris responderet, quod sic. Quod sufficeret sibi, licet nesciret praefatum Credo.* Sum. v. scientia.

(x) *Privatio ipsa scientiae secundum se non sit peccatum v. ignorant. n. 8. est peccatum ratione negligentiae ibid. negligentia addiscendi necessaria ad salutem, quae aliquando est mortale, licet hoc judicare sit difficile. v. acedia. n. 3. non potest sermone determinari. v. praedicat. n. 7. Supra.*

Ipamet ignorantia vincibilis non est formaliter peccatum nec commissionis, nec omissionis, &c. Bonacina de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 31. After Corduba, and many others.

is not a sin to be ignorant of what he ought to know, but upon the account of negligence; that negligence to know things necessary to Salvation may be a mortal sin sometimes, but when, it is hard to tell, yea impossible. So that here is encouragement enough to continue carelessly in ignorance of things necessary to Salvation, and to neglect saving knowledge; for when this is a mortal sin, no man can tell; and a venial fault, no man needs avoid. In short, they not only justify simple ignorance, how gross so-ever, but that which has a worse character (*ignorantia prave dispositionis*): and count it no crime not only to want the knowledge of the Articles of Faith, but out of Ignorance to entertain opinions contrary thereto. He that believes an Heresie, saith Navar, (a) out of simplicity or ignorance, because he thinks the Church holds it, and is ready to relinquish it when the Truth shall be discovered, regularly he sins not mortally. And with Alphonsus a Castro, no kind of Heresie is a sin, if it be out of ignorance, & without pertinacy, (b) If their Teachers instill such Errours into the People, and they through Ignorance, receive impressions contrary to points of Faith, and follow such Guides blindfold; therein they sin not. (c) Yea, I say more, saith Angelus, Sometimes such an error may be meritorious; for example, One hears a famous Preacher or a Bishop preach some Error, and he simply believes it, with a mind to be obedient to the Faith, but ready to be reduced; for things are to be judged of by the intention. But (d) sometimes it may be a venial fault, as when an old Woman believes the Trinity to be one Woman, and because she thinks the Church so holds, therefore believes it.

To recite the names of those who assert that the people, through ignorance, may safely follow their Teachers in Errours, would be tedi-

(1) Idem ibid. n. 9. Si præ simplicitate aut ignorantia id credit, quia sibi videtur ecclesia ita tenere, & est paratus errorem deponere quandocunque veritatem fuerit edoctus — nec peccat mortaliter regulariter, l. 11. n. 22. p. 141.

(b) Lib. 1. advers. Hæres. c. 9.

(c) Immo plus dico, quod aliquando talis error possit esse meritorius, ut puta, aliquis audit aliquem prædicatorem famosum, vel Episcopum prædicasse aliquem errorem, & simplex credit animo obediendi fidei, paratus tamen corrigi. Nam ex intentione opera judicantur cum voluntate. de sent. excom. Sum. Angel. v. fides. n. 6.

(d) Aliquando cum peccato veniali, ut puta, vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam personam: & quoniam credit Ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit, ib. ibid.

ous, they are so many: for shortness, let us take *Sanctia Clara's* word, who tells us (e) *It is now the common Opinion of their Schools and Doctors, that people erring with their Teachers, or Pastors, are wholly excused from all fault, yea, many times by so erring materially, for this Christian obedience which they owe their Pastours, they merit.* So that Ignorance of points, whose belief is with them necessary to Salvation, is so far from being a sin, that it can render Heresie sinless; yea, make the entertaining of damnable Errours, to be a meritorious belief.

We cannot expect that knowledge should be accounted necessary, where the worst sort of ignorance hath such excess of honour and privilege. It is no more necessary, nor more of it (according to their principles) *necessitate precepti*, by vertue of any *command*, than we have shewed out of their best Writers. But then the *necessitas medij*, needfulness as a means or way to life, that is none at all. For as the same *Author* tells us, and brings us abundant evidence of it, it is the (f) common doctrine of their more grave Divines, that men may now be saved; and the more (g) common Tenet of their Schools, that they may be justified without the explicit belief, and so without the knowledge of Christ himself. So that those who hold the knowledge of Christ unnecessary to *Salvation*, are many, & their most grave Divines; those that count it unnecessary to *Justification*, are the greatest number of their Doctors: put these both together, and there will be few left amongst them, and these little considerable in comparison, for number or gravity; but such as judge the knowledge of Christ needless to bring men into a saving state, for this, it will not be needful to be Christians, unless any can be Christians without the actual belief or knowledge of Christ.

Sect. 3. *Thirdly*, they need not know what they ought to do; they may be without sin, ignorant of what the Lord hath made their duty. *Adrian, Corduba, Herrera determine*, and it is the more common and received opinion, that men may be inculpably ignorant of the Law of Na-

(e) *Et videtur hodie communis sententia Scholarum & Doctorum, quod laici errantes cum suis Doctoribus aut pastoribus omnino ob omni culpa excusentur, immo multoties sit materialiter errando, ob actum obedientie, quam pastoribus suis debent, Merentur, Probem. 15. p. 99.*

(f) *Puteo placere hanc esse sententiam Doctoris, & communem. ibid. p. 90.*

(g) *Et hæc est communis in Scholis, ibid. p. 89.*

ture, and the ten Commandments, (b) as *Sancta Clara* informs us. But then, since they need not know the Rule, what have they to follow? why, the direction of *their* Teachers; and these they must follow blindfold, right or wrong: *It is one of the qualifications required in the obedience of others, but especially of the Religious* (which they would have us think to be best of all) *that it be (i) blind*: Nor should Fear of going wrong, move them to open, or use their own eyes; for if they do wander out of the way of God, after such Guides, yet they are right, and do their duty. Those who managed (k) the conference for the Romanists at *Ratisbon*, Anno 1601. maintained that *the people are so subjected to the government of their Teachers; that if they erre, the people may and ought to erre with them*. And they are not only excused from all faults, when they thus wander with *their* Teachers, but *their* obedience to *their* Pastors herein, is many times meritorious. This is the judgment not only of *Valentia, Angles, Vasquez*, but the common determination of *their* Schools in (l) *Sancta Clara*. It seems a man may deserve eternal life by leaving the way to it; and may come to Heaven meritoriously by wandering from it. What a strange thing is it, that they will not let their Catholicicks be certain of Salvation, since they cannot miss it, no not by going out of the way that leads to it? When they follow their Guide into the ditch, yet they are safe; but that's a small matter: by being willing to be led by such as see not, or mind not the way, they merit, and spring up to Heaven marvellously, even when they are falling from a precipice, and tumbling headlong after their Leaders.

The same Author tells us (m) that *some Doctors ascribe so much to the instruction of Pastors, who have care of the Flock, that if they should teach that now and then God would have them to bate him, a simple Parishioner*

(b) *Communio tamen & recepta sententia post Adrianum, & est nostri Corubæ & Hereræ & aliorum communiter, quod potest dari ignorantia invincibilis respectu legis naturæ & decalogi, Probl. 16. initio.*

(i) *Obedientiam cæcam, promptam, sortem esse par est, de his conditionibus in obedientia religiosæ præsertim requisitis bene, P. L. Victorel. ibid. ad l. 8. c. 14. p. 1158.*

(k) *Hungerus. Velferus. Hannemannus. Oretzerus. Tannerus. (l) Vid supra.*

(m) *Immo aliqui doctores tantum tribuunt instructioni pastorum, quibus incumbit cura ovium, quod si docerent hic & nunc, Deum velledio haberi, quod teneatur Parochianus iudicis eis credere. ibid. Probl. 15. p. 97.*

is bound to believe them. All think not fit to give so broad instances, but whether all have not warrant to do it by *their* common Tenet, let others judge.

However, if the people (content to trust, and not to see, what so much concerns them) suffer themselves to be deceived, they sin not, their ignorance will save them harmless. And what could any Impostor desire more than to have those whom he hath a mind to abuse to the uttermost, possessed with such a confidence, that how-ever they be deluded, it will not hurt them? Now what an admirable expedient is ignorance for the Children of this Kingdom, when by virtue of it, the Leaders may carry the people whither they list, without suspicion, the people may follow in the dark without danger? No wonder if ignorance be nourished in them by all means, when they are not concerned to know whether that which they are led to, be good, or evil, just, or unjust, against God, or for him; what-ever it be, they ought to obey at a venture. (n) *They need not so much as know whether their Leaders have power to require what they enjoy.*

If they be in doubt whether that they are led to, be against the Law, yet on they must go, for they all agree here, to drive them; (o) *secundum omnes*, saith Sylvest, *if he doubt of this, whether it be against the command of God, yet he is bound to obey*, he may venture safely. It seems, that is no danger which the Apostle speaks of, *He that doubteth is damned*. Rom. 14. 23. They alledge (p) an express Text for this in *their* Law, which will carry it against the Apostle.

(n) *Non oportet, quod sciat id ab eo juberi posse.* Nav. l. 13. n. 37.

Affirmant in omni dubio parendum esse preposito Bonavent. Paludan. Sylvest. Angelus. Socus in Vasquez. in 1. 2. tom. 1. disp. 66. l. 9.

(o) *Secundum omnes si sit de hoc dubius (illud esse contra legem Dei) — tenetur obedire: Sylvest. v. confc. n. 3. Et generaliter ubi est dubius an debeat obedire necne, tenetur obedire. Idem v. relig. 6. n. 6. Quid si prelatius precipiat aliquid quod conscientia subditi dicat esse contra legem Dei Resp. secundum Bonaventuram quod tenetur eam deponere, nisi clarum sit illud fore contra legem Dei. Sum. Angel. v. Conscient. n. 1. Quid debet facere inferior, quando dubius est, an quod ei precipitur est peccatum? dico debet obedire. Ita tenet, Sylvest. & habetur hoc expresse, (p) 13. q. 1. Can. quid culpatur ubi statuitur, cum non est certum, superiorum factum esse malum, esse obediendum: in dubiis enim debet inferior credere superiori. Tolet. Instr. l. 8. c. 15.*

And

And as that evil which God forbids, may be done by him that doubts least God hath condemned it, *so (q) that good which he hath enjoined (if Salvation can be had without it) may be neglected when Superiours will have it so; their Canonical Text saith it, which must be regarded what-ever becomes of that other, Whether it be better to obey God or men, judge you, Act. 4. 19.*

(s) Yea, if they be past doubt, that what is required is against God, if they think, if they believe it to be against his Command, yet if they believe it but upon weak grounds; yea, or if upon *probable grounds* (if they be not more certain thereof than they ought to be of *their Salvation*), they are to suppress their own judgment, and will be excused *for the goodness of such Obedience*, i. e. for obeying men rather than God, and that against *their own judgment*.

Such art is used to perswade the people, that they need see nothing they are to *do*, further than *their* Leaders would have them; if they doubt, or if they believe; if *their* eyes be opening, or if they be opened; they must shut them close, and obey men blindly, without discerning what God forbids or requires. And it is not for nothing that they deprive them of their eyes, for thus they can make them grinde. Such Ignorance is the way to have them in more subjection, and *that* they account the most perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledge, and without judgment; *that* they need not have, and *this* they must not use: a judgment of *discretion* must by no means be left the people, that is a point they would maintain against us: but as to their own followers, they put it out of question before-hand; for by keeping them without knowledge, they leave them no judgement,

(q) Immo aliquando etiam bonum, sine quo potest esse salus propter obedientiam, debet omitti. Sylv. v. obedient. n. 2.

(r) 11. q. 3. quid ergo. ibid.

(s) Si vero opinatur, ita quod nescit, nec dubitat, sed credit; distinguendum est: quia si credit ex levibus, tenetur tale iudicium deponere, &c. & obedire: & similiter si credit probabiliter, & excusatur propter obedientiam bonam. Sylvest. v. cons. n. 3.

Si non scit pro certo sed ex levi & temeraria credulitate, tunc ad consilium sui prelati, deponat. Si vero habeat credulitatem probabilem & discretam, quamvis non manifestam & evidentem: tunc propter obedientiam, faciat quod sibi precipitur, quoniam tenetur in tali dubio, & propter bonum obedientie excusatur, Sum. Angel. v. cons. n. 2.

but such as one may pass on colours in the dark. *Ribera* expresseth their sense significantly. (†) *All who are to obey, especially Religious persons, ought to have no head of their own*, (i. e.) they are to obey as if they were without eyes or brains. So he explains this worthy expression, *non suo sed rectoris sui consilio duci*. Let me but add the pregnant words of *Cardinal Cusanus*, which comprise all that I charge them with in this particular, (u) *No man (saith he) can be deceived by an ill Pastor; if thou say, Lord, I have obeyed thee in him, whom thou hast set over me, this will be sufficient for thy Salvation; for thou by obedience paid to a Teacher whom the Church tolerates, cannot be deceived, although he command what is unlawful: wherefore the opinion of the Pastor binds thee upon thy Salvation for the good of obedience, although it be unjust; for it belongs not to thee to take notice whether it be unlawful or not, neither hast thou leave not to obey, if it seem unlawful to thee; for that obedience which is irrational is the most compleat, and most perfect obedience, to wit, when one obeys, without the use of Reason, as a beast obeys his owner. A speech fit only for the mouth of the Beast and the false Prophet.*

The sum of their doctrine concerning ignorance, is little less than this; they need not be *Men*; as to their obedience; they need not be *Christians*, as to the knowledge of Christ; they need scarce be *either*, as to their worship.

SECT. 4. The ground of all this, is, that they judge the knowledge of the Scriptures unnecessary, in a manner to all sorts; yea count it necessary to keep as many as they can possibly from acquaintance therewith. They are highly concerned for this, even as much as those who have villanous delignes, and would accomplish them without observance and controul, are concerned to shun the light. They know full well

(†) *Omnes qui parent & præsertim religiosi homines debent esse sine capite*, *Comment in Amos*, p. 169.

(u) *Nemo decipi potest etiam per malum præsidem: si dixeris, Domine, obedivi tibi in præposito, hoc tibi sufficit ad salutem: tu enim per obedientiam quam facis præposito quem Ecclesia tolerat, decipi nequis, etiamsi præceperit injusta: quare sententia pastoris ligat te pro tua salute propter bonum obedientie, etiamsi injusta fuerit: nam ad te non attinet cognoscere quod sententia sit injusta, nec conceditur tibi ut non obedias, si tibi injusta videatur: obedientia irrationalis est consummata obedientia & perfectissima, scilicet quando obeditur, sicut jumentum obedit Domino suo. Epist. 2. ad Bohemos & Excitat.*

L. 1. & 6.

the Scripture condemnes Popery, we may well say they know it, when themselves confesse (x) *that both their worship and their doctrine is contrary and repugnant to Scripture*, and alledge this as the Reason, why they would have as little of the Scripture, as can be, known to any. From their own mouths we have the reason, why they would never have suffered the Bible to be exposed in a vulgar Tongue, if it could have been avoided. The Protestants Translations made that impossible, and the Papists among them, who had a *mind* to look into the word of God, might have made use of these, if no other had been provided: to prevent which, they were forced to translate it, and yet *their own Translations* (which are so strange a disguise of Scripture) they dare not trust to the common view; they are in the *Index of forbidden Books*, put out by *Pius* the fourth, and an unpardonable sin they make it for any to read them, but such as can procure a Licence for it from a Bishop or Inquisitor; that is, none but those who, they are confident, will not be moved by what they meet with there against Popery: and yet (as if so great restraint were too much liberty for so dangerous a thing as the Word of God) in the *after Edition* (*) of the *Index*, by *Clement* the Eighth, he declares, *That no new faculty is granted to Bishops or Inquisitors to grant any Licence for reading the Bible; since by the Mandate and usage of the Church of Rome, and the Universal Inquisition, all power of granting such Licences is taken away.* So far are they from thinking the knowledge of the Scriptures needful for the people; that they count it Heresie to affirm, the Scripture ought to be in a Language which they know (how can it be less than Heresie to think that needful to be known, though it be the Revelation of God which discovers Popery to be an Imposture?) It is a sin from which they shall never be absolved, if they read any thing of the Word of God in a Language which they understand, without a Licence from a Bishop or Inquisi-

(x) *Consil de stabilienda Rom. sede* p. 6.

(*) *In indice recens edito jussu Clementis 8. circa prædictam quartam regulam— nullam per hanc impressionem & editionem de novo tribui facultatem Episcopis vel inquisitoribus, aut regularium superioribus concedendi licentiam legendi biblia in vulgari lingua editæ: cum hæcenus mandato & usu S. R. E. & universalis inquisitionis, sublata eis fuerit facultas concedendi hujusmodi licentias in Azor. Inscr. Mor. pars. 1. l. 8. cap. 26.*

tor, by *Pius* his Rule; and no Bishop or Inquisitor hath any power to grant any Licence, by that of Pope *Clement*.

Knowledge of the Scripture is no more needful for Monks than other people; it is equally necessary, that they should be ignorant of the Word of God, they are under the same restraint, and (a) *are no otherwise permitted to read or buy it*. Ignorance is proper for this kind of Creature, (b) *they are for contemplation, not for knowledge*. It seems they may employ *their* heads in contemplation of they know not what: To be sure they need neither Sacred, nor any kind of literature. (c) *A Monk may be illiterate* (say they) they have that privilege by their Canon Law there quoted by *Sylvester* and others, and they generally make use of this Indulgence: For their Clergy, six parts of seven, need no more be acquainted with the Scripture than the black Art. The four first Orders are sufficiently accomplished, if they (d) *are able to read*, (according to the *Council of Trent*) the two next should understand *Latine*, i. e. the words, but not the matter, yet no necessity of either; it is not of necessity to *their* (e) *Sacrament of Order*, that any below a Bishop should have the use of Reason, when he enters into Orders.

(a) *Regulares vero, non nisi facultate a praelatis suis habita ea legere aut emere possint. Index lib. prohibita Con. Trid. 4. regula. 1. ita Pius 4. Sublata est regularium superioribus facultas concedendi licentiam. ita Clemen. 8. id. ibid.*

(b) *Contemplatione magis indigent quam scientia, Sylv. v. Clericus. 2. n. 1. Graff. l. 1. c. 15. n. 5.*

(c) *Potest monachus esse illiteratus. ut not. per gloss. 16. q. 1. ca. legi versic. instructio. Graff. ibid. facit quod legitur 16. q. 1. ubi dicit Joann. quod sufficit monacho si sit bonus, licet sit illiteratus, Sylvest. ibid.*

(d) *Nam in minoribus constitutis, sufficit scire legere, & commode pronunciare; & juxta Conc. Trid. Sess. 23. c. 11. Saltem Latinam linguam intelligere diacono, & subdiacono sufficit intelligere quæ Latine legit, licet mysteria non ita calleat, Tolet. Inst. l. 1. c. 93.*

(e) *Ordines autem majores etiam Presbyteratum posse conferri infantibus, est communis Doctrina theologorum & Canonistarum, S. Tho. Bonavent. Richard. &c. Idem. ibid. cap. 61.*

S. Tho. tenet & probat quod in solo Episcopatu requiritur usus rationis in suscipiente de necessitate consecrationis Episcopalis, Sylv. v. ordo. 4. n. 1. vid. Angel. v. ordo. 3. n. 1.

Yea, *their* Priests need not have any knowledge of the Scriptures. It is no part of *their* (f) qualification; nor doth their Office, by the Roman constitution, require it; (g) *all that belongs commonly to a Priest, is only to say Service and to say Mass; there (h) are infinite numbers made Priests, merely to read Mass (as Polydore Virgil tells us): and (i) this they may do compleatly, though they cannot so much as read without a Fescue, such as the Missal hath ready for every syllable.*

But if the Priest have a special cure, & so be a Preacher or Confessor, yet may he be both good enough without any acquaintance with the Scripture; he may Preach the Gospel after the Roman mode, without knowing the Word of God; for with them it belongs both to Deacons and Monks to Preach; yet * those need not understand any thing of Scripture, and *these* must not read it in a Language they understand, without a Licence.

The Priests in *Scotland* (*) were accounted sufficiently qualified, who, it is said, did think the New Testament to have been composed by *Martin Luther*.

The Priests even in *Italy*, (k) if they had more notice of the Author, yet scarce more acquaintance with the Contents of the New Testament, they never read it, and were much more ignorant thereof, than the silly Women amongst the *Thaborites*, as *Æneas Sylvius*, afterward Pope *Pius 2.* writes.

(f) *Ad Presbyteratum sufficit scire canones communes pœnitentiales & cætera de quibus dist. 38 quæ ipsi. Sylv. v. Cleric. 2. n. 1. Graff l. 1. c. 15. n. 5. Angelus reduces their Canons to 20 (none of which have any ground in Scripture). Sam. v. confes. 6. n. 5.*

(g) *Primum & secundum officium (viz. divinum officium & missam celebrare) commune est omnibus, reliqua vero quæ ad praxim pertinent, non nisi iis, quibus ex munere particulari incumbunt, Tol: ibid. l. 1. c. 3.*

(h) *Sunt autem infiniti, qui tantum celebrandis missis, quæ dicunt, operam dant, & ejus rei causa sacerdotes sunt, perinde quasi in ea omne consistat officium. de invent. rer. l. 4. c. 7.*

(i) *Sacerdos in quantum deputatus est ad officium divinum tenetur scire tantum de Grammatica, quod sciat verba congrue proferre, & accentuare, & quod intelligat saltem literaliter quæ legit, Graff. pars. 2. t. 1. c. 11. n. 19. (*) H. st. of. Ch. of Scot. l. 2. p. 75.*

(k) *Pudeat Italix sacerdotes, quos ne semel quidem legisse constat novam legem: apud Thaboritas vix mulierculam invenias, quæ de novo & veteri testamento respondere nescit. Comment de dict. & fact. Alfonsi regis lib. 2. Apoph. leg. 17.*

* Angel. sum. v. prædic. Sylvest. sum. v. Diacenus, n. 3. ex Paludano. Gratian. in Navar. c. 27. n. 259.

Kuow.

Knowledge of the Scriptures (*m*) was not counted necessary for their Preachers either Regular, or Secular. The chief of their Regulars were the Franciscans and Dominicans. In the rule of Fryar Francis, approved by several Popes, the Minorites (one sort of Preaching Fryars) are, amongst other other vices, to avoid *learning*, if they were illiterate

And those of the Dominicans (*n*) (the order of Fryars *Predicant*) who were rude and illiterate, did Preach notwithstanding.

As for their other Doctors (*o*) or Teachers, that which they are bound to know, is, the rudiments of faith (such as our Children (who can scarce read) will give an account of.

The Papacy had no Doctors or Divines more eminent than those of the *Sorbon*; (*p*) yet they seem little beholding to the Scripture for their Divinity. Robert Stevens in the last age conversing with those Doctors, would be asking in what part of the New Testament such or such a thing is written, but had such answers returned. They had read it in *Jerom*, or the *Decrees*, but what the New Testament was they knew not.

For a Confessor he is sufficiently qualified according to *Aquinas*, *Bonaventure* and *Albertus*, as *Sylvester* collects (*q*) if he have but read and understand (not the Bible) but *Antoninus* his Book entituled, *Defecerunt*; unless he be a mere natural or presumptuous fool: And neither will doubt of any thing (when he knows nothing,) nor enquire of

(*m*) Et non curent nescientes literas, literas discere.

(*n*) Illi rudes & illiterati predicabant. *Urspergens* in Cent. 13. Magd. Cap. 6.

(*o*) Si vero sacerdos est Doctor, tenetur scire saltem rudimenta fidei. *Graft.* decis. pars. 2. l. 1. c. 11. n. 19.

(*p*) Si illud apud Hieronymum aut in decretis legisset; quid vero novum Testamentum esset, ignorare. *Rob. Steph.* Resp. ad Censur. Theol. Paris. in Prefar.

(*q*) Secundum istos sufficientem credo, qui attente legit & intellexit *Defecerunt*: nisi sit aut naturaliter stultus, aut presumptuosus, ut non sciat dubitare, vel nolit interrogare *Sylv. sum. v. Confessor. 1. n. 2. vid. Tol. ibid. l. 3. c. 15.*

That which a Confessor is to know, is, which sins are mortal, which venial. Now this they cannot learn from Scripture, as themselves go near to acknowledge. *Valent. Tom. 2. di/p. 6. q. 18.* And so no need of Scripture for them. *vid. Angel. sum. v. confessor. 4. n. 3. Sylvest. ibid.*

others.

others. So that he may be a compleat Confessor and guide of consciences, who knowes nothing of Scripture, and little else; if he have but the wit to discern his own ignorance, and a will to learn of those that are wiser, when he can meet with them. Thus we see a Roman Priest is furnished for all points of the Office common or special, without any acquaintance with the word of God.

As to Bishops, they seem to agree, that some knowledge of the Scripture is requisite in them, and some venture to say a full and perfect knowledge of the old and new Testament signified by their Mitres; the two Horns whereof mystically demonstrate, that they understand the two Testaments both alike. And indeed since their Prælates Secular and Regular, have honour, power and plenty by the Papal contrivement, and hopes of more and greater than other professions can offer: their interest ties them so fast to it, that they may trust them (if any) with the sight of the word of God securely; and not fear that any discovery of Popish corruptions, through such a *Medium*, will make any impressions on them to their prejudice; or move them to believe, or act any thing against that which is so much *themselves*; there is no such danger in admitting these to some acquaintance with Scripture as others, who have no expectations from Religion, but for their Souls and Eternity. Nevertheless their Rules which seem to make this knowledge necessary for Bishops; are rather Counsels, than precepts, they are cautious, and will not press this too much: (for conscience enlightned sometimes proves too hard for secular interest.) And their Prælates may be easily dispensed with, if they be ignorant of Scripture, or have little notice of it. It's one of *Sylvesters* and *Angelus* questions (r) whether an ignorant Bishop sin mortally, if in his Ordination being asked whether he understand the whole Bible, he should affirm he does? this he so resolves after *Richardus a Sancto viatore*. If the Bishop be so ignorant, that he knowes not in general the Commands of God, the Articles of faith, what are virtues &

(r) *utrum peccet mortaliter Episcopus ignorans respondendo in ordinatione sua cum interrogatur utrum sciat novum & vetus Testamentum: quod scit. Resp. secundum Richardum sic. sicut ita ignarus quod nesciat in generali. mandata Dei, articulos fidei, virtutes & vitia, etiam sacramenta, quoniam tunc mentitur perniciose. Angel. sum. v. episc. n. 26. Sylv. ibid. n. 5.*

vices, and which the Sacraments; then he so sins, he lyes perniciously. Leaving us to judge that he doth not thus lye; when he solemnly affirms, that he hath as much knowledge of the old and new Testament, as the Church of Rome requires in a Bishop: if he do but know the Creed, the Ten Commandments; which are vertues and vices, and which are Sacraments, and have but some general perception of these. They will not have the Bishops burthened with too much Scripture-learning, since every Child they confirm, should have no less than this. This may pass for perfect knowledge of the Scripture, and of an Episcopal pitch, with those, who count it no imperfection, to be ignorant of that which they say, (a) doth more hurt than good, for so they are wont to blaspheme the Scriptures, or the Holy Ghost, whose inspiration they are. The Bishop of Dunkeld (*) thought he had enough of it, when he said, *I thank God I have lived well these many years, and never knew either the old or new Testament.* I content me with my Portuis, and Pontifical. Hist. of Ch. of Scotl. l. 2. p. 66. The Bishops in other Countreys thought themselves bound in conscience, to be as ignorant of the Scriptures, when they counted it a sin to read them.

Yea he that wants a sufficiency of this knowledge, though so very little or nothing be sufficient, may be dispensed with upon the account of some other quality. As for example, (b) Charity they say, will make up want of knowledge in those, who have not sufficient to make them capable of any place or dignity amongst them. Yea they may be dispensed with, though they have no better qualities than in Gerson's time, when he tells us (c) *there were none any where, that were good, or approveable for Doctrine or Practice: but all chosen were both carnal persons, and ignorant of spiritual things.*

(a) *Idem* lib. prohibet. Regul. 4. Pij. 4.

(*) Putant peccatum esse si scripturas legerint, & in lege Domini meditabundos, quasi garrulos inutilesque contemnunt. Espencæus in 1. Tim. digress. l. 2. c. 2. p. 180. &c. in Tir. c. 1. p. 486. Edit. Paris an. 1619.

(b) Magnitudo Charitatis supplet imperfectum scientiæ. Sylvest. sum. v. Cleric. 2. n. 1.

(c) Nullibi Episcopos bonos & opere & doctrina præditos eligi; sed homines carnales & spiritualium ignaros Gerson declar. defect. Ecclesæ.

So he in the Fifteen age, and about the same time *Clemangis* sayes, there were scarce any advanced to the Pontifical dignity, who had so much as superficially either read or heard or learnt the Scriptures; or who had ever touched any thing of the Bible, except the cover. *Quotusquisq; hodie est ad Pontificale culmen evectus qui sacras vel perfunctorie literas legerit, audierit, dedicerit; imo qui sacrum codicem nisi tegumento tenuis unquam attigerit? De corrupt. Eccl. Statu.*

In the age after whetein the Council of *Trent* was held, we have (in *Papyrius Masson de Episc. Urbis*) The Character of the Roman Prælates, by *Pasquil* begging the next Cardinals Cap, as being more capable thereof than the Bishops then created.

*Si impellesum atq; rude marmor,
Complures quoq; episcopos creari
Ipso me mage Saxos videbis.*

And the same age, in the Council of *Trent* where (as they boast) was the flower of all the Roman Prælates in Europe, (d) very few of

(d) The Bishops, amongst whom very few had knowledge in Theology. *Hist. Conc. Trent. lib. 2. p. 179.* It is not strange they had no skill therein. For the Italian Prælates who carried all in that Council (being many more than two to one) neither studied nor read the Scriptures (lest the word of God should sduce them from Popery) nor was Divinity their study, but the civil and Canon law, as one of them inform'd *Espencæus*. *Memini Episcopum Italum nobilem, nec vero imperitum, mihi dicere, contrarios suos a studio Theologico deterveri, & quodammodo abhorvere, ne sic fiant heretici, quasi vero hereses ex scripturarum studio nascentur. — Quam igitur artem vestrales (ait) profitentur? jwis (ait) utriusq; sed in primis Canonici in Tit. cap. 1. p. 486.*

Dudithius an eminent Bishop in that convention, calls the Prælates who prevailed there *indolito & stolidos, sed tamen impudentia & aulacia utiles.* *Epist. ad Max. 2.*

Yea the whole Synod determine, that it is not requisite to inquire concerning those who sit in Council, *utrum sint docti & utrum habeant scientiam sacrarum literarum.* In *Juel Epist. de Conc. Trid. Sect. 22.*

Dixrenus, who writ while that Council was sitting, lets us understand how ignorant all their Bishops then (few only excepted) were of the Scriptures, nor only in Italy, but other Countreys. *Hoc seculo Episcopatus & sacerdotia indottissimis hominibus, & a religione alienis deferri solent. Hodie Episcopi nostri (paucis exceptis) sacrarum literarum scientia cæteris ex populo longe inferiores sunt. De sac. Eccles. Minit. & Benef. l. b. 1. cap. 11. in fin.*

Some thought it strange, that Five Cardinals and 48 Bishops should so easily decide the most principal and important points of Religion, never decided before. Neither was their amongst these Prælates any one remarkable for learning; some of them were Lawyers, perhaps learned in that Profession, but of little understanding in Religion; few Divines, but of less than ordinary sufficiency. *Hist. of Council of Trent. l. 2. p. 163.*

the Bishops had knowledge in Theology, as Father Paul tells us; yet these only had decisive voices in that Council, and all was concluded by plurality of their Votes: when far the major part understood not the matters concluded; so that the Articles of the Roman faith were Voted *blindfold*. And yet all must be damned who believe not these points of faith: when those who made them so, were ignorant of them, and knew not what they did, when they decreed them. Such is the Romane charity, and knowledge; so burning and shining are their best lights, they will have all burned here, and in Hell too for not believing that, which the Council (for the greater part of it) understood not.

But sure, the knowledge of the Pope must be transcendent, especially, as to the Scripture, his place and office requires it, being accounted head of the whole Church (which ought to have good eyes;) and teacher of Christians (as much or more, than Peter was); and Judge in all controversies which concern Religion; and Interpreter of all difficulties in Scripture, and a more lively Oracle of God, than the Scripture it self in the things of God. Yes say they (e) the Pope ought to have far more knowledge than any other, being the President of the whole Christian Common wealth, so de Grassijs. But then he adds as to him the presumption of the Law is enough for all this, and that presumes, that all is in the Cabinet of the Popes breast (as it may well be presumed, that a skill beyond that of all Physicians is in a bold Mountebank) (f) although indeed what is quite contrary, may prove true. Accordingly the Pope may be all that they stile him, without the knowledge of a Novice in the Scripture, without any such acquaintance with it, as to pretend to the name of a Divine (though acquaintance with it be expected from none but Divines) and many that have the name, have little or nothing of the thing. The Popes think not

(e) *Papa debet habere longe majorem scientiam alijs, cum sit prepositus curie toti Christiane republice. Pro eo tamen sufficit presumptio juris, quod papa presumitur habere omnia in scrinio pectoris. Graff. l. 1. c. 15. n. 3.*

(f) *Licet de facto quandoq; possit contingere contrarium: cum memoria hominis sit labilis. id. ibid.*

Quum hoc tempore nullus sit Romæ, qui sacras literas didicerit, qua fronte aliquis eorum docere audebit, quod non didicerit? Arnulph. in Concil. Rhem.

themselves concerned at all to trouble their heads with Divinity. (*) If he be but a Canonist (as *Peter* no doubt was) he is the Apostles undoubted Successor: though he be no more a Divine than his Chair is, or can make him; and why may not the Chair inspire him with knowledge, as much as holiness? Pope *Innocent* the Tenth in our dayes (since they have been more concerned for the Reputation of the *Vatican* Throne, than as before to let Monsters of debauchery and ignorance ascend) declared (g) that he had never studied Divinity, nor was it his profession. Pope *Clement* the Eighth, began to study it when he was very old; and then not to much purpose it seems: for he could not at last decide the question that he had studied, how much soever their Church was concerned in it.

None can understand their Church prayers but expert Divines, as *Soto* tells us, he means the matter of them indeed, but Popes need not understand the words neither; for many of them do not, who pass for lawful Popes, and such can neither understand the subject nor the words of the Bible, for it is in Latine. And if *Alphonsus* deceives us not, many of them have not gone so far as their Grammar; (i) yea very many of them have been so ignorant, as they could not speak their own name in Latine. Yet such knowledge of Scripture is enough in the Roman account for the infallible Interpreter of Scriptures, the supreme Judge in all matters of faith, and the teacher of the Universe. When we are ready to wonder at this, they stop us presently, by telling us, (k) that God did make *Balaams* Ass speak.

(*) The study of the Laws, the Canon Law especially, is the nearest way (*breve compendium*) to the highest dignities in their Church, even the Popedom it self, scarce any thing being left for Divines, but *Curasies*. *Theologis nihil pene præter curata, quæ vocant sacerdotia, reliquo facto: as Espenceus informs us. in Tit. c. 1. p. 486.* And the Prelate or Pope that hath studied the Laws, needs no Divinity, because the Law is learning enough, *immo jurium (aiunt isti) bonus interpres Theologia non eget: Cur ita? quod in jure omnes disciplina includuntur. Idem. ibid. p. 487.*

(g) *S. Amour* part. 3. cap. 12.

(h) *Castrenf. hæc. c. 4. edit. Paris 1534.*

(i) *Adcoq; pleriq; literarum ignari sunt, ut vix sciant nomen suum Latine exprimere. Platina in Jul. 1. vid in Johann. 24.*

(k) *Bosius de sign. l. 16. c. 2.*

they

They seem to grant as much stupidity in a Pope, as can be imagined, but then the miracle of making an Ass speak, does patly answer that objection. Had the Bishops of Rome anciently been such ignorant dull Creatures, as many of their later Popes, and yet adored at that rate; the Heathens might have had some colour for charging the Christians with worshipping an Asses head.

As for the people, they are so farr from obliging them to get knowledge, that they either make it impossible for them to attain it, or encourage them never to looke after it. They cannot attain it, but either by reading or hearing: They must not read the Scriptures (as before;) and they cannot, or need not hear. If the Priests be ignorant (as they are allowed to be) (1) they are not able to instruct them: if they be able they need not preach, that's *sub consilio*; or the people need not hear, no nor inquire of them, in private, no, not those that are most ignorant. The further they are from all knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care, nor pains about it. *Sancta Clara*

(1) The Generals of the Regulars, and others declared to the faces of the Bishops in the Council of Trent, That the Bishops and Curats had wholly abandoned the Office of a Pastor, so that for many Hundred years the people remained without Sermons in the Church, and without the Doctrine of Divinity in the Schools. *Hist. of Council of Trent. l. 2. p. 169.*

And there also against the Regulars and Fryars (the only Preachers, beside those who had abandoned the Office) it was a general complaint. That though they were severely forbid to Preach and Teach; yet they assumed the power--- And so the flock remained without either Shepherd or Hireling---because these Preachers knew neither the need nor the capacity of the people, and least of all the occasions to teach and edifie them. Besides, the end of these Preachers, is not to edifie, but to take Alms, either for themselves or their Cloisters: which that they may obtain, they aim not to benefit the Soul, but to delight the ear, and sooth men in their pleasures, that thereby they may draw more profit: and the people instead of learning the Doctrine of Christ, learneth either novelty, or vanity at the least---That it is a clear case, that they exhort the people to nothing but to give, *ibid.*

How these things were reformed by that Council, in the Prelates, who would have the other severely forbidden to Preach, appears by *Esp. natus. Quotusquisq; prelatorum majorum, minorumve populum suum docere videtur? an illi ipsi decreti hujus autores unquam docuerunt, quorum exemplo alij ad docendum, aliaq; munera sua facienda excitarentur.---Ludimusne in re adeo serca? an potius hac decretorum speciei reformationem poscentibus, illudimus? Quid emendationis sperari possit a nobis, nostra tam recens edita non observantibus? in 1 Tim. l. 2. c. 2. p. 179.*

makes this Query. (m) *Are they not bound at least to some diligence, to free themselves from this ignorance?* he answers if it be one, who hath no knowledge of these things, which may move him to seek instruction; it is certain that no diligence, or care is required of him, especially if he do not at all doubt (i.e.) if he be confident, that he knowes well enough, and his ignorance makes him so senseless, that he discerns it not. His Reason is, *because he is not obliged to that which is impossible, and it is not possible that one should seek that, which never came into his mind* (as Angles also determines with him.) So that if knowledge never came into his mind, there is no need, that it ever should come there; and he is not bound to take the least care, or pains to make way for it.

C H A P. III.

Their Doctrine makes it needles to love God.

Love of God, or (as they had rather call it) Charity is in their account, as they seem sometimes to express themselves of greatest moment. Regeneration and spiritual life (they say) consists in it; without it no man is in the state of grace, or favour with God. This is the righteousness whereby they are justified, and their sins pardoned, i.e. abolished (for that is pardon with them:) and their Souls sanctified (for justification and sanctification is all one in their reckoning.) This is it, which is the life and spirit of all other graces and virtues (say they) without which, the best of them, are dead and unactive.

(m) *Petes, annon teneantur saltem ad faciendam diligentiam, ut ignorantia talium expungatur? Ad quod dico primo, quod si aliquis fuerit, qui nullam de his notitiam habeat, unde moveretur ad querendam de illis doctrinam, certum esse, nullam requiri industriam & sollicitudinem, saltem si nullatenus dubitavit: quia non tenetur ad id quod est impossibile: est autem impossibile, quod quis querat aliquid, quod nunquam ipsi in mentem venit. ut recte Angles Probl. 15. p. 95. vid. Bonacin. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 3. n. 3.*

things.

things, and deserve not the name of virtues. (a) And though they look not for Heaven, unless they deserve it, by their own works: yet their works they say are of no worth, without this. (b) Yea their indulgencies will not avail any thing without it. (c) So far therefore as love to God is unnecessary; so far Regeneration, and spiritual life, a saving state and reconciliation with God; justification, pardon; all graces and virtues; all their own good works, or their Churches indulgencies are unnecessary. No further need of what, either God or themselves have made necessary to salvation.

One would think, if they had any desire of Heaven, or fear of Hell, or dread of their own Purgatory: if they had any design for the salvation of Souls or any regard of what is saving: they should be tender in this point above all, and not abate any moment of its necessity. But what they do herein, let us see. Indeed they make both the *habitual* and the *actual* love of God unnecessary. First for *habitual* love, they teach, the Lord hath not at all commanded us to have the habit or principle of this love: he no where requires that we should love him habitually. (d) *certainly, saith Bellarmine, the Lord hath not commanded that we should love him from an infused habit, for Laws do not require habits.* Add to him one of the most eminent amongst the Dominicans, (e) *there is no affirmative precept for habitual love to God;* saith Melchior Canus. I need alledge no more, I find none of them questions it.

Now in that they do not make this love necessary as a *duty* they can-

(a) *Nulla virtus nec ejus actus acceptatur sine charitate; quæ sola dividit, inter filios regni & perditionis.* Sta. Clar. probl. 35. p. 244.

(b) *Nam opera quantumcumq; moraliter bona, si fiant extra charitatem in statu peccati mortiferi, absq; dubio preceunt, & mortua reputantur, quantum attinet ad gratiam & gloriam promerendam.* Nav. c. 1. n. 29.

(c) Bellarm. de penitent. l. 2. c. 14. p. 95.

(d) *Certe non præcipit ut diligamus ex habitu infuso.--leges enim de actibus dantur, non de habitibus.* Degrae. & lib. arbitr. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664.

(e) *De amicitia habituali Dei, nullum est præceptum affirmativum, pars. 4. relect. de penitent. p. 870.*

not account it necessary as a *means*. For they (f) hold that all means necessary to salvation are commanded. So that the habitual love of God by their Doctrine is no way necessary.

And this they teach not only of the habit of love, but of all other graces the (g) precepts of the Law are not for habits saith Soto, we are not (as he adds) to pay what we owe from a habit of justice or liberality. (h) When we are enjoined to live soberly and righteously, we are not required to do so out of habit, but only to do it, saith Bellarmine; and these instances they bring to shew, that we are not obliged to do any thing out of a habit or principle of love to God.

Señ. 2. Secondly, for actual love, how can they account the acts of it needful, when they make the habits or principle from whence the acts must flow, to be unnecessary? But let us view their Doctrine about this more distinctly. The acts of love are either more forrain and remote, which they call *Imperate*: or native and proper which they call *Elicite* acts.

For the former, all acts of Religion and Righteousness, that they may be truly Christians such as the Gospel requires in order to Salvation; that they may have a real tincture of Divine and supernatural goodness, and be advanced above the pitch, at which Heathen, or graceless persons may arrive: they must proceed from love to God, and be ordered and directed by it. This they sometimes not only confess, but assert. And yet notwithstanding they teach, (*) that it is

(f) Aquinas 2. 2. q. 3. art. 223. *Ea quæ sunt necessaria ad salutem cadere sub præcepto* Canus ibid. p. 857. *Ea omnia quæ necessaria sunt necessitate mediæ, censentur necessaria necessitate præcepti, licet non quæcumq; necessaria sunt necessitate præcepti, sint etiam necessaria necessitate mediæ.* Bellarm. de pæn. l. 2. c. 8. p. 935. Suarez. l. 1. de Orat. c. 29. n. 2. ex D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. & q. 3. art. 2. & 3. q. 68. a. 1.

(g) *Præceptiones legis non sunt de habitibus*—non enim jubemur persolvere debita ex habitu justitiæ, aut liberalitatis sed tantum persolvere ad justum. Nat. & Grat. l. 1. c. 21. p. 57.

(h) *Cum præcipit Deus ut justè, sobrièq; vivamus, non imperat ut ista faciamus ex habitu, sed tantum ut faciamus.* Degrat. & lib. arb. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664.

(*) *utrum tenemur conformare voluntatem in modo volendi cum Deo?* Resp. secundum Alexand. & Lombard in 1 dist. 48. quod non absolute: quoniam si homo honorat patrem suum, non ex charitate, sed ex benevolentia, non peccat: sed tenetur conditionaliter scil. si vult merei vitam æternam. Angel. sum. v. voluntas n. 6.

not needful to perform any such acts, or to observe any commands of God out of love to him. (i) *The commands of God*, saith de Grassijs, *doe not oblige us to perform them in love*, he clears his meaning by an instance. For he sins not, nor is punished of God, who gives due honour to his Parents; *although he have not the habit of piety* (and so though he do it not out of such a principal) much less (adds he) *doth the Church oblige any one to observe the command in love* (k) for if the end of the precept be love saith Cassius, *we are not forthwith bound to observe all the commands out of love*. The reason is premised, for in the opinion of Aquinas and the most grave Authours, *we are not bound to observe the end or intention of the Law-giver* (i. e. of Christ) but the means which the Law prescribes in order to it. Soto discourseth this at large, and concludes. (l) *Love being considered as the universal condition and mode of acting all vertues, and performing all obedience; such a mode of acting out of love is not commanded as when we are enjoined to honour Parents, the precept binds us not to honour them out of love to God*. This he delivers as the Doctrine of Aquinas, and finds but (m) one Doctor amongst them of opinion, that we are bound to do all out of love to God; but (n) condemns this as false and very near the Lutheran error condemned by the Council of Trent, because then all acts done without grace would be sins. So we must believe (if we will not venture to fall under the condemnation of their Council) that it is no sin not

(i) *Præcepta Dei non obligant, ut perficiantur in charitate: non enim peccat, nec a Deo punitur, qui debitum honorem impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, ergo multo minus ecclesia obligat quenquam, ut illud impleat in charitate. Decis. Aur. pars. 2. l. 3. c. 17. n. 10. p. 176. Non tamen tenemur semper operari ex charitate, sed satis est operari ex aliqua honestate morali. Suarez. l. 1. de orat. c. 30. n. 3.*

(k) *Non enim si finis præcepti charitas est, tenemur procius omnia præcepta legis implere ex charitate. -- Ex D. Thomæ, & graviorum autorum sententia ad finem legislatoris minime tentamur, sed ad media, quæ lex finis gratia consequendi præscribit. pars. 4. lect. de panit. p. 871.*

(l) *Actus charitatis consideratur ut est universalis conditio, & modus omnium virtutum. -- Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub præcepto: quod est dicere, in hoc præcepto Honora patrem & matrem, non includitur ut sint parentes ex Dei charitate honorandi: sed quid exhibeatur eis ex terior reverentia. De iust. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44.*

(m) *Dionysius Cisterciensis.*

(n) *Hec autem opinio non solum falsa, verum & errori quam proxima est Trid. Synodo Can. 7. adversus Lutheranos damnata, nempe cuncta opera, quæ extra Dei gratiam sunt, esse peccata. ibid.*

to obey God, out of love to him ; that all acts of vertue and obedience whatsoever, may be performed without sin, though they be done without love to God ; that any man Baptized may be saved, though he never act out of love to God (no, not so much as once while he lives) ; though he perform not one act of a true Christian while he is on earth. He can never perish for want of love to God, in any, or all the acts of his life ; for he will never be damned but for sin ; and to act without love to God is no sin. Thus their chief Doctors determine, and this they must all do, in conformity to the decrees of their infallible Council, and be deluded infallibly in a matter of no less consequence than the way to Heaven ; believing that they may arrive there without acts of love, filial obedience or ingenuous observance of God in any thing that he hath commanded, without ever *acting* as (and so without *being* at all) true Christians.

Sec. 3. But though they do not transgress other commands, when they observe them without Love ; yet they may violate that *special* command, which requires inward acts of Love, if at that time when this obligeth, they do not act out of Love. Some of them seem to say this, and we shall see what they make of it in the next place,

The nature and proper issue of Love, is its internal act, when the heart being possessed with a principle of divine Love, to God in Christ, actually loves him above all. If this actual Love (the inward act of it,) be not necessary ; as there will be no need of the habit, (that being but in order to acts ;) so there will be no place for the *Imperate Acts* ; for those who would have us sometimes observe other commands out of Love, yet never think this requisite, but when the precept obligeth us to actual Love. (o)

Now whether there be any command for this act of Love, or whether it oblige, or when, they are not agreed ; only in the issue, they conspire to make the Commandement of no effect.

(o) Neque hoc præceptum universum obligat ad suum ipsius modum, sed quando occurrit articulus interne diligendi. Soto. ibid.

Tenemur secundum Bonaventur. — pro loco & tempore, quam viz. tenemur exire in actum charitatis. Angeli. sum. v. voluntas. n. 6. & hoc si habemus Charitatem. Si autem non habemus, non tenemur ad hoc, sed ad æquivalens : quoniam tenemur facere quod in nobis est, ut eam habeamus, ibid.

Some of them determine, that the command to Love God with all our mind, is not obliging; which is all one, as if they should say, there is no command for it at all; thus *Stapleton*, one of the greatest Divines amongst them in his time, (p) *The precept of loving God with all our mind is doctrinal, and not binding.*

To the same effect others conclude there is no special precept of Love to God. So *Job. Samcius* (q) *There is no special command in the Law of God for this, but general*, says he. By which he would have us understand, that there is no Precept in particular for loving God, none besides those Commands that require other things; which if they be done, we are discharged from any act of Love, or inward Affection to him. *Aquinas* is vouched for this, and much alledged out of him, (r) to shew he was of this persuasion. If there be any special Precept for this affection to God, it is that which requires us to Love him with all the heart and soul, and strength: But this (as Cardinal *Cajetan* (s) declares) does not oblige to the love of Charity. And *Bannez* (t) teaches, that for natural Love, there is no special command; and so amongst them they leave no such command for any sort of Love to God at all. The command to God with all our hearts, *Maldonat* (u) will have to be a general, no special Precept.

Others of them confess there is a special command obliging us to Love God actually; but they put such a construction upon it, that it signifies little or nothing more, than if there were no such thing. They say it is requisite, that we should Love God one time or other; but what time this is needful, you will never learn of them; what period one fixeth, another unfixeth: and while they find no certain time for it, in the end they leave no place for it.

(p) *Hoc præceptum diligendi Deum ex tota mente, doctrinale est non obligatorium.* De Justific. l. 6. c. 10.

(q) (Disp. 1. n. 21. (r) 2.2. q. 44. art. 1. ad 3. & art. 4. ad 2. & art. 6. ad 2. & 484. art. 3. ad 2. (s) Comment in Deut. 16. in Catherin adv. Cajet. p. 268. (t) Sanctus, ibid.)

(u) *Respondet illud non speciale sed generale præceptum esse*, in Luc. 17. 10.

Dr. Smith against *Pet. Martyr*, so understands it. And *Sancta Clara*, quoting him, approves it as being agreeable to the Sentiment of his great Master *Scotus*, Probl. 11. p. 68.

They all agree in this, that we are not bound to Love God always actually; for say they, the Precept for it, is affirmative, and such Precepts bind not at all times.

But since we are not obliged to Love God at all times, at what determined time is this required of us? Are we to Love him after we are fallen into sin, is that the Article of Necessity? No, *Canus* (x) supposeth that this will be generally denied; that a man is obliged to Love God soon after he hath sinned.

Are we to Love Him when he vouchsafes some special favour; when he discovers his infinite goodness and amiableness, and makes the most lovely representations of himself to us? one would think, then, if any time at all, we should be obliged to Love him actually. No, saith the same *Bishop* (y) and he no Jesuite or late Casuist) *he sins not mortally, (i. e. he transgresseth no Command of God) who loves him not, how much so ever he discovers his divine goodness, and most inamoring loveliness, unless it be when it is necessary to love him.* And when shall we ever meet with the time when it is necessary, if not in such circumstances as these? if it be not needful to Love him, either when we disoblige him, or when he most obligeth us to acts of Love; if neither when he is angry with us, nor when he is well pleased, when will, when can it ever be needful?

Let us see if any others amongst them can nick this Article of time, when this Love will be necessary. Are we bound to put forth an act of Love on Holy-days; so *Scotus* thought: The time, saith he, for observing this Command, is on Holy-days, then we are to recollect our selves, and ascend in mind unto God. He would have had this Love to be a Holy-day habit at least, if not fit for every days wearing. But this is too much (say others) nor do they find any reason why this

(x) Pars. 4. releſt. de pœnit. p. 863.

(y) *Nec peccat mortaliter, qui non diligit Deum, quantumcunque divina bonitas proponatur, omne dilectione dignissima, nisi necessitatis articulus intercedat. idem de præcepto fidei & spei videre licet. Melch. Canus. ibid.*

Idem affirmat, unumquemque quoties insigne aliquod beneficium a Deo consequitur, tenni ad illud explendum, quod tamen nulla lege, neque ratione efficari evinci posse videtur, & ita non est asserendum, Navar. c. 11. n. 7.

imagination should come in the subtle Doctors head, *Camus* saith, (s) without all doubt it is to be rejected, and so they do. *Scotus* herein is borne down by the full torrent of their Doctors. I find none now that will have us obliged to Love God so often.

But since they think it too much to Love God every Holy-day, are we bound to Love him upon his own day? No; not once a week neither. (t) For though the Church oblige them to be present at his Worship, to mind things above, to praise his infinite Divinity, and to give thanks for his bounty towards them; yet in all this they are not bound to any act of Love; and *Soto* gives this reason for it, *The end of the Commandment* (which is Love) *is not commanded*. The assertion is hardly so absurd as the reason given for it; that the end, which is the principal in moral actions, should not be commanded. This is to say, that the Law do's not require to be fulfilled; for Love, which is the end of the Commandment, is by the Apostle expressly said to be *the fulfilling of the Law*. But notwithstanding all this, in this Maxim, (which is one of their chief Engines, whereby they demolish Christianity in the practice of those who profess it; make voyd the Commandments of God depriving them of their life and spirit, and leave nothing of the whole body of Religion, but the meer superficies:) (u) *Their Divines* (he tells us) *unanimously agree with Aquinas*. So that it seems the worship of God may be sufficiently discharged without any love to him. We may serve him we'l enough (as far as the Command for his Service

(s) Libere possum sine omni dubitatione negare, ibid. p. 871.

Dura videtur Scoti sententia, a quo recedit Adrianus, nempe, nos, omnibus festis diebus teneri ad illud, quia nullus est textus, nec ulla ratio, quæ id necessario concludat, & ita non videtur asserendum Nav. c. 11. n. 7. Sententia negans necessitatem hujus actus in die festo, & vera & communis est: & sumitur ex D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 122. act. 4. quatenus ait per præceptum de observatione sabbati non fuisse mandatum cultum in interiorum orationem, vel devotionem internam, nam eadem est ratio de amore, ut Cajetan. Navar. Soto, & ceteri communiter. Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 16. n. 13. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 122. art. 4. Bellarm. de cult. Storum. lib. 3. c. 10. p. 1609. Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8. Covarruvias, l. 4. varia. resol. c. 19. n. 6. Soto de iust. & jure. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.

(t) Quamvis finis Ecclesie obligantis nos interesse sacris fuit, ut superna animo meditantes, immortalis Deo, tum eo infinitam suam divinitatem, laudes dicamus, tum de sua in nos beneficentia habeamus gratias: tamen finis præcepti non cadit sub præcepto. Nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 21. p. 57.

(u) Theologi consentienter agnoscunt cum S. Thoma. ibid. c. 22. p. 54.

will have us) without any affection. In all acts of worship, there needs not any act of Love (by their doctrine) in any part, or any of the times of worship, either *their* own Holy-days, or the Lords. They have no more respect to *his* than *theirs*, nor for him in either, but serve them and him all alike; and think *they* hallow them, and honour him enough, without any motion of love in their hearts, when, (if ever it were needful in their account,) it should be most in motion. Certainly those that think not this Love due to God in his worship, think it not due to him at all.

But if it be more than needs to love God (*) once a week, are they obliged at least to love him once a year, if not at ordinary times, yet upon extraordinary or special occasions, such as more particularly seem to call for some act of Love? When they are to partake of some Sacrament, when they come to the Eucharist, or to the Sacrament of Penance (as they are to do once yearly by *their* Church orders)? No, it is not then necessary neither; (a) *it is false faith Navarre, that we are bound to fulfil this Command, when we receive any Sacrament; for it is enough, that we be not in mortal sin, or that we probably believe so, although no such actual Love be conceived in the heart. We are not bound to that Love (saith he) when we minister, or receive the Sacraments; because we are not then bound to have contrition.* Those that make such hard shifts to discharge themselves from the obligation of loving God, when ever occasion is offered, will scarce think it needful to love him upon no occasion: and what occasion can we think of, upon which it will be counted requisite, if not on these already specified? if not after sin, if not upon the receipt of mercy, if not on any day of worship, if not in any part of worship; if these be not occasions for it, who can hope they will ever meet with any? if an act of Love be not requisite once a week, or once a year, on such an account as would make it so,

(*) Vid. Suarez. Tom. 3. disp. 63. Sect. 3. p. 801. in 3. Thomæ.

(a) *Eadem ratione teneremur implere hoc mandatum quotiescunque aliquod Sacramentum recipimus — quod falsum est: satis enim est, ut non simus in mortali peccato aut probabiliter id credamus, quamvis hujusmodi adeo excessum amorem actualem animo non concipiamus.* Navar. c. 11. n. 9.

Non tamen ad id tenemur quoties administramus aut accipimus Sacramenta — quia non tenemur tunc habere contritionem, ibid. n. 8.

if any imaginable could do it ; it will not be a duty in any week, or any year, in a whole life ; those that discharge themselves of it, in such circumstances, do plainly enough discharge it for ever.

But since they would make a shew of finding some time for it, (though *their* determinations all along are pregnant with a denial of any) ; let us proceed with them a little further. If an act of Love be not due to God once a year, yet may it be a duty once in four or five years? *Soto* and *Ledesma* in *Filiutius* ventur'd to think it may be requisite once in five years, and he gives this reason for it ; (b) *Because the time is not determined, but left to the judgment of the wise ; but* (saith he) *thus wise Divines have thought.*

Thus Love to God, the greatest duty that we owe the Divine Majesty, and that which is the sum of all the rest, is left to mens arbitrement ; and if two or three reputed wise, shall judge that God is to have no love at all, or but one act of Love in a whole life ; that must be the rule, God and man must be determined by it : Man will owe no more, and the Lord must have no more. Those of *their* Divines have had the repute of wise, who thought it enough to love God once in a life time, as well as such who conceive it probable, that he should have an act of love once in five years, or once in seven, for thither it may be adjourned by our Authors leave.

The *Jansenists* charge this opinion upon the late *Jesuits*, and would have all the *odium* cast upon them : but they go about to lead us into a mistake, if they would have us believe that these, and other horrid conceits concerning an actual love to God, are confined to that Society ; they are too common amongst those Doctors who are of greatest repute, and judged free from extravagancies in *their* morality, and more tenacious of what they would have accounted the genuine doctrine of their Church.

There were many in the time of the Council of *Trent*, when Jesu-

(b) *Quia cum determinatum tempus non sit, relinquitur arbitrio sapientum. Sic autem sapientes theologi arbitrati sunt, ut Soto & Ledesma, &c. tr. 22. l. 9. n. 290. aliqui praeferant satisfieri praecepto si semel in anno eliciatur actus amoris Dei ; alij si tertio quoque anno, alij si non differatur ultra quinquennium, Petr. a S. Joseph. Sum. de 1. praecept. art. 4. (c) Tr. 6. n. 208.*

itisme was but in its Infancy, who held it enough to love God actually *but once in a life time*. One act of love (*d*) *once in a life, which some count enough*, saith Soto, and these *some*, he tells us afterwards, were very many.

In the time of Francis de Victoria, who lived till the Council of Trent had sate a year, this was the common doctrine, that a man is but obliged to love God once in his life. For upon the question, when the Precept for love obligeth? he says, *Nec videtur sufficiens solutio communis, quod tenetur semel in vita* Relect. part. 3. n. 11. *The common answer, that one is bound to it once in a life, seems not sufficient*; he speaks modestly, as one loth to dissent from the common doctrine. (that Council (who if it had been concerned for God and mens souls, as it was for other things, would have appear'd in all its thunder against such an error) mends this, as it did other matters, by establishing a doctrine which makes it needless to love God so much as once in a life: of which hereafter.)

But when is that once? They leave us at liberty for the time, so it be but before we dye. Suarez was not alone in this, as he wants not followers, so he had many that went before him in this conclusion, and those not Jesuits only; for it is grounded upon the notion which the Romish Doctors have of affirmative precepts, when the time for *their* accomplishment is not expressed. They teach, that such divine commands, divers of them are fulfilled, and have sufficient observance, if they be but obeyed *semel in vita*, once in a life-time. Those that are very cautious, express it with a *saltem*, once at least in a whole life, intimating that though more may be better, yet once is as much as is precisely needful; and this they extend to such things, as by the Lords constitution, are means necessary to salvation. (e) *There are Precepts, saith Canus, without determination of time, which oblige us to observe them some times, at least once in our life, such as are the means necessary to salvation*. But in what part of our life must it be, that the Lord must have this act of Love from us, which is enough once in the whole? Why since neither the Scripture nor the Church, say they, hath determined the time, there is no reason for one time more than another;

(d) *Semel in vita, quod quidam satis arbitrantur. de nat. & grat. l. 1. c. 22. p. 53.*

(e) *Alia vero præcepta sunt sine determinatione temporis, quæ videlicet nos obligant, ut aliquando implentur, saltem semel in vita, ut sunt media ad salutem necessariæ, pars. 4. relect. de penit. p. 968.*

it is left to a mans own discretion (*) to love God when he thinks fit ; let him but doe it before he dye, and he may take his own time, so some leave it.

But *Vasquez* would not leave it at such uncertainty, so he fixeth the period ; and that is the period of a mans life : he determines, (*) the time for loving God is when a man is at the point of death : Nor is this the doctrine of a *Jesuite* only ; for before his time, and before the Society was founded, it was the common opinion of the Romish Doctors ; so *Dominicus Soto* informs us, (f) very many bold that the time for the observing of this Command, is at the point of death ; that is (as he explains it) when there is not any time left for deserving ought of God. Now every act of Love being meritorious with them, either they contradict themselves, or by this opinion they are not bound to love God actually, till there be no time left for any acts of

(*) *Sed quæras tandem, quodnam sit tempus illud quo divina charitas obligat ante mortem ad habendam Dei dilectionem : hoc est enim, quod oppositum sentientes maxime movet ; & nos etiam plurimum torquet, quia non possumus tempus hoc in particulari certo & definite designare. Illud vero tempus, si non sit positiva lege præscriptum, prudenti arbitrio ipsius hominis, vel alterius, qui (ejus conscientia cognita) possit auxilium præstare, committendum est.*

Neque aliquam regulam certiore, aut magis particularem assignare possum, tam in hoc præcepto, quam in aliis affirmativis, præsertim circa actus, qui ad Deum ordinantur, sola ac nuda ratione naturali perspectis. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 6. n. 20.

(*) *Merito ergo diximus esse præceptum dilectionis, & solum extrema necessitate obligare, sicut præceptum contritionis, sed non quemcumque, sed tantum existentem in mortali, non suppletent suam justificationem per Sacramentum, in 3. Th. tom. 3. q. 90. art. 1. dub. 4. n. 40. So that the Command to Love God, does not oblige any but at the point of death ; nor any then who are justified ; nor any other in the state of sin, unless they cannot have the Sacrament.*

(f) *Plerique aiunt, tempus hujus præcepti, illud maxime esse, quod est articulus mortis. ibid. quando jam nullum superest tempus bene merendi de Deo. ibid.*

B-sides these many in Soto, others determine with Vasquez, that Love to God is never a duty but at the point of death. So Jo. Sanciuz hæc videtur verior sententia, disp. 1. n. 21. & in Antonin. Dian. alij velint solum obligare in articulo mortis, Verb. Charitas. And before them, others in Bonacina, alij dicunt obligare solum tempore mortis, i præcept. d. 3. q. 4. p. 2. n. 1. And we must take it to be the Opinion of all, who hold that this Precept obliges not, but when we are bound to an act of Contrition ; and they cannot maintain that none are obliged to this before the approach of death, nor any that are in the state of grace then ; no nor any that are in mortal sin, if they will use those other expedients which their general Council or other Doctors have devised, to discharge them from the obligation of a duty, to which not only the Gospel, but the law of nature binds all rational Creatures eternally.

Love

Love: We are not by this doctrine obliged to love God, till we can live no longer, and are past acting at all.

But are we then bound to love him, is it then necessary? may not a man be saved, who hath continued without Love to God all his life, if he love him not actually, neither, when he is a dying? For this observe what *Aquinas* tells us, (g) That we do not break this Command, but fulfil it, so, as to be free from all mortal guilt, ~~if we do nothing against the Love of God~~; that is, if we run not into mortal sin, and so hate him; as a Souldier satisfies his Captains command, who, though he get not the Victory, yet doth nothing against Military discipline; or as *Bonaventure* explains it, (h) *Per exclusionem affectus contrarij*, by the exclusion of the contrary affection, as if it were sufficient that he do not hate him.

(*) *Marfilius* (of great renown for learning amongst their Divines,) will have that which the command for love enjoyns, to be the keeping of Grace and Friendship with God, and the recovering of it, when lost. So that it doth not oblige to actual love, but only to the avoiding of habitual enmity and hatred of God.

But what if he hate God, and persist therein? is it not absolutely necessary, that he should beware of that? it seems not, for saith one of their Doctors, *There is no Precept that a Sinner should not persevere in enmity against God*; there is no negative Command which forbids him to persist in such hatred. It may be you do not read this (no more than I could) without some horror and trembling; and I confess, when I found *Reginaldus* quoted for this, I was ready to think, it was but the extravagancy of some singularly bold Jesuite: but upon further enquiry, I find it asserted by such whose writings have the greatest approbation of the Romish Church. *Melchior Canus*, a Dominican, a Bishop, cryed up as a most elegant, judicious, and cautious Writer too, and inferior to none of that Order, *their Angelical Doctor*

(g) *Qui in via hoc præceptum non implet (viz. perfecte). Nihil contra divinam dilectionem agens.* 22. q. 44. art. 6. ad 2dum, non peccat mortaliter.

(h) In 3. dist. 27. n. 58.

(*) *Marfilius* vir profectus inter theologos egregie doctus, l. 2. q. 18. tenet, lege hac dilectionis obligari homines, servare gratiam & amicitiam Dei, & perditam recuperare, Soto De nat. & Grat. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57.

only excepted, clearly delivers this doctrine, (i) *We are not bound by any negative Precept that we should not be Enemies of God, in respect of guilt.* He adds, *for as there is no affirmative Precept, requiring habitual friendship with God, so for habitual enmity against God in respect of guilt, there is no negative Precept that forbids it.* So that to persist in Enmity and Hatred against God, by their approved doctrine, is no sin, it is against no Command.

We need not alledge the words of any other, since this is the plain and necessary consequent of *their* common doctrine : and we must take it to be the judgment of all, who hold that it is no sin to delay contrition (*i. e.* Repentance and turning to God) in which both their Antienter School Doctors, and modern Divines agree. For while it is no duty to turn to God, habitual enmity and hatred of him will be no sin. Now contrition (and so conversion to God) they say may be deferred till death. Indeed by their doctrine it will never be a duty; for even at death the last Attrition with their Sacrament of confession, is all that is needful.

Seci. 4. However, they make it unnecessary to love God, either living or dying. For though they pretend that there is a time, some or other, when the Precept for it is obliging; and make a shew, as if then unavoidably, he that will be saved, must have an act of love for God in his heart: yet when ever that time comes in life or death, to which their several fancies have determined it; they discover to them many ways, whereby the Precept may be satisfied, without any act of love that it requires: and those which have a *mind* to be deceived with hopes of Heaven, without ever loving God while they live, may have *their* choice, which way they will be deluded, for they present them with variety. First, a natural love will serve the turn, such as a graceless man may have. For *Aquinas* determines after others, that he that

(i) *At ne simus inimici Dei secundum reatum; nullo negativo præcepto sumus affecti. Sicut enim de amicitia habituali nullum præceptum affirmativum est, sic de inimicitia, que secundum reatum est, quasi habitualis, nullum est negativum.* pars. 4. relect. de pœnit. p. 870.

(k) *Non est impossibile hoc præceptum observare, quod est de actu charitatis: quia homo potest se disponere ad charitatem habendam, & quando habuerit eam, potest ea uti.* 1. 2. q. 100. art. 10. Corp.

hath no love to God, may observe the Precept of loving him actually, by disposing himself to receive this grace; and whereas some think, that this great Precept of loving God, since Adams sin cannot be fulfilled, but in the state of grace, Navar asserts the contrary, both upon Reason and authority; because a man, by his natural power, remaining also in mortal sin, may and doth conceive God to be amiable above all, and the last end of all, and consequently can love him as such; as also, because there may be a love for God, above all, without grace, as Cajetane proves; moreover, because St. Thomas affirms that one may, without grace, fulfil the command of Loving God, as to the substance of the act, though not as to the meriting of blessedness.

Elsewhere he affirms (m) that all the Ten Commandements, and all other Precepts, may be fulfilled by him who is in mortal sin, as to the substance of the act, so as to avoid all sin that would be incurred, if they were not fulfilled; and this, according to the judgment of Aquinas, commonly (*) followed, and the sense of the Council of Trent. They assign (we see) two ways whereby the divine Precept may be fulfilled. One as to the substance of the act, so as sin is avoided, and the other as to the end of the Law-giver, so as to deserve Heaven. And they teach that any Precept may be accomplished the former way, by such as are destitute of grace. Now to observe the Command of loving God, so far as not to sin against it, is all that is required, if Bellarmins arguing

(l) Contra quod tamen facit, quod homo sola virtute naturali, etiam existens in peccato mortali, potest concipere, imo concipit, partim Deum esse super omnia diligibilem, & finem omnium ultimum, & consequenter eum ut talem diligere potest. Deinde quod datur dilectio Dei super omnia, sine gratia, ut probat Cajetanus. Præterea, quod ipsemet, S. Thomas affirmat posse quem sine gratia implere præceptum diligendi Deum quoad substantiam actus, licet non quoad meritum beatitudinis, cap. 11, n. 7. V. Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44. Col. 2.

(m) universa ista 10. præcepta & alia omnia, possunt impleri ab illo, qui est in peccato mortali, quoad substantiam actus & præcepti, & effectum evitandi novum peccatum, quod incurreret si non adimpleret illud, juxta definitionem Aquinatis communiter recepti quod Conc. Tridentinum sensir. &c. ibid. n. 17.

(*) Deum ab homine posse diligere super omnia, viribus propriis, sine auxilio gratie (dicunt), Scotus, Cajetan. Nominales, Petr. Alliaco, Ocham, Almain, Major, Durandus, apud Vasq. in 1. 2, disp. 194. cap. 1.

be good. (n) *If I sin not*; saith he, *when I love God, without degree of Love (in the judgment of St. Thomas,) certainly I am not bound in strictness to love him more: therefore, if I add another degree, I love him more than I am bound to do.* So that an unsanctified man loving God in such a degree, as not to sin against the Precept of love, hath all the affection for God that it requires: and none will be obliged to any love, but such as is natural, and may be found in a graceless heart.

Secondly, an inferiour degree of love will satistie the Command, such as is far short of what it enjoyns. (o) *He is no transgressor* (saith the Oracle of their Schools) *who attains not the intermediate degrees toward perfection, if he reach but the very lowest of all.* To (p) *keep the divine Precepts* (saith Bellarmine) *any degree of love whatsoever, is sufficient.* (q) *Any act of Love* (saith Bannes) *how remiss soever, is sufficient to fulfil all the Commands of God; neither is there any certain intenseness requisite, that one in this life may accomplish the Precept of Love to God.* The Lord requires that we love him with all our hearts, *i. e.* with all the affection our hearts can contain: they say that any the smallest degree will suffice. He enjoyns us to love him with all our might, *i. e.* as much as we can: They say it is enough to love him a little as we can; we need not love him as much as we might if we would; no more is commanded, but as little as is possible. The lowest degree of all will serve; and if we advance but another step, we supererogate, and God is beholding to us for more than is due.

Their gross mistake about the perfection of obedience in this life, intangles them in a necessity to maintain this and other impious absurdi-

(n) *Si non pecco, ex sententia S. Thomæ, si amem Deum, nisi uno gradu amoris, certum non teneor in rigore amplius amare: ----- ergo si addam alterum gradum amoris, amplius quam teneor.* De Monach. l. 2. c. 13. p. 1162.

(o) *Non est transgressor præcepti, qui non attingit ad medios perfectionis gradus, dummodo attingat ad infimum.* 2.2. q. 184. art. 3. ad secundum.

(p) *Sufficit autem quilibet charitatis gradus ut quis servet verbum, i. e. præcepta Domini.* De Purgat. l. 2. c. 3. p. 1381.

(q) *Quemlibet actum charitatis quantumlibet remissum, sufficere ad implendum omnia præcepta: neque ullam determinatam intensiorem requiri, ut aliquis in hac vita adimpleat præceptum dilectionis Dei,* in 2.2. q. 44. art. 5.

Dilectionis mandatum in quolibet gradu intentionis impleatur, for this Jo. San. acknowledges Aquinas, and near 20. more of their Divines, besides Jesuites. Disp. 1. n. 22.

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tics. For if every just person perfectly observes the Law, the least degree must be sufficient for such an observance; and when this command declared, with such circumstance of loving God *with all our hearts, mind, and strength*, doth especially puzzle them; they are concerned, either to deny its obligation, as some of them do, or to interpret it so as to make it signifie that which is next to nothing, as others. All of them are obliged to deface it one way or other, that it may not appear to confound them.

But to go on. If we are not bound to love God, save in the lowest degree, yet that degree sure should exceed our affection to all other things. No, not so neither, for they tell us commonly, *We are not obliged to love God more intensely than other things*: So Cardinal Tolet, (r) *Yea*, saith he, *sometimes we more fervently love things sensible, and the Creatures.* (s) *Navarre*, after *Aquinas*, and their Divines ancient and modern concur herein.

Its true, they say, God should be loved appreciatively (as to valuation, and in esteem) above all: but then by, *All*, they understand, not simply all things but the worst things of all. In those, (the worst of evils) he is to have the preheminance: but the Creatures are not such evils, and they may be preferred before God in most cases. By *their* doctrine, we may prefer the judgement of others, or our own before the advice of God in all matters of *meere Counsel*, and to this they have reduced the greatest part of Christian duties; and we may follow our own wills, or the will of others, rather than Gods continually, and make this the constant practice of our lives, in all those innumerable evils which they count venial. And so in the most instances by far, we may love and esteem our selves and others more than God, and yet love him enough, and not transgress the Precept. We need not love him more than all Creatures, we may love any Creature more than him, even in way of valuation; only he is to have this honour, and this will be enough, to love him more than deadly crimes; such

(r) *Quantum ad intentionem vero non tenemur sub precepto illum plus diligere: imo aliquando ferventius amamus res sensibiles & creaturas*, Instr. l. 4. c. 9. p. 614.

(s) Cap. 11. n. 6. & cap. 1. n. 4. p. 57. *Gabriel*, Major, Jo. Medina. Domin. Sorus. Navar. Sylvester. Paludanus in Vasquez in 1. 2. tom. 1. disp. 124. cap. 3. n. 13.

as declare open hostility against God : this is all the import of that great precept, which concerns us in this life, as it is expressed after *Aquinas* by (*) *Soto* and others.

Yea, to admit mortal sin, and so to love the Creature more than God, in that respect, in which alone, they say he is more to be loved, is not against this Precept. So *Navar* informs us, (u) *Indirectly*, saith he, *to love the Creature more than God, is not against this Command (of Love); because whosoever sins mortally, indirectly loves something more than God-- yet such a Delinquent doth not therefore sin against the Precept; because directly he doth nothing against it, nor acts what in it self, and in its own nature separates from God; but by accident, according to Aquinas and Scotus. So that to love the Creature more than God, and to shew it in a way, which themselves say is most repugnant to the love of God, is no transgression of this Command. To say he doth nothing against it directly, is no salvo, when that he doth, is all, which they count (if they count any thing) inconsistent with the Love commanded. He tells us further, (*) and Lopez after him, That absolutely to love God, but so much, or not so much as other things, without making any comparison, is not evil. So that if God have some affection from us, though we love him less than other things, it is no sin, no transgression of the*

(t) *Nihil divine amicitie contrarium admittat juxta Evangelicam vocem ex toto corde, &c. contrarium inquam: quoniam venialia non obstant dilectioni Dei super omnia. De nat. & grat. l. 1. c. 22. p. 56.*

Ex toto corde, idem sit quod nihil charitati adversum mentis assensu concipere. idem de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 244.

ut transgressionis delictum quis evitet, satis est ut nihil contrarium charitati ejusque preceptis committat; idem ibid. p. 242.

Non tamen peccamus, dummodo nihil divine dilectioni contrarium agamus, Sylvest. v. Charitas. n. 3. Vid. Bonaventur 3. dist. 27. n. 58. Graff. l. 1. c. 3. n. 9. Sca. Clar. Probl. 1. p. 67.

(u) *Admonemus item indirecte diligere creaturam amplius quam Deum non esse contra hoc preceptum, quoniam quicumque peccat mortaliter, indirecte plus diligere aliud quam Deum-- attamen hujusmodi delinquens, non ideo peccat contra istud preceptum, quoniam directe non facit contra ipsum, neque aliquid operatur, quod secundum se & suam naturam separata a Deo, sed secundum accedens. juxta S. Thom. & Scotum Cap. 11. n. 19.*

(*) *Licet diligere Deum comparative minus quam illum, vel æquæ ac illum, sit malum: diligere tamen eum absolute, æquæ vel minus absque ulla comparatione, non est malum. c. 11. n. 10. & n. 18. & cap. 1. 8. ut facile colligat quis ex dicto, Conc. Trident. Lopez. Cap. 40. p. 217.*

Precepti

Precept; and if this be not transgressed in the instant, when it calls for performance, it is fulfilled.

Thirdly, it will suffice, if nothing be done against Love, as we heard before out of *Aquinas*. So that when the Precept of love obligeth, if we then do nothing contrary to that love, we may be excused from the act it self, or from acting any thing out of Love. For that which they count contrary to it, may be avoided out of fear, or other considerations forrain to Love; and so the Command may be satisfied at the instant, when (if ever) it requires actual Love, without any act either of love, or from it.

Fourthly: External acts may satisfie. *The precept of Love*, saith *Soto*, (a) *doth not oblige precisely to inward affection, but certainly to some outward act*; so elsewhere he explains this loving God above all, by doing his (b) Commandments; to the same purpose, (c) *Maldonado* and others. Now if the precept of Love may be fulfilled by external acts, or by endeavours to observe the other commands of God, then it requires not the exercise of the inward act of love to him, and so there will be no command, *for that*, at all, nor will it be a duty; and all these other commands may be satisfied without any act of love to God in the heart, and we shall love him enough, though we never conceive any actual love for him in our souls.

Fifthly: It will satisfie the precept, if a man believe that he loves God above all, though indeed he do not. So *Lopez*. (d) *It is enough*

(a) *Præceptum dilectionis non præcise ad internum affectum obligat, sed certe ad externum opus. De just. & jur. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10. p. 44. Col. 2. Cum vero dicitur diliges, non tam exigitur dilectio affectus, quam charitas operis Molanus. Theol. pract. Tract. 3. c. 16. n. 3.*

(b) *Diligere Deum super omnia, est omnia in ipsum referre, puta, omnia præcepta ejus facere, De nat. & grat. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57.*

(c) *In Luc. 17. 10. p. 305. (d) Vid. S. Clara. Probl. 12. p. 68.*

So *Bannes* concludes that the Precept for Love is fulfilled by receiving the Eucharist once a year: *Abique scrupulo credi potest, quod qui digne sumit Eucharistiam semel in anno, adimplet simul speciale præceptum charitatis, in 22. q. 44. art.* Yet (as we saw before) it is their common doctrine, that the Eucharist may be worthily received without any act of love, or other grace, or any actual disposition that is gracious.

(d) *Satis est ad evitandum peccatum omissionis hujus præcepti, probabiliter quis credat, se illud implere tempore, quo occurrit ejus obligatio. cap. 40. p. 217.*

to avoid the sin of neglecting this Precept, for one to believe probably that he fulfils it at the time when its Obligation occurs. Navar had concluded this before him. (e) He that believes God, probably believing that he is in the state of Grace, and that his Love is a love of God above all, although in Truth it is no such thing, nor he in such a state; nevertheless, the Precept is fulfilled by him so far, that he is not then guilty of no sin for omitting the observance of it; he adds this reason for it, *Because without special revelation; no man can know when he is in the state of Grace, as the Council of Trent determines; and so unless we maintain this, we cannot know when we fulfil the Precept.* Thus, though his determination seem strange and desperate, yet the ground he proceeds on, is a principle of their Faith, and obligeth all to be of his perswasion, who submit to that Council. He declares himself further to this purpose. (f) *He sins mortally, who loves not God at that time when he is bound to do it, under the pain of mortal sin, that is, when there is danger of death, or necessity of receiving, or administering a Sacrament, unless he probably believe that he hath Grace or Charity.* For then, he would have us believe it is not sin, as his limitation shews. Here we have the times specified, wherein the Precept of loving God obligeth, and these are but two, and the latter of them himself expungeth, concluding it false, that we are bound to love God at a Sacrament. (g) So that a man is never bound to love God, but when he apprehends death approaching; no, nor at the point of death neither, if then he probably believe that he hath Grace and Charity, though he have it not; for such a presumption will excuse him from sin, if he love not God, (as all his life before, so) even when he is dying. Thus is the case resolved accor-

(e) *Idem, cum qui diligit Deum, probabiliter credat se esse in statu gratiæ, subindeque suam amorem esse amorem Dei super omne aliud, quamvis in rei veritate non sit huiusmodi, neque sit in eodem statu; nihilominus tamen adimplere hoc præceptum, quoad effectum evitandi novum peccatum quod admitteretur ob omissionem implementi ejus, quoniam sine speciali revelatione scire non potest quis, quando est in statu gratiæ ut definit Conc. Trident. Et si a nisi hoc teneamus, nequiremus scire quando hoc præceptum impleverimus. Cap. 11. n. 10.*

(f) *Peccat mortaliter, qui eo tempore Deum amare negligit, quo sub peccati mortalis reatu tenetur, veluti quando mortis periculum, vel necessitas recipiendi vel administrandi aliquod Sacramentum se obtulit, nisi probabiliter crederet se gratiam vel charitatem, habere. idem ibid. n. 20. (g) Ibid. n. 8. & 9. supra.*

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ding to their common principles ; by the most learned, and the most pious of their Casuists, as (b) *Bellarmino* honours him, though he was none of the Society.

Sixthly, *attrition*, with the Sacrament of Penance will excuse any from loving God actually, living or dying : and will secure him from perishing eternally, though he never entertain an Act of love for God in life or death. The Doctrine of their Church obligeth them all to believe this, and if any of their Doctors seem to say otherwise, they contradict either *that*, or *themselves*. For their Church requires nothing precisely, to put a man into the state of Grace and Salvation living, or dying (how long so ever he hath persisted in enmity against God ; how highly so ever he hath expressed his hatred of him) ; but only a due partaking of the Sacrament of Penance : and he is sufficiently qualified for such a participation, if he be but *attrite*, that is, as they explain it, if he have but some remorse for sin out of *servile fear*, not out of *love* to God. (For (i) that fear as servile, is *contrary to the love of God* :) so that for this (which they count sufficient to secure his eternal state) even at last gasp, he needs not any act of love to God, and this is not only the opinion of particular Doctors, but (as I shall shew hereafter) the Doctrine of the (*) Council of *Trent*, and so not only probable with them, but certain.

If a man at the point of death, who never had an act of love for God in all his life, do thou ask his Confessor, whether such an act be needful for him before he dye ; if the Priest tell him it is not necessary, he may safely give up the Ghost, and dye as he lived without any actual affection for God : (for though he be deluded by his Confessor, yet consulting him he has done his endeavour, and so his (*) ignorance (they say) is invincible, and will excuse him.) And the Priest must tell him, that it is more than needs, if he believe the Council of *Trent*, since there it is declared, that the *Sacrament* with *attrition*

(b) *Martinus, Aspilcaeta, Navarrus, vir doctissimus, & Pijissimus.* De script. Eccles. p. 313.

(i) *In quantum servilis est contrariatur charitati.* So *Aquinas.* 2.2. q. 19. art. 4.

(*) *Sell.* 14. c. 4.

(*) *Sum. Rosel. v. ignorant. n. 1. Bonacin. de peccat. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 3. r. 16. Sta. Clara. Problem. 15. p. 87. Doctores communiter.*

(though this include something repugnant to such love) is enough to justify, and pass any into a state of grace, and consequently is sufficient for Salvation.* And thus they argue, (*) *Grace is a sufficient cause of glory, hence whatever it is, without which grace may be obtained, that is not necessary to Salvation.* By which account no act of love (nor of any other grace) will be needful for them, that they may be saved.

Thus in fine, here's a Religion which pretends to be Christian, but excuseth, and disingageth all that profess it, from the love of Christ; a Doctrine which bereaves Religion of that which themselves count its life, and quite stifles all the spirits of Christianity; chops off all Christian virtues, all gracious acts and qualities, in this one neck, and leaves nothing but a gassy Carkase. For obliging them to neglect love as needless, it makes the rest impossible; without it, there can be no saving faith, no godly sorrow, no filial fear, no delight in God, no desire to enjoy him, no genuine gratitude. When the life of a true Christian should be made up of these; they leave it not possible for him to have one act of true Christian virtue: for without love, they say themselves there cannot be any one true virtue. Here is a way to Heaven for those that never loved God in life or death, a path that pretends to Heaven, but lies quite Cross to the way of Christ, and leads directly to *outer darkness*. A Doctrine that encourageth them to live in hatred of God all their dayes, and in the end sends them out of the World under the dreadful sentence of the Apostle, 1-Cor. 16 22. *If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be Anathema, Maranatha.* To conclude this head; It is a Doctrine which is damning, not only meritoriously, but effectually; and will certainly ruine eternally all that believe and practise it, and hath in it the mortal poyson and malignity of a hundred such speculative Opinions, as pass for Heresies.

And beside the danger, and horrible impiety of this Doctrine, it is ridiculous to the very highest degree. For can any thing be more senseless, than to ask how often a man ought to love his best friend and Benefactor? whether once in his life be not enough in all Conscience?

(*) *Disendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa glorie, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri potest gratia, non est de necessitate salutis.* Aquinas. in 4. dist. 9. art. 1.

may, whether it be not very fair not to hate him? And indeed they state the business all along in such a manner, and manage it with such nicety and caution, not as if they were afraid lest men should love God too little, but as if all the danger lay on the other hand; and their great care were that no body should love him too much, or love him at all. I do not believe that things so palpably impious and ridiculous, were ever so solemnly debated by men of any Religion whatsoever.

CHAP. IV.

There is no necessity of saving or justifying faith by the Romish Doctrine.

Sect. 1. **T**HAT no man can be justified or saved without *faith*, is so evident in Scripture, that none but an Infidel can question it. The *Romanists* do not express any doubt of it; and yet they make no other faith necessary, than that which is neither justifying, nor saving. They have two sorts of faith, one for the unlearned and ignorant, which they call *Implicite*: The other for the learned and more knowing, which they say should be *Explicite*.

The former as they describe it, is an assent to some general including many particulars, with a mind to believe nothing contrary thereunto, the general is this. That what ever the Roman Church (which cannot err) believes, is true, the particulars included, are they know not what, for they are supposed ignorant. Now, this we say, is no Christian faith; and make it apparent, that it is no such thing. For first, it is no belief of any one particular, or article of the Christian faith. It is only a belief of a general, which is no truth at all, much less Christian (that the Church of Rome cannot err, or believe any thing but what is true) when the ignorant person neither knows what this Church is, nor what she believes, nor why he should give her such credit. So that the *act* is a blind conceit unworthy of a Man, or a Christian; and the *object*, a general error.

And then as to the particulars which are necessary for Christians to believe, this *implicite* faith doth not actually believe any of them at all;

all; if it did, it would not be what it is, *implicite*. It apprehends them not, & therefore cannot believe them, for as themselves acknowledge (a) *That cannot be believed which is not known*. To render this clear to us, they thus explain it. *When (b) a man is asked, whether Christ were born of the Virgin Mary, and whether there be one God, and three persons; and he answers that he knows not, but believes touching these things, as the Church holds, this is to believe implicite*. So that a man may have this faith compleatly, and yet not believe an article of the Creed, and if this be Christian faith, a man may have it, who believes nothing of Christ. They are believers at this rate, who have a mind to hold, what the Church doth, concerning Christ, or the Creed; though they never know, what that is. They know not what the Church holds; unless the Churches knowing, be their knowledge; and so believe nothing, unless the Church's believing be their faith; and so have no faith to save them, unless it be saving faith, to believe by an Attorney.

Secondly, as this faith may be without the knowledge and belief of any of the particular Articles, which are necessary to be believed by Christians; so (which is yet more strange) it may be with the belief of what is opposite, and repugnant to the Christian faith. This they acknowledge and clear it to us by instances. A man may be disposed to believe what the Church holds, and yet may believe that God the Father, and God the Son are not equal, but one greater, and elder than the other, or that the persons in the Trinity are locally distant. Such is the vertue of *implicite* faith (c) *Altenstaig, that, if he who hath it believes these errors, or any like them, he would be no Heretic, he would not sin; provided he doth not maintain his error pertinaciously, and that he believes, because he thinks the Church believes it*. Or such

(a) *Neg; enim credi potest quod non cognoscitur.* - Fill. tr. 21. n. 39.

(b) Bannes. 22. q. 2. art. 8. Sect. dubitatur secundo. Sum. Rosel. verb. fides. n. 1.

(c) *In tantum valet fides implicite, quod si quis habens eam falso opinaretur, ratione naturali motus, Patrem majorem, vel priorem Filio: vel tres personas localiter distare, aut simile quid, non sit hæreticus, non peccet: dummodo hunc errorem pertinaciter non defendat, & hoc ipsum credat, quia credat ecclesiam sic credere.* Verb. Credere. Sum. Rosel. v. fides. n. 2. After Pope Innocent and Hostiensis.

a Catholick may believe (d) that the three persons in the God-head are one Woman, it would be but a small fault with *Angelus* to believe this, thinking the Church believes the same. (e) Or he may believe, that *Christ* is not true God and Man; and yet not be condemned for it, if the Pope believed it too. (g) If trusting a Priest (who tells him the Church holds it) he believes anything against the Articles of faith, he is excused faith *Sancta Clara* after *Scotus* and *Gabriel* and others (h) Though he expressly dis-believe any Article of faith, yet he may be said to believe it implicitly. So that he may believe that the Creed or the Gospel is not to be believed, he may count it a Fable (as Pope *Leo* called it) and yet be a Christian, as to his belief, if this be the Christian faith. He may be expressly an Heretick or a monstrous mis-believer, and yet implicitly be a faithful Roman-Catholick.

Thirdly, such a faith as this, Jewes, and Turks, and Pagans have, even the worst of these, who do but acknowledge a God of truth. For they believe what this God reveals is true, and this general involves all the particulars of the Christian belief; so that if the belief of such a general without other faith as to the particulars, may be sufficient for Papists; such Infidels may pass for as true believers, as Roman-Catholicks. Yea the faith of such Catholicks will be so much worse, than that of these Infidels; as it is better to believe Gods veracity and Revelation, than to believe the infallibility of the Roman Church, or the truth of all therein believed.

Indeed such a faith was not counted sufficient for Christians; till Christians were thought to be something like Asses. *Aquinas* inquires, whether all be a like obliged to have an explicite faith? He answers negatively, and the ground of his conclusion is, Job. 1. 14. *The Oxen were plowing, and the Asses were feeding beside them*: From whence he

(d) *ut puta vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam Feminam, & quoniam credit ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit: & tamen non est heretica: quia conditionaliter credit, si ecclesia sic tenet & credit. Verb. fides. n. 6.*

(e) *Si quis non crederet Christum esse verum Deum & hominem, & idem sentiret papa, cum non in damnatum. Cardin. St. Angeli. ad legatos Bohem. an. 1447.*

(g) *Rusticus & imperitus qui suo Parocho fidem habens, credit aliquid contra articulos fidei, excusatur a peccato. Probl. 15. p. 98.*

(h) *Licet alicui articulo fidei discredat explicite, credit tamen implicite eidem in generali fide, &c. ibid. Corduba.*

argues

argues gravely. (i) *That the people who are signified by Asses, are to lye down in the faith of their Superiors, who are signified by the Oxen, as Gregory expounds it.* But what if the Oxen go astray, what must become of the Asses then? Why, they may follow them without hurt, believing that they are right, when they are in a wrong way (for they must not have their names for nothing?) So he resolves this difficulty. (k) *Human knowledge is not the rule of faith, but Divine truth: from which if some of the Superiors (the Oxen) make defection, that hurts not the faith of the simple (the Asses) who believe them to have the right faith.* After these two Saints, their best Pope, and their Angelical Doctor, (that we may see we owe not this rare notion (where their whole Church is so subtilly divided into Oxen and Asses) to any lower, than the most eminent amongst them.) Cardinal (l) *Bellarmino* their great Champion makes use of the same exposition of that Text, to maintain the sufficiency of such a faith.

Stapleton, would have us believe, that they admit not of this implicate faith, save in points of less moment, but herein he misrepresents them, and would delude us. For it is the common Doctrine of the Romanists, That an implicate faith in Christ, (such as Pagans may have, and for which none should have the name of Christians) is sufficient under the Gospel, to pass any into (m) a justifying or saving state.

This is it which our Divines commonly teach faith (n) Vega, when they say, the faith of one Mediatour either explicite or implicate, is enough for

(i) *Quia videlicet minores qui significantur per asinos, debent in credendis adhaerere majoribus, qui per boves significantur ut Gregorius exponit in 2. moral. Aquinas. 2.2. q. 2. art. 6.*

(k) *Humana cognitio non fit regula fidei, sed veritas Divina; a qua si aliqui majorum deficiunt, non praedjudicat fidei simplicium qui eos rectam fidem habere credunt. Aquinas. ibid. ad tertium.*

(l) *De justfic. l. 1. c. 7. p. 706.*

(m) *For these are alledged. Altiſiodorensis, Gulielmus Parisiensis, Richardus de Media villa, Scorus. Bradwardin, Gabriel, Baptista Troiamala, Vega, Medina, Corduba, Faber, Patigianis Herrera, &c. Victoria, Soro, Canus, Bannes, Alvarez, in Sta. Clara. Probl. 15. & in Bannes in 22. q. 2. art. 8.*

(n) *Vega pro Conc. Trident. l. 6. c. 15. p. 92.*

justification. And (o) *Sancta Clara*, with others, tell us, this is the more common tenet in their Schools. And whereas they make some difference between justification, and salvation in this point: *Bannes* helps to remove it (p) *It is neither Heresie, faith be, nor Error, nor Rashness, nor Scandal, to assert, that a man may also in the same manner be saved; because justification being the last disposition to glory: it is very probable, that he which is justified by an implicate faith; may also by the same faith, without alteration be saved.*

It is true, they say there is a precept for a more expresse faith, though no more than this implicate belief in Christ be needful, *necessitate mediæ*. But they have so many ways to exempt Infidells (even under the profession of Christians) from its obligation; that few in comparison will be culpable for not observing it: By their *Docters* they are excused, if they (q) *be dull or gross-witted*. If they be (r) *ignorant or impotent*, or (s) *if their Priest or their Parents mislead them*; or (t) *if the object of faith be not duly proposed, if by slight reasons, or by impious persons (then it would be imprudence to believe;)* or (u) *if they do not doubt of their faith; or if their Teachers be fallacious or erroneous; or if the proposal (x) be not enforced with reasons, with holiness of life, with the confutation of the contrary, and with some wonders.* In short, *if they have not had sufficient instruction (in this all agree.)* And

(o) Probl. 15. p. 89. & hæc est communior in Scholis, ut dic'at & sequitur *Herrera*, &c. So *Bartholom. de Ledesma* sum. de sacram. panit. cum ad primam justificationem fides explicita Christi non requiratur, ut supponimus, tanquam magis probabile, & commune in Scholis, &c.

(p) in 22. q. 2. art. 8. dub. ult.

Dicendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa gloriæ, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri potest gratia, non est de necessitate salutis. *Aquinas.* in 4. dist. 9. art. 1. vid. *Soto.* in 4. dist. 5. q. unica. art. 2. dub. ult.

(q) Fill. tr. 22. n. 40. & (r) n. 54. Dico secundo obligationem prædictam esse sub peccato mortali, nisi ignorantia aut impotentia excuset. *Communis doctorum.*

(s) Probabilis est (ignorantia) quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid ductus testimonio sui Parochi aut parentum—sic doctores communiter. *Sancta. Clara.* ibid. p. 87.

(t) Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur, ut rationibus frivolis, vel ab hominibus impijs: tunc enim credere esset actus imprudentiæ, secundum *D. Tho.* m. 22.

q. 1. art. 4. ad secundum. idem. ibid. vid. plures in *Jo. Sanc.* d. 19. n. 3. & 4.

(u) Id. ibid. p. 95.

(x) *Aragon.* in 22. q. 11. art. 2. dub. ult. ibid. p. ci.

this alone will excuse a great part of their Church, who for want of such instruction, are acknowledged by themselves, to be Infidells. Thus *Navarre* delivers it. (y) *In the whole Christian Commonwealth* (he means the Roman Church) *there is so great neglect as to this, that ye may find many every where, who believe no more of these things (i.e.) of Christ and the most necessary Articles of the Christian faith) in particular and explicitly, than some Heathen Philosophers, who have only the natural knowledge of the one true God.*

But if the precept could reach any through all these securities, (which we cannot easily imagine) yet there is one way to clear them all of it: so that they may live and dye Infidells, without danger from any command requiring faith in Christ. For he that hath not that express faith which is commanded in the Gospel, but only what is requisite *necessitate medij*, is living or dying, if he be sorry for his negligence, and purpose to amend (which may be in their sense without true Repentance) capable of absolution, without any instruction from his Confessor (a). And by vertue of that, he may live in a justified state, or if he dye, he passeth out of the World, as a very good Christian, though he believe in Christ, no more than a Heathen.

Sect. 2. Pass we to their other sort of faith, which they call *explicit*, it is, as they define it. *An actual assent to the particulars, which the Church propounds, as revealed by God.* This with them is justifying faith requisite in the learned, and more intelligent amongst them. As to the *object* of it, if we view it well, it looks untowardly for a thing by which a sinner is to be justified. For it is prodigiously extended, and takes in things uncertain, false, impossible, impertinent, and ridiculous; as points that must certainly be believed unto justification. For their Church propounds as things revealed by God. (and so ob-

(y) *In universa Christiana republica, circa hæc tanta est socordia, ut multos passim invenias nihil magis in particulari & explicitè de hisce rebus credere, quam Ethnicum quendam Philosophum, sola unius veri Dei naturali cognitione præditum.* Cap. 11. n. 22. p. 142.

(a) *Imo in rigore, non tenetur confessarius, etiamsi sanus sit penitens, eum instruere ante absolutionem; æquum enim doleat de præterita negligentia, & proponat emendationem in futurum, capax est absolutionis, sola fide explicita circa mysteria necessario credenda ex medio.* Fill. tr. 28. n. 58. vid. Jo. Sanc. d. 9. n. 18.

As of justifying faith) not only what is delivered in Scripture; but *unwritten Traditions* concerning matters of faith and manners, and these, if they will be justified, they must believe; though they know not what they are, nor where to find them, but in the Churches unerring fancy. She propounds also, *the unanimous consent of the Fathers*, in several points; and though this never was, or is impossible to be known: yet it must be believed, by those that mean to be justified. She propounds the *decrees of Councils* to be believed as Divine truths; when it is acknowledged, *that the design in Councils, for many hundred years; was not to discover truth, but to promote the Roman greatness*. She propounds also the *determinations of Popes*, these must be believed as infallible, when ordinarily they were neither persons of common truth, or honesty, and we must be justified by believing the dictates of Atheists or (c) Hereticks; of (d) Conjurers, (e) or incarnate Devils; of vicious Beasts, (f) and wicked Monsters. For those who cry up his Holiness, have adorned him also now and then with these other Sacred Titles.

I know not whether these things are more ridiculous, or more horrid; however letting them pass as they are, let us take their faith at best, and make it better than they will have it. Suppose it rested in the Scriptures, and had no tying for its object but Revelation, such as is truly Divine: yet even so they give such Report of it, as will scarce suffer us to think, that they can expect to be justified by it. Considered in it self they (c) count it not *worthy the name of a vertue*. They (d) call it a *dead, idle thing*, and though they would have it to be an infused habit, and the gift of God (because the Scripture so calls that

(b) *Omnia Concilia post Chalcedonense potissimum instituta fuerunt, non ut evinceretur veritas, sed ut roboraretur, defenderetur, atq; augetur semper ecclesie Romanæ potestas, & ecclesiasticorum libertas.* Aeneas Sylvius. l. 2. de gest. conc. Basil.

(c) Canus. loc. Theol. l. 6. p. 243. 344.

(d) Sylvest. 2. Platin. Chron. Martini Poloni. Hilleband. Binno Cardin.

(e) *Fex vitiorum & Diabolus incarnatus* Constan. concil. Sess. 11. art. 5. Benedic. 9. vid. Baron. an. 1034. n. 3.

(f) *Sunt qui scribunt hunc sceleratissimum hominem, seu monstrum potius* Platina. vi. a. Joh. 13.

(c) *Dominic. a Soto. de natur. & grat. lib. 2. c. 7. d. 75. & 81.*

(d) Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 7.

which is justifying faith indeed) yet they say a (e) mere humane quality acquired without any supernatural assistance ; may perform its proper act and office, by actual assent to the whole Christian Doctrine. They confess it is commonly found in the worst of men (*in perditissimis hominibus*) such as are neither acted nor possessed by the spirit of God ; such as live and dye in mortal wickedness, (f) and are damned for it. Yea some of them confess that it is in the Devils. *This faith, faith Cardinal (g) Contarenius is not it, by which we believe, that there is a God ; or by which we believe that the things are true which God speaks : For this also is in the Devils, and the most wicked men.* Yet at other times this is with them, **THE CHRISTIAN THE CATHOLICK FAITH**, as if it were enough, to make them true (*) Christians and Catholics : but sure they will not seek for their Christianity, and Catholicness in a Room lower than Purgatory. However instead of a faith which the Scripture calls for, as saving and justifying ; they commend to Christians a faith, which hath no connexion at all, necessary or probable, with Salvation or Justification. All they have to say, is, That it must necessarily be joyned with love : but when they have said this, they undo it, and all, by making love it self unnecessary, as we saw before.

Sect. 3. In fine, they seem little concerned for faith who hath it, or hath it not, or how little it be, or how seldome acted. It is not (h) necessary that the Pope himself should have this faith (though the Devils want it not) yea or any other vertue for all his Holiness : the Body may do well enough, though the Head of it be an Infidel.

(e) Scotus in 3. dist. 23. ait. *fide humana, (quam ipse appellat acquisitam) hominem posse assentiri toti prædicationi Christianæ. Imo ita inquit, credimus autoritate ecclesie (quam ipse putat humanam & imitatione parentum)* — Cui sententiæ adhuc explicativus subscribit Durandus q. 1. in 2. sent. d. 28. *Dicens fidem infusam non esse necessariam, nisi u^o facilius credamus.* Soro. *ibid.* l. 2. c. 8. p. 81.

(f) Bellarm. de Baptism. l. 1. c. 14.

(g) *Fides hæc non est ea tantum qua credimus Deum esse, & qua credimus vera esse que dicit Deus, hæc etenim est etiam in Demonibus & perditissimis hominibus.* Confut. artic. Lutheri. art. 1.

(*) Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 28.

(h) *Non enim fides interior Romani Pontificis ecclesiæ est necessaria.* Canus, loc. Theol. lib. 6. c. ult. p. 344.

They are obliged to maintain this, because their Popes often have been no better. And the body may shift pretty well without it too. This may be the true Catholick Church made up of the whole company of believers, when not one amongst them all hath faith, for *time was*, say they, *(i) when none at all had faith, but only one Woman*, and it may be so again.

As for the exercise of *fit* *Hurtado* thinks an act of faith may be requisite once in a year ; (*) but the Jesuite may seem to deal unmercifully with them, putting them to believe some of their Creed once in Twelve moneths: those of other Orders would not have them so much oppressed, once in 12 years will be enough, *Bonacina* (k) saith 4 or 5 moments in a whole life may suffice for this and specifies them ; but because this may seem too hard, he signifieth withall, how they may be eased in a manner of them all. For once (though that be at the point of death) an (l) implicate act may serve. At an other time or two the precept for faith doth not of it self oblige to the act, only (m) it is requisite by accident ; and so the neglect of it then, will be no special sin, nor need be confessed. At another time (or more if there were occasion) ignorance, or want of consideration may (n) excuse them (for these two, though they ruine the greatest part of the World eternally, yet are the greatest security of Roman-Catholicks : and not only exempt them from that which is most the duty of Christians, but will not suffer them to sin, at least mortally, do what they can.) So that after all, one act of their faith once in a life time will be enough. (o) *Izthink it sufficient* (saith he after many others) *for those that are rude, to give an explicate assent once, to the Articles necessary to*

(i). Abbas in Sylvest. sum. v. Concil. n. 3.

(*) *Existant aliqui preceptum elicenda fidei obligare singulis annis — verum hoc communiter negatur.* Pecc. a S. Joseph. sum de 1. precept. art. 1. p. 6.

(k) Tem. 2. in 1. precept. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 2. (l) n. 12. (m) n. 9. & 11.

(n) n. 8.

(o) *Existimo tamen sufficere, ut isti rudes semel assensum explicate praeberint articulis ad salutem necessarijs dum sibi proponebantur a confessarijs, vel ab alio.* Ibid. n. 14. ibi. *Malderus & alij* Peter a S. Joseph reduces all the moments and occasions where an act of faith may be thought requisite to six heads : and then declares upon each severally, either that the precept doth not of it self oblige, or that they may be excused from sin in neglecting it, at any of them. Sum in 1. precept. art. 1. p. 3. 4, 5, 6.

Salvation, while they are propounded by their Confessor, or some other. But how must the Confessor propound these Articles to them, so as they may pass this one act of faith upon them once for all? Why the best way (p) he tells us, is by a mode of forming the sign of the Cross, as it is described for this purpose, by *Graffius*, *Bellarmino*, and other great *Divines*. I had the curiosity to see how a Confessor can make the most ignorant persons true believers by the sign of the Cross; and so effectually, as they never need more believe than once, while they live, and found it lying thus; (q) *let the Confessor teach him to form the sign of the Cross with three fingers, to signify the mystery of the most Sacred Trinity. But first it must be drawn from the top of the head, or front to the Navel, to shew that the Son of God descended from the highest Heavens into the bowels of his Mother: then draw the cross line from the left Arm to the right, so the cause of the Incarnation is expressed. He came from Heaven to Earth, that we who were to be placed amongst the Goats at his left, might be removed to his right hand amongst the Sheep. This is the admirable expedient: the grave Benedicte reflecting on it, was put into a transport; for he adds (r) behold what great mysteries of faith Mother-Church hath taught us by one mode of forming a Cross, so that a rude person needs know nothing besides this, even this alone may be sufficient for his Salvation.* Here is a compendious way indeed to Salvation, and all the knowledge and faith needful for it: he that can be satisfied with it (and give himself up to absurd and ridiculous delusions (against all the evidence of Gods word) may in few minutes with once making the sign of the Cross, get all the faith requisite for a Roman-Catholick: and when by such admirable conduct of the Cross he hath but once believed; he need never more trouble himself with faith, while he lives. (s) *The precept for faith (faith another) obligeth*

(p) Bonacin. *ibid.* n. 16.

(q) Graff. *decis. part. 1. l. 1. c. 24. n. 3.*

(r) *Ecce quanta nobis fidei nostrae mysteria unica formandae crucis ratione Mater Ecclesia docuit, ut si nihil praeerea sciret rudis homo, vel hoc solum ad salutem illi sufficere queat. ibid.*

(s) *Præceptum fidei non obligat perse, nisi semel forte in vita. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 41. n. 32. Advertant præceptum fidei non obligare perse, nisi tempore usus rationis adventantis, vel postea, si tunc non est impletum taliter, quod post semel elicited actum fidei raro vel fortasse nunquam occurrat dicta obligatio exercendi actus fidei, sic expresse Suarez, not,*

not, but perhaps once in a life, and it is delivered as the judgment of Aragon Torres, and other their chief Divines, that of itself it binds not, but when one comes to the use of reason, or if it be not then performed, afterwards: but after one act of faith once put forth, the obligation to exercise more acts do rarely or may be never occur. Such is their faith, and thus you must conceive if you can, how they live by it. They can make a life of faith of one act alone in a whole life. No wonder they presume, that they can so perfectly fulfill the whole Law, yea and pay God much more than his due: when they make the greatest commands (the sum of the Law and Gospel) to amount to little or, nothing; and instead of a Hundred set down not Fifty, but a fraction, or a cypher: when in the case before us, they take no more notice of the faith which the Gospel calls for, yea make bold in a manner wholly to neglect that of their own making.

C H A P. V.

*There is no necessity of true Repentance for Romanists
by their Doctrine.*

Señ. 1. **I**F any thing be absolutely and indispensably necessary to Salvation, it is Repentance. *Christ* himself declares it, *Luk. 13. 13.* The doctrine of Repentance from dead works, is a fundamental, and so made expressly by the *Apostle, Heb. 6. 1.* So that without the belief and practice of it, no Sinner can possibly be saved, nor have any hopes of it, but such as are delusions. Thus necessary hath the Lord made it, and yet by the Roman Doctrine, it is more than needs for any sort of sins.

As to Original sin, (the corruption of our natures) those of them who hold there is any such thing within us; yet declare that, if it be any sin at all, it is the least of all sins. *Andradinus* employed by the Council of *Trent* to write, tells us, that *their* Divines so determine.

Bellarmino

Bellarmino saith, (a) that amongst all sins it is the least voluntary, and on that account is less than any venial sin; and it must be little indeed, that is, less than any venial; for that, as another *Cardinal* (b) tells us, passeth for nothing. And that which hath so little, or nothing of sin in it, needs no repentance. So (c) *Soto* concludes, *A man that hath no guilt but that of Original sin, hath no need of any Repentance*. Thus they represent Original sin, as it is in them before Baptisme: but after they are Baptized, they all agree that it is no sin at all. The Council of *Trent* hath determined it (and so it is now with them an Article of Faith) (d) *That in Baptisme, not only the guilt of Original sin is remitted, but what ever of it hath any thing of the true and proper nature of sin, is totally taken away*; and they curse (e) those who hold that it is only pardoned or impaired, and not all the sin of it quite abolished by Baptisme. They say they are become *Innocent, Pure, Harmless, Spotless*, without the least speck of Original sin; and so without any need of Repentance, upon that account, (g) *They are so far from being actually obliged to repent of any natural corruption, that they cannot be obliged to it*, God himself cannot bind any one to Repent of it. So that if there be in our natures any defectiveness, as to the Image of God, any averiness to God, and that which is good, any propenseness to evil; we are not to take notice of it, or grieve for it as a sin: for how ever the Apostle frequently calls it so, it is none; no more to be repented of, than

(a) After Aquinas 3. q. 1. art. 4. De amiss. grat. l. 1. c. 10. p. 226. *Inter omnia peccata minimum habet de voluntario & ideo minus grave est in ratione voluntarii quam quodlibet veniale.*

(b) *Modicum pro nihilo habetur*, Cajetan. Sum. v. fest. (& saepius alibi) secundum quoque commune, est, modicum pro nihilo reputari, p. 310.

(c) *Haud tamen huic homini, ulla est penitentia necessaria*. De nat. & Grat. l. 1. c. 12. p. 92.

Contritio cum sit dolor, voluntatis duritiem ex peccato contrariam comminuens non proprie est de peccato Originali, Aquin. supplem. q. 2. art. 2. Sylvest. v. contritio n. 4. Graff. l. 1. c. 4. n. 2.

(d) *In Baptismate* — non modo remittitur originale peccatum, sed totum id auferri, quoad veram at propriam rationem peccati habet, Sess. 5. c. 4.

(e) *Ibid. ca. 4.* (f) *Innocentes, puri, immaculati*, inno xij.

(g) *Tantum abest ob id igari quempiam ad originalis culpe penitentiam, ut neque possit*. Soto *ibid.*

an innocent harmeless thing. Thus Original sin is quite discharged from any concern in our Repentance.

Señ. 2. There are other evils which make up the far greatest part of actual sins, which by their doctrine are but Venial. Of this quality are not only those which they count small in their own nature; and those which are small in respect of the matter of them: but likewise all (how hainous; so ever, as to the nature of them, how great soever as to the matter of them) that are acted without perfect deliberation, and are not compleatly voluntary. And by favour of *their* describing this third sort of minute evils, the most enormous wickednesses that can be acted against God or Man, may come under the notion of Venial faults, (of which hereafter.) Blasphemy, Perjury, Adultery, Murder, &c. when without perfect deliberation will be no worse.

How-ever these with them are light faults, and lightly cancelled (as they tell us) *by the Bishops blessing, by Holy water, by knocking the breast, by saying a Pater-Noster; by extreame Unction, (so (b) our Rhemists. Aquinas adds) by the Eucharist, by any of the seven Sacraments (i), by any Sacramental Unction, by Prayer in a Holy place; yea, or by but entering into a Consecrated Church.*

So that by these, and other such means & *si aliqua alia sunt hujusmodi* (saith *Aquinas*) Pardon of Venial sins may be obtained, yea any one of them will quite (k) abolish the fault, if not the whole penalty, particularly Holy water, which (as *Canus (l)* teacheth) *takes away the punishment of sin, and also the faults that are Venial.* No wonder if they determine that the Sacrament of Penance is not needful for these, not so much as *their* ritual Repentance, and that there is no necessity they

(b) In Matth. 10. 12.

(c) 3tia. q. 87. art. 3. *Taceri citra culpam, multiq; aliis remediis expiari possunt, Conc. Trident. Sess. 4. Can. 5.*

(k) Vid *Aquinas* ibid. 3tium.

(l) *Peccatorum pœnis solvit culpas etiam veniales, De Sacrament, pars. 1. p. 752. vid. p. 751.*

should be so much as confessed, (*m*) nor any remorse or grief required for them; nor that any should be (*n*) relinquished so much as in *resolution* only. Contrition is so far from being requisite for Venial sins, that with them attrition is not needful; for that is a displicence arising from shame or fear; but these sins are (in their account) (*) neither shameful (its no crime (they say) to glory in them) nor dangerous; no man can be condemned for them. (*)

Thus *their* Doctrine giveth them all abundant encouragement to live and dye impenitently in these sins; in all of them, (*o*) for all of them in the World, if found in one man together, amount not to so much as one mortal sin. All the penitence for these that is required by the preciseft of them, is no more than one act of Charity contains, i.e. such a (*p*) Virtual dislike, as a man may have of that, which he was never actually displeased at, *no, nor so much as thought of*.

It may seem strange (the operation of spirit of delusion not considered) how such a conceit could ever possess the fancies of rational persons, and of some acquaintance with the Scriptures; that their Sacramental, (Holy water, and the like trifles) should have the vertue to procure pardon of sins, even without Repentance: *Aquinas* would

(*m*) Concil Trident. Sess. 4. Can. 5.

Ad venialia in confessione explicanda teneri, qui solis venialibus urgetur—negat communis opinio cum D. Thoma. Scoto, Durando. Major. Vidorell. ad Tol. l. 5. c. 11.

Utrum peccata venialia necessario fiat confitenda? Resp. secundum Scotum, quod non, etiamsi nullum habet mortale: quoniam per peccatum veniale etiam in proposito, homo non potest damnari nec periclitari, & penitentia est secunda tabula pro periclitantibus, igitur non obligatur ad eam nisi habens mortale. Immo dicit Petrus de Palude in 3, quod nec etiam Papa possit ad hoc obligari. Angel. sum. v. Confess. n. 25.

Cum dolor de venialibus non sit necessarius, ne confessio quidem venialium necessaria est. Canus. pars. 6. relect. de penitent p. 955. Secundum S. Thom. in 4. dist. 17. homo tenetur habere istum dolorem (contritionis) de peccato actuali, non de originali—& de mortali non de veniali, quia cum ejus complacentia mori potest, ac salvari, Sylvest. v. contrit. n. 4. vid Navar. c. 1. n. 24.

(*n*) Non est necessum habere propositum nunquam peccandi venialiter, Navar. c. 1. n. 406.

(*) Conc. Trid. Sess. 13. 4. (*) Vid Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 6. n. 3.

(*o*) Etiamsi omnia venialia peccata simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale peccatum. Bellarm. de amiss. grat. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91.

(*p*) Aquinas, 3. 1. 87. art. 1. e.

have

have us satisfied with this, that they do not remit sins of themselves, but are said to do it, because they may excite that fervour by which they are remitted; but this fervour is not Repentance, and what-ever it be, it ought to be excited, that it may remit sin, since this admirable virtue is ascribed to it on that account. No, say his followers, (r) *We must understand him so, that it is not always requisite, it should be excited, but that these Sacramentals are instituted for this end. Wherefore to receive them as accommodated by the Church to this effect, is an act of Repentance, and procures remission of Venial sins; although there be no way, any excitement of devotion, nor any repenting of these sins, nor any dislike of them; for if this were required, truly, they would not be Sacramentals, since this dislike alone would be sufficient; so de Graffis after Soto.* Here is pardon of sin by an excitement of fervour, though it be not excited; that must be the *implicite Repentance*, sufficient for the pardon of Venial sins; and the *Explicite* very like it, an act of Repentance (such as is receiving of Holy-water) without any remembering the sins to be repented of, or any dislike of them. They had need believe, that these sins are no transgressions of the Law, since they expect to be secured from it's penalty by that which is no repentance.

Señ. 3. Hereby it is too manifest that they make Repentance needless, both in reference to Original sin, and likewise to all those which they count Venial. If they will have it needful for any sin at all, it must be for those they call Mortal; but then these are but few in com-

(q) *Ideo ista dicuntur specialiter dimittere, non quia remittunt per se, sed quia sunt excitativa fervoris per quem fit remissio.* D. Th. in 4. art. ad 2dum.

(r) *Sed adverte quod responso D. Thom. quod ideo ista dimitunt venialis, quia excitant fervorem, intelligenda est, non quod semper requiratur illa excitatio, sed quod de se hæc Sacramentalia ad hoc sint instituta. Quare illa suscipere, tanquam ad illum effectum ab ecclesia accommodata censetur actus penitentie, & acquirit remissionem venialium, etiamsi nullatenus excitetur ad devotionem, nec memoriam habeat venialium, vel displicentiam, nam si illa requireretur, profecto Sacramentalia non essent, cum sola displicentia sufficeret.* Sotus dist. 15. q. 2. art. 1. *modo tunc non habeat complacentiam, Graff. t. 1. c. 16. n. 9. p. 13. Victoria, Canus, Major Cajetan. Ledesma & alij in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 12. Sect. 2.*

parifon. They have reduced them to feaven, (*) and none pafs for deadly, but fuch as quite extinguifh fpiritual life, and kill the foul immediately.

Well, but is Repentance neceffary for thefe? As to this, divers of great eminency amongft them (r) conclude, that there is no divine precept for Repentance. God hath not commanded any to Repent: Now if he command it not, it is not neceffary; and if it be not a neceffary duty, it is no mean neceffary to Salvation: for, as (t) themfelves tell us, *Though all that is commanded be not neceffary to Salvation, yet all that is neceffary to Salvation is commanded.* That there is no fpecial precept which requires Repentance, was the opinion of their famous *Francifcus de Viçtoria*, (in his time the great Mafter of Divinity in Spain) and of other Divines both before and after him, as *Melchior Canus* (fometimes his Scholler) tells us. And when that of Chrift, *Luk. 13. Except ye Repent, ye fhall all likewise perifh*, is objected, they Answer, the meaning is, *They fhall perifh for preceding fins, not for impenitence.* By their doctrine there is no danger that any fhould perifh for that, though perfifted in unto death: and they had fome reafon to alledge *Aquinas* (the Angel of their Schools) as of their judgment herein; for he faith plainly, (u) *That impenitency continued in till death is no fpecial fin, but a circumftance of fin.* By this doctrine, it is no fin, no tranfgreffion of any divine precept to be impenitent, or to perfevere therein to the end.

(*) The particular fins contained under thefe 7 Capitalls (as their Off-fpring) the people need not trouble themfelves about them; for common Confefors are not obliged to know whether they are mortal or no. *Angel. fum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3.*

(r) *Sunt enim Theologi & fuerunt, quorum opinione de actu penitentiae fpeciali praeceptum nullum eſt, hanc vero ſententiam in primis ſuadent teſtimonio, D. Thomae, &c. Canus pars 4. reſeſt. de panit. p. 856.*

(t) *Aquinas & Bellarm'in. ſupra. Media neceſſaria ad ſalutem ſunt nobis divino jure praecepta quod tradit, D. Tho. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. &c. & eſt quaſi axioma communiter receptum, Suar. l. 1. De Orat. c. 29. n. 2.*

In hac controverſa Praeceptor minus olim. F. Franciſcus Viçtoria, vir noſtra aetate literis, ingenio, religionique clariffimus, ibid. fuisse Catholici quidam, ut reſert. Jo. Medina & Vega. & quidem ex ſchola, D. Tho. ex quibus fuit Viçtoria, qui dicebant penitentiam non eſſe in praecepto ullo, idque ex D. Thom. videbantur probare, & meo judicio ſatis effuſe, Vaſq. in 3. 1 hom. tom. 3. q. 86. art. 2. dub. 2. n. 1.

(u) *Permanere in peccato uſque ad mortem, non eſt ſpeciale peccatum, ſed quaedam peccati circumſtantia, 2. 2. q. 14. art. 2. Corp. & tamen ſi eſſet de penitentia ſpeciale praeceptum, omiſſio illius ſpecialis culpa ſine dubio eſſet, as they argue in Canus, ibid.*

Thoſe

Those who will be concluded by the Council of Trent, must believe that there is no divine precept which requires Contrition or true Repentance precisely, but only disjunctively, either that, or what is there declared to be sufficient without it. And they must take it for certain, that it is not a *medium* necessary to Salvation: since that Council has determined, that something else will suffice for pardon without it; and so they declare it expressly. (*)

Señ. 4. But let us take notice of those who seem more severe. Many there be, who think that Repentance is under a Divine command; yet these in the issue make it no more necessary then the other, who find no precept for it. For they determine that *we are not obliged to Repent presently*; that it may be deferred till the approach or danger of death; and in fine, *that it is needless, even when a man is dying.*

For the first, They teach that a Sinner is not bound to Repent presently, it is lawful to defer it. So their Doctors of all sorts, so all the faithful (say they) so the whole Church, (a) That a man is not bound to Repent presently is a conclusion, faith Soto, established by the practice and the usage of the Church. Canus (b) tells us, it is his own, and the

(*) *Contritio proprie accepta, in lege nova; non est necessaria simpliciter necessitate mediæ ad justificationem & salutem*, Bonacin. de Sacram. disp. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 1. *ibid.* Petigianus, & alij.

(a) *Non illico ut homo se reum sentit culpæ, penitentiæ lege penitere constringitur. Hæc profecto conclusio more & usu ecclesiæ satis videtur constabiles.* Soto in 4. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 6.

(b) *ut mea fert & communis opinio non protinus tenetur homo penitentiam agere. Atque hæc assertio non alia ratione potius ostendi possit, quam quod fidelium omnium consensus facile admittit, &c. nec aut penitentes in confessione hujus criminis se accusant, aut sacerdotes id curant — Cum nulla idonea ratio sit, nullave autoritas qua præceptum adeo durum asseratur, &c.* Melch. Canus. pars. 4. relect. de penit. p. 262. 263.

Licet toto temporis quo quis agnoscat se lethali peccato mortuum, de bono consilio debeat curare, ut a tam gravi morbo resurgat, periculumque mortis subitæ atque æternæ effugiat, juxta illud, Ne tardes converti ad Dominum, & ne differas de die in diem, Eccl. 5. — non tamen ad id tenetur præcepto, ad novum peccatum mortiferum obligante; nisi ea temporis parte, qua memoriæ occurrit quoad usum — secundum communem opinionem. Imo neque tunc, ob ea per quæ id affirmavit Adrianus, & ob ea, quæ nos addimus Navar. cap. 1. n. 17. & n. 29.

Alensis, Bonaventura, Durandus, Aquinas, Adrianus, Angelus, Medina Viguierius, &c. *vid. in* Suarez. 4. 4. disp. 15. *Señ. 5. n. 2.* Præceptum non obligat ad agendam penitentiam statim, etiamsi opportunitas occurrat, seu licet facile fieri possit, *Vid.* Vasq. in. 3. Th. *ibid.* dub. 5. n. 9. *Est Verissima opinio præceptum contritionis non obligare statim.* Alexand. S. Thom. Angelus. Jo Medina, Sotus, Durand. Canus, Navar. Paludan. Adrian, Viguierius, merito ergo omnes in hoc conveniunt.

common opinion, That a man is not obliged to Repent forth-with; and this he saith is confirmed by best Reason, viz. The consent of all the faithful, both Priests and People; and adds, That to make the precept so rigid as to require present Repentance, hath no probable reason, no nor any Authority.

Now this Doctrine concerning Repentance, in this first step of it, where it appears more modest and innocent than in its further advance, is yet very horrid and desperate. For it is all one as if they had said, That they may, notwithstanding any command of God, continue (for some time at least) in *their* hatred of God, and state of enmity against him, since that is confessed, the temper and state of the impenitent. Besides, it emboldens Sinners, and giveth them confidence to leave *their* souls at a desperate venture; presuming they may Repent time enough hereafter, when they can have no assurance of any time at all for the future. And it is the more dangerous, because *their* doctrine takes away all apprehension of danger, leaving them no fear, either of penalty, or sin in putting off Repentance. No danger of suffering by present neglects or delays, for they are told that they may Repent when they please. The Lord, saith one (c) part of *their* Divines, is every moment ready to help them to Repentance; or say (d) the rest, He will help them to it (if they please) in the Article of necessity when ever the precept makes it *their* duty. And what should hinder them upon such encouragement to defer it, even to the point of death? they need not fear that they shall perish, nor need they fear they shall sin by thus putting it off. Some of *their* Doctors make it no sin at all, others as good as none. (e) Bellarmine determines, That it is not a

(c) Vega in Conc. Trid. lib. 13. cap. 11. Molina. concord. grat. & lib. arb. q. 14. art. 13. disp. 10. Valent. tom. 2. disp. 8. q. 3. Semper quoad se habet oportunitatem, quia semper est in suo arbitrio positum ceteri Filiuc. tr. 6. c. 8. n. 202. Cum quilibet possit ope divina (que nunquam facient quod in se est) suorum peccatorum penitere, et eorum veniam consequi. Nav. cap. 24. n. 14.

(d) Cum non potest sine conversione vitare peccatum. Bellarm. de grat. l. 2. c. 5. & ed. Becan. de auxil. grat. cap. 6. Alvarez de auxil. grat. l. 11. disp. 112. n. 5. concl. 2.

(e) Neque enim præceptum de penitentia agenda quovis tempore obligat, cum sit affirmativum, sed solum certis temporibus, ut cum versamur in periculo mortis, cum ad confessionem est accedendum, (but for this, he says attrition will suffice, l. 2. c. 18. p. 974.) cum Deus peculiari inspiratione ad penitentiam nos invitat. At extra ejusmodi tempora penitentia non tam peccatum novum, quam peccati patrati circumstantia est. De penit. l. 2. c. 9. p. 938.

fin, but only a circumstance of sin, when the command doth not oblige; and that, it doth not presently, but only at a certain season. (f) *Medina* affirms, *That without all doubt it is lawful.* (g) *Soto* saith, it is but a Venial sin. *Canus* takes a course to reconcile them, he concludes it is no sin at all not to Repent presently; and that it is but (b) a Venial sin to *Will* (or resolve) *not to Repent.* Now if it be no sin at all, there is no danger at all; if it be but a Venial sin, there is very little or none to be regarded, no necessity upon any account to Repent of it; and he saith *the people never confess* this in order to Repentance, *the Priests never require it, nor regard it; by the consent of all we are not obliged to it.*

Now that which a man is not bound to Repent of, he may still continue in, and so he may still continue resolved to put off Repentance, yes, so he may safely, say they, till the Article of necessity.

Seci. 5. But when is that? Let us next enquire after it, and in the pursuit thereof, we shall discover the second point I charge them with. *That a man, by their doctrine, needs not Repent all his days, till he be in danger of death.*

This is *their* common doctrine, since the command to Repent is Affirmative, (i) it doth not oblige but in time of necessity, even as other affirmative precepts do. All the question will be, When is this time of necessity, when it will be necessary to Repent without longer delay? Now *their* Doctors are agreed in no other Article of time, except it be the point of death, or when a mans life is apparently in danger. There is no other time in a mans whole life, wherein it is likely that Repentance should be requisite, but they deny it to be then necessary; and offer arguments to prove, that it is not needful in any other, however probable seasons. Let me shew this in some instances.

Is it necessary to Repent at solemn times of worship, when we address our selves in a more particular manner to a Holy God? No, say

(f) *Non est dubium, quin id licitum sit, de pœnit. tr. 1. q. 6. p. 18.*

(g) *In 4. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 6. Relect. de pœnit. pars. 4 p. 866.*

(b) *Ibid, p. 863. supra.*

(i) *Quantum autem ad vitandum novum peccatum transgressionis præcepti de contritione, tempus est determinatum ad articulum necessitatis: sicut in aliis affirmativis præceptis contritionis. Cajetan. Sum. v. contrit. p. 104. Canus, ibid. p. 863.*

they (k) generally: and *Canus* (l) giveth this reason for it. Though acts of Religion be then required, yet Repentance is not an act of Religion, but of Revenge.

Is it needful on days of Fasting? It may seem so, because the main and proper end of Fasts, is the exercise of Repentance and Humiliation. No. say they, It is not needful then; for if this were the intention of God, or the Church, in injoyning Fasts, yet the intention of the Law-giver doth not bind us. (m) No exercise of Repentance is with them, requisite on their Fasts, but what they may perform in a Dream: for if they sleep the whole Fasting day, yet they fulfil the Precept for Fasting (*). To their Fasts they require nothing but abstinence from some sort of meat, not any Religious act at all: and if with them the Precept for the Mass, or Prayer, could not be fully accomplished without some penitent sense of sin, as it may; yet neither the Mass, nor Prayer publick, or private, is requisite to their Fasts. Yea, in extraordinary times for Prayer, upon occasion of some great calamity befallne them for their sins; they think not contrition for sin needful: the people (n) know not there is then any necessity thereof; their Confessors and Preachers are never wont to mind them of this.

(k) Aquinas 2.2. q. 122. art. 4.

Cajetan, ibid. p. 105, Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. supra Bellarm. de cult. Stor. l. 3. c. 10. supra. Sylvest. sum. v. Domin. n. 8. Graff. lib. 1. cap. 5. n. 24. Navar, cap. 13. n. 17. Sum. Rosellæ, v. ferie n. 1. Lopez, cap. 12. p. 85.

(l) In diebus festis non obligari homines ad agendam penitentiam aut divino præcepto humano, præceptum enim de colendo Deo, quo festis diebus astringimur, opera religionis præscribit: at penitentia religionis opus non est, sed vindicationis, Canus ibid. p. 864. Ita Cajetan. Soto, Navar, Armilla, Rosell. & alij communiter, Suar. l. 2. de fest. t. 16. n. 14.

(m) Ex D. Thomæ & graviorum auctorum sententia ad finem legislatoris minime tenentur, Canus ibid. p. 871.

(*) Si aliquis dormiret pro totum diem quæ observari præcipitur jejunium, præceptum jejunij impleret, Jo. Sanc. disp. 51. n. 2.

(n) Vid Bonacin. de Sacram. d. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 6.

Quia non constat privatis hominibus tempore u gentis necessitatis oraturis pro populi necessitate, quod contritio de suis peccatis sit remedium solitum ab ipsis adhiberi, & quia ignorant id remedium esse necessarium, neque de hoc tanquam de re necessariæ solent admoneri a confessoribus vel prædicatoribus: ideo peccatorem privatum tempore calamitatis magnæ, quæ premittitur republicæ, orantem Deum pro reipublicæ liberatione sine prævia contritione, ad peccatum mortale non ideo damnare, &c. Lopez, cap. 16. p. 97.

thing

thing necessary; and therefore Lopez saith, He would not condemn any private person, that neglects it in these circumstances, and so concludes he after others. As for *their* common Fasts, these (no more than *their* Festivals) require not abstinence from acts of wickedness, much less Repentance for them.

Is it necessary when sins are brought to our remembrance, and when our minds dictate to us, that they are to be hated and Repented of? It seems then needful, if ever, seeing a practical judgment obligeth even in things lawful, though they be not otherwise necessary. (o) No, not then, (p) *a man is not bound to Repent when his sins are offered to his mind, either speculatively or practically.* One would think if a sinner needs not repent, when he is mindful of his sins, it could never be needful, since he can never repent but when he is mindful of them.

Is it necessary when a sinner comes to *their* (q) Sacraments; particularly to that of Penance? This must be the time for it (as we may well conceive) if there be any time for it at all, in the Romish Church. Then a sinner is to survey his life, to find out his sins, and as a Penitent to make particular confession of them, and is to have pardon of his sin, as one that truly Repents; being absolved by a judicial sentence, as

(o) *Ex hoc autem quod peccata memoria occurrunt, sicut non tenetur ad tunc confitendum, ita nec ad tunc conterendum* Cajetan. sum. v. contrit. p. 105. *Non autem quandoeumque occurrat memoria peccatorum tenetur conteri--nec etiam si practice occurrant memoria peccata extra tempus precepti, quia tunc secundum Sotum, neque placere neque displicere, sed neutro modo se habere, non est contemptus.* Lopez. cap. 12. p. 85. vid. Navar (after Adrian) cap. 1. n. 27.

(p) *Non tenetur homo penitentiam agere, quoties peccata memoria occurrerint, sive speculative sive practice occurrerint.* Canus. ibid. p. 863.

(q) *Non tamen ad id tenemur quoties Ministramus, vel accipimus Sacramenta--quia non tenemur tunc habere contritionem* Navar. cap. 11. n. 8. vid. Lopez. cap. 10. p. 70.

Their common Doctrine, as we saw before, requires nothing but attrition for Baptism and Penance, no actual disposition at all for their other Sacraments.

Baptizans autem in necessitate non tenetur ad hoc (viz. Contritionem) Sylvest. v. Baptism. 3. n. 6. neque Baptizandus. vid. Soto. de Nat. & grat. l. 2. c. 15. p. 101.

Si attritus suscipit Sacramentum Penitentiae & Eucharistiae, satisfait precepto ecclesiae. Cajetan. sum. v. contrit. p. 104. *Sacramentum Baptismi & penitentiae, licite sumi possunt ab his qui habent conscientiam peccati mortalis, modo habeant attritionem qua tollitur obex & complacentia in peccatum commissum.* Canus. ibid. part. 6. p. 932.

(r) valid, as if Christ himself did pass it immediately. If Repentance be not needful, when a sinner is to have pardon, then the Lord never required it, nor can it ever be made necessary by man.

This notwithstanding, Repentance, they say, is not necessary, no, not for the Sacrament of Penance. Attrition will serve for that, which is but a(*) slender (r) dislike of sin, because it is hurtful to a man's self, without respect to God, as it is offensive to him. This, (t) though short of true Repentance, is sufficient to qualify a man for the Sacrament of Penance, by the Doctrine of their Church. For they hold the Sacrament is not only duly administered; but (x) effectual for all its ends and purposes, when there is no obstacle in the receiver; (x) the obstacle in this case is complacency in mortal sins, (y) the complacency is gone, when sin is disliked or displeasing out of any respect, and so the obstacle is removed by the dislike of sin, which is in attrition.

Thus comes Attrition to be sufficient, and (x) true Repentance not needful, no, not for the Sacrament of Repentance.

This is not only concluded by the generality of their Doctors, but by the Council of Trent. And by these particulars we may discern, That

(r) *Neq; aliter est accipienda vox sacerdotis peccata condonantis quam vox Christi, qui ait paralytico, Mar. 7. Confide fili, remittuntur tibi peccata. Catechism. Trident. de pœnit.*

(*) *Aquinas asserit attritionem esse displicentiam imperfectam. Can. ibid. p. 935.*

(s) *Attritio est dolor peccatorum, non qua ratione sunt offensa Dei, sed quatenus nobis nocua. Nimirum quia sunt causa pœnæ aut in hoc, aut in futuro seculo. Soto de nat. & grat. l. 2. c. 14. p. 99.*

(t) *Concil. Trident. sess. 14. cap. 4. vid. Cajetan. Navar. Canum. Lopez. supra. Bellarm. de pœnit. l. 2. c. ult. p. 974. Sacramenta novæ legis conferunt gratiam attritis. Canus de Sacramentis. pars. 5. p. 797.*

(u) *Concil. Trident. sess. 7. c. 6. Sacramentum gratiam confert omni adulto offerenti se, non pœnando obitem. Cajetan. sum. v. absolut. p. 12. Canus pars. 3. Relect. de pœnit. p. 844. Angel. sum. v. confess. 7. Secundum Scotum & S. Thom. si præcedens dolor non successisset ad contritionem, &c.*

(x) *Idem ibid. p. 932. supra.*

(y) *Complacencia vero satis tollitur per quemcumq; dolorem. Soto. de nat. & grat. l. 2. c. 15. p. 101.*

(z) That which we, with the Scripture, call true Repentance, they call Contrition. As for attrition, it is so far from being true Repentance, that, with the Council of Trent, they all acknowledge, it is not of it self sufficient for pardon. Attritio---quamvis sine penitentiæ Sacramento pe. rse ad justificationem peccatorem perdere nequeat. Concil. Trid. Sess. 14. c. 4.

Répentance with them, is not necessary, at any season of a mans life, when it would be counted so, if they did judge it needful at all, before the approach of death.

Señ. 8. But indeed there needs no induction of particulars to prove this, for they declare plainly that by the command of God, it is not necessary to repent till one be at the point of death. This is said to be the judgment of *Aquinas, Soto, Navarre, Durandus, Medina, Cajetan* and others in *Suarez*. The ground of it is, *(b) because the reasons brought to prove that it doth not oblige presently; prove it as much of any other certain time in our life, except that only when a man is dying.*

It is to the same effect that others say, the precept does but oblige in danger of death, or perpetual madness. So *Bonacina* and in him (besides Jesuites) *Medina, Sotus, Angles, Zerola Pitigianus, Sayrus, Molfesius*, and others. *De Sacram. ibid. n. 5.* So that while a man is like to live, and be sober, he need not repent: but if he be in danger to dye, or run mad, he should be so wise as to repent first, but how he shall know when he is like to run mad, or that his madness will be perpetual, is a hard question; and till he can resolve it, they will go near to excuse him. And if he can have a Confessor, though he be at the point of death and distraction too, he need not trouble himself with repenting, that proviso they still add (*saltem quando non adest copia confessorij, cui fiat confessio cum attritione*) this indeed is it, that their Confessors serve, for to save sinners the labour of going to Heaven, by turning them out of the only way to it.

However by this it appears, that any Papist hath warranty by their Doctrine to live impenitently, till he be in danger to live no longer. He need not grieve for offending God, till he be dying, nor resolve upon that account to forsake any sin, till there be reason to think, that he can live no longer to commit it.

(b) In quare est multorum opinio hoc præceptum (penitentiae) per se & natura sua; tantum obligare pro articulo mortis, ita sentit. D. Thomas & Durandus.---Et eodem modo sumitur hæc opinio ex Cajetano, Medina, Soto, Navarr, &c. Et fundamentum--- quia supposito, quod præceptum non statim obliget antea articulum mortis; nulla est major ratio assignandi unum tempus, quam aliud: imo neq; est ratio designandi aliquod, quia in nullo est vera necessitas: præceptum autem affirmativum tantum obligat p o articulo necessitatis. Suarez. Tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 6. n. 2.

What a Temptation is here for all wicked persons to turn Papists, if they could but prevail with themselves to believe in this particular, as the Church believes, against all that God hath declared concerning repentance? And since men easily believe, what they desire should be true though against the word of truth: how strange would it be, if the World did not *wonder after the Beast*?

Señ. 7. But though they excuse a sinner from repenting all his life before, yet when he comes to dye, do they not then make it needful? they make some shew of it indeed, but it is a more delusive shew; & they are therein as false to their own pretensions, as they are to the Souls of sinners. For at the approach of death (as at any period before, wherein some of them seem to make Repentance necessary, yet) even then they abuse them with conceits, that something else will serve without it. The expedients which they have provided, thus to delude perishing Souls all their lives, and even when they are passing into eternity, are many and various; that those who do not like to be ruined one way, may be taken with another; and so, *that repenting*, which alone can secure them, may be declined by all.

First, Repentance without any sensible sorrow for sin, will serve the turn. This is the way of *Scotus*, and *Vega* and others. *A will not to have sinned*, though it be without any (c) grief for sin, or without any actual consideration, that he hath sinned, is sufficient for pardon. Such an act of the Will is the essence of that contrition which procures forgiveness. (d) as not only *Scotus*, but *Paludanus*, *Cajetane*, *Soto*, *Victoria* and *Navarre* in *Lopez*.

(e) Sorrow is not essential to Repentance, but an effect; and such a one as is contingent and separable, and doth not necessarily follow it. Correspondent to this is their Doctrine who teach, that a verual Re-

(c) In *Navar. cap. 1. n. 3*

(d) *Ex mente Navarri, Soti, Paludani: Scoti est, quod contritio quoad suam essentiam est iste affectus nollem peccasse. Lopez. cap. 10. p. 68. & cap. 6. p. 38. vid. D. Thom. Paludan, Soto, Navar, Ledesma, Cajetan. Concil. Trident. and others in Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 8.*

(e) *Per supradicta constat (contritionem) non esse dolorem essentialiter; sed causam, ex qua, & alij ad id necessarij nascitur dolor, si aliunde non impediatur. Nav. ibid. n. 14.*

penitence is sufficient, (f) any act whatever, which may be counted penitence virtually; though it be no such thing actually, or formally; is enough by their common Doctrine, any (g) love to God above all is such a virtual Repentance, though without (h) any remembrance of sin, this is not only the opinion of *Medina*, but that which is commonly received. Any kind of love will serve for this, though it be but natural, and such as may be had without the grace of God, as (i) *Navarr* expresseth it. And the limitation which he would seem to add, that such a virtual Repentance is but sufficient when there is no time for a formal Repenting, is excluded by their common Doctrine. For he and others with him generally teach, that there is no space of time requisite for this, but it may be sufficiently dispatched in a (k) moment.

And some of their chief Divines hold, that a sinner being pardoned upon this virtual penitence, if he remember his sins afterwards, is not bound to repent of them. So *Corduba, Sotus, Vega, Bonacin. ibid d. 5. q. 5. p. 2. n. 1.*

Thus we have Repentance sufficient to Salvation in the Roman Church without any sorrow, without any sense or remembrance of sin. And how can they count any more sorrow for sin necessary? who hold (l) *That no prudent person doth confess his sins to a Priest, but he detests them formally or virtually*, and so some way sufficiently: when it is known to be their common practice to confess sins, without any sorrow or detestation thereof? Yea even in the hour of death, asking God forgiveness without any remembrance of sin or actual Repentance, is enough for pardon. So *Joseph the Minorite* teacheth, favouring their conceit (as *Lopez* observes) *who think it repentance (m)*

(f) *Sufficit actus qui licet non sit penitentia talis formaliter, est tamen virtualiter secundum Scorum communiter receptum. ibid. n. 5.*

(g) n. 30.

(h) *Imo quilibet amor Dei, quo plus quam omnia alia diligitur, videtur virtualis peccatorum penitentia, secundum communem quam sequitur. Jo. Medina. ibid. n. 5.*

(i) Cap. 11. n. 7. r. 131. Supra.

(k) Cap. 1. n. 38. *Penitudo momentanea--ad remissionem peccati juxta communem sufficit.*

(l) *Nullus est adeo imprudens qui tempore confessionis peccata sua non detestatur formaliter vel virtualiter. Major & Victoria in Lopez. c. 17. p. 100.*

(m) *Sufficere ad contritionem, tumorem pectoris, aut prolationem Miserere mei--Cap. 13 p. 90. Instante mortis præ angustia tollente recordationem peccatorum, si quis toto corde petat veniam, sine actuali penitentia per orationem justificabitur. enough.*

enough, to beat their breasts, and say Lord have mercy. Nor doth such pernicious presumption find encouragement only in the *Minorites* Divinity; Pope *Clement* the 8th contributes more to it, when in his indulgences sent to *Poland* he promiseth pardon, to any one whoever that is dying, if he have but the name *Jesus* once in his thoughts, though he cannot express it.

As there can be no true Repentance without sorrow for sin; so neither without Resolution to forsake it: and yet they teach, Repentance may be as well without this as the other. (n) a virtual resolution may serve i. e. such a purpose to abandon sin, as he may have, who never thought of leaving it. (o) *Navarre* tells us that the sufficiency of such a purpose is learnedly and magnificently asserted by *Vega*. He (p) himself explains it and defends it, without any limitation, but, that the vanity whereof appears before; and (q) tells us the Council of *Trent* requires not a formal purpose, but thinks that sufficient which is only virtual. And their Divines whom they call *Nominals*, deny that any purpose to forsake sin is necessary to Repentance, as *Soto* (r)

(n) *Non est necessarium ad remissionem peccatorum formale propositum vitandi peccatum.* Vega. Concil. Trident. l. 13. cap. 21.

(o) Cap. 1. n. 6. *Sicut alius, qui est penitentia virtualis, sufficit, ita eadem ratione sufficere videtur, quod eam comitetur id, quod est propositum virtuale constituendi, satisfaciendi, & amplius non peccandi.* n. 11.

(p) n. 12. vid. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 4.

(q) *Graves Doctores existimant sufficere virtuale propositum, ita Major, Almain, Vega, Medina, Pegus, Soto, Navar. Adrian. idem. ibid. disp. 4. p. 3. n. 2.*

(r) *Ex nominalibus quidam addubitant, nam in ratione contritionis necessarium sit propositum cavendi a vitijs in futurum. Atq; id negant Soto De natur. & gr. l. 2. c. 14. p. 99. vid. Canum, Cordubam qui refert Durandum, Paludanum, Capreolum & Antoninum pro tali sententia in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 2. n. 6. Non esse necessariam detestationem efficacem cum absoluto dolore & proposito non peccandi, sed dispendium quancunq; cum velleitate non peccandi, sufficere ad valorem Sacramenti, sentit Cajetan. Viñoria, Canus, Ledesma, Sicut Paludanus, Sylvester, ibid. Sect. 4. Aquinas, Capreolus, Thom. Hurtado. Tom. 2. tr. ult. n. 501.*

Neg; oportet, ut confessor sibi persuadeat, & judicet etiam probabiliter, ita esse futurum ut penitens a peccando ablineat, sed satis est, ut existimet tunc habere tale propositum, quamvis post breve tempus illud sit mutaturus. Ita docent omnes auctores. Idem disp. 32. Sect. 2. n. 2. p. 426.

Scotus in 4. disp. 14. q. ult. art. 3. and Sylvester after him, sum. v. confessio n. 24. hold that neither sorrow for sin, nor resolution against it (no, not so little as they ascribe to attrition) is needful: but that a willingness to partake of their Sacrament is sufficient for justification by it.

informs us. So that by the Doctrine of all sorts of Divines amongst them, a repenting, which wants the essentials of true Repentance, will suffice in life or death.

Secondly, A Repentance or sorrow for sin, which is merely natural is counted sufficient. The Apostle to true Repentance requires Godly sorrow. 2 Cor. 7. 9, 10. but they, many of them, think it not requisite that it should be Godly, no not in respect of its original. That will serve, which is not from God, but from nature. *Scotus* a leader of one mighty Squadron of their School-Doctors determines, (s) That such a sorrow may be had by the power of nature, as will in congruity merit pardon of sin. And *Adrian, Durandus* with all the *Nominals* in a manner, take that to be his judgment, and are of the same persuasion themselves. The *Franciscans* maintained it (t) in the Council of Trent. *Aquinas* (u) whom the rest of their School Divines generally follow, was of that opinion too. And the chief of the *Dominicans* his modern followers (even those of them, who are loth their Anglican Doctor should appear to be so much a *Pelagian*) do hold ; that such a sorrow as is merely from nature (without either habitual grace, or special assistance) is enough, to justify him, who through ignorance thinks it enough. So *Canus* and *Soto* in (x) *Lopez*, from whence *Lopez* infers (y), That in their account such remorse for sin, as requires special assistance, is not necessary to the justification of a sinner : but

(s) *Expressè ipse (Scotus) in 4. dist. 14. q. 2. ait. quod ex puris naturalibus, cum communi influentia, potest esse attritio, quæ sit meritum de congruo ad deletionem peccati mortalis—ad eo pro constanti ubiq; habet, quod naturaliter possumus disponi de congruo ad justificationem : quam solam dispositionem ipse docet. Atqui Adrianus, Durandus, & ferme Nominales, & ita illum sentire indubie putant, & sentiant ipsi. Soto. ibid. l. 2. c. 4. p. 68.*

(t) That a man by natural power only, may feel a sorrow for sin, which is a disposition, and merit of congruity to abolish it. *Hist. of Coun. of Trent. l. 2. p. 198.*

(u) *Ibid. & Soto. ibid. l. 1. c. 2. (Aquinas) opinionem communem inequitus affirmasset, tum quod homo ex naturalibus posset se disponere ad gratiam, tum quod dispositio illa esset meritum de congruo. p. 66.*

(x) *Quæstio oritur, an cum attritione orta solum ex viribus nature simul cum Sacramento in re, possit penitens justificari. Et quidem quæstio est, quæ nobis Thomistis facit negotium, propterea quod Scotus & Canus Clarissimi Thomistæ, videntur hic affirmationem tenere. Cap. 8. p. 53. (y) p. 55.*

that

that may suffice, which is had from the power of nature, though the ground of it be but outward disgrace. Thus if we will believe the Romane Doctors, Thomists or Scotists (the Jesuites who serve themselves of both as they see occasion, I need not mention ; since of their concurrence herein there is no question) : a sinner may be saved by such a sort of Repentance, as is not the gift of God ; but the pure issue of corrupt nature.

Thirdly, a slight and inconsiderable sorrow (such as falls short of what the Scripture calls for) will suffice instead of true Repentance. One act of grief, they tell us, is enough for the sins of a whole life, one only, there needs not two. So (a) Soto, (b) Bellarmine, &c. One act will serve for all sins in general and together, remembred or not remembred, in which sense they say a (c) general Repentance will suffice. Their sense de Graffis thus Reports. (d) *A particular Repentance is not required, but one general will serve, extending it self, at least virtually, to all mortal sins, both which he remembers, and remembers not; with a will to abstain from all; this is enough for Remission of sins.*

Further, this one act of grief needs be but very little and slender, the very least remorse in the lowest degree that can be, will serve.

When they require no sensible sorrow at all to Repentance, but only a dislike of the will, or a will not to have sinned ; the best and weakest motion of the will that way (against past sins) will suffice.

To (e) the perfection of Repentance, a certain slender inward

(a) S. Thom. Nugnus, Navar, Victoria, Sotus, Pitigianus, Zerola, Cajet. Palatius, Canus, (in) Bonacin. ibi l. d. 5. q. 5. p. 5. n. 1.

Satis est si penitens peccatis omnibus memoratis, unam detestationem applicet. in Lopez e. 6. p. 39.

(b) Neq; illud exigitur ut tot sint actus contritionis, quot sint peccata—est concedendum hominem unica actione peccata omnia, quae memoriae forte occurrunt, detestari, atq; ob ea commissa dolere: alioquin enim falsum esset, quod paulo ante demonstravimus, in homine posse hominem converti, & justificari. De penit. l. 2. c. 1. p. 944.

(c) Cajetan. sum. v. contrit. p. 103, 104. Soto dist. 17. q. 2. art. 3. Tol. l. 3. c. 15. p. 516.

(d) Non requiri singularem sed quod sufficiat una generalis, quae saltem virtualiter se extendat ad omnia peccata mortalia, &c. l. 1. c. 5. n. 5.

Satis est ut concipiat generalem ejusmodi penitudinem quae virtute se extendat ad omnia mortifica. Navar. c. 1. n. 22. quod tenendum est cum Jo. Majore & Cardinale S. Sixti alij communiter in Bonacin. ibid. punct. 6.

(e) Ad perfectionem penitentiae requiritur tenuis quidam dolor internus. sum. q. 16. art. 1. Contritio una licet remissa. l. 3. c. 5. grief

grief is requisite faith Maldonat, one act of Contrition, though it be remis, is enough, faith Tolet. These two are Jesuites, but speak more modestly than others of their Doctors. Let us hear Canus (f) we need not grieve for sin as much as we can, such an endeavour is not required in any other precept for Love, Faith, Hope, or Righteousness. Yea they would be foolish precepts, if they enjoyed a certain degree. But if we need not grieve so much as we can, how then? Why, as little as can be: or if that will not satisfy, As little as we will. *Quantumcumq; sit remissa* (g) faith Navarr, Penitence be it never so little, it is sufficient for the washing away of all crimes, according to the common sense of the Doctors, (h) *quantumvis remissa*, Be it as little as you will, sayes Lopez after Aquinas. (k) No certain degree, none that can be assigned, above the least of all, is requisite in Bellarmine, Victoria, &c. But should there not be a degree, more than the least, for the more grievous sins? No, no more for them than the less. In (i) honestly we may grieve more for the greater, to comply with the advice of God, but there is no necessity for it; it's only matter of Counsel, and so left to our pleasure. But must we not grieve for sin, as those who conceive it to be hateful above all, and most to be avoyded? No, (m) not that neither: Lopez (n) tells us, that neither Council, nor Scripture have

(f) *Præceptum de actu fidei & de actu spei homo implet, etiamsi non agat ex toto conatus, ergo & præceptum de charitate & contritione: non ergo contritio totum animi conatum exigit. Quod autem nullum ejusmodi esset præceptum, patet, esset enim stultum præceptum, quod semper invincibiliter ignoratur. Relect. de pœnit. pars. 3. p. 841.*

(g) *Quantumcumq; sit remissa*—satis est ad crimina diluenda Cap. 1. n. 31 Secundum mentem communem Doctorum.

(h) *Secundum. S. Thom. quæcumq; contritio vera, quantumvis remissa, etiam in instanti concepta satis est ad remittenda omnia mortalia. Cap. 15. p. 94.*

De pœnit. l. 2. c. 11. p. 943. Contrit. n. 106.

(i) *Dicendum est ad rationem contritionis nullam definitam intensiorem requiri, sed sufficere substantiam actus, in quocumq; gradu fiat. Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 4. Sect. 4. Ita expresse Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navarrus. ibid. n. 9. vid. plures in Bonacin. ibid. punct. 7. n. 3.*

(l) *Licet de graviore peccato graviore requiratur penitentia sive penitudo, hoc tamen intelligendum est de consilio & honestate, non autem de necessitate. Navar. c. 1. n. 31.*

(m) *Detestari peccatum supra omne malum penæ, non necessarium. Cajetan, Navar, Vega, in Suarez. ibid. disp. 3. Sect. 9. n. 8.*

(n) *(Nullum concilium, nec Sancti, nec Scriptura Sacra, id supra omne odibile, dolorem necessarium esse expressere. c. 15. p. 92.*

declared it necessary to grieve for sin, as that which is most hateful: and (which is more than all,) that the *Council of Trent* requires it not. *Navarr* (o) had said as much before him, only the former thinks, it may be requisite that the penitent do not expressly or positively form in his mind a Resolution not to grieve for sin above all that is hateful. Thus is Repentance reduced in a manner to nothing: in respect of *Appretiation*, it is too much to grieve for sin, as that which is most odious: in respect of *intensity*, it is enough to grieve less for it, than other grievances, the least degree of all is sufficient, and that which is next to nothing may serve.

Moreover, this one act so extremely little, may be dispatched(*) in a moment. The least degree of it is enough, but the least continuance is too much; all the Repentance that is a Sinners duty, may be perfectly finished in the twinkling of an eye; an indivisible instant can serve all the exigencies of it, and it may be as soon over as a man can say *peccavi*. It's such an act as vanishes so soon as ever it appears, and is come and gone before there is time to observe it; they allow not the least space, the least particle of time to be necessary for it: And it is so in Faith, Hope, Love, and other virtues; no man ever required any space of time for this; so *Bellarmin*, (p) *Canus* (q) *de Graffis*; (r) so *Navar*, (s) so all in a manner; for he tells us, it is the common sense of their Divines. The least penitence that may be, in the shortest time that can be, yea, in that which is less than any particle of time, even in an instant, is enough to blot out all crimes. And *Scotus*, for saying that penitence dispatched in a moment, is not sufficient for pardon, had like to have suffered shrewdly, every one almost being ready to fall

(o) Cap. 1. n. 25.

(*) Sufficit, si fiat in instanti Bonacin. ibid. punct. 8. ibi. Nugnus, Molfesius & alii.

(p) Non requiritur certus gradus intensiōis, neque mora ulla temporis ad veram contritiōem — Quis unquam in Præceptis fidei, spei, dilectionis, aliarumque virtutum istas mēsuras excogitavit, &c. De pœnit. l. 2. c. 11. p. 943.

(q) Canus. pars. 3. Relect. de pœnit. p. 842. (r) Graff. l. 1. c. 5. n. 7.

(s) Secundum mentem communem Doctorum, quam explicat Jo. Major, penitudo circummissa debitis circumstantiis & supradictis, quantumcunque remissa; & brevissimo tempore, etiam in instanti concepta, satis est ad crimina diluenda, Cap. 1. n. 31. & n. 22. & n. 38.

foul upon him ; (t) but his followers have compounded for him, and brought him off with a distinction, which makes him say as the rest do, whether he thought so or no. And now it passeth currently, that all the sorrow which any need have for all his sins, may be over in less than a minute, and may be begun, perfected, and ended in less time than you can pronounce the least syllable of *miserere* ; and this they restrain not to extraordinary cases, but conclude it as common to all. Finally,

This one little act so suddainly dispatched, need never return : Do it but once, and no need to do it again. The act, though next to nothing in degree ; though nothing at all, as to continuance, is not necessarily to be repeated, or the defect of it to be supplied by another act, though there be time and occasion for it ; all exercise of Repentance for sin, supposed to be thus pardoned, upon any occasion, is altogether unnecessary. Having passed one act of grief so extremely slender, & so suddainly over, he needs never trouble himself with it further ; (u) *There is no command that can oblige us to have it twice for the same sin.* Such is the Repentance which in the Church of Rome is counted sufficient for salvation, even in ordinary cases ; how agreeable it is to that which the Scripture makes necessary, let others judge ? to me it seems calculated for the humours of those who would be saved with a conceit of Repenting, without troubling themselves with the thing ; yet this is not the worst. For,

Fourthly : When they have commended to Sinners a sort of Repentance, which is not sufficient to save them, they take it for granted that it is insufficient ; and yet maintain that it is enough, if the Sinner do but think so, yea, or do not think the contrary. He that thinks he is contrite, saith *Soto*, when he is not ; (x) *though his inward remorse*

(t) *Vid. Lopez. cap. 15. p. 94. alij Scotistæ videntur Scotum salutare ejus sensum & mentem interpretando. — Nam culpam posse remitti per contritionem etiam remissam, & habitam in instanti, non dubitavit, &c.*

(u) *Non est præceptum quod nos obligat ad eam habendam bis speciatim de eodem, Navar. c. 1. n. 28. vid. Sylvest. Sum. et contri. n. 4.* He is not obliged afterwards when he remembers his sins, *Aquinas, Navar, Sajinus, Angles, Pitigianus, Molfesius, &c.* Bonacin, *ibid.* punct. 2. n. 9.

(x) *Tum enim licet attritio interna non sufficit, tamen quia ille bona fide accedit, recipit gratiam per Sacramentum, De nat. & Grat. li. 2. c. 15. p. 101.*

be not sufficient, yet because he means honestly, he shall receive justifying grace by the Sacrament. Navar tells us that Soto herein follo^d Aquin^{us} commonly received; and he (y) after Franciscus Victoria judgeth it to be the plain sense of the Council of Trent, (a) Carduba, Canus, and (b) de Grassis, with others, concur herein. As for the followers of Scotus, amongst them it is taught, That whosoever thinks he is contrite, hath really obtained pardon; and therefore none, who make account they bring contrition to the Sacrament, do by it receive the first Grace, because they are possess^d of it already, by thinking so well of themselves, (c) as Soto reports them. Add but Cardinal Tolet (that we may see how all Orders conspire herein) (d) Those who come with remorse (which they think to be contrition) receive the first Grace. He thus explains it: Sometimes a man hath some grief for sin which is not sufficient for pardon; but the Sacrament being added, he is pardoned.

Thus all sorts agree in this conceit, which I know not, whether it be more ridiculous or pernicious, that a man's, thinking he hath true Repentance, when he hath it not, is enough (at least with the Sacrament of Absolution) to save him. Let any man but delude himself, or be deluded by others, with a false conceit that he truly Repents, when he doth not; and any Priest can let him, in his impenitence, into Heaven; if the best of the Roman Guides may be believed, or those Impostors regarded, who hereby make it plain, (if they did it no other way,) that they are given up to strong delusions.

Fifthly: If a man want that penitent sorrow which is sufficient, yet if he signifie, that he would have it, or that he is sorry that he hath

(y) Cap. 1. n. 42. & n. 35

Quando non habet signa sufficientia doloris, potest & debet interrogare penitentem; ut ex animo detestetur peccatum, cui affirmanti credere tenetur. Et hoc idem dicendum est de proposito in futurum---Ita docent omnes authores. Suar. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 2. n. 2.

(a) Victoria. Soto. Ledesma. Vega. Corduba in Suarez. l. 4. disp. 10. Sect. 1. n. 7.

(b) Quando saltem concipitur ob amorem Dei---cum credulitate quod habeat sufficientem dolorem, licet revera illum non habeat, l. 1. c. 2. n. 8. & n. 6.

(c) Neque vero ignora Nominalium quorundam opinionem docentium, quod quicumque existimas, se esse contritum, revera obtinuisse jam veniam, atque adeo quod nullus cogitans contritionem se adferre ad Sacramentum, per ipsum recipit primam gratiam: quin vero jam recepit per suam bonam illam cogitantiam, ibid. p. 102.

(d) Aliquando homo dolet de peccato, dolore qui per se non sufficeret delere peccatum, & iam non accedente Sacramento deletur, Just. l. 2. c. 16. p. 460.

it not, it is as effectual, as if he had it. (e) *The Penitent is to be asked* (saith Paludanus) *whether he Repent; and if he do not grieve sufficiently, whether this do not displease him, and whether he would not grieve sufficiently; and this* (saith he) *is sufficient, which Sylvester would have well observed, because one so disposed may be absolved; (i. e. though he want that Repentance which is sufficient, yet he hath enough to put him into a saving state) and this he tells us, is not only the sense of Peter Paludanus, but of Aquinas and Bonaventure, and all their Divines. (f) Navar saith as much approving it as the opinion of all their Doctors. And yet this willingness which they will have to supply the want of sufficient Repentance, is but a conditional Velleity, such as Lopez observes, (g) may stand with an absolute unwillingness to Repent sufficiently; such a Will as a Whore may have to leave the Stews, when she hath an absolute purpose to stay there; and yet he himself (b) will have such a Velleity with attrition (which is far from true Repentance) to be sufficient, in the want of it; and this leads us further.*

Sixthly: *Attrition*, though known by the Sinner to be short of true Repentance, is sufficient without it, to pass him into a saving state, if the Sacrament be added. Betwixt *Contrition* (which with them is true or compleat Repentance) and this *Attrition*, the distance is great; they give an account of it in (i) many particulars. *THAT* is a grief for offending God, *THIS* for temporal or eternal punishment, as the greatest evil. *THAT* proceeds from filial, *THIS* from slavish fear. *THAT*

(e) *Secundum Pet. de Pal. a penitente requirendum est, si penitet: & si non sufficienter dolet, an hoc sibi displicet, & vellet sufficienter dolere. Et hoc inquit sufficit, quod valde nota, quia sic dispositus est contritus vel saltem attritus, ut possit absolvi.--- & est mens S. Thom. S. Bonavent. & omnium Theologorum, Sum. v. contrit. n. 2.*

(f) *Cap. 1. n. 18. & cap. 10. n. 4.*

(g) *Secundum Doctores & ipsum Navarrum penitentia de præteritis habetur per istum conditionalem actum nollem peccasse, sed cum istis conditionalibus nollicitatibus aut vellicitatibus, hæve potest propositum absolutum de sibi contrario. ut cum nollicitate qua ingruente procella mercator nollet projicere merces suas in mare secundum, Aristor. stat. absolutum propositum, eas projiciendi. Et cum vellicitate quam meretrix in lupanari tenet inde exorandi, hæve potest absoluta voluntas ibi manendi, Cap. 15 p. 91.*

(h) *Non sufficit cum Sacramento penitentia ad salutem, nisi saltem attritio adsit, ibid. vid. Suarez.*

(i) *Vid. Soto in 4. sent. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 3. Graff. l. 1. c. 2. n. 3.*

cannot

cannot be had without supernatural assistance, *THIS* may be had by the power of nature, say many of them. *THAT* is an act formed by Grace and Love, *THIS* an act unformed, destitute of Grace and Love. *THAT* can pass one into the state of Grace, with a desire only of the Sacrament, *THIS* cannot, without an actual partaking of it. So in fine, *THAT* is compleat Repentance, *THIS* but a defective remorse, (k) such as was in, *Antiochus* and *Judas*. Attrition, we see by *their* own account, is very far from true Repentance, yet being held sufficient for a saving state without it, if the Sacrament be added, by virtue hereof, Repentance is most evidently rendred needless. And such Attrition they think sufficient for this purpose, as either ariseth from the turpitude of sin, as it is disagreeable to reason, or from fear of Hell, or apprehensions of temporal punishments and damage, as loss of Health, Credit, Estate, &c. The Council of *Trent* admitts of any of these. (l) For Attrition by their declaration, is either (m) *that which proceeds from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or fear of Hell, or other punishment.* And such Attrition is, with the Sacrament, sufficient for pardon, as is determined by that Council in these words, (n) *Hereby he makes his way to Righteousness, and although without the Sacrament, it [Attrition] cannot by it self bring a Sinner to justification; yet it disposeth him to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of penance: So that by their doctrine, Attrition so disposeth a Sinner for Justification, that their Sacrament being added, it actually justifies, i. e. puts a Sinner*

(k) Idem ibid. C. *Judas*. C. *Scelerator*. de pæn. dist. 3.

(l) *Quinimo minime malum est penitere solum metu pænæ, infamiae vel atterius mali: modo voluntatem peccandi excludat, luculenter declarat, Concil. Trident. Sess. 14. c. 4. Navar. cap. 1. n. 8. Vega lib. 13. in Trident. c. 14. Concedit detestationem ob meritum aliarum pænarum, esse attritionem, & contineri sub primo membro: nam Concilium utrumque conjunxit, scil. ex metu gehennæ & pænarum, in Suar. tom. 4. disp. 5. Sect. 2. n. 15. vid Bonacin. ibid. punct. 3. n. 3. Zerola. Chamerota, Pitigianus, & alij ibid.*

(m) *Illam vero contritionem imperfectam, quæ Attritio dicitur: quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione, vel ex gehennæ & pænarum metu communiter concipitur, Sess. 14. cap. 4.*

(n) *Quo penitens adjutus viam sibi ad justitiam parat, & quamvis sine penitentiae Sacramento per se ad justificationem peccatorem perducere nequeat: tamen cum ad Dei gratiam in Sacramento penitentiae imperandam disponit. ibid.*

into a state of Grace and Salvation. From this sentence of the Council, as Bellarmine tells us, (o) *the Truth of what their Divines hold, is conspicuous, viz. That Attrition arising out of fear, is a disposition to Justification; and the Sacrament being added, doth truly justify.* How generally they hold (with some difference of notion) the sufficiency of Attrition with their Sacrament, we may see in such as give an account of their Opinions distinctly (not taking any of the Society into the reckoning): it will be enough but to name some of them, since their suffrages after the determination of a Council are less needful. (p) Some are for Attrition improved, as Henricus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Petrus, Soto. Some for Attrition, mistaken for Contrition, (q) as Vitoria, Soto, Ledesma, Vega, Corduba. Some for Attrition known to be so, (r) as Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Cano, & some (s) for the opinion of Attrition, without the reality. But this is enough to shew, that by the doctrine of their Church, Attrition with the Sacrament, is sufficient to put a Sinner into a saving state at any time living or dying. Thus is true Repentance reduced to Attrition, and this made enough to qualify an impenitent Sinner for pardon, so as he cannot fail of it; and yet Attrition, of what kind so ever, can scarce pass for a good quality. That sort of it which is rational (a dislike of sin, because it disagreeable to reason) is not so good in their account as that which is (servile); because as such, (t) *it is but a meer natural act, and hath no respect to God, and so hath nothing in it which looks like Godly sorrow.* As for that which is servile, (a dislike of sin only, or principally for fear of punishment temporal or eternal) this is so far from being spiritually

(o) Et de eo loquuntur theologi, cum dicunt, attritionem ex timore conceptam, dispositionem esse ad justificationem, & Sacramento accedente, revera justificari, ut perspicuum est ex concilio Tridentino, Sess. 14. c. 4. de pœnit. l. 2. c. 18. p. 972.

(p) Vid Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 5. (q) n. 7. (r) n. 9.

(s) Soto, Canus, Vega, n.

(t) Detestatio peccati quia est contra rationem non est sufficiens, quia non respicit Deum ipsum, nec peccatum, ut est offensa ejus. --- tum quia ex vi illius motivi non est supernaturalis, Idem ibid. disp. 4. Sect. 2. n. 11. Primum itaque genus imperfectæ displicentiae est, cum quis dolet de peccato propter humana naturaliaque motiva, ut quia turpe est & contrarationem, Canus, Relect. de pœnit. pars. 3. p. 836.

good, that it is morally evil. So bad it is, by the Authority and reason of their own Divines. Thus Gregory, *Almain*, and *Adrian* conclude (u), that it is evil to act out of fear of punishment, as the next end or motive. It is no better by the reasoning of others, who would have us think better of it. A Sinner thereby prefers himself before God (and that sure is a sin (in any, unless they will except his Holiness) not any repenting of sin); for he that dislikes sin for punishment principally, or as the greatest evil, (x) regards more (as themselves argue) that which is evil to himself, than that which is evil to God, and so placeth the ultimate end in himself, not in God.

Señ. 8. Having thus reduced Repentance to a thing no better than we see Attrition is, as though it were yet too good and too much; they bring Attrition down to nothing. It is but as they describe it, a dislike of sin, not as that is offensive to God, but out of other respects, wherein (*) self-love is most concerned, and slavish fear is most operative. The least dislike of this nature will serve, and in the lowest degree that can be: (y) Nor need this continue any longer than the least moment.

And it will be sufficient, say some, though it be but (z) merely natural, excited by some natural or human motive, without the grace of God, or his Divine assistance: So *Canus* and *Soto*. Or it will serve if

(u) Nonnulli Catholici--operari ex timore tanquam ex fine proximo, judicant esse malum ut Gregorius, *Almain*, *Adrian*, *Suar. ibid. disp. 5. Sect. 2. n. 3. p. 65.*
Vid. *Angel. Sum. v. Timor.*

(x) Si pena timeatur tanquam maximum, supremum, pessimumque malum, tunc est pravus timor, nam per illum preferit homo malum suum, malo Dei: unde in se non in Deo consistit finem ultimum. *Idem. disp. 1. de spe. Sect. 4. n. 5. Valent. tom. 3. disp. 2. q. 1. punct. 3.*

(*) *Aquinas 2. 2. q. 19. art. 6.*

(y) Nulla intentio vel duratio est de ratione contritionis (*Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navar.*) & idem est de Attritione propter easdem rationes, *Suar. ibid. disp. 5. Sect. 1. n. 6.*

(z) Ad effectum hujus Sacramenti sufficere Attritionem naturalem, i. e. solis viribus nature elicitam: sive illa sit concepta ex motivo eterno & honesto, ut est fugere penas inferni, vel turpitudinem peccati, sive ex motivo temporali & indifferente, ut est vitare infamiam, vel aliud temporale detrimentum, *Soto & Canus, ibid. disp. 20. Sect. 2. n. 7.*

there be but a dislike, that this dislike of sin is wanting (a). So *Paludanus*, *Navar*, and others. Or it will be enough if there be a willingness to have it in those who have it not, (b) according to the Doctrine of their holy men *Aquinas* and *Richardus* especially. Or a mans thinking probably, that he hath it when he hath it not, (c) will serve the turn; so *Canus* and *Vega*. (d) Or if he neither have it in reality nor in conceit, it will suffice, if he be but willing to partake of the Sacrament; for so they tell us, he is virtually willing to be attrite, and this qualifies him for pardon, though he neither actually hath Attrition, nor desires it; so *Scotus* and *Sylvest* after him. Thus after Attrition hath swallowed up true Repentance, yet it still becomes more lank by their handling, and in fine, shrinks quite away. But whether it be little or nothing, it will serve to justify them, yea, and that too, without their ritual penance; other Sacraments, or rites, with this, will do it. They advance the sufficiency of Attrition, for all the purposes of true Repentance, even without their penance. This, with the Eucharist, will serve, not (say they) that there is need of true contrition, a conceit that he hath it, with this and the Eucharist, (e) will procure

(a) Satis est, ut quidam dicunt, quod pœnitens displicentiam habeat, quod de peccato non dolet, Ibid. Sect. 1. n. 2.

(b) Sufficit, si quis vellet habere displicentiam, & Dei gratiam cavendi in posterum: quia talis est Attritio virtualiter secundum doctrinam Sanctorum, maxime, S. Thom. & Rich. Sylvest, Sum. v. Confess. 1. n. 24.

(c) Aliqui sentiunt ad hunc effectum non esse necessariam veram Attritionem, in re existentem, sed inculpabiliter & probabiliter putatam sufficere, quod sensit, Cano & Vega. l. 13. c. 34. Suar. ibid. Sect. 2. n. 2. & alij in Bonacin, ibid. q. 5. p. 3. n. 6.

(d) Imo dicitur fortius secundum Scotum, quod sufficit, quem velle talem displicentiam non solum formaliter, sed etiam virtualiter, eam volendo in sua causa, i. e. in Sacramento pœnitentiæ justificante, quia in 4. dist. 14. q. ult. in art. 3. tenet, quod ad consequendam gratiam per hoc Sacramentum, non requiritur attritio: sed sufficit voluntas suscipiendi hoc Sacramentum, &c. Sylvest. ibid.

Imo aliqui Doctores asserunt hoc valere (viz. attritionem putatam) etiamsi omissa sit, vera attritio ob negligentiam in preparatione faciendâ, Bonacin. ubi supra de pœnit. d. 5. q. 5, Sect. 1. p. 3. n. 6.

(e) Aquinas 13. q. 79. art. 1. 2. in Tol l. 8. c. 16. Halonfis in Victorell, ibid. Soto d. 12. q. 1. art. 4. dicit hanc esse D. Thomæ sententiam, & omnium. Suarez lays, omnes theologi ita docent, Tom. 3. disp. 63. Sect. 2.

him pardon. This with extream Unction will serve, as (s) *Sylveſter* tells us; yea, this may be enough without any Sacrament at all; as if a man in mortal ſin, and ſo (with them) not in the ſtate of grace, be killed, becauſe he is a Chriſtian, while he is a-ſleep; if he was Attrite, and willing to ſuffer before, by vertue hereof his ſins are pardoned; ſo *Cajetan*, *Sotus*, and *Lopez* (t) after them.

In ſhort, the Maſs may ſerve their turn; for divers of them hold, that this being offered for ſuch as are Attrite, by vertue thereof (*ex opere operato*) immediately, and without more adoe, they have pardon of mortal ſins, and habitual grace; ſo *Catharinus* (in *Canus, loc. Theol.* l. 12. c. 13. p. 693.) and others.

Here is competent proviſion made, that Sinners may periſh ſecurely, and never look after true Repentance, living or dying. There is but one thing which may ſeem to give ſome check to this great encouragement. Theſe adminiſtrations, whereby they will have the Impenitent ſaved, depend upon a Prieſt; and the Sinner may be in ſuch circumſtances (though this be very rare) wherein a Prieſt cannot be had, and then if he ſhould chance to dye without Contrition, he will periſh. But this need not diſturb any in their courſe of impenitence; for in caſe of neceſſity, where a Prieſt cannot be had, another may ſerve in his ſtead, though he be a Laick, Confeſſion may be made to him, and God will ſupply the want of a Prieſt; ſo *Aquinas* (in 4. diſt. 17. q. 3. art. 3.) or he may have the Eucharift adminiſtered to him without a Prieſt: and it is their common doctrine, that the Eucharift juſtifies one that is in mortal ſin, if he be attrite, and thinks but himſelf contrite. yea, he may adminiſter it to himſelf with the ſame effect, in caſe of neceſſity: divers of all ſorts amongſt them are of this opinion. The Authority of *Aquinas* is alledged for it, (3. q. 82. art. 3.) and *Cajetan* in *Matth. 26*. The example of the Queen of *Scots*, (commonly produced) who having the Sacrament by her, adminiſtered it to her ſelf, is highly approved by all.

(s) Sum. v. Sacram. n. 4. Navar. juxta opinionem, S. Thom. communiter receptam. 23. n. 13. this may (as they ſay of all their Sacraments) *ex attrito facere contritum, infundendo gratiam primam, ut communiter tenent omnes*, in Jo. Sauc. d. 27. n. 8.

(t) Cap. 12. p. 83. & hoc videtur ſentire, D. Thom.

Thus far Satan has prevailed with them, to promote the Damnation of Sinners, by hardning them in impenitence, even when the interest of their Priests seems a little concerned. But what if a Catholick Sinner, relying upon such Impostors; still neglect true Repentance, and death surprize him so suddenly, as to render these other devices unpracticable, is not his case then desperate? No, he may have as good hopes of Salvation as other Catholicks have, a probable ground for his hope (and none must have any certainty.) Such a ground is the judgement of their Angelical Doctor, who declares, that *if one sick desires pennance, and before the Priest comes, he dyes, or is speechless; the Priest may look on him, as if he had confessed, and may absolve him, being dead,* (Opusc. 63. de offic. Sacerd.) Accordingly Clemens 8. Absolved one whom he saw falling from St. Peters Church in Rome, (Molfes. t. 1. tr. 7. c. 5. n. 48.) So that any may be Absolved, i.e. Pardoned and Sanctified (for the sense of the Priests *Absolvo*, is, *I give thee grace which pardons thy sins,* Impendo tibi gratiam remissivam peccatorum ut communiter Doctores, in Jo. Sanc. disp. 27. n. 18.) even after they are dead, if they did but desire confession before. Now those amongst themselves, who do not desire confession while they live, are such only as will not have Salvation if they might, upon the most trivial terms, and so none need fear Damnation, how impenitent soever; otherwise they live and dye but such as are worse than any Devil now in Hell. And who can accuse them as too rigid, if they make true Repentance unavoidably necessary for such as these, since this doctrine makes it needful for none besides?

All these ways any man may be saved without true Repentance, if he will believe the Roman Doctors (though if we believe Christ, he shall certainly perish that repents not, what-ever course he takes besides.) Any of these are probable, and may be by *their* principles (having grave Doctors, more than enough, to authorize them) safely followed; but that of the Councils prescribing is infallible, and will not fail to secure those who practise it, if any thing in *their* Church may have credit; nor can fail to ruine those who follow it, if the word of God may be trusted. Thus *while* they would increase *their* party, by having it thought, that in their way, scarce any *Roman Catholick* will be Damned; they take the course (in this, as in other particulars)

that none, who will follow them, can be saved, unless salvation be for the impenitent.

Sect. 9. By this it is also manifest, that the charge brought against them in the three last Articles, for making *Saving Faith, Love to God,* and *true Repentance* needless in life or death, is not founded only upon the opinion of their private Doctors, or the greatest part of them, but hath that which they count the surest ground of all, the determination of a general Council confirmed by the Pope. For if Attrition be sufficient, as that Council declares, then *true Repentance* is not necessary. If grief for sin, out of slavish fear, or shame only, without any love to God, be enough, then *Love to God* is needless; and if Love be not needful, then *Faith*, which *works by Love*, and is the only saving Faith, is needless, till there be no time for it to work.

But is it credible, that they who sometimes seem to lay so great stress upon these graces, as necessary to salvation, should contradict, not only the Scriptures, but themselves, and make them needless, not only all a mans life before, but even when he is dying? sure, they must have some device, to supply, in pretence at least, the want of these; if not before, yet at the point of death, and will substitute something in *their* stead, of supposed equivalence to them. Indeed they are fruitful in inventions tending to ruine souls, and subvert the doctrine of salvation: and one particularly they have in this case; and that is, what we before mentioned, *their Sacrament of Penance*. When a man is near death, if he be Attrite, and confess his mortal sins to a Priest, and be absolved; by vertue thereof, he hath remission of sins, and together therewith infusion of grace, particularly of *Faith, Hope, and Charity*. Thus they come to have grace in a moment, who lived graceless all *their* days before; and had dyed so, if such a Rite had not been provided for *their* relief. By vertue of this Sacrament *Love* is planted in *their* heart, and *their* Faith in God, and sorrow for sin, is formed by *Love*, and becomes saving; so that if they dye presently in that state, *their* salvation is secured. But what if they live, must not these habits be afterwards exercised? must not there be some act of contrition in those who never had any before? No, by *their* doctrine there is no necessity for it, though there be no true actual Repentance without it. The question is in one of *their* greatest Divines,

Whe-

Whether (u) in the Law of Grace, after justification obtained by the Sacrament of Penance with Attrition alone; there remain any obligation to have Contrition? and it is resolved, that there is no such obligation, and that this is the judgment of all those who hold that the Sacrament of penance doth justify with Attrition alone, known to be so; and (x) these are the most for number, and the most considerable for authority in their Church and Schools, Aquinas and Scotus, both, whom the rest most commonly follow, concurring in it, besides their great Council.

Señt. 10. This then is the doctrine of *their* Church introduced there, instead of that of the Gospel: the Habits must serve to save them without *their* Acts, and the Sacrament of Penance, will help those that are attrite, to those Habits. Here's all the hopes they have for sinners, whom they have encouraged to continue all *their* days, without Repentance, saving Faith, or Love to God, even to the very Article of death. If this Sacrament do not perform all this for them, they will not deny, but they are certainly damned? But what ground have they for this, upon which *their* everlasting estate depends? None at all, but *their* own opinion, and the opinion of such men as themselves, without any support from the word of God. If *their* own word will secure them for Eternity, they are safe enough; otherwise trusting to this, they are lost for ever, the whole weight of *their* salvation hangs upon a Spiders Web, spun out of *their* own conceits. For this Sacrament of Penance, upon which all depends, is a mere invention of *their* own; there is no divine institution for it, it was never authorized by God; he never promised any thing to it, or any part of it upon *their* terms, much less any such thing as they expect.

(u) *An etiam in lege gratiæ post obtentam justificationem per Sacramentum penitentiæ cum sola attritione, maneat hæc obligatio habendi contritionem? Dicendum est, per se loquendo, non manere in lege nova obligationem hanc post prædictam justificationem. Ita sentiunt omnes, qui putant Sacramentum penitentiæ justificare cum sola attritione cognita Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 15. Sect. 4. n. 12. & 13. (x) Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Darandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Cano, ibid. disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 9. Corduba, Vega, Soto, in Vafquor. (Corduba docet, quod qui justificatus est Sacramento penitentiæ, cum contritione tantum existimata, non tenetur eorundem peccatorum contritionem veram habere) & eam aperte colligere licet ex Soto. & ita Vega. in 3. Thom. q. 86. a. 2. d. 2. n. 11.*

And who but they who are under the power of strong delusions, would trust to any thing for Salvation, without a word from him; who is the absolute Disposer of grace, and the Sovereign Lord of life, and death? Some of themselves acknowledge that their Sacrament of penance (x) was never instituted by Christ. And many (y) of them hold that the material parts of it have no such institution: Now to trust to any device of man for spiritual effects, of so high a nature, is impious folly; but to lay their Salvation on it is prodigious madness. They may with as much reason, expect the infusion of grace from the sprinkling of holy-water; or the cleansing of a Soul at death from the

(x) *Glossa quæ nonnulli Canonistæ secuti sunt.* Erasmus, B. Rhenanus, Bonaventure Alexander Alensis, Hugo Victor, Janfenius, in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 17. Sect. 1. n. 9.

(y) The essentials of this pretended Sacrament are with them, it's matter and form. The matter of it consists in contrition, confession, and satisfaction; each of these are acknowledged by their own Authours, to be either unnecessary any way, or at least by Christ's institution. *Contrition*, and therewith true Repentance is dismissed as unnecessary to this Rite, not only by their other Doctors, but by the Council of Trent, and another thing assumed instead of it, as we saw before. *Satisfaction* is as unnecessary in their account. There's no need, either that the Priest should injoy it (D. Thomas, Petrus Paludanus, Petrus Soto, Victoria, Ledesma Cajetan, Navar, *ibid.* disp. 38. Sect. 3. n. 2. & 4.) or that the confitent should submit to it. Scotus, Gabriel, Medina, Sylveſter, Armilla, Navar, Hostiensis, Panormitan, Cajetan. *ibid.* disp. 38. Sect. 7. n. 1. Thus all material in it, is reduced to *Confession*, and so the Rite has almost lost its name, being now commonly styled the *Sacrament of Confession*. Yet confession is acknowledged not to be of Divine institution by all their Canonists. *Sunt inter Catholicos qui putant nullum esse Divinum præceptum de confessione, ut omnes decretorum interpretes, & inter Scholasticos* Scotus, Maldonat. Sum. q. 18. arr. 4. And their best Divines deny the necessity of it, as to this Rite. *Hunc modum Secretæ confessionis non esse de necessitate hujus Sacramenti. Ita docent frequentius Scholastici.* Alensis, D. Thomas, Major, Richardus de Sancto Victore, Paludanus, Soto, Adrian, Richardus, Medina, Pet. Soto, Vega, Castro, Cajetan. (*Christum non instituisse auricularem confessionem*) Canus. Et nunc cenſeo hanc doctrinam certam ex concilio Tridentino (*viz. quod*) neq; in institutione posuit Christus Dominus modum Secretæ confessionis. Suar. *ibid.* disp. 21. Sect. 2. n. 9. p. 290.

Yea the form of it (their mode of Absolution) is denied by their Divines, who hold that the Priests cannot forgive sins properly as to the fault, and eternal punishment. *Qui negant potestatem clavium extendi ad remissionem culpæ mortalis.* So Magister sentent, Hugo, & Richardus de Sancto Victore. Alensis & Bonaventura, Gabriel, Major, Supplementum Gabr. Medina, Adrian, Pet. Soto, Altisiodorensis, Abulensis. *ibid.* disp. 20. Sect. 1. n. 3.

guilt

guilt and stain of sin, by a Priests spittle; the Lord hath given them no more ground to expect any more from the one, than from the other.

But I need not insist upon any thing which they may have the confidence to deny. It will be plain enough by what they cannot but acknowledge, that neither pardon, nor grace can be expected from their Sacrament of Penance as ordered by them. For, they assert (2) *that pardon and grace are alwayes inseparably conferred together*; So that he hath no infused grace, that hath not pardon. And it cannot be denied, but that pardon can never be had, without true Repentance, in Scripture nothing is more evident. He therefore that comes to the Sacrament of Penance with Attrition only, and so without true Repentance; he gets thereby nothing at all: neither pardon, which cannot be had without Repentance; nor infused grace, which is never had, without pardon; neither Love, nor Faith working by love, nor Godly sorrow, nothing that is saving; unless he can have it without God, or against what he hath expressly declared. So that if he comes to this their Sacrament in a damnable condition, he certainly dyes so, for any relief that Rite will afford him. And therefore their Doctrine which encourageth sinners, to live all their life, without saving Faith, or Love, or Repentance; in confidence that this rite will help them to these graces, when they are dying, is a damning imposture; and their Sacrament of Penance, a most pernicious trap to draw sinners (as they set and bait it) out of the way of Salvation, whilest they live; and to plunge them into Hell, when they dye, without any apprehension of their danger, till there be no way to escape it.

Señ. 11. Hereby they manifestly declare themselves to be enemies to Christianity, and the Souls of men. For what more effectual course could they take to destroy *these*, and root out *that*: than by concluding

(2) *Unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum cui infertur, fides, spes, charitatem.* Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. c. 7. *Gratia non præcedit sed simul infunditur cum remissione peccatorum* Bellarm. de prænitent. l. c. p. 954.

Sperare a Deo remissionem peccatorum sine penitentia--modus præsumptionis conjunctus cum hæresi. Pet. S. Joseph. De 1. præcept. art. 4. Acunas, Arragon, Bannes, Malderus, & alij in & cum Bonacin. in 1 præcept. q. 3. p. 1. n. 4.

it certain (ascertain as they would have a decree of the Council of *Trent* accounted) that though sinners neglect the great Duties, and Acts of Christians, and live in any wickedness opposite to the rule of Christ: yet the Church hath a device to save them; and by it they may be sure to escape Hell without true Repentance? What is this, but to declare, that the most damnable neglects and practices shall never damn them, though they never repent thereof, the Church hath a trick to secure them notwithstanding? What is this, but to proclaim that the Lawes of God, and the rules of the Gospel are unnecessary impositions, without the observance whereof Salvation may be had? The knowledge of Christ, explicate faith in him, actual love of him (which comprize all the rest) as they teach, are not necessary as *means*, Salvation may be had without them: and as for a necessity hereof by virtue of any *Precept*, that is not considerable, but in reference to the danger of not observing the precept; and there's no danger in this, though the neglect hereof were in their account a mortal sin, no more than in Venials (or no sins at all); if it will not damn those, who never truly repent of it. So that plainly by excusing sinners from Repentance, they make *all sins safe*, and *all duties needless*: and give men assurance, that they may live and dye impenitently, in the neglect of all, even the most important duties; and in the practice of any, the worst wickedness, and yet be saved. There never was any Heresie broached in the World, more monstrous and pernicious than this which the Council of *Trent* hath brought forth, it hath all the damnable wickedness, both as to judgment and practice, that ever was or can be on Earth, in the bowels of it. It promotes the Birth, the Growth, the continuance thereof: for it promiseth safety to impenitency therein, yea Salvation too, by a knack of a very easie use, and new invention. It hath in it the venome of all damning opinions, practices and neglects; for that which makes them all deadly is impenitency; not would they without this be finally and unavoidably destructive. But this would have impenitency it self swallowed.

CHAP. VI.

Their Doctrine leaves no necessity of Holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian Vertues.

Sec. 1. **H**oliness of life, is needless by the Popish Doctrine, though the Lord hath made this every way necessary both as a duty, which he indispensably requires: and as a means, without which he ordinarily will save no man, it is declared necessary both wayes at once, *Heb. 12. 14.* The *Papists* indeed boast much of it, and seem sometimes to lay great stress on it, as if they would have it to be a character of the true Church; concluding theirs is the only true Church; because there is no Holiness to be found in the World, but amongst them only. Thus they pretend it to be of greatest consequence, but this is but to serve another turn, the design is not for Holiness of life, for their Doctors count that more than needs. And really they are extream good Husbands here, and make a little Holiness go a great way: for it is enough to denominate the Universal Church holy; if there be but one holy person in it, so *Costerus*. (a) *How many soever of its Members be dead, and impious; so long, as there is any one man, that retains Holiness, the Church must be called holy.* And then to make this one man holy, one act of vertue is enough; and that a very slender one too, for saith *Bannes*. (b) *Any one act of Charity how weak soever it be, is enough to fulfil all the commandements of God.* Now he is doubtless a holy man, who fulfils all those Commandements. Further, this one act he need but do once, and that not all his life, he may defer it, till he dye, if he have no mind to trouble

- (a) *Tametsi ejus plurima membra sint emortua & impia, non amittit tamen Sancti nomen, quamdiu vel unus pietatem ex animo colens, retinet sanctitatem.* Enchirid. l. 3. c. 8. *Possibile est, quod tota fides remaneret, in uno solo: & verum esset dicere, quod fides non deficit in ecclesia.* Abbas in Sylvest. v. Concil. n. 3.
 (b) *Quilibet actus charitatis, quantumlibet remissus, sufficit ad implendum omnia præcepta in 2. 22. q. 44. a 5.*

himself with it in any part of his life before, as we have already shewed. Yea, and he may be excused from it, when he is a dying too, as well as whilst he lives, if he can but get a Priest to absolve him: and (c) the Priest must absolve him, if the dying man give but any sign, which may be interpreted a desire of it. And their Sacrament he must have and be absolved absolutely when speechless and senseless, if any can but witness that he desired Confession. *Antonin. 3. part. tit. 10. c. 2. Sylvest. v. confess. 3. n. 16. Paludan. dist. 21. q. 2. a. 2. Concl. 2.* Yea if he did not desire it, nor ever give any sign of Repentance; he may be conditionally absolved, *Rituale Pauli. 5.* And though he have lived wickedly without restraint all his days, if at last gasp he be attrite, and have but (though it never appear) the virtue of *Judas* (only hoping better *i. e.* presuming more than he did) by virtue of such absolution, he will be as certainly saved, as other good Catholics: though the other unfortunate wretch for want of a Priest (as virtuous as himself) to absolve and give him hope, was unhappily damned.

See here a most compendious way to be holy! who can imagine any other, but that such principles as these, make holiness of life extremely needful? But more particularly, we may discover how necessary they judge it, by what they determine concerning the necessity of exercising Christian virtues; and the forsaking of sin. There is no need of either of these by their Doctrine.

Sec. 2. It is not necessary to live in the exercise of such virtues. (though one would think, that Religion could not be Christian, which obligeth not the professors of it, to Christian virtues; and excuseth

(c) *Vid. above 40* Doctors for this in *Jo. Sanc. disp. 44. v. 34. Sacramenta Baptismi & absolutionis posse conferri, etiam ijs qui in periculo vitæ sunt, licet ipsi vi morbi oppressi non habeant usum rationis aut sensum: modo constat eos antea desiderasse ejusmodi Sacramenta. Bellarm. de effect. Sacrament. l. 2. c. 8. p. 121. Affectus charitatis semper requiritur ad justificationem seclusis tamen Sacramentis: Sacramenta autem in non ponente obicem, eundem habent effectum, quem haberet charitas & contritio sine Sacramento. Canus. Relect. de pæn. t. pars. 3. p. 844.* Thus, though an act of charity, or repentance be requisite alwayes where the Sacraments cannot be had; yet the Sacraments in him that gives no obstruction (as he does not, who has neither the use of sense or reason) have the same effect, that love to God, or Repentance would have, without the Sacrament. *i. e.* the Sacrament will justify and save them, who have no act of love to God, or true Repentance.

them from the most proper Character of true Christianity) yet those who have the confidence , to account themselves the only true Christians, do this. For they teach, that the acts of these virtues are required by affirmative precepts ; and such commandments oblige not at all times ; no nor always when there is occasion, and opportunity for the exercise of them : but only in the Article of necessity, and when this is, it is not certain, there's no determination of it, it must be left to discreet men to judge : and being left to men, either they find no time for it at all ; or none that will signify it needful, to live in the exercise of such virtues. To exert an Act of virtue once a year, or once in many years, or once in a whole life, or at the hour of death , is far enough from the daily exercise of Christian virtues ; or an intimation, that it is needful in their account, who so determine. But indeed their Church is more indulgent, and assures them all (that have no more regard for their Souls, than to believe it) : That at the hour of death, one act of slavish fear (though themselves count not that so much as a (d) moral virtue) with confession, will excuse the neglect of every Christian virtue, all their lives ; and make their way at last into Heaven, though they never had one act of virtue, any one character of a Christian all their days. A pleasant doctrine indeed, and greedily to be swallowed by those, that have an Antipathy to a holy life ; if the Gospel, and the Doctrine of Christ, concerning Hell and Heaven and the way to it, could be counted but Fables.

Señ. 3. They reckon but Three Theological or Divine virtues, all the other they call moral, of which the Divine are the (e) foundation ; and so all the rest must stand or fall with them. Now two of these three they make needless (as is before declared) and without these two, Hope, which is the third, is so far from being needful, that it is not possible to have it, as themselves (f) acknowledge. A lively hope, with them, is needless, till they (g) be dying ; and then it can

(d) Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 19.

(e) *Virtutes Theologicæ quæ sunt circa ultimum finem---sunt causæ omnium aliarum virtutum.* Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 161. art. 4. ad primum.

(f) *Fides & spes---sine charitate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt, nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet, ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene.* Aquinas. 1. 2. q. 64. art. 4.

(g) *Tempus quo obligantur præcepta fidei & spei esse idem, quod tempus charitatis.* FILL. tr. 22. n. 293.

but be like the giving up of the Ghost. For to all that follow their Doctrine, and look after no more than that makes necessary: their hopes at last can be no better, no other, than the expectation of such a pardon of sin; as a Priest can give to an impenitent person, one to whom the Lord, did never give hopes of pardon. And this is a hope, than which despair it self is more hopeful: for this leaves no sense of danger, (which despair retains ;) and so leaves no desire, nor endeavour to avoid it, even when they are sinking into bottomless misery. Hope is no more needful with them, than a House is to him, who thinks himself concerned, to dig up the foundation of it; and counts it enough that he hath a Castle in the Air. And when they have left nothing that can be a real ground of hope; they found it upon that, which is worse than nothing, *their own (h) merits*: that which is inconsistent with the free grace of God, and the merits of Christ, without which Sinners are hopeless. It is a conjecture, founded upon a delusion, *upon merit*, which no man can have, and themselves say, none of them know they have, and so upon they know not what. Oh! wretched hopes, that have not so much for *their* foundation as the Sand, that have nothing to bear them up, but a proud and groundless fancy; that we might count ridiculous, if it were not too horrid to be the matter of sport. Can they blame those, who doubt, whether they will be saved; when they themselves have no better hopes of *their own* salvation?

How much they are concerned for hope, they declare, when they tell us, that the precept for hope does but, of it self, oblige, when the soul is tortured with the more grievous assaults of despair. (†) It seems, unless they be violently tempted to despair, they need not hope. This rarely falls out as to any, and is scarce the case of one in a thousand, so that there is not one of a thousand in Popery, who would have any hope in God, or of mercy from him. No not any at all, as others

(h) *Actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo, qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quæ quis habet, quod non potest esse sine charitate. Aquin. 1.2. q. 65. art. 4. c. Propria certitudo spei, est ex meritis. Certitudo quæ non est præsumptio, ex meritis est, & meritis se comeditur. Alex. Alensis. q. 65. in 3.*

(†) *Quando graviores desperationis impetus animum vexant* Viſtorel. ad Tol. l. 4. c. 7. and Bonacin (*with others*) in 1. præcep. d. 3. q. 3. p. 2. n. 2.

teach; for the command for hope is satisfied both by grief for sin, and also by a purpose against it (*Dian.* after others, *v. Spes.*) So that either of these, or both at least, will supersede all acts of hope for ever, and make them needless. And indeed he that considers what sorrow and purposes they count sufficient, may believe them, when they teach, that these leave them without hope.

Sect. 4. The next in excellency to the divine graces, by (*i*) *their* account, is *humility*, and for this *their* doctrine makes excellent provision, as a virtue most necessary, by quite sweeping away the true ground of it. It leaves them without sense of any *sinfulness*, *weaknesses*, or *unworthiness*, to make, or keep them humble. Being baptized, by virtue thereof, all the sinfulness of *their* natures is not only pardoned or weakened, but quite washed away, and utterly abolished. (*k*) So that they are *Pure*, *Immaculate*, *Innocent*, even as our first Parents were in the state of Innocency; not any thing left in the least, that can be truly counted sin. So that it would be very absurd and irrational, for them to be humble under the sense of any remaining sinfulness, since they believe really there is none. But if they sin mortally afterwards (for Venial sins they make no account of, and think that the Lord herein, is such an one as themselves) they may be presently restor'd again by *their* Sacrament of Absolution, to a perfect Righteousness, without the least mixture or alloy of what is faulty. A perfection short of Heaven, because not so firm and fixed, but not wanting a hair of what is due; having not only all the parts, but every degree of what is required for their present state. And by the power hereof they can fully and perfectly fulfil the whole Law in every Precept, without any culpable defect; they can fulfil it very easily (*m*) *facili & parvo negotio*. Yea (*n*) they can do much more, than the Law requires, or the Lord

(i) *Post virtutes Theologicas — humilitas est virtutum excellentissima, & potissima.* Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 161. art. 5.

(k) Concil. Trident. sess. c. supra.

(l) *Soto De natur. & grat. l. 3. c. 4. p. 134. Bellarm. de purgar. l. 2. c. 3. p. 1381. de justificat. l. 2. cap. 10. p. 794.*

(m) *Idem. cap. 1.*

(n) *Possumus facere plusquam debemus, si consideremus legem nobis a Deo impositam, & proinde possumus facere plusquam debemus.* *Idem de Monach. l. 2. c. 13.*

Hath made their duty: so far are they bereaved of all sense of any *weakness*, that might humble them. And their righteousness is not only spotless, but meritorious; there is such a transcendent worth and sufficiency in it (as they improve it) that they need not (at least after they are justified) ask any thing of God, but what they fully deserve at his hands. All that God doth for them, is but the paying of his debts, his bounty is prevented; his grace is quite excluded; it is not in his power to bestow any free gift: all is due to the meritorious excellency of their performances, before-hand. They can merit the first grace (b) in congruity, (p) the second grace by way of condignity: and Heaven and Glory is as due to them, as a penny for a penny-worth; or Hell is due to proud presumptuous sinners. God would be unjust, and not pay what he oweth them, on their own just account, if he should not let them have all the glory of Heaven and Eternity. They can merit the pardon of Mortal sins before (q) they have grace; pardon of venial sins before, or after; they can merit (r) the continuance of grace while they have it: and the restoring of it, when they have lost it. They can merit not only for themselves, but for others; and deserve for them, not only pardon, but (s) grace: such grace as will inable them, to set up, and merit Heaven for themselves. They can merit not only habitual grace for them: (t) but the Divine assistance, whereby the Lord works it. They can merit for them not only while alive; but when they are dead: and by their merits, bring them out of those torments which are equivalent to the pains of Hell, but only for the continuance, which their deserts hinder from being everlasting.

(q). Vid. Soto ibid. l. 2. c. 3. p. 64. & 66. Bellarm. l. 2. de penit. c. 12. p. 949. Sancta Clara. Deus. Nar. Gr. Probl. 21. p. 125.

(p) Conc. Trident. sess. 6. Ca. 32. & Ca. 16.

(q) Potest homo nondum reconciliatus per opera penitentiae impetrare & mereri de congruo gratiam justificationis. Bellarm. de just. l. 5.

(r) Reparationem post lapsum & perseverantiam usque in suum, non cadere sub meritum de condigno, sed solum de congruo. Idem. ibid. cap. 22. tit.

(s) Sicut certum est non posse unum alteri ex condigno gratiam mereri, ita non dubium est, posse id ex congruo fieri. Idem. ibid. cap. 21.

(t) De congruo potest unus alteri mereri primam gratiam, non solum sanctificantem, sed etiam primum auxilium supernaturale, & alia dona. S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 114. art. 7. vid. Full. tr. 21. n. 498.

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Here's a Doctrine as proper to nourish humility, as poyson is to make a man fat and healthful; however this, as that, is apt to swell them big; and mount them upon the heights of boasting and glorying. (u) It is far below persons of such Dignity, to receive eternal life at Gods hands, *as a poor man receiveth an Alms: abfit*, far be it from them, it moves their indignation to think of it; that they should expect eternal glory for Gods sake. They will not so disparage themselves as to have it in such a beggarly way: They will have it for their own sake, as that which they fully deserve, or else be without it. They will have it in a way more glorious, becoming persons of such transcendent worth, as Conquerours and Triumphers (x) *as a Laurel which they have sweat for*, and is due to their merit. The Lord must treat them as persons of such high quality, and in a way that suits their honour: (y) *Now it is much more honourable faith Bellarmine, to have a thing by his own merit, than anothers gift* (though God be the giver) *And the Lord* (adds he) *to honour them, would have them get Heaven by their own deserts.* Oh! humble Doctrine, and that which is as like the Gospel, as the Apostle St. Paul was to the King of Pride. Can they think Humility needful, who plucking away the true grounds of it instead thereof, instill those principles, than which Hell can scarce hatch any prouder?

SECT. 5. As for those vertues which concern men, they are all comprized in love, that love which affects others as capable of eternal happiness, and so desires it for them. Thus they describe Christian love (as for humane or natural, we are not here, concerned in it) and tell us, it is this the Scripture speaks of *Joh. 15. Colof. 3.* and cannot deny, but it is called for in the New Testament most frequently, and with greatest importunity, and yet their Doctrine makes it needless. *We are not bound faith Sylvester (a) to be moved with love towards any men whatsoever, but only in preparation of mind, if necessity occur.*

(a) *Abfit ut iusti vitam eternam expectent, sicut pauper Eleemosynam.*

(x) *Tanquam palmam suis sudoribus debitam.*

(y) *Magis honorificum est habere aliquid ex merito, quam ex donatione.*

(a) *Motu dilectionis---nec tenemur moveri ad quoslibet homines, nisi secundum preparatum animi---si necessitas occurreret.* Sylvest. v. charitas. n. 3. Sum Rosel v. charitas. n. 5. both of them in the words of Aquinas.

This seems to dissolve the obligation of this great command, and turn it into a mere Counsel; For in these very terms they describe a Counsel to us, (*) and thereby distinguish it from an obliging precept: But are we bound to love our Brother, when there is necessity? No, not when he is in such necessity as is *extream* (and consequently never) for though it be requisite, that we help him in that condition; yet we *sin not, if we do not help him, out of Christian love; it is enough to avoid sin, if we relieve him out of natural affection.* Thus Navarre. (b) And this holds, not only in the external necessities of others, but also in those that are spiritual, only he saith, that it very rarely falls out, that one can relieve spiritual necessities, without this *Christian love*, but he tells us also, (c) *That a Christian is rarely in such necessity.* So that though it cannot be done without Christian love, but very seldom; that will not make such love a duty at any time; because the external act needs not be done, but seldom. Yea if the external act also, whereby we should relieve the Soul of our Brother, be neglected, it's with them, no great matter. For as Cajetane determines (d) *That weakness of mind, which withholds us from those things which are profitable to our Neighbour, especially for the Salvation of Souls, though it be grievous, it is but a venial fault.* In short, what ever be the circumstances of our Brother; yet we may be excused from loving him indeed, if we do but think, we do it. For Navarre (*) and others tell us, that he who honestly thinks himself to be in the state of grace, when he is not; may satisfy this command for Christian love, by some other kind of affection, so that it is enough to think that we have this love,

(*) *Præceptum differt etiam a consilio--quia consilium non est de necessitate ad salutem nisi secundum preparationem animi, si oporteret (S. Tho.) 1. 2. q. 108. Idem. ibid. v. præceptum. n. 1. Gratian & Aquinas in Navar. Cap. 20. n. 21.*

(b) *Putamus non peccaturum eum, qui hunc amorem charitativum non conciperet erga eum, qui eam pateretur extremam necessitatem vite corporeæ, si modo alio amore naturalis inferiore, de inferioribus opitularetur. Navar. cap. 14. n. 9. Lopez. cap. 53. p. 74.*

(c) *Cap. 24. n. 9. Raro tamen ejusmodi necessitatem patitur Christianus, quam per contritionem, abq; alia ope salvari possit.*

(d) *Pusillanimitas quando retrahit ex alijs utilibus proximo, & præcipue salutem animarum; licet veniale sit, grave tamen est. Sum. v. pusillan. p. 485.*

(*) *Lopez. cap. 53. p. 275. Satisfacit præcepto de diligendo proximum, qui extitit statum gratiæ, putans se verisimiliter in eo statum gratiæ esse.*

when we have it not; and this is confirmed by a Reason (e) *a fortiori*, because it is so, in our obligation to love God. Thus one dangerous error is grounded upon another, and by such arts we are discharged from all Christian affection to God or Men. But we need not stay longer here. All necessity of this love they quite take away, by making it needless to love God; the connexion between these, being indissoluble, by their own account (f).

If any will not rely upon consequences, *Cajetan* tells them (1) that the command to love our Neighbour as our self, obliges not to a love of charity, i. e. to that special love which was alwayes thought, (till the Roman Doctors taught otherwise) to be the great duty required of all Christians by the Gospel. By the Doctrine of *Aquinas* (2) The precept requires, no special act of love to our Brethren, no formal or (3) internal act at all, nor any exterior, that will signifie more than the want of hatred. This is the common Doctrine amongst his devoutest followers, the *Dominicans* (4) Others expresse it thus. (5) There is no affirmative precept for love to our Neighbour, *no time for it: it is enough that we do nothing against him.* Thus, so great a part of the whole sum of the Law and the Prophets, and all the rules of the Gos-

(e) *Videtur nobis non peccare neve illum, qui bona fide credens se esse in statu gratie, cum tamen non sit, adimplere præceptum de diligendo Deum ex charitate, quando ad id est obligatus; ita a fortiori satisfacere videtur præcepto de diligendo proximo ex charitate, qui extra statum gratie, illud implet, putans verisimiliter se in eo esse.* Navar. ibid.

(f) *Amor supernaturalis & divinus seu charitativus, vel charitas infusa, qua proximum amamus, est ejusdem generis & nature, cujus est amor Dei charitativus, seu charitas secundum S. Thom. Nam licet obiectum materiale amoris charitativi proximi sit idem proximus, obiectum tamen formale, sive ratio vel causa amoris, est ipsa divina & infinita bonitas que nihil aliud est quam ipse Deus--ut idem S. Thom. explicatus ibi a Cajetano. Idem. ibid. n. 6. Charitas est dilectio qua diligitur Deus propter se, & proximus propter Deum, vel in Deo. Pet. Lombard. dist. 27. Dilectio proximi nihil aliud est quam quidam Dei amor* Soto de Just. l. 7. q. 5. a. 1. p. 142. vid. Suar. tom. 3. disp. 81. Sect. 8. p. 1078.

(1) *Cather. n. annor. adv. Cajet. p. 268.*

(2) *2. 2. q. 15. a. 8. Quodl. 4. art. 24. ad 1.*

(3) *Suar. de Charitate disp. 5. Sect. 4. n. 4. Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 21.*

(4) *Vid. Acacium de Velasco in Guinen. p. 139.*

(5) *Vid Vasquez in 3. tom. 3. q. 90. arr. 1. dub. 40. dilectionis proximi ex charitate, cujus præcepti affirmativi ego nullum tempus video. Satis est nihil contra ipsum facere. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 21.*

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pel, leading us to Brotherly love and the special expressions of it, are snapt off short; and we reach all that they oblige us to do, by doing nothing: we love them well enough, though we neither will, nor do them good, if only we do them no mischief; or do no more for them than may be done, without inward affection, or any Christian Charity.

Sect. 6. It would be tedious to pursue this in all particular virtues. The generals, which they acknowledge, will serve for the rest. They confess (g) that knowledge must go before faith, and that faith is (h) the foundation of Charity, and that charity (or love to God which hath its rise and being from faith) (i) is the form and root of all virtues. They all agree in it, nor is it only evident by their own confession, but also by the nature of the things themselves; that other virtues depend upon Knowledge, Faith, and Love, for their being or exercise. For example, without love to God proceeding from faith, there can be no delight in God, nor desire to enjoy him. Delight and desire are but love in several postures; Desire is love in its motion, and delight is love in its rest. There can be no (k) delight in enjoying that which we love not; nor can the enjoyment of it, be desirable. So also there can be no filial fear without love, for love is essential to it, and thereby it is distinguished from that which is slavish. Ingenuous (l) fear springs from love, and is nourished by it, and increaseth or declines with it. It cannot be, nor act; but when, and where love is, and is acted. So that together with love the fear of God, and the acts of it are cashiered; even all due Reverence of him, and care not to offend him.

(g) *Cognitio apprehensiva præexigitur quidem ad fidem.* Bellarm.

(h) *Fides est fundamentum spei & charitatis.* Idem. *Fides generat spem & spes charitatem.* Aquinas. 1. 2. q. 65. art. 4.

(i) *Charitas est forma & radix omnium virtutum.* Aquinas. ibid. q. 62. art. 4.

(k) *Spirituale gaudium quod de Deo habetur ex charitatis dilectione oritur.* Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 28. art. 1.

(l) *Timor castus sive amicalis quo timemus ne Sponsus tardet, ne discedat, ne offendamus, ne eo careamus, timor iste de amore venit.* Mag. Sentent. 3. dist. 34. *Timor ex amore generatur.* Bonavent. 3. dist. 34. n. 83. *quanto aliquis plus habet de spiritu amoris, tanto plus habet de spiritu timoris.* Idem, ibid. n. 87. vid. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 19.

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(*) It is their common Doctrine, that there is no special command, either for servile or filial fear of God; so that the want of it need neither be confessed, nor repented of.

So likewise, There can be no hatred of sin, or sorrow for it, as it is an offence or dishonour to God, (*) nor any true virtue at all without love; nor love without faith, nor faith without knowledg. Now these radical graces being rendred needless by their Doctrine (as I have declared before) : They hereby stubb up all the rest by the Roots; so that neither sprigg, nor bud thereof can be expected. To tell us after this, that they count any exercise of Christian virtue needful; is as if a man should take the spring out of his watch, and then persuade us seriously that he counts it very necessary, it should still go, and the Wheels be always in regular motion.

Sect. 7. But let us stay here a little longer, and observe how their principles (concerning love particularly) disingage all from any exercise of virtue, and every act that is truly Christian. They take notice in virtue, of a goodness that is merely *Moral*, such as may be found in Heathens; and of a goodness that is *Divine* and supernatural, such as ought to be in Christians. This latter (they tell us) is derived from their end, when in the exercise of them, they are referred to God, as our supernatural end, and acted for his sake, (*m*) with an intent to please him. They (*n*) declare further, That they cannot be thus referred to God without affection for him; nor done with a design to please him, unless they be done out of love to him : and so must be at least *IMPERATE* acts of love that they may be *Christian* acts; and any thing better than nature in the Heathen might reach. And yet they conclude (as appears before by variety of Testimonies) that we are not obliged to observe any command, or act any other virtue out

(*) *Licet nonnulli existiment dari speciale præceptum horum timorum, ita ut eorum defectu speciale peccatum committatur; oppositum tamen docetur communiter, longeque est probabilius. Pet. S. Joseph de 1 præcepto. p. 55.* (*) *Nulla virtus est vera virtus sine charitate. Aquinas.*

(*m*) *Vid Navar. cap. 14. n. 7.*

(*n*) *Convenit inter omnes, ut opus referri debeat in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, si futurum sit meritum vite eterne, at opera virtutum cæterarum non referuntur in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, nisi a charitate imperentur & dirigantur, &c. Bellarm. de justific. l. 5. cap. 15. p. 958.*

of love to God. They find no (o) time at all, when we are obliged to this, unless it be when we are bound to have an inward act of love for God; but when this is, they never agree, except in this, that it may be never. For those who seem to say that it should be *sometime*, though but *seldome*, or but once for all; in other words signifie it need not be at all: since they assign something else, which may serve instead of it, when ever it may be thought requisite. Thus (according to their Rule in indefinite precepts) their wise men have determined; if their School-Doctors or Casuists, or their Council of *Trent*, will pass for wise. Now being thus discharged from doing any thing out of love; They are thereby exempted from all Christian acts, and any other Christianity, as to the exercise of virtue, their honest Heathenism. It's true, They hold, they cannot be saved without meritorious acts, and cannot well think them meritorious, if they be no better than merely Heathenish: they should, (one would think) have some Christian character upon them, and this of love (p) particularly, that they may merit Salvation, and if they dilingage their Catholicks from this, they make it not needful for them to be saved. But I cannot help that, seeing they will have it so.

If they think there is no necessity *their* Catholicks should be Christians (as they do, when they make no Act truly Christian needful for them); they conclude it not necessary for them to be saved, unless they believe, that such as are no Christians can be heirs of salvation. *Their* Church (Pope, or Council; or who-ever it is) must provide them some other Heaven, since that which is prepared for Christians they need not; no one step of the way to it being needful for them. All the necessity laid upon them by the Popish profession, is not for salvation, but for something else: they must be *Roman Catholicks*, but they need not be true Christians; they must be the Popes subjects, but they need not be Christs Disciples; and this (and the rest) because they need not learn of him one Christian act while they live.

Sett. 8. Moreover, all exercise of Virtues so opposite to Acts in *their* account, but venially evil, is with them unnecessary. And this goeth

(o) Non obligat pro semper, sed certis opportunisque temporibus; extra quæ ideo tempora, non est cur obligemur, cætera ex charitate præstare. Soto de Just. l. 2. q. 3. art. 10.

(p) Vid. Bellarm. Supra.

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neer, not only to discharge all acts of Virtue, which are required of Christians, but such also as were found even in Pagans. This is groundred upon *their* doctrine concerning venial sins; these with them are not necessarily to be avoyded, being either not prohibited by any command (as most of them hold), or by no command necessary to be observed (as some of them had rather expresse it), and therefore no need, that the virtuous acts opposite to them should be practised. Upon this account, no exercise of Virtue will be necessary, but what is consistent with the vicious acts contrary thereunto, in any degrees of wickedness which they think Venial; no acts of Temperance, Sincerity, Righteousness, Truth, or Faithfulness, Chastity, Liberality, &c. will be needful, but what is consistent with all the Intemperance, Hypocrisy, Unrighteousness, Perfidiousness, &c. which by their doctrine is Venial. So he may be *temperate* who still loads his stomach till he Vomits, and is daily half drunk. He may be *sincere* enough; though he always design to seem better than he is, or good when he is not. He may be a man of *Truth* and *Roman* faithfulness, though his constant practice be telling Lyes, or breaking promises, or swearing falsely, so all be but in venial measures. He may be just enough, though in all his dealings, he be continually wronging others in lesser matters. He may be *Chast* enough, though he be unclean in thought, word, and deed venially. And he may be *liberal* enough, though he constantly practise all the covetousness which is opposite to every degree of liberality, so it be no worse. He may be *Religious* enough, though his soul never actually worship God; and *Devout* enough without any inward devotion, and *Reverent* enough, though greatly irreverent, even in the worship of God; and though at other times he be still prophaning the Name of God with vain Oaths, and divers sorts of Blasphemies: *Holy* enough also, though he never have one act of inward holiness, no not on those days which either God or themselves have made holy. And in short, he may be *Godly* enough, though he never love, nor fear God till he dye. (Some of these particulars are plain by the premisses, the rest will appear so when we present their account of Venial sins): So that, though a man were so far from expressing any Christian Vertue, that he should be instead thereof, continually acting the contrary sins in all degrees not mortal, yet he would not be condemned: For by
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their doctrine, (q) all the venial sins in the world that a person can be guilty of (though every hour, every minute of a whole life, how long soever, should bring forth one or other of them), cannot possibly damn him. And since whosoever shall not be condemned, will be saved, (which themselves also maintain), consequently, he that after Baptisme, acts not one vertue Divine, or Moral, whose whole life hath nothing of a Christian in it, but less and worse than a Pagan, will yet be saved. Thus may they be deluded, who will trust their souls in this infallible Church. They may be true Catholicks, though they be not Christians, so much as to one religious Act; and may pass cur- rantly to Heaven, though they never move one foot in the way. Such a thing we must take Christianity to be, and with so vastly and frightful a face will it look upon the world; if Popery have not thus far abandoned it, and obtruded upon us a Changling, instead of what Christ left us; there will be no lineament of virtue in the visage of it, not one of necessity; nor needs there be more in the lives of those, who would be counted the only true Professors, and faithful embracers of it.

Seci. 9. They have other ways to make the exercises of Christian Vertues unnecessary. They do it especially by turning the commands of God into *Counsels*. Of those things that are required in Scripture, some, they say, the Lord only adviseth and commends; others he commands and enjoins: Those which he adviseth, they call *Evangelical Counsels*; the other are divine Precepts. Now the precepts, they say, are necessary to be observed, sometimes at least; the Counsels are not needful to be observed at all, any man may be saved without complying with them, they are matters of supererogation, more than we need to do. So that all those Vertues, which they make but matter of *Counsel*, are unnecessary, the acts & exercise of them more than needs. And those which they make so expressly, are not small nor inconsiderable in themselves; and in consequence little less than all. Many of those admirable rules which Christ giveth us in his Sermon on the Mount,

(q) *Etiam si omnia peccata venialia, simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale Eccl'arm. De amiss. grat. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91. Non est mea mentes hic asserere, quod veniale possit fieri mortale per multiplicationem actuum venialium, etiam si in infinitum multiplicarentur, Lopez. cap. 2. p. 12.*

wherein the singular and divine excellency of that Religion, to which he calls the world, is so very conspicuous, they will not have to be Laws, obliging all Christians, but dissolve the obligation of them by declaring them mere *Counsels*; though they were ratified by our great Law-giver with those universal Sanctions, *Matth. 7. 21. Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he which doth the Will of my Father, which is in Heaven; and v. 26. Everyone that heareth these sayings of mine, and doth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, who built his House upon the Sand; Maldonate* giveth that as the acconut, why he is said, *chap. 5. v. 2. THEN TO OPEN HIS MOUTH*, because he (r) never before propounded that sublime doctrine of Evangelical perfection. Of this nature in (s) their account, is trusting in God such as frees us from solicitousness, about the things of this life, *chap. 6. v. 31. 34. Sincerity of intention in doing good, such as is enjoined, v. 1. Patient digesting of injury, such as is commanded, v. 39. Relieving others freely, such as is required, v. 42. Innocent Communication, such as is specified, v. 37. Avoyding occasions of sin, such as are meant, v. 29, 30. Exemplary walking (t) intended, v. 14. Poverty of spirit, v. 3. Spiritual mourning, v. 4. Christian meekness, v. 5. The three last, saith Soto, (u) are *Trinum Consiliorum votum*. We must take them to be the peculiar concerns of votaries. *Righteousness* (x) likewise, as to earnest desires after it, *v. 6. (y) Mercifulness, v. 7. (z) Purity of heart, v. 8.* as it is the*

(r) *Quod nunquam ante, sublimem illam de Evangelica perfectione doctrinam proposuisset.* Comment. in Matth. p. 99.

(s) Vid. Joh. de Combis in compend. Theol. l. 5. cap. 70. Ludolph. de vita Christi, par. 2. cap. 12. Angel. Sum. v. & v. præcept. n. 17. Sylvest. Sum. v. præceptum, n. 2. Soto de Just. l. 2. q. 9. art. 3. Navar, c. 24. n. 5. Soto, de nat. & grat. l. 3. c. 2. p. 126. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.

(t) Unde statim Christus in solenni illa legis promulgatione, ante necessaria præcepta proposuit perfectorum consilia Beati pauperes spiritu--- Beati qui lugent, & his similia. Et ideo subdit vos estis lux mundi: quasi quibus competit non solum justitiam vulgariter colere, sed egregie usum etiam rerum licitum abjicere, Idem. ibid.

(u) *Quod si trinum hoc consiliorum votum, quod nro hoc loco stabilitur, &c.* Idem. de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 243.

(x) Idem. ibid.

(y) Ibid.

(z) Ibid.

height of Charity, (a) *Peacefulness* also, v. 9. Love to Enemies, v. 44. more pressed by Christ than the rest, v. 45, 46, 47, 48. And before Popery, taken to be the proper character of Christians; but with them (b) it is no duty, nor any thing of like nature, as that *Prov.* 25. If thy Enemy hunger, feed him, &c. Yea, (c) Acts of Mercy are no more our duty, for these are another instance of the same Authour, immediately adding, *Et reliqua præcepta misericordiæ*; not only that, *Prov.* 3. 4. Honour the Lord with thy substance; but all the rest in Scripture of like nature. So likewise, not only (d) *Magnificence*, and *magnanimity*, but (e) *humility* also, with *sincerity of Conversation*, and *Christian simplicity*, or plain dealing. If these be not enough, all good works are in danger to become no duties. *Dominicus a Soto*, tells us, (f) there are three kinds of good works, to which all Christian Offices are reduced: One respects a mans self, the quelling of his own pleasures, signified by fasting; the other respects the Love of our Neighbours, of which kind is Alms-deeds; the third respects God and divine Worship, denoted by Prayer: and all these three with him are works of supererogation. When they come to an account in particulars, they vary not: As to what concerns our selves, (g) to abstain from our lawful pleasures, even when

(a) Ibid.

(b) Quæ ad cumulatiorem virtutum perfectionem ornatumque attinet, sub forma consilij admonet, qualia sunt illa quæ pertinent ad inimicorum dilectionem, *Prov.* 25. Si spervierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum. (c) Et reliqua præcepta misericordiæ, Ut cap. 3. Idem. ibid. l. 2. q. 3. art. 2. p. 37.

(d) De magnificentia & de magnanimitate, non fuerunt danda præcepta, sed magis consilia, *Aquinas* 2.2. q. 140. art. 2. ad primum.

(e) Dico virtutes Evangelicas dici illas, quæ colliguntur ex consiliis Evangelicis traditis a Christo Domino---ducentes hominem ad perfectionem supra communem bonitatem---possimum Sex. 1. pauperas spiritus. 2. Castitas virginum, 3. Obedientia, præsertim religiosæ, 4. Humilitas quæ ita animi nostri comprimitur elatio, ut ad altiora non se erigat--- 5. Penitentia quæ pro commissis culpis Deo satisfacimus, 6. Simplicitas quæ postea est in quadam facilitate & sinceritate morum juxta rationis præscriptum, *Fill.* tr. 21. n. 194. 195.

(f) Vanam gloriam a tribus operum generibus expulit, ad quæ cuncta officia reducuntur---ex his enim tribus, eo quod opera sunt supererogationis, solent homines mandati aviam ambire, Ibid. l. 2. q. 9. art. 2. p. 66.

(g) Licetis voluptatibus abstinere ad consilium continentie attinet, Idem. ibid. art. 3. p. 67. Consilia vero ea rescindunt, quæ etsi licita sint, nec Charitati prorsus inimica, tamen nonnulla sunt ad calmen progredientibus obstacula, l. 7. q. 5. art. 1. p. 242.

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they may be an impediment to holiness, is but advice, we need not follow it. Also to avoid worldly cares, to be content with Food and Raiment, not to be eager after superfluities, not to be too solicitous for the body; not to affect dignities, are but matter of Counsel by their common doctrine, in *Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.*

As for the concerns of God, (b) no inward worship in publick is under command, nor any outward, but the Mass; and for the hearing of that, no divine precept. No more are we obliged to worship in private, (i) Meditation is reckoned among Counsels of perfection. (k) Vocal prayer is not enjoined by God, and so all publick prayer in Christian Families and Assemblies, are under no divine injunction. Mental prayer may be a duty, (l) when it is our duty to Love God; but when that will be, is not (m) well known: So mental prayer will be a duty, no body well knows when. But this is a Jesuite who minces the matter too precisely. In the judgment of *Aquinas*, (n) and the generality of their Doctors, mental prayer is under Counsel only. And it is the more considerable, because they tell us, that in mental prayer all the internal acts of Religion are comprehended, so that hereby the very soul of Religion is dismissed as a thing of no necessity among Roman Catholics. And since in all worship, publick or private, they will have spiritual attention and devotion to be but matter of Counsel,

(b) *Ex præcepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultam externum ei exhibere*, S. Joseph. Sum. de 1. præcept. art. 5.

Attentio ad Deum non est necessaria; this is commonly asserted, even when it is acknowledged that all inward worship is included in it; *sub hac autem attentione ad Deum includitur omnis interior reverentia & cultus, omnis oratio & petitio, ut eleganter describit Gregorius 10. in c. Decret. de immunitat. Eccl. in 6. Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 3. p. 1146. Solus exterior cultus cadit sub hoc præcepto---sola missa communiter est in præcepto.---utrum autem audiat (missa) vel non---sub præcepto non cadit, Cajetan, Sum. v. fest.*

(i) *Meditatio Scripturarum---perfectionis instrumentum*, Soto, ibid.

(k) *Uldericus. Sum. confess. & Pisan. & alij in Sylvest. v. orat. n. 8. supra.*

(l) *Supra.*

(m) *De præcepto diligendi Deum & aliorum, nempe fidei & spei---non satis certo constat quando obligent, & quando violentur*, Fill. tr. 22. n. 297.

(n) *ut orent mentaliter---solum sub consilio---ut tenet D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 32. & communiter, Doctores, Jo. Sanc. ibid. Oratio mentalis, in qua omnes actus interni religionis comprehenduntur*, Suar. de Orat. l. 2. c. 7. n. 10.

(without which all that they call Worship is but a Cipher, or a blot rather); they leave no worship of God at all necessary. Cardinal Tolet gravely distinguisheth (o) of a *SANCTIFYING* the Lords day, and all other holy days (for which presence at Mass, and abstaining from servile work is sufficient); and of a *sanctifying* them *WELL*, (to which it is necessary, that he who is in mortal sin, should be contrite, and turn to God; and he that is in Grace, should give himself to divine Contemplation and good works, and both of them should abstain from new sin). Yet observe (saith he) that a man is bound under mortal sin to *SANCTIFY* the day, but not to *Sanctifie* it *WELL*. And after concludes, So I am only obliged to these two things, viz. (presence at Mass, and avoyding servile works) but not to the end (to wit, sanctifying it well); although it be very good Counsel to perform all the other upon this day. Thus with him it is no necessary duty, to which any are obliged on Lords days, or any other days for worship; to repent of sin, and turn to God, to meditate on divine things, and do good works, and abstain from any wickedness; all these it seems are only matter of Counsel; and herein he saith, Soto, Navarre, and Cajetan concur with him. And if they be only Counsels on all these days, the world will scarce find a day, when they will be duties. However with them, to do a thing, is commanded; to do it well, is not necessary. On all the days which either God or themselves would have kept holy, it is mere Counsel, either to do that which is good, or to think of it, either to be sorry for past wickedness, or not to commit more. And since it is no more on the holiest, it may seem not so much as a Counsel on prophane and common days. The means of honouring God, being thus by them made unnecessary, no wonder if they discharge us from the due use of them; (p) *pious sedu-*

(o) Adverte, festum posse sanctificari, & posse bene sanctificari. Ad sanctificandum duo sunt necessaria--id est, sacrum audire--& abstinere ab opere servili & prohibito, l. 4. c. 24. p. 685. ad bene autem sanctificandum, ultra hoc, aliud est necessarium, puta, ut qui est in mortali, tunc converteretur, & ad Dominum converti studeat: qui vero est in gratia, divine vacet contemplationi, & bonis operibus, uterque autem a novo peccato abstineat. Adverte tamen, quod homo tenetur sub mortali ad sanctificandum festum, sed non tenetur sub mortali ad bene sanctificandum.

Ita solum obligor ad illa duo in festo præstanda, non ad finem, quamvis consilium sit optimum, omnia &c. exequi in die festo, vid. Soto, Navar, Cajetan, qui nobiscum sentiunt, ibid. p. 687.

(p) Pia sedulitas inter consilia recenset Hunnæus in Catechism. ad finem Sum. Aquin. lity

lity (diligence for Heaven and our souls) is but matter of *Counsel*, we need not trouble our selves with it. No more scarce with any thing else, for (q) *the shunning of Idleness is but Counsel*, yea, and such as doth not oblige the Monks themselves, though they will have none else obliged by Counsels; in reference to them, *Soto* says, the avoyding of Idleness is not commanded.

Acts which concern others, are either those of Righteousness or Charity; for the *former*, how favourable they are, we saw before, they (*) discharge us from such desires thereof as Christ encourageth to the uttermost, *Matth. 5 6*. The *latter* they make corporal or spiritual. That Mercy or Charity which affords *outward* relief, even *their* (r) *Religious* are not obliged to. Nor need others exercise it, by (s) *GIVING* any thing, no, not to those that are in greatest necessity, how much soever themselves have, how extreemly soever others want. Spiritual relief, in affording of which, the exercise of mercy consists, they give an account of in many particulars, viz. advising those that want Counsel, teaching the Ignorant, comforting the Dejected, correcting Offenders, remitting Offences, bearing those that are burthensome, and praying for others. Now all these (and as many more belonging to the other branch) (t) *are no necessary duties*, or (which is all one in effect) *under no precept obliging to mortal guilt, except in two cases only*, saith *Navarre*, and those two concern only corporal relief; so that all the o-

(q) *Evitatio otij non est in præcepto*, *Soto*, *ibid.* l^r 7. q. 5. art. 2. p. 243. ad fin.

(*) *Quæcunque vultis ut faciant vobis, &c Scilicet necessario, aliter consilium est*, *Angel. Sum.* v. præceptum, n. 17.

(r) *Elemosynas erogare non est in religiosis virtus*. *Soto*, *ibid.*

(s) *In quibus vero duobus non est de præcepto subvenire donando; sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando*, *Navar. cap. 24. n. 5*. Non semper est necesse donare, sed tunc solum, cum egenti neque per mutuum, neque per venditionem, neque alia ratione succurri possit---quamvis hæc doctrina vera sit, & non solum a *S. Thoma* in 2.2. q. 31. art. 6. sed etiam ab alijs Theologis communiter tradi soleat, *Bellarmin. de bon. Operib. l.3. c.8.*

Consule, castiga, remitte, solave, fer, ora.

(t) *Misericordia seu Elemosyna sive sit spiritalis, quæ melior est corporali, sive sit corporalis, est de consilio; vel saltem non de præcepto obligante ad mortale, exceptis duobus casibus*, *Idem. ibid.* subvenire necessitatibus proximorum corporalibus, sicut proprijs necessitatibus, pertinet ad consilium, *vid. Aquin. Quodl. 4. art. 24. ad. 1.* *Misericors cor proximi necessitatibus communibus præstare, infelicisque eventus eorum condolere---consilium*, in *Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 1.*

ther dutys which we owe to the souls of men, are left arbitrary, as mere matters of advice without exception. (*) That of the Apostle, 1 Pet. 2. 13. For subjection to Governours is with them a Counsel. No more is that rule of Christ for Church Discipline & government, *Muh.* 18. 15, 16, 17. *if thy Brother shall Trespass against thee, &c.*

Mortification can scarce with them be so much as a Counsel, for their doctrine will have nothing in us to be mortified; that which is to be so treated, is sin in us; but they maintain, that in a just man there is no sin after Baptisme. Carnal concupiscence it self is sinless; it is natural to us, and so innocent. (u) *That which is in us by Nature, they say, is neither worthy of praise or dispraise: Hence they conclude, he is blind, who will say, concupiscence is a sin.* They grant it induceth us to sin, but it is no more sin upon that account, *than hearing, seeing, or other of our senses; than Gold, or Honour, or Beauty, or any thing else that may draw us to evil;* and so plainly, we are no more bound to mortifie it (if sin only is to be mortified) than we are obliged to ruine our senses, to destroy gold, or to spoyle the beauty of a handsome Woman. And the same must be said of other vicious habits, contracted by a continued practice of sin; for though they call these Vices, yet Vices with them are no sins, no more than Vertues are dutys; (*) the Law of God is not concerned in any habits, as it commands not those that are good, so it forbids not those that are vicious; and no reason to mortifie that which is not condemned by the Law. However, they retain the word, but little else we meet with in them, about this great concern of a Christian; and a very odd object they find for it, instead

(*) Glossa in loc.

(u) *Concupiscencia carnis naturalis nobis est.---Igitur cum ea quæ nobis insunt a natura, nec laude digna sint nec vituperio, quis vel cæcus, dixerit concupiscentiam illam, esse peccatum? nisi forsitan materialiter ante baptismum. ut superius explicatum est. Revera quæ ratione id dixeris, sequenter compulsus confiteberis, & visum, & auditum, & reliquos sensus qui nobis post peccatum Adæ instrumenta sunt delinquendi, delicta & ipsos esse. Quin vero & aurum & honores, & muliebrem formam, & quicquid nos pellicit, pellitur ad malum, Soto, de nat. & grat. l. 1. c. 12. p. 14.*

(*) *De habitu constat non esse peccatum, How they would prove it, see in Suar. l. 3. de Juram. c. 6. n. 1. Non sufficit habitualis affectus seu dispositio ad peccandum, sed requiritur actualis affectus seu dispositio, ut peccatum reipsa contrahatur, Bonacina, de peccat. disp. 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 3. alij communiter.*

of that which the Scripture assigns; it is the *natural body* that is to be afflicted and inacerated, not the *body of sin*; and so they are not concerned to get the work of the Devil destroyed; it is the work of God that must be mortified. They may be excused, if they make not this so much as a *Counsel*. But they say the maceration of the body is in order to the bridling of concupiscence: It seems, as Innocent as it is, it may need a curb, yet they take care to leave it loose enough, for those severities which should hamper it, they say are not commanded. (x) *Afflicting of the body is under no precept*, saith Soto and Sylvester, having told us out of Aquinas, that a Vow is properly of a work of Supererogation, acceptable to God; he adds, the (y) *maceration of the body*, as such, *for the bridling of Concupiscence, falls under Vowes*. And so how unruly soever the flesh is, they may choose, whether they will use the bridle or no. Yea, if the Priest should be so rigid as to enjoin severities of this tendency, the Sinner needs not submit to them.

Nor will they have us more engaged against the world than against the flesh; all the evils of the world are by the *Apostle* reduced to three heads, 1 *Iob.* 2. 16. but the Oracle of their Schools tells us, that to relinquish these three wholly, (z) *as far as we can, belongs to Evangelical Counsels*. Soto herein follows him, and tells us (a) that *Christ left this unto every one under Counsel*. So to be crucified to the world, and to get the world crucified to us, *Gal.* 6. is matter of advice with him, nor are we obliged thereto, in reference to those things, (b) or Lusts, which very much endanger our souls.

(x) *Afflictio corporis non est in præcepto*, de just. & jur. l. 7. q. 5. arr. 2. *Mortificationis operibus sedulo esse addictos, consilium*, in Jo. Sanc. disp. 1. n. 1.

(y) *Sum. v. Votum.* 1. n. 4.

(z) *Hæc autem tria totaliter deselinquere secundum quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia Evangelica*, Aquinas 1. 2. q. 108. arr. 4. Corp.

(a) *Temporalium tria sunt genera, scil. concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, & superbia vitæ---animos vero ab illis prorsus cællere, non est cunctis, immo neque multis in hoc seculo possibile. Quare sub consilio Christus id cuique reliquit, ut qui capere possit, caperet*, Ibid. l. 1. 2. q. 9. arr. 3. p. 67. vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 10.

Huc enim (viz. ad votum religionis) attinet Paulinum illud verbum ad Gal. 6. mihi absit gloriari nisi in cruce Domini, &c. per quam mihi mundus crucifixus est, & ego mundo, Ibid. l. 7. q. 5. arr. 1. p. 242

(b) *Non possunt non multa alende charitati creare pericula*, Ibid.

Self-denial also hath the same measures from them. *Bellarmino*, by these words of Christ to the young man, *Matth. 19. 21. Follow me*, understands self-denial, explaining it by *Matth. 16. If any man will come after me, let him deny himself*, it is nothing else, saith he, (*) *but to renounce ones own judgment and affections, and to accommodate himself to the judgment and will of other*; this the young man should have done, but it was not his duty, it was only a *Counsel of perfection*, (as he and all of them conclude) to subject himself thus to the will and judgment of Christ. He distinguisheth indeed, and will have submission to the will and judgment of Christ in things necessary to salvation, to be a common duty enjoined, *Matth. 16. and Luk. 9.* But such a subjection of our wills and judgments to Christ in things not of themselves necessary to salvation, to be only a Counsel; (c) *it is advice for those alone that would be perfect.* This is bad enough, for thus it will not be a duty to subject our selves to Christ in most things; or to deny our selves in any thing, which is not in their sense a deadly evil. But *Soto*, than whom there was no Divine more considerable in the Council of *Trent*, advanceth farther, and concludes that self-denial, not only which is required, *Matth. 19. Luk. 18.* But that also commanded, *Luk. 9. Matth. 16.* (which the *Cardinal* understood to be a subjecting of our wills and judgments to Christ in things necessary to salvation) is but a Counsel; and tells us (d) *for a man to deny himself, is by Vow to give up his liberty to anothers will*; and so Christ no where enjoynes other self-denial, than what their Perfectionists voluntarily oblige themselves unto by Vow, and the main duty of Christians is confined to Cloysters; that self-resignation, wherewith Christ should be honoured, being transferred to an Abbot.

There is one thing more remains, which Christ requires of those, who will be his Disciples, that is, *Christians* (and but one where he

(*) *Abnegare se nihil est aliud, quam valedicere suo iudicio, & suis affectibus, & accommodare se alterius iudicio & voluntati.*

(c) *Solis ijs consuli- tur qui volunt esse perfecti, de qua agitur, Matth. 19. Luc. 18. de Monach. l. 2. c. 9. p. 1151.*

(d) *Luc. 9. -- Idem est se hominem ipsum abnegare, quod propriam libertatem alterius arbitrio voti nexu subdere. Ibid. p. 248. Abnegare seipsum, est propriam voluntatem, per quam homo est homo, abnegare: quod revera nisi obligatorio voto alteri eam sic tradas, ut in tua non supersit facultate eandem rursus tibi usurpare, fieri non potest. Ibid. art. 4. p. 247.*

gives us the sum of all) and that is *suffering for him*. It would be strange, if when they have eased themselves of the rest, they should leave their Catholicicks obliged to this. The device of *Evangelical Counsels* had not been so useful a tool, though it freed them from the rest of Christs Yoke, if it would not have served to cast off the *heaviest* part of it; but hereby they can cast off Sufferings, greater, or less. Martyrdom they reserve for those who receive the truth in Love; for themselves it is only a *Counsel (e)* when it serves for nothing more than the glory of God, and the advancing of the Faith; and this according to the judgment of *Aquinas*. If it be no more than an opportunity of manifesting the divine glory and edifying the Church, it is a work of supererogation, and of no necessity, saith another. Parting with other things for Christ is no more a duty; to forsake Brethren, or Sisters, or Father, or Mother, or Wife, or Children, or Lands, for Christ's sake, Matth. 19. 29. is not a duty of any Christian, but only such as profess perfection, such forsaking all for Christ, to follow him, is more than needs, it was so in (g) the Apostles. In short, *taking up the Cross* is more than is commanded, when it is joyn'd by Christ with *self-denial*, and *following him*, as the best character of his Disciples, Luk. 9. (b) They take it to be but matter of *Counsel*, and so quit themselves of the full character of Christians at once.

If there be any vertue left, requisite for the practice of a Christian, which this Engine hath not yet demolished and brought to discretion,

(e) *Est autem solum in Consilio, quando ex eo nihil amplius quam Dei gloria, vel filii exaltatio consequitur; secundum mentem ipsiusdem Doctoris. Navar. c. 12. n. 40. Lopez. c. 41. p. 224. Si adest solum oportunitas manifestandi Divinam gloriam & edificandi ecclesiam, martyrrium est supererogationis, & non necessitatis. Angel. sum. v. charit. n. 5. Sylvest. sum. v. Martyr. Secundum Boravent. & S. Thom. sum. Rosel. v. charitas. n. 10.*

(f) *Math. 19. Omnis qui reliquerit Domum vel fratres, &c. Vide quam cunctis rebus eum denudet, qui optaverit esse perfectus. Soto. ibid. arr. 2. p. 244. Religio- nihil aliud significat, quam quod Christus Evangelicum adolescentulum docuit: Si vis perfectus esse, vade & vende, &c. Et sequere me.*

(g) *Et quod subinde Petrus subjunxit: ecce nos reliquimus omnia, & secuti sumus te. Ibid. arr. 3.*

(h) *De voto obedientie intelligit. Luc. 9. Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semetipsum, & tollat crucem suam quotidie, & sequatur me. Ibid. arr. 1. p. 43. vii. arr. 4. p. 247.*

by working it otherwise, it will make clear work. The least degree of vertue, they say, is all that is necessary; (i) none can be assigned above the lowest (in Faith, Hope, Love, Repentance, or other Vertues) which is enjoyed. Now that which is lowest of all, is next to nothing; and that which is no more, can act no further; so that all exercise of Vertue which their doctrine makes needful, is either nothing, or next to it. All growth in grace, with them, is (k) needless, for the first degree they attain is not only a sufficiency, but all the perfection that is necessary; (h) what is more, may be profitable, but not simply needful. The first and least degree of Vertue in every kind satisfies the precept, and that being satisfied requires no more. So all other degrees will be but under Counsel; it will be no duty to look after more than the least, nor will the grossest negligence, as to endeavours for more, be any sin.

And since encrease of Vertue is by the exercise of it, where the increase is not necessary, the exercise is needless. Further, no Act of Vertue in any degree is requisite, but only in the article of necessity; for then only affirmative precepts oblige, at all other times, they bind no more than mere Counsels, nor than neither, unless it can be known when this Article occurs; and how shall it be known? the Scriptures have not declared it, they say, nor Councils neither, why they have a rule in the case. (m) Things not determined, are left to the Arbitrement of an honest man; & so it is left to every mans will, who can suppose himself honest; if he never find time for any act of vertue, he will not be obliged to any: or if he will be so cautious to consult their Divines in the case, some of them declare, that such a vertuous Act is rarely needful, nor can they certainly tell when: others conclude there is no necessity of it all. Now he may follow which please him best, even those (if he list) which discharge him from all obligations to the acts in question; and this he may do safely, not only by their doctrine of probability, but by the determination of their Oracle. The Council of

(i) Bellarm. de penit. l. 2. c. 11. *supra*.

(k) Nisi forte in religioso, qui tenetur habere propositum proficiendi: quia nullibi est præceptum, ut istam curam habeamus, sed consultatur tantum, Sylvest. v. peccat. n. 4. &c.

(l) Perfectio una necessaria ad esse, altera necessaria ad bene esse, quæ consistit in consilio. Bellarm. de Monach. l. 2. c. 12. p. 115⁸.

(m) Quæ indefinita relinquuntur a lege, arbitrio boni viri sunt definienda, Navar.

Trent will secure him, though he never perform one act of Vertue all his life, nor repent thereof at his death, by a fine device, which is neither Repentance nor a Vertue, of which before.

Besides, all acts which have more than moral goodness, seem by their doctrine to be under *Counsel*, and all acts supernatural and truly Christian more than needs. They are not truly Christian, unless they be done out of respect to God, with an intent to please and honour him, as the *Apostle* requires, 1 Cor. 10. 30. But this rule, as *Soto* tells us, (n) taken in that sense which is nearest to the letter, *that all be actually referred to God*, is but a Counsel. But may not a virtual intent to glorifie God be necessary, though an actual respect thereto be but advice? No, not that neither, for without such a virtual reference, the acts we speak of, may be morally good, (as they say they were in those that knew not God) and so no sin. Now in any degree above this (*viz.* wherein they are more than not sins, or any thing better than merely inculpable) (o) they are works of supererogation, if their great Cardinal be not mistaken.

There is yet another *Maxime* pregnant for this purpose; (p) *The mode of Vertue falls not under the Precept*; that is, we are not enjoyn'd to act in a vertuous manner, or as becomes vertuous persons, *viz.* out of a vertuous habit or principle. *Aquinas*, who delivers and maintains this *maxime*, explains it by this instance: (q) *He is neither punished by God, nor men, as a transgressor of the Precept, who paies his Parents due Honour, though not out of a habit of piety*. Such Honour, though it be no act of that Vertue (Piety they call it) from whence proceeds what we owe to Parents, doth satisfy the Precept, so that the person is free both from sin and the punishment. Accordingly *Soto*, (r) *We are not*

(n) *Potest tamen accipi in sensu, ut sit consilium: & hic videtur propinquior literæ, scilicet siue comeditis siue bibitis, &c. omnia actus referatis in Deum. De nat. & grat. l. 1. c. 23. p. 60.*

(o) *Si addam alterum gradum (viz. præter eum quo non pecco) eo modo facio actum supererogationis & consilij. De Monach. l. 2. c. 13. p. 1162.*

(p) *Modus virtutis non cadit sub præcepto neque legis divinæ neque legis humanæ.*

(q) *Neque enim ab homine neque a Deo punitur tanquam præcepti transgressor, qui debitum parentibus honorem impendit, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, l. 2. q. 100. art. 9. c.*

(r) *De nat. & grat. lib. 1. c. 22. p. 57. supra.*

commanded to pay what we owe, out of the habit of Righteousness, or liberality, but only to pay it to the full. By this one instance he would have us judge of all other Precepts concerning Vertues: The habits, *i. e.* the vertues need not be exercised; let the thing be done, and it is all, the command of God requires, though it be not done out of a vertuous principle, nor be any act or exercise of it. So Bellarmine (*s*), *When God commands that we live righteously and soberly, he commands not that we do this from a habit, but only that we do it.* The external acts which Pious, Sober, and Righteous persons do, are requisite; but the exercise of any vertues therein, whether they concern God, others, or our selves, is not commanded: (*) *The habit is that, which they count the vertue;* since therefore they say, that nothing need be done out of habit, they thereby declare that no exercise of vertue is enjoined; nothing that we do, need be the act or issue of a vertuous principle; this will be but matter of Counsel, and not under any obliging command. Indeed they make the exercise of vertue universally needless, since they declare it not requisite in all those cases, where if in any at all, it would be needful, they find no necessity for it, either in worship, or common conversation; all may be done very well, without any act of grace or vertue. They may pray effectually; they may celebrate or hear Mass meritoriously (and these are the sum of all their ordinary worship); they may partake worthily of all their Sacraments; they may obtain all the effects of Sacraments or Sacramentals (these are evident by the premisses); they may satisfy all the commands of God, and precepts of their Church, so as to free both from sin and punishment in the judgment of Aquinas and his Followers; yea, they may merit too, not only other things, but grace and glory: this is the point more stuck at than the rest, but the (†) gravest of their Authors maintain, that it is suffi-

(s) De grat. & liber. arbit. l. 6. c. 7. p. 664. *supra*.

(*) Per virtutem intelligimus habitum bonum, Nav. c. 23. n. 1.

(†) Non desunt gravissimi authores, qui sentiant, omne opus bonum hominis iusti, & habitu Charitatis præditi, vite æternæ meritum esse, Bellarm. de Justif. l. 4. c. 15. p. 957.

Ad meritum imperium charitatis non est necessarium proprie & in rigore, sufficit enim, ut ab habente charitatem proficiatur, vid. Suar. tom. 4. disp. 37. Sect. 3. n. 3.

cient for merit, that a man be in the state of grace, though he do not act it; and this state consists but in that imaginary grace, to which a Priest can help an impenitent Sinner. It will be hard to divine, for what ends the exercise of vertue can be by them counted needful, since without it, all the ends specified may be accomplished, the chief not excepted. However here's enough to enter the exercise of vertue amongst mere Counsels.

If we should take into this account all these rules in Scripture, the transgression of which is by their doctrine but Venial, as *Scotus, Gabriel*, and others, would have us, (*Scotus & Gabriel, asserunt peccata mortalia esse contra precepta; venialia vero contra consilia*, Vasq. in 1. 2. tom. 1 disp. 143. c. 4. n. 7.) the number of Counsels would swell infinitely, and all Conscience of the exercise of Vertue would be in a manner stifled under that notion: but of Venials hereafter. They have, without this, yet another expedient ready to do them universal and effectual service this way, for by their principles any one may turn what divine precept soever pinches him, into a Counsel, and make no more Conscience of it, if he have but some Doctors opinion for it (*ad preceptum non teneris, si te non teneri probabilis Doct. est sententia*, Medina, Soto, in *Victorell. ad Sa. v. dubium*, n. 2.) Yea, though he have but the opinion of some one Doctor, that's enough to secure him, as *Angelus, Sylvest. Navar, Sairus, Viçiorel*, (*ibid. & in Jo. Sanc. d. 44. n. 61.*) and above 20. of their Authors conclude (*vid. infra*). So far is it from being the singular conceit of some Jesuites, yea, though that Doctor therein be opposed by all others, *idem. ibid.* after *Lorca, Villalobos*, and many more.

Not to be tedious; where Christ intimates, *Math. 5. 19.* that some of the commands are greater, and some less; the great commands some of their *Writers* will have to be Evangelical Counsels, because they are better, more meritorious, and tend to greater perfection: (*n*) others will have the less commands to be but such Counsels, because they are not necessary to be observed. Now betwixt these two, both the great commands, and the less, will be dissolved into Counsels, and what then becomes of the exercise of Christian vertues? If this be but

(n) *Vid. Soto, ibid. l. 3. c. 1.*

matter of *Counsel*, there is no necessity that any should trouble themselves about it. For this is the difference, saith *Aquinas*, betwixt a Precept and a Counsel (x). *A Precept imports necessity, Counsels are left to the free choyce of him, to whom they are given*: So that he may mind or not mind them, as he lists: if he observe them not, there is no fear of penalty, either eternal or temporal: (y) *There is no punishment* saith *Bellarmino*, *if a Counsel be not observed*. (*) They all maintain this. Not one of their Divines will yield, that God may punish any one for acting against his Counsel, though of the highest importance. And no wonder, for by their doctrine he no way sins mortally or venially, that doth not observe it. Though it may seem strange, that it should be no sin to neglect Counsels given us from Heaven, and not to follow the advice of the All-wise God; yet it is past all doubt by their principles. (z) *A neglect of Counsel is no sin at all*. It is not only no sin to neglect these Counsels at other times, but also when God calls us to comply therewith by divine inspirations and motions of his Spirit; to disobey these calls, and resist these inspirations is no fault at all. Cardinal *Tolet* is rejected as too rigid, for counting it so bad as a venial fault, not to yield to these divine inspirations, (*Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 4*). So that if the great God calls to us, either by his Spirit, or by his Word, or both together, as our Counsellor; we need not regard it, we may resist both, and yet be innocent. Herein others concur; *Aquinas* himself counts it no sin to neglect Counsels, even against Conscience dictating, that it is good to follow them, (2. *sentent. dist. 39. q. 3. art. 3. ad. 6.*) They may refuse the observance of them with some contempt, a presumptive contempt (*i. e.* a continued neglect thereof) passeth

(x) *Præceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus, cui datur*, 1. 2. q. 108. art. 4.

(y) *Consilium si non servetur, nullam habet penam*, De Monach. lib. 2. c. 7.

(*) *Operari vero contra consilium licet altissimum, peccatum non est: nullus enim Theologorum concedit fractionem consilij puniendum fore a Deo*, Jo. Sanc. disp. 7. n. 5.

(z) *Intermittere consilium, nullum peccatum est*, Vega. de Justific. l. 14. c. 12. *Nec ulla (leges) divine consultoria etiam ad veniale obligant*, Navar. c. 23. n. 49. & c. 21. n. 43. *Inobedientia aut est contra consilium, & tunc si sit consilium perfectionis, non est peccatum*, Sylvest. v. *inobedient. n. 2. ut enim optime ait Suarez, operari contra consilium, nulla nec minima Christi offensus est*, Jo. Sanc. *ibid.*

without controll, as innocent. (a) *A negative contempt* hereof is justified, as either a *small fault*, or *none at all*. And some of them exclude not a positive contempt of these *Counsels of perfection*, but allow a contemptuous neglect of them as *sinless*. (b) So *Angelus*, after their Law, and *Gloss*, and their *Saint Antoninus*. They may glory in their neglect of these divine Counsels, and make their boast thereof; this will be but a slight fault at most; for they may glory in any thing but mortal crimes, and this is not so much as venial. It will be no worse if they not only neglect, (c) *but abandon them with some abhorrence* too. They may bind themselves by Oath, not to observe them; it will be but a small fault at worst, to Swear, and call God to witness that they will not follow his Counsels. (d) So they commonly determine; and (e) if they be true to their Oath, it will be no fault at all: So that if we be loth to believe, that they abandon holiness in the exercise of Christian virtues, as a thing superfluous, and more than needs, under this notion of *Counsels*; to put us out of doubt, they are ready to Swear it, and their Doctors assure them they may do it safely.

Sec. 10. But if all this were otherwise, and any exercise of virtue were needful by their doctrine; yet would there be no necessity of it, but only during the *Popes pleasure*. For by their principles, if the Pope should determine, that any Virtue were a Vice, all Romanists are bound in Conscience to conform to his judgment, and Virtue must be avoyded as if it were a Vice indeed. *Bellarmin*, their chief Champion (who is wont with so much confidence to deny, or with so great Arti-

(a) *Contemptus negativus est peccatum mortale, si Dei lex quam violat, est præceptiva: aut veniale, vel nullum, si est consultoria tantum Sylvester, v. contempt. n. 3.*

(b) *Si vero non contemnit auctoris potestatem, sed observantiam consilij seu exhortationis: & sic solum peccat venialiter, si consilium est reverentiae — si vero est consilium perfectionis, nec etiam venialiter peccat & tunc est perfectionis quum licite potest dimittere, Sic Archi. 6. dif. & sic intellige Gloss. & jura quæ alligat Sum. v. contempt. n. 1. omittere rem levem ex contemptu formali non est mortale, vid. plures in Dian. p. 3. tr. 6. ref. 72.*

(c) *Et ex hoc patet, quid dicendum de eo qui attediatus abhominatur divina & spiritualia: quoniam nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, & ea demittat: vel deliberate disponat dimittere, non peccat mortaliter, Angel. Sum. v. accidia. n. 1.*

(d) *Non est peccatum mortale per se loquendo jurare aliquid contrarium consilij, Glossa, Tabien. Cajetan, Navar, c. 12. n. 16. Antoninus, Soto, & alij in Suarez, de Juram. l. 3. c. 18. n. 6. Graff. l. 2. c. 15. n. 6. & c. 18. n. 11.*

(e) *Hujusmodi juramenta sine peccato observari possunt, Navar, ibid.*

fice

fice to hide or disguise any thing in Popery which may render his party either odious or ridiculous) delivers himself plainly to this purpose. (f) *If the Pope, saith he, should mistake in commending Vices, and forbidding Vertues, the Church would be bound to believe those Vices to be good, and those vertues to be evil, unless she would sin against Conscience.* The Cardinal would have us think, that he proceeds herein upon an impossible supposition, and that the Pope cannot thus mistake, as to commend Vices, or forbid Vertues; but the world knows, that this is so far from being impossible, that he hath already actually done it, and this in such instances as may well perswade us, that it is not only possible, but *likely*, that there is not any Virtue, but (if occasion serve, and his interest requires it) he may forbid it, and declare it a sin, yea, and bind the Church in Conscience to avoyd it, as if it were a Vice.

(*) He may do it with as much demonstration of Reason, Holiness, and Infallibility, in any case, as he hath already done it in too many. Since then, that Church hath so far subjected all the Conscience and Reason they have unto him, as they cannot without sin but believe him, if he should determine, that light is darkness, and good is evil; he may take away all Conscience of Vertue, and the exercise of it, when ever he pleaseth; there will be no need of any act of Vertue for any Papist, if he list but out of his *Chair* to say so; they cannot without sinning against Conscience, practice any, if he do but the same thing in the rest, as he hath done in a great many already.

This is enough to shew how needless they count the exercise of Christian Vertues, and so how unnecessary they make all holiness of life; but it will be yet more evident, if their doctrine allow them to live in a course of sin, and make it not necessary to forsake wickedness

(f) *Si autem Papa erraret præcipiendo vitia, vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur Ecclesia credere vitia esse bona, & virtutes malas, nisi vellet contra conscientiam peccare, De Rom. Pontif. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 721. Sect. secunda.*

(*) He may bind the Catholic Church in Conscience to believe a Lye, and to call good evil, and evil good. This is to speak home: and now let Bellarmin say a worse thing of *Antichrist* if he can, and shew us what the *Gates of Hell* can be imagin'd to design or attempt more destructive to the Christian Church and Religion, than what he supposes the Pope to have full power and authority from Christ to do.

and

and abandon such evil ways, as are condemned by the Holy God. For continuance in sin is as inconsistent with holiness of life, as it is with hopes of Salvation; and this is as clear in Scripture, as if it were described with a Sun beam, 1 *Job.* 3. 8. *Act.* 3. 26. 2 *Timoth.* 2. 19. *Gal.* 5. 16. & 19, 20, 21. 1 *Cor.* 6. 11. 9. &c. Notwithstanding, by their doctrine it is not necessary to forsake sin; this will be manifest, if we take notice, that there are many sins that they count Vertues, and so not to be avoyded; and many which they call sins, but think it not necessary for the Salvation of any man to abandon them; and many sins also, which they have made to be no sins at all.

CHAP. VII.

Many hainous crimes are Vertues, or necessary Duties by the Roman Doctrine.

There are many horrid sins, which they have transformed into vertues, or count high strains of Piety and Devotion: and thereby, are so far from being concerned to forsake them, as they are obliged to live in the practice of them, I might instance in *Blasphemy, Idolatry, Perjury, Robbery, Murder, &c.*

Their *Blasphemies*, in ascribing the peculiar excellencies of the Divine Majesty, and the prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ to the blessed Virgin, and other Creatures, and to their Popes (though diverse of them, as themselves acknowledge, were Monsters and incarnate Devils) have been sufficiently discovered by others, and therefore, designing brevity, I here wave them.

For the same reason, I will not insist upon their *Idolatry* in invoking Saints, adoring the Host, and worshipping Images, only as to this hint, let me observe what is less taken notice of, that their own Doctrine before opened, quite shuts out the best, and only considerable plea, they make use of, to excuse themselves from this Crime. It is their common Doctrine, that *the same Worship is to be given to the Image, and the exemplar, id est, the Worship of God to the Images of the Trinity, the Worship of Christ to a Crucifix, or a Cross, or the Image of the Cross.*

Cross. They also define Idolatry, to be, *a giving the Worship of God, to any thing else besides God.* Who would imagine, but they had hereby fastened the charge of Idolatry upon themselves unavoydably? yet they make account to escape by pleading that the Worship they give to Images is *Transient*, not *Terminative*, *id est*, it staves not in the Image, but passes from it to the exemplar, the mind of the Worshipper directing it to God. There's no need to ask what ground they have to imagine, that their giving the Worship of God to an Image *Transsitively*, is not Idolatry; it is enough that they acknowledge it to be Idolatry, if it be not *Transient*: since whatever they pretend when they are pinched, yet they count it not requisite, that their worship should pass from the Image unto God; but think it safe to let it stop, where it first fell, and terminate in the Image. For they confess it passeth not to God, without an act of the *mind* directing it to him; this is not, nor can be, when in the Worship God is not *minded*: and they generally agree (as was shewed before) that they need not *mind* God in their Worship. So the result of their own Doctrine is, that they need be no better than Idolaters. I know not what they will say here, unless as *Cajetan*, that a *virtual termination* will suffice, *id est*, when they have an intention, to terminate their Worship on God, without doing it actually, and indeed. But if no more be necessary, the Worship need not pass to God really, but may rest in the Image, and *actually* terminate there: and so they will be real, and actual Idolaters, whatever their intention be. Yea as to *that*, by their Doctrine it is not needful, to *intend* to Worship God, as we saw before. Answerably in their prayers to Saints, before their Reliques, or before an Image; (which is their usual practice) since by their common Doctrine, the person prayed to, whether God, or a Creature, need not be *minded*, the address may be actual to the Image, and to that only; the *mind* not transferring the prayer, so much as by one thought, towards the Saint, it will terminate in the Image, if any where, and be as senseless Idolatry, as the most stupid amongst the Heathen were guilty of. Thus what they say, many of them do; (a) by their com-

(a) *Sunt bene multi rudiores qui imagines colunt non ut signa, sed perinde quasi ipse sum babeant, magisq; eis fidunt quam Christo.* Polyd. Virgil de invent. rer. l. 6. c. 13.

mon Doctrine, all may do, viz. apply themselves to a senseless Image, as though it heard their prayers, and search'd their hearts, and were no less than God.

Sec. 2. There is another branch of this crime, which I shall stay a little on, viz. Their worshipping of Reliques. Herein they are so liberal, as to give Religious Worship to such things, which they do but fancy to be Reliques; yea such as it is absurd, and ridiculous to imagine, they are Reliques. For who can imagine (at least when he is waking) how they could catch, or keep St. Peters shadow; or bottle up Josephs bough, his toylsome breathing, when he was at his Carpenters work? yet both these, with others of like quality, are among the Reliques, which they count worthy of such Worship. (b) *The shadow of St. Peter*, sayes one, *is not the greatest among Reliques*, and therefore if that be adored, *why are not the rest to be honoured and Worshipped?* Bellarmine (c) asks, *what Relique can be imagined to be meaner, than the shadow of Peter?* possibly he might be resolved, near Blois in France, where Josephs bough is Honoured, and Worshipped as a Relique. (d) *Baronius* ascribes much to the shadow of Peter, for he makes it the ground, not only of their Worship of Images, but also of the honour and power of the Popes. Who can doubt hereafter, but that the weightiest things in Popery have a substantial foundation? They Worship their Reliques, not only when they are whole and sound, but when they are corrupted, and reduced to dust; or nothing else of them left, but the vermine bred in them; not only the ashes, but the Vermine too may be Worshipped, though some stick at the latter. *Henricus* one of their School-Doctors concludes, that the Reliques in the form of Dust and Ashes, may and ought to be adored, but not under the form of vermine, and gives some reason for it; but their great *Vasquez* rejects this scruple, and the ground of it, as vain and frivolous; and concludes they may be Worshipped, as well when they are vermine, as when they are Ashes. (e) *A man*,

(b) *umbra vero non est maxima inter alias reliquias*, &c. *Vasquez* de adorat. l. 3. disp. 3. c. 2. n. 81.

(c) *Quæ reliquia viliores umbra (Petri) cogitari possint?* de imagin. cap. 3 p. 1494.

(d) *Art. 34. in Spondan. n. 77.*

(e) *Recta intentione & sincera fide, possit quis in verminibus sanctum apprehendere, & venerari.* *Ibid.* cap. ult. n. 113. 114.

faith he, *may with right intention, and sincere faith, apprehend a Saint, and Worship him in Worms.* If the question had been, of the little Worms in the Ulcer of St. Harry of Denmark, (f) for which he had such Saint-like love, as when they crept out of his Knee, to put them in again, that they might be nourished, where they were bred; Or of the Lice of St. Francis, (g) for which he had such a holy tenderness (it is Recorded as an argument of his holiness) that when they were shaken off, he gathered them up, and put them in his Bosome: I suppose *Henricus* himself could scarce have denyed, but those Sacred Creepers (having so near Relation to, and being sanctified by such extraordinary contact, of so great Saints) might have been adored.

It cannot be denyed, but they are lyable to grosse mistakes, about the object of their Worship here; and some of them acknowledge, that the people herein are deluded with great and detestable (h) impostures. What if the Tooth which they Worship for St. *Cristophers* (as bigg as a mans (*) fist) should prove the Tooth of a Beast? or the Hair, which they Worship as part of St. *Peters* Beard, should be the excrement of some Malefactor? or the *shift* which they Worship as the Virgin *Maries*, should be the covering of some Harlot? or the dust, or the Vermine which they Worship, as the remains of some Saints, should have been in their original, no more holy than a Bruit or a damned sinner? as great mistakes as these about their Reliques, the World has discovered, and themselves have been convinced of. *Valla*, a person of great learning, and eminency amongst them, sayes plainly, (i) *There are ten thousand such things* (counterfeit Reliques) *in Rome it self.* And if the seat of infallibility be so well stored with cheats, what shall we think of other places? They say indeed they have the attestation of Visions, Revelations, Miracles to insure them: but these they have, and produce as well for those that are confessed to be counterfeits, as for them which they take to be true. So that they are proved beyond all question, to be all alike: the true ones, as very

(f) Engl. Martyrol. Jan. 16.

(g) Canus. Loc. Th. lib. 11. c. 6.

(h) *Ingentes & detestande imposturae patefierent.* Cassand. Consult. c. de reliquijs.

(*) *L. vives* in August. de civit. Deil. 15. c. 9. *Dens molaris pugno Major.*

(i) *Decem millia talium rerum Romae sunt.* De Constant. donat.

counterfeits as any; and the counterfeit, as true as the best. Now, may they with safety venture to Worship them for all this? Yes, their Devotion is maintained to be not only safe, but meritorious, however they be deluded about the object of it. They may worship at all adventure, what they take to be a Relique, though it be indeed no such thing: and yet be so far from Idolatry or any sin, that they deserve highly at Gods hand by so doing. If (k) any man think, sayes one, that to be a Relique of a Saint, which indeed is not so, be is not frustrate of the merit of his Devotion. Yea a man may merit by a mistaken belief, though he should worship the Devil, sayes another. (l) So that they have not only a fair excuse, but great incouragement to venture; though they may happen to Worship the Devil himself, and not only some limb of him, instead of Christ, or his Saints, or their remains. When the Lord declares *Deut. 32. That his Wrath should burn to the bottome of Hell*, for that the Israelites Worshipped Devils instead of God: they might, if *Baronius* had been their Advocate, have come off well enough with his Plea, *sides purgat facinus*. The Israelites believ'd as firmly as Roman-Catholicks (only they were mistaken) that they did not Worship Devils, but that which was a proper object of Worship: therefore they were so far from the bottom of Hell, or any danger of it; that hereby they might merit Heaven and Glory.

Let me add, that the miscarriages in their Mass furnishes them with many Sacred Reliques, and their orders about the disasters there, create for them diverse objects of Worship; and help them to many right Worshipful things, of the vilest Vermine, and that which is more loathsome. If the body or blood of Christ (so they will have it to be) fall to the ground; it must be lick'd up, the ground is to be scraped, and the scrapings reduced to ashes, are to have place among the Reliques. If the blood be spilt upon the Altar-cloathes, those cloathes are to be washed, and the Sacred wash, is to be inshrined. If a flye, or a Spider fall into the blood, it is to be taken out, and burnt; and the ashes put into the holy shrine: But if the blood of Christ be poysoned,

(k) *Si quis putans aliquam esse particulam sancti, quæ non est, merito sue devotionis nræ caret. Vsq; ibid. cap. ult. n. 114.*

(l) Holcot infra.

it is to be kept in a clean vessel among the Reliques; and so poyson becomes a very Worshipful thing. If a Mouse, or a Spider, or a Worm eat the body of Christ; (I must desire pardon for mentioning such horrid things) these Vermine in their ashes, are to have the same preferment, and be put into shrines for Reliques. If a Priest or other person do vomit up the Host, even that (if no mans Stomach will serve him devoutly to lick it up) being turned into ashes, is to be honoured among the Reliques. All these and more particulars are ordained and provided for in the Cautels of the Mass: and thereby we see what order is taken by holy Church, that *dirty water*, the *scrapings of the ground*, *Venemous* or *loathsome Vermine*, yea the *Vomit* of a weak or gluttonous Stomach, casting up that which they call Jesus Christ; may be enshrined among the Reliques, which they adore. They tender Worship to all, under the Altar promiscuously: yea their very prayers are so directed thereto, that you cannot discern, whether it be more to the Reliques, or the persons they relate to, for example, when they say, (1) *O you that are seated under the Altar, intercede ye to God for us.* For they may as well believe, that these Reliques can intercede as that Christ, or the glorified Saints, are seated under their Altar.

Sec. 3. Some of them would have us believe, that they give not Divine honour to Reliques, but a sort of Religious Worship, which they call *δωλεία*: but the Scripture (and secular Authors too, (m) as is acknowledged) make no difference between the terms of their distinction, but appropriate both to God. And the people make no difference in their practice, as is confessed, but Worship Saints, (and so their Reliques,) even as they Worship God. And their Teachers, and learned writers encourage them to give that to Reliques, which is Divine Worship indeed, viz. *To put their trust in them, to swear by them, to bring them oblations, to burn incense, and pray to them.* So they are taught to give them the *thing*, which is confessed to be Divine Worship, only they will not give it the *name* (for though they be real Idolaters, yet it is not convenient to be called so). Nor is this all, there

(1) Pontific. Roman. Sec. de consecr. Eccles.

(m) Secundum profanos Auctores idem significant. Bellarm. de sanct. l. 1. c. 14. p. 1463.

are a world of Reliques, to which they will have *thing* and *name* given, even *λατρεία* expressly. For it is their common Doctrine (*) *That the Reliques of Christ, are to have the same Worship with Christ himself.* And under the notion of these Reliques, they take in (as of the Saints also) not only the parts of his body, but all that *belonged* to him, yea all that *touched him*, or was touched by him. Accordingly *Aquinas* (whose Doctrine is highly approved, not only by all the *Jesuits*, but in a manner by all their *Universities* n) teaches (o) that, *not only the Cross is to have Divine Worship, because it touched Christ, but all things else, that belong to Christ, by vertue of this contact, and Damascen* (whom he quotes) will have all things near (p) to Christ *τὰ ἀνακείμενα* Worshipped on that account. 'Tis true they distinguish here, some things touched him *innocently*, others *injuriously*. *Waldensis* seemed loath to grant, these latter should be Worshipped; lest he should be brought to adore, the lips that betrayed him, or the hands that buffeted him: but he is run down by the stream, both of their Doctrine, and practice. For the things which they worship especially, and will have worshipped as Christ himself, are the instruments of his sufferings. The knife, where-with he was circumcised; the Pillar, at which he was scourged; the cord, where-with he was bound; the 28. steps of white marble, up which he was led, in his passion, to *Pilate's* house; the purple Robe, and the white one too, which he wore in derision; the Keys, and stones of the Sepulcher, the Sponge, the Reed, the Vinegar, the Crown of Thorns, the Lance, the Nails, and (which may serve for all) the Cross, which is never the less, for the loss of so many pieces, as are Ten thousand times more than the whole: all these, (and who can tell how many more?) though they ministered to his pain, or reproach in his passion, have Divine worship. But the things which they will

(*) De fide esse adorandum (signum crucis) adoratione latræ sicut adorantur spina, lancea, clavi, præsepe & aliæ reliquæ quæ Christum tetigerunt—ita S. Thome. — & alij communiter. Bonacin. tom. 2. disp. 3. q. 1. punct. 3. r. 6.

(n) Possevin. Biblioth. Select. l. 1. c. 10.

(o) Crux Christi—propter membrorum Christi contactum latræ adoranda est—Dicens—*quod quantum ad rationem contactus membrorum Christi adoramus non solum crucem sed etiam omnia quæ sunt Christi* par. 3. q. 25. art. 4.

(p) πάντα τὰ θεῷ ἀνακείμενα προσκυρεῖται Orithod. fd. l. 4. c. 12.

have worshipped, for the *innocent contact* might suffice, being numerous beyond account. To wave the rest, *Damascent* (whom *Aquinas* followes) of this sort reckons, not only *his Clothes, and Tabernacle, the Cave, the Manger, and Sepulcher*: but also *Golgotha, and Sion* (q) *and the like*. VWherein may be included *Galilee, Samaria, Judea and Egypt*, the Earth where he trod in every place, being (if not deified yet) sanctified by such contact. There is a divine vertue therein, sayes (r) *Baronius*, and they were wont to bring Earth from those parts, for the working of Miracles. And amongst the Reliques at *Venice*, they had a stone translated from *Chio* thither, whereon 'tis said, he (s) sat at *Tyre*. The water also of the River *Jordan*, at least, after it comes to the place where he was Baptized; and there that was taken up, they say, (t) which is inshrined at *Cassino*. And why not the air too, when it comes to any place, where ever it touch'd him? that so every Element might furnish them with objects of Divine worship; and they might have no need to content themselves with such petty Idols as the Heathen had: but have them in such extent, and largeness, as is proportionable to the vast improvement of this kind of Devotion in the Church of *Rome*.

Moreover by vertue of this *Contact*, not only things, but persons, are capable of Divine worship, and such as touched Christ may be thus worshipped. The blessed Virgin in the first place. *Cajetan* declares (u) that in secret, where it can be done, *without scandal, and danger*; she may have Divine worship on this account, and tells us this is the sense of *Aquinas*. Later writers determine, that she may be so worshipped, as Christ himself, either upon the account of *Contact*, or *Confanguity*. Upon the same ground *Simeon* may have Divine honour, for he once imbraced Christ: and *Joseph* his foster Father, for he had him oftner in his arms, which their Church has taken notice of in a prayer on

(q) Golgotha. Zion & similia. *ibid*.

(r) *Vid. Spondan. An. 34. n. 41.*

(s) *Platin vir. Cælestin. 2.*

(t) *Cett. 11. p. 305. Chronic. Cassinen. ibi.*

(u) *Cajetanus, --Cessante (scandalo & periculo) fatetur, posse B. Virginem adorari adoratione latræ, ratione solius contactus. Alij vero recentiores Theologi, non solum ratione contactus existimant, adorari posse adoratione latræ, sed etiam ratione maternitatis, propter sanguinis conjunctionem. Vasc. ibid. l. 1. disp. 8. c. 1. n. 195. 196.*

his holy-day (x). The Apostles, and Seventy Disciples did probably sometimes touch him, and so, by the same reason, may have the same worship, with their Lord. And no wonder, seeing they tell us, *the lips of Judas*, (y) for but touching him with a treacherous kiss, may be thus worshipped. The woman also with the bloody issue, and those many of the multitude that pressed him, *Luk. 8. 45.* *Mary Magdalen* especially, she has double honour, seeing they worship more bodies than one for hers. But this is common, and they had need of a prodigious faith to believe (if any of them believe) that the things they worship are not counterfeit: since the most of them may be convicted of imposture, even by their own practice, and approved writings. They must either believe themselves deluded, or believe that one person had more bodies, and one body more heads than one, yea more than two or three. Many of their most eminent *Saints* are thus turned into Monsters, but I instance only in those, who may challenge Divine worship upon the common ground of *Contact*. *John* who touch'd *Christ* when he Baptized him, had three or four heads, if he had as many as they worship: for they worship his head in so many (z) several places, and when they have it whole in some shrines, yet they will have several pieces of it in others. So that *Herod* had not beheaded him when one head was quite cut off: and when the *Damsel* had it in a charger, it might be still on his shoulders. *Longinus* also, who they say pierced *Christ's* side, and had his eyes cured with a touch of his blood, must have four bodies: (a) for in so many, very distant places, they worship it; and yet this their *Saint* had never one body, nor being in the world. As for *St. Christopher* (who must needs touch *Christ* too, if as they say, he carryed him over an arm of the Sea on his Shoulders) there was no need to make him so many bodies, since they have made him one as big as many, and worship for him an *Effi-*

(x) Sicut B. Joseph unigenitum tuum---his manibus reverenter tractatus meruit & portatus.

(y) Idem. ibid. l. 3. disp. 2. c. 6. n. 76. vid. infra.

(z) Vid. Fulk on *Math. 14. 2.*

(a) Vid. Bolland. act. Sanct. ad Jan. 13. p. 911.

Jacobus de voragine, cap. 95.

gies, more like (b) a Mountain than a Man. I need not mention those many thousands besides, who had an occasion to *touch* Christ for the space of Three and thirty years, while he was on Earth; the meanest of these might have Divine worship, by that Doctrine which makes *Contact* a sufficient ground for it. Nor must this seem strange, since (c) *the very As he rode on, when it could be done without scandal, might upon this account be Religiously adored.* Yet all these, are not all, that may have the honour of Christ, if we follow their Doctrine whither it leads us. Hereby not only these persons, but their Reliques too, are capable of Divine worship. For they commonly teach, (d) *that the Reliques may have the same worship, with the persons whose remains they are.* Those are in the right, sayes (one of their most absolute Divines) Doctor Stapleton, (e) *who confer the like honour on the Reliques, as on the Saints; since from both they hope to receive the like advantage.* Thus they have huge Shoals of objects, fit for divine worship. Those multitudes of Reliques which pass for the blessed Virgins, and all accounted to be the Apostles, and the other persons forementioned. They say they have the blessed Virgins hair in several places, which is no such wonder, since a Monk could shew some of the hairs, (f) which fell from a *Seraphim*, when he came to imprint the five wounds in Fryar Francis his body. Her Milk(*) too, kept from sowing by a continued miracle Sixteen hundred years, and so much of it, as if with their St. Catherine, she had had nothing, but milk in her veins. Nor is this so wonderful, seeing an Image (f) of hers, could let forth of its breast such a Liquor in great plenty. Her

(b) Erasmus Colloq. Naufrag. & peregrin. monti iusto par.

(c) V. sq. ubi supra. Those that stick at this, believe there is in the As a sufficient ground for Divine Worship, only they say it is not decent. *Respondeo cum Suarez contactum Christ esse causam sufficientem adorationis, aliquando tamen non expedit, vel non decere, ut omnia, quæ Christum tetigerunt adorentur.* Propterea asina, quæ Christum detulit non esset adoranda, quia non decet. Bonacin. ibid.

(d) Eadem adoratio tribui potest reliquijs, quæ tribuitur personæ cuius sunt reliquie. Idem. ibid. punct. 4. n. 4.

(e) Promptuar. part. 1. p. 291.

(f) V. d. Vergerium annot in Catalog. hæret. p. 17.

(*) Quid dicitur si videtur hodie passim ad quæstum ostentari lac. Mariæ, quod bene propemodum æquat corpori Christi consecrato? Erasmus. Annot in Math. 23.

(g) M. Paris. in anno. 1099.

Nails too, or rather the parings of them (worthy enough of divine worship) for the nailes themselves she could not spare at her assumption. (That one story, has prevented a hundred other Fables, if they had not believed the assumption of her body, 'tis like we had heard of as many bodies of hers in several places, as *Geryon* had, twice or thrice over: and more heads than they were wont to shew of *St. Barbara*). Her wedding Ring (*h*) too (though they used none in her Country), and her attire *Cap-a-pee*, from her vail, even to her Petticoat and (*2*) Shift too. Whether she wore any or no is not material, the Archbishop of *Chartres* (*i*) wore it, and was thereby inspired with such courage, in a Battle against *Rollo*, that the dagger wherewith *St. Michael* combated the Dragon (if he had borrowed it of his Neighbours in *Normandy*) could not have performed braver exploits, nor made greater slaughter, than his *Grace* did: though some will ascribe less to his prowess, because being harnessed with such a shift of mail, he might think himself invulnerable. Her Slipper also, and Shoe; yea the (*k*) figure also of the sole of her Shoe, is to be adored. Yet this is at a pretty distance from Christ (though it's prime vertue be from Contact) and derives from him, like the Feathers of the Hen, which were of the brood of the Cock, that crowed when *Peter* denied him. They have *Simeon's* arm (mentioned in the Gospel) at *Aken*, (*l*) which hinders not, but they may have it at *Hartsburg*, and other places too. They have not only *Joseph's* Hem, but his Breeches. (*) And I hope kept less nastily, than *Thomas Becket* kept his; which yet were worshipful, Vermine and all, and that not *per accidens* (it may be) since it is one commendation of his Saint-ship, (*m*) that his Breeches ran quick. They have some remains of all the Apostles, though no body could tell them where diverse of their bodies were interred, but things of this nature, they still have by Revelation; and how can such

(b) Vid. Rivet. Apol pro Virg. M. l. 2. c. 9. p. 281.

(2) Erasmus ibid.

(i) Gaguinus. l. 5. de gestis Franc.

(h) Vid. Rivet. ibid. p. 295.

(l) Ranulphus. l. 5. c. 26.

(*) Erasmus Annot. in Matth. 23.

(m) Engl. Festival. in S. Thom. Episc. Cant.

as these want Revelations, who in pilgrimage to holy Reliques, declared (*n*) that a Goose carryed before them, was the Holy Ghost. They have *Peter's* Keys, his Sword, his Staff, his Coat, his Garment besides, and his Girdle, part of his body is at *Constantinople*, half of it at *Rome* in one place, and yet the whole in another. (*o*) They have martyr'd him over again (or some other bodies for his) and torn him into more pieces than their *St. Hippolitus*, was torn with Horſes. They have his head (or some of it) in Seven ſeveral places in *Rome*, only they want his brains, which were reſerved in another place, and worſhipped (or a Pumice-ſtone inſtead thereof). And there may be ſome myſtery in that; for they ſpeak of ſome time, under *Peter's* Succeſſors, when their Church ſhould have *Caput ſine cerebro*. (*p*) Setting that aſide, we may be ſure they have miſs'd nothing that belonged to *St. Peter*, ſince they could catch his ſhadow, and hold it as faſt, as they do his Keys. And why might not this be done, as well, as the Monk could bring with him from *Paleſtine*, (*q*) the ſound of the Bells that hung in *Solomon's* Temple. I have not yet in their Sacred liſts diſcerned the lips of *Judas*, but they have his *Lantern*, which ſhew'd him the way to apprehend his Maſter; and thereby perhaps in time they may diſcover the other. They want nothing for this, but ſome of the Oyl of the Candle of the Sepulcher, which can light it ſelf, and thiſt the Monks at *Caffino* (*r*) can help them too. If they have not the Aſs upon which Chriſt rode to *Jeruſalem*, they miſs'd it narrowly, when they caught the Palm (*s*) he then had in his hand (whether he had any or no) and a worſhipful Relique of the Aſs ſome ſhew, 'tis ſaid, (*t*) his tail is inſhrined in *Liguria*. And who can think but that may be as proper an object of adoration, as the Hay, wherewith Fryar *Francis* his Aſs was ſaddled. And every hair in that tail, may make a compleat Relique, as worſhipful as the whole: for by their Divini-

(*n*) Aventinus. lib. 5.

(*o*) Vid. Reinold. de Idololatr. p. 59.

(*p*) Ibid. p. 515.

(*q*) Vid. Vergerium ubi ſupra.

(*r*) Chronic. Caſſinon. lib. 3. cap. 38. in Cent. Magd. 11. p. 305.

(*s*) Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 24.

(*t*) Vid. D. Hall. No peace. Sect. 21.

ty, (*) *the vertue of the whole, is in every part.* If it were but well distributed, this one, might serve to furnish a hundred shrines: and entertain the Devotion of as many votaries, and Pilgrims, as come to worship at *Loretto*.

But I need not insist on such Reliques, as are to have Divine worship by consequence: those which they say expressly should be so worshipped, are enow, and as many as they please to imagine. For though they have no good ground to believe, that they have any one true Relique of Christ, or the least part of one: yet imagination is enough with them, both to give them being, and to multiply them *in infinitum*, and to warrant their worship of each of them, as of Christ himself: even such imaginations as interfere, and confute one another, and are each of them confuted by such miracles, as are the ground of the whole imposture. The fore-skin of Christ is *more Religiously worshipped among them, than Christ himself*, as (u) *Erasmus* observed. It is kept and exposed, in at least (x) four several Countreys, and miracles brought to confirm the truth of its being there: and yet while it is seen, and adored in so many places on Earth, some of their chief Writers say it is no where on Earth, but in Heaven; and must be so, otherwise the glorified body of Christ would be imperfect, and not intire. His Shirt, and besides that (though he had no other Shirt) his Coat, which the Souldiers disposed of at his death, was not found till the year 593: (y) yet they had it elsewhere, and greatly worshipped it long before in a City of *Galatia*, sayes (z) *Gregory of Tours*. 'Tis much that they should have it, before it was found, and something strange too (that as it was without seam so) it should be without Rent, though afterwards they they found it, in several places at once, many hundred miles distant. They have it in *Germany*, and they have it in *France*, and they may have it in all parts of the World at once, as cer-

(*) *Eandem virtutem in exigua parte reliquiarum, que in toto sit corpore, experimento probatum.* Baronius. an. 55.

(u) *Alibi Christi præputium cum sit res incerta religiosius adorant, quam totum Christum.* Annot. in Math. 23.

(x) Vid. Rivet. ibid. l. i. c. 17. p. 132, &c.

(y) Baronius. an. 593.

(z) Vid. Spondan. an. 593. n. 11.

ainly as they have it there: but whether they have it or no, that which they take to be it, must have the same worship and honour with Christ. And we must not think it strange, that it should be in so many places, since, they say, (a) it *grew on his back*, and so not unlikely might multiply it self since. About the blood of Christ there is no less imposture, and as great Idolatry. They pretend to have much of it in parcels, that which *Nicodemus* saved in his Glove, that which *Longinus* brought in a Vessel to *Mantua*, that which *Joseph of Arimathea* brought into *England* in two Silver Vessels, that which is kept at *Venice* with the Earth it fell on, that which is shew'd at the *Holy Chappel in Paris*; that which is adored at *Rome* on *Easter-day*; that which may be seen in every Countrey, where Popery hath left people no eyes: yet the Angel of their Schools (whose Doctrine they say was approved by a miracle, and which they must not question, if they believe their portels) is (b) positive, that all the blood of Christ that was shed before, was in his body at his Resurrection, and so ascended with him into Heaven: and that the blood which is shewed in Churches for Reliques, did not flow from Christs side, but miraculously from a certain wounded image of Christ. So that the blood which they worship as God, is no better, than that which an Image can bleed, and this will scarce prove so good in *England*, as the blood of *Hales*, which (how much sœver worshipped) was discovered to be but the blood of a Drake.

They have the Reed, the Sponge, the Crown of Thorns in so many places as gives them reason enough to believe, they have it in none, and yet they worship these in all. We must imagine (to have such things go down smoothly) that they grow more than any Thorn hedge does, not only in length, but in number. And something towards this, *Gregory of Tours* (c) writes of those Thorns, *they are green still, and though the leaves wither sometimes, yet they revive again, and flourish.*

(a) Ludolphus de vita Jesu part 2. cap. 63. p. 221.

(b) Sanguis autem ille, qui in quibusdam ecclesijs pro reliquijs conservatur, non fluxit de latere Christi, sed miraculose dicitur effluxisse de quadam imagine Christi percussa. 3. q. 54. art. 2. ad 3. An autem extet aliqua portio sanguinis - dissentio est inter Doctores, aliqui enim negant. Bonacin. ubi supra punct. 3. n. 6.

(c) Vid. Spondan. an. 34. n. 27.

But the old *Bishop* had not the good hap to see this, he had it only by rumour, and such rumours their *Annalist* is wont to make much of; for it is not amiss to abuse others into a belief of that, which they cannot believe themselves. The Lance which pierced Christ's side, was got into the West, before it had left the East (its proper place). *Otto* the great, presented *Athelstane* King of *England* with it, and other rarities in the tenth age (*d*). Yet the Dominical Spear (the same we may suppose, though some question it) was the same age in the possession of *Rodolphus*, Duke of *Burgundie*, (*e*) of which, *Harry*, Emperour of *Germany*, was so covetous, that he threatned the Duke to destroy his Country with Fire and Sword, if he would not give it him; and in fine, gave him a good part of his Country for it. Much worship it had, and brave feats it play'd then, and I know not how long before; for *Charles* the Great, they say, had it too (*f*); yet for all this, it was still in *Asia* (if any where) and not found there, till two hundred years after; for the *Latines* having taken (*g*) *Antioch*, were blest with the Revelation of it in *St. Peters* Church (for holy reliques was the adventure which those Knights errant sought, and they were concerned in point of honour, either to find or make some); but this was confirmed by miracle (else it had not been worth a rush); *Peter*, the finder of it, to prove the truth thereof, (*h*) walked through a mighty fire with the Launce in his hand. 'Tis like, this Champien had something of the mettall of that (*i*) *Hermite*s marvellous pot; in which, though it was of wood, he boiled his Meat constantly, how hot soever the fire was, without burning; but that of the pot it seems, was better tempered, for that endured many years, do the fire what it could; but the man could not long survive that hot brunt, dying shortly after. The Nails wherewith Christ was fastened to the Cross, were three or

(d) *Ranulphus*, lib. 6. cap. 6.

(e) *Luitprandus*, l. 4. c. 12. *Otbo Frisingensis*, l. 9. c. 8. in *Cent Magd.* 10. p. 335. vid. & *Spondan.* an. 929. n. 2.

(f) *Spondan.* ibid.

(g) *Baron.* an. 1099. *Bellarmin.* de imagin. l. 2. c. 27. out of *Galil.* *Tyrinus*, *Prælus*, *Amilius*, *Dodechinus*, &c.

(h) *M. Paris*, in an. 1099.

(i) *Gregor. Turonens.* de glor. confess. c. 28.

four at most (*) *Barronius* dare not say they were four, though he does not always speak with the least in this matter of Miracles. These, as the rumour was, being sent by *Helena* to *Constantine*, lost quite the form of Nails, being used for the making of a Bridle and a Helmet for the *Emperour*. In this (k) *Theodore*t (l) *Sozomen*, and (m) *Socrates* agree, (but they tell us not how the Nails which pierced Christ, were known, from those which fastened the two Thieves to the other Crosses. If they had foreseen that such things should have been worshipped equally with Christ himself, they would have thought this necessary (or rather to have said nothing at all without better ground) lest the Nails of the Thieves might have divine worship for those of Christs). *Gregory of Tours*, who will have a fourth Nail, (n) says, one was thrown into the *Adriatick Sea*, where it seems it Spawned, and from thence came the multitude of Nails which were shew'd and adored for the true one: (This is as satisfactory, as the shuffling account which their great *Annalist* gives thereof.) If *Constantine* had liv'd in times of Popery, his Horse had been in danger of divine worship, for his Bridles sake, and his Helmet could scarce have defended it self from being made an Idol: but seeing his Religion was of another strain, than that now in request with *Romanists*, 'tis well if he escape reproach for converting that, the Counterfeit of which they think worthy of the worship of God, to a prophane use. However, they would not long indure such abuse, for upon a time, one of them (whether re-assuming its old form or no, I know not) skip'd out of the Bridle (or Helmet, as you please) into *Constantines* Sword hilt, and that from thence, sword and all, into these Western parts; and that we may not question this, it was given by *Otho* the great to our *Athelstan* (o). But this was nothing to the Spear which *Count Sampson* gave to *Rodolph* of *Burgundy*; and which *Harry* the *Emperour* (or *King*, as *Baronius* calls him) forced from *Rodolphus*; for there were I know not how many of these Nails artificially fastened to the Spear,

(*) *Sententiam de tribus tan'unmodo clavis Christi recentior probavit usus*, *Spondan.* an. 34. n. 35.

(k) *Lib.* 1. c. 18. (l) *l.* 2. c. 1. (m) *l.* 1. c. 13. χαλκῶς τε καὶ περικεφάλαιον ποίησας.

(n) *De glor. Martyr.* cap. 5.

(o) *Rannulphus*, l. 6. c. 6.

(p) *say*

(p) say some; (q) others will have it wholly made of them, and then these Nails had need be twenty times more than ever touch'd the Cross, or else they must be such as were fit only for the use of their *Gyant Christopher*, whose Saintship they make full twelve Ells (*) high. For all this they had still many of these Nails at their Shrines and Altars. To wave the rest, the *Bishop of Metz* officiating at *Tryers* (z) for *Poppe*, who was turned Pilgrim, slyly filches away from the Altar one of those sacred Nails, conveying another very like it into the place; and he had carryed it clearly, but that as ill luck was, the holy Nail fell a bleeding (and it is like the Nail had more tenderness than the Consciences of those who eoyned such stories). However, this holy *Bishop*, who had so dear a love for Reliques, must not suffer under the bad Character of a Thief, much less as Sacrilegious, for stealing of Reliques was then the practice of the best (and no wonder if Theft got reputation, when Cheats were in so much request): besides, there was something more than ordinary in the case, for such Thieves with the Receivers, cheated themselves most of all; and those that were Robbed, made account (as they had reason) that they lost nothing, but wor-shipped what was gone, as still in their possession. So they at *St. Dennis* believe they have still the body, as well as the name of *St. Dennis* the *Aueopagite*, though (*) *Pope Leo* the Ninth declared by an authentick Bull, that it was stoln from thence, and carryed to *Ratishone* in *Germany*. And no wonder if the *French* will not be baffled out of their Faith by the *Pope*: for is it likely that he who carryed his head in his arms (s) (after it was smitten off) for two or three miles together, and would not dye till he came to the place where his body should rest, would not keep it from being carryed from that place, signalized with such a miracle? And the remains of *St. Bennets* body were stolne from *Cassino* in *Naples*, and carryed, as they say, to *Fleury* in *France*,

(p) *Orto Frisingens.* l. 9. c. 8.

(q) *Sigebert & alij in Spondan.* an. 929. n. 2. lancea ex Christi clavis confecta.

(*) *Baptista Mantuan.* fast. lib. 7.

(z) *Catalog. Trevirens.* in *Cent. Magd.* 11. p. 308.

(s) *Baronius.* an. 1052.

(t) *Breviar. Saxon & breuiarium Roman.* nov. Lesson. 6.

and the Monks there offer proof of it by (*) Miracles; and yet those at *Cassino* believe they have it, and accordingly worship it still, confirming themselves and others in that confidence by Miracles (u) too. Whereby the world may judge of their Miracles, for since God works none upon such occasions, to be sure, not for the confirming of contradictions: these must be the fictions of cheating Knaves, or the feats and illusions of Sathan. And some of themselves (x) confess, that multitudes of them are no better as to their original. Indeed they make such use of their Miracles, that it is enough to blast the credit of a thing, to have a Miracle alledged by them for it, since it is their common practice to confirm one lye with another; and the confirmation is more intolerable than the first fiction, because they will have the Divine power interposed thereby to delude the world.

Not to digress further, they tell us of the Oyl, (y) or Liqueur which drops from the knots of the true Cross: No wonder if this be thought worthy of no less worship than the rest, since they ascribe to it a divine power. Besides many marvellous feats, it can cast out Devils; for it must be of no less Vertue than the Oyl of the Sepulchre of St. *Martin*; which duely administred to a man possessed, gave him such a purge, (z) that he squirted out a foul Fiend behind, and voided the Devil for a Stool. In short, that the Cross is self should have divine worship is their (a) common doctrine; this at first was no more than one man might well bear, but by the good Housewifery of that Church (who scruples no Cheats in this sacred traffick) it is retailled out for worship in so many pieces, that together would sink a Ship of a good barden (b); so that there are many, many Cart loads of Roman

(t) *Sigebert*, an. 753. *Vincentius*, lib. 23. c. 155.

(u) *Vid. Spondan.* an. 1088. n. 1.

(x) *Aliquando maximam deceptionem fieri in Ecclesia per miracula ficta a sacerdotibus*, Nic. *Lyran.* in cap. 14. *Daniel. Cassander*, consult. c. de reliquijs infra. *Vincentius*, l. 26. cap. 21. dicit fuisse quosdam qui questus gratia per magiam hæc miracula sepe aperte contestati sunt.

(y) *Spondan.* an. 598. n. 4. & an. 633. n. 1.

(z) *Gregor. Turon.* de glor. Confess. cap. 9. *Dæmonem per fluxum ventris egressit.*

(a) *Aquinas* 3. q. 25. art. 4. *asserimus cum sententia communiori & in Scholis magis trita, crucem colendam esse latius hoc est cultu divino*, &c. *Gretser* l. 1. c. 49. *Est de fide Bonacin. supra.*

(b) *Fragmentula ligni crucis tam multa, ut si in æræum redigant, vix vel navis oneraria vela*, *Erasm.* Annot. in Math. c. 23.

gods, which are really no better than common chips. In all this, there is not any one bit, which they can upon good ground believe to be part of the true Cross. They cannot be more confident of any, than that piece which with *Pilates* inscription on it, they say is reserved and worshipped at *Rome*; but that is detected to be a counterfeit by *Baronius* (c) his own words; for he says, that on the true Cross the *Latin* inscription was first (and so the *Greek* next, and the *Hebrew* last), and confirms it by no less Authority than that of a *Pope*, *Nicholas* 1. whereas in that piece at *Rome*, the *Hebrew* is first, and the *Latin* last. By this we may judge of the storys concerning the invention of the Cross by *Helena*. This now mentioned, was a considerable piece of the discovery, nor would the *Cardinal* himself have us believe, that what is said to be sent to *Constantinople*, or reserved at *Jerusalem*, were more real parts of the true Cross than that at *Rome*. However, true or false, here's enough, one would think, to glut the most ravenous devotion of any *Ægyptian*. But when they will have this worship given to the Images of the Cross, (d) in any matter whatsoever, or immaterial either, they give warranty to turn all things in the world into Idols, any sticks, or straws, yea, a mans own fingers laid a-cross, may be worshipped by him; or let him but move one finger a-cross in Water, or Oyl, or the Air, any where, and instantly he has of his own creating, what he may worship as God.

For those reliques, to which they give divine worship under another name, they are yet more numerous. So that upon the whole, if the *Philistines* had worshipped not only (e) the god of flies, but the flies themselves too, they would scarce have out-vied these in numbers. The Idolatrous *Israelites*, who worshipped the Host of Heaven, had a fair company of Idols; but the *Ægyptians* might have more, who could sow gods in their Gardens, and make them spring up on their back-sides; but both put together, would come short of the *Romanists*

(c) *Baron. an. 16. n. 8.*

(d) *Vid. Gretfor ubi supra,*

utraq; crux adoratur adoratione latræ, Bonacin. ibid.

(e) זכר בעל rendered by 70 Βααλ μύας.

herein, both for number and quality, though they of *Ægypt* became the scorn of the world, for the vileness of what they religiously worshipped. How they came by so many, when for three hundred years after Christ, we hear of none; we have an account from their own Authors: (f) *out of Covetousness*, says their Learned and Ingenuous *Cassander*, *False reliques were daily forged, feigned Miracles were published, Superstition thereby nourished; and sometimes by the illusion of the Devil, new reliques were revived*. So that in brief (to use the language of their own Author) the Devil help'd their Church to some of them, and covetous Knaves to others. This stuff might be had cheap, and sold very dear; this encouraged many to take up the trade, and Monks are noted as prime Merchants for this traffick. They were such, who in *Austin's* time, (g) being imployed, as he says, by *Saiban* (whose Factors they were, and for whom the trade was driven,) sold the members of Martyrs, or what they pretended to be so. He was of the same profession (h), who declared he came out of *Spain* into *France* with reliques, which being looked into, proved to be *roots of Trees, the teeth of Moles, the bones of Mice, and the claws and fat of Bears*. And they were Monks, who, as the same Author tells us, were found at *Rome*, near *Paul's* Church, digging up bodies, and confessed their design was to make reliques of them. As for him, whom *Glaber* speaks of, (i) *who furnished France with innumerable reliques*, it may seem strange that he should be counted a Cheat, when he was thus trading in another Country; since his stuff had the very same mark, which makes their other reliques currant as good ware, unquestionably good, and than which their best have no better; for he wrought

(f) *Avaritie causa ad simplicem populum illicendum falsæ reliquæ supponebantur, & ficta prædicabantur miracula---nonnunquam autem astu & illusionē Dæmonis hominum superstitione abantis, per insomnia & visa novæ reliquæ revelabantur, & ejusdem operatione miracula edi videbantur*, Consult. c. de reliquijs.

(g) *Augustin. de opere Monach. c. 18. tam multos hypocritas sub habitu monachorum assu quique dispersi Satum---alii membra martyrum, si tamen martyrum venditant.*

(h) *Gregor. Turon. h. st. Franc. l. 9, c. 6.*

(i) *Vid. Spondan. an. 1027. n. 3.*

wonders, (or the Devil for him) and by one Carcass which he feigned to be a Martyrs, (*k*) be freed many that were sick, from variety of Diseases. But I suppose he was not free of the Company, and they like not Interlopers. The Court of Rome can furnish Altars with holy Reliques out of common Graves, and none must count them Cheats for it. And if this Huckster had but procur'd a Commission from thence, he might have transubstantiated the bones in any Church yard; yea, those of a Sheep, or a Hog, either into the bones of Martyrs, or Apostles, as well as others. By this we may judge what their reliques are, the best of them meer cheats; and consequently, how criminal it will be to give them worship, the highest of all; (*) & yet they are so far from abandoning this, that it is in a manner, the sum of their Religion. And so it is expresed by some of their own Communion (*l*) *The whole of Religion is almost brought to this* (to wit, their Religious treatment of reliques) *through the Covetousness of Priests, and the Hypocrisie of Monks, fed by the foolishness of the people* : Thus their great Erasmus, in his Annotations, approved by Pope Leo 10. his Breve. (*m*)

SECT. 4. Let us see in the next place, if Perjury may not prove as blameless, and as necessary. Breach of Oaths is no less with them than a virtue, or a necessary duty in many cases; (of which a further account hereafter) let me now instance but in one. Suppose a Prince that has Protestant Subjects, should for their satisfaction, give them the security of his most solemn Oath, that they should not suffer for their Conscience, either in Life, Estate, or Liberty; that Religion does oblige the Prince to break all such Oaths, or to count himself no wayes obliged by them, because they are against the Lawes of the Church; against that particularly of the general Council of Lateran

(*k*) *Multos infirmos varijs morbis liberasse, ibid.*

(*) *In bonis quoque viris, pio zelo præditis, summa quasi religionis in hujusmodi reliquijs, &c. Cassander, Consult. c. de reliquijs.*

(*l*) *Huc fere summa religionis vocatur avaritia sacerdotum, & Monachorum quorundam hypocrisis, quos alit populi stultitia, in Math. 23. (m) Hist. of Council of Trent, p. 473.*

under *Pope Innocent. 3.* which forbids all favour to be shewed to Hereticks under the severest penalties, and decrees that favourers of Hereticks are under **Excommunication**. So that in this case it must be the Princes duty to be perswaded, and to break his Oath made in favour of his heretical Subjects, & that by the sacred decree of the Church. He must forswear himself, if he will not be Excommunicated and consequently deposed; and thereby exposed to the violence of every hand. Yea he puts himself into the state of Damnation, and sins mortally, if he be true to his Oath. So *Pope Martin. 5.* Declared in writing to *Alexander Duke of Lithuania, (n) know*, sayes he, *that thou sinnest mortally, if thou keep thy Oath with Hereticks.* Hereby it appears that no *Papists, Princes or Subjects*, can possibly give any security which may be trusted, that *Protestants* shall enjoy any thing, which is in their power to deprive them of; for the greatest securities that can be given in this case, are engagements of faith and truth, God being invocated for confirmation in solemn Oaths: but by the principles of their Religion, they are so far loosed from all such Bonds, that they are not at all to be trusted by any, but credulous fools; unless it can be supposed, that they will act as other men than *Papists*, and condemn all the Authority of that Church, which leaves no hopes of salvation but in obedience to it. For another general Council, that of *Constance* has determined; that no faith is to be kept with Hereticks. In the nineteenth Session of that Assembly it was decreed, that no safe conduct given by Emperour, King, or secular Prince to Hereticks, or any defamed (o) for Hereticks, though with a design to reduce them, by what engagements soever they have obliged themselves: shall hinder those Hereticks from being prosecuted, unless they recant; (p) though they come to the place of Judgment relying upon such security, and would not have

(n) *Scire te mortaliter peccare, si servabis fidei datam Hereticis.* Apud Cochium. l. 5. hist. Hussitarum.

(o) *Quocumq; vinculo se astrinxerint concessio.*

(p) *Etiam si salvo conductu confisi, ad locum venerint iudicii, alias non venturi, nec se promittentem—ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum.* in Crab. Tom. 3. p. 1111.

come otherwise. And it is declared further, that one thus bound by promise, was not hereby in the least obliged. And what they decreed and declared they immediately practised, for the Emperour Sigismund, having given safe conduct to John Hus, and so engaged the publick faith, and his own honour, that he should come and go safe to and from the Council; and Pope John 22. then present in the Council, having given his promise and engaged his faith (if he had any) for his safety: yet the honour and faith of the Emperour, was born down by the principles of their Church; and the Pope (as soon as the poor man was drawn into danger past escaping) made nothing of his promise, pretending, when he was urged with it, that he was over-ruled; and so notwithstanding all the security an Emperour and a Pope had given him, he was first miserably imprisoned, and after cruelly burnt to ashes. Hereby the world, Protestants especially, have this plain and useful admonition, that they must trust to nothing among Papists (those that will be true to that Church), but what will keep them out of their power. The principles of their Religion (for such are determinations of General Councils) bind them to observe no faith, or truth or common honesty with those, whom they count Hereticks, no not when life is concerned. Their Religion obliges them, to violate the most sacred Oaths, and the most solemn engagements of faith and truth; rather than an Heretick shall be safe, in any of his concerns, where they can reach him. It is a vertue, a duty in that Religion, to snap asunder all securities (by which the world and humane society hath hitherto been preserved) to ruine a Heretick: no fear of perjury, or any other perfidiousness, must be a hindrance in the case. Nor is perjury so necessary or innocent only, when it is mischievous to us, but when it does mischief to themselves, and the world also. The practice of their Popes for many ages, may satisfy us herein, and to those who are acquainted with History, which gives an account thereof, it is no improbable observation, that the bloody Wars and Massacres, that have been for many Hundred years in those places, which the Papal influence could reach; cannot be imputed to any thing more, for the most part, than the Perjuries of the Popes themselves; and of those whom they involved in that guilt, by discharging them from the obligation of their Oaths.

Sett. 5. And this brings me to some other Crimes forementioned *Robberies*, and *Murders*, which the wonderful power of Papal holiness, hath transformed into Christian, and vertuous acts. By the Doctrine of their Church to deprive those whom they count Hereticks, of their Estate and Lives, is a vertue, and a meritorious act. There is too good evidence for this. A decree of *Pope Innocent, 3.* Recorded in the *Tomes* of their Councils by their own Writers, as an authentic act of the general Council of *Lateran* under that Pope, and inserted by *Gregory, 9.* into the *Decretals*, which is the Law of their Church, and part of that which passes with them for Divine Law. There is, there can be no act of their Church more Authoritative, and obliging, than such a decree as this. There first of all (*q*) Hereticks are Excommunicated and condemned, and then it is decreed, that the *Estates of those condemned are confiscated.* But that's not all, the secular Princes or Lords, are to be compelled (if they will not do it otherwise,) and bound with a solemn Oath to endeavour to the utmost of their power utterly to destroy them all. (*r*) *They are to labour in good earnest with all their might, to root them all out.* And further, if any temporal Lord proceed not to such ruining execution within a year, (*s*) *The Pope is to absolve those that are under him, from their allegiance, the Land is to be seized on by Catholics, who having exterminated the Hereticks, are to possess it without control.* Here it is plain, that by the highest Authority the *Roman Church* pretends to, (that which is no less with them than Divine) the Papists are bound to destroy all whom they count Hereticks, and to take possession of their Estates

(*q*) Cap. 3. Concil. Later. sub Innocent. 3. in Crab. Tom. 2. p. 947, 948. *Excommunicamus & Anathematizamus omnes Hereticos--condemnantes universos hereticos quibuscumque nominibus censeantur--ita quod bona damnatorum, si laici fuerint, confiscantur.*

(*r*) *Quod de terris sue jurisdictionis subjectis, universos hereticos ab ecclesia denotatos, bona fide pro viribus exterminare studeant.*

(*s*) *ut tunc ipse vasallos ab ejus fidelitate denunciet absolutos, & terram exponat Catholicis occupandam, qui eam exterminatis hereticis, sine ulla contradictione possideant.*

And this Barbarous decree, (which has so much force with them, (t) as the word of God with any,) was put in execution in the dayes of that very Pope; For he imployed Armies against the *Albigenses* (the Predecessors of the Protestants in *France*) who destroyed above (*), Two hundred thousand in the space of some moneths. It was executed in the age before this, in *France*; (u) where so many Thousands were treacherously and cruelly Murdered, that the channels run down with blood into the River: and this magnified as a glorious action, honoured with a Triumph at *Rome*, and the unparallel'd Butchers rewarded with his Holiness blessing. We have known it executed in our dayes upon some Hundred thousands of the Protestants in *Ireland*, where that bloody Tragedy was acted by the *Popes* excitement and concurrence, just according to the tenor of that decree: the *Irish* Papists endeavouring with all their might, utterly to destroy all the Protestants, that their Estates, and the whole Land, might be in the possession of Roman-Catholicke. And in all Countreys about us, where ever they have been powerful enough, or but thought themselves so: they have effected, or attempted it. Such outrages were, and are to be committed by warrant of the Romish Doctrine; They are bound to act thus by all the Authority of that Church; which not only injoyns this by her decrees, but gives all encouragement thereto; such Robberies and Butcheries are vertuous, yea meritorious acts. Those that will ingage therein to the utmost, (as their Church requires) are assured by the Pope, (x) of those indulgences and priviledges, which were granted to the Adventurers for the recovery of the holy Land, and these are expressed, in an Appendix to that Council, to be full pardon of all their sins here, and a greater measure of glory hereafter. At no

(t) *Consiliorum decreta sunt spiritus sancti oracula.* Staplet. Relect. contr. 6. q. 3.

(*) Vid. Jo. Paul. Perin. de Albigen.

(u) Thuanus Hist. l. 53.

(x) *Qui ad hereticorum exterminium se accinxerint, illa gaudeant indulgentia, illosq; privilegio sint muniti, quod accedentibus in terra sancte subsidium conceditur.* p. 48. ibid. p. 967.

less rate do they value the blood, and utter destruction of such as we (whom they count Hereticks): with such, and no less hopes, do they engage all Papists; to indeavour, as far as is possible, our utter extermination. 'Tis true, there are good natur'd persons amongst them, as there are amongst other sorts of men, and such as have a great aversion to such Barbarous cruelty: but their Religion tempts them to it, not only with hopes of Hereticks Estates, but of the greatest rewards that can be propounded; yea and forces them to it, even beyond their inclination, with threatnings of the most dreadful import, expressed in that *Decree*; which signifies also, that they must act at this rate of inhumanity (y) if they will be counted Christians; and must not expect to pass for faithful Romanists, unless they will act as monsters. But if it be their duty, as they are Roman-Catholicks; and they bound in Conscience, as far as their Religion, and all the power of it can bind them, to destroy the Protestants amongst whom they live; and seize upon what they have: why do they not fall to work, and make an end of us, that all may be their own? how is it that they live quietly and peaceably in this, and some other places? to satisfy us here they use plain dealing (though we must not alwayes expect it) and tell us in expresse terms, they do it not, merely because they have not power to do it. Though the Church have made it their duty to destroy Protestants, yet when they are not strong enough to do it, and where the attempting of it, because they are a weaker party, would endanger them: there they are excused, they may wait the happy hour, till they have sufficient power, to shew their obedience to the Church, in executing her exterminating decrees, without apparent hazard of their own interest. So Bannes a Dominican determines (z) that Catholics, in England, and Saxony, are excused from rising up

(y) Etiam sicut reputari cupiunt & haberi fideles. p. 948.

(z) Sequitur primo excusandos esse Anglicanos & Saxonicos fideles, qui non se eximunt a potestate superiorum, nec bellum contra eos gerunt. Quoniam communiter non habent facultatem ad hæc bella gerenda contra Principes & imminent illis gravia pericula. In 2. 2. Thom. q. 12. art. 2.

against their Protestant Princes with their Subjects, because they commonly are not powerful enough; and the attempt in such circumstances, would expose them to great danger (a) Bellarmine speaks it as plain'y, if it were possible to root out the Hereticks, without doubt they are to be destroyed Root and Branch: but if it cannot be done, because they are stronger than we, and there be danger if they should oppose us, that we should be worsted, then we are to be quiet. So that the reason why Protestants in such places are not presently ruined, is because the Papists are not there strong enough, we and others have the privilege to Live: because they are not yet able to Kill us, and to seize on what we have. When they have once power enough (or but think they have it) let us look to our selves; for if Papists have any Conscience, that any thing in their Religion can touch: they must then destroy us utterly, and leave us neither Liberty, Estate, nor Being; unless they will resist Conscience, and rebell against the Authority of that Church, which they count most Sacred and Sovereign, or which is all one in their Catholick sense, they must either exterminate us, or be damned themselves. And to deal thus with us, would be so far from being a sin, that by their most infallible Doctrine (the decrees of Popes and Councils) it would be an act highly meritorious; though in the common sense of mankind, it be Robbery and Murder. They may become the best Catholicks, by abandoning Justice, Mercy, and Humanity it self; and procure pardon of all other sins, by the most detestable injustice and cruelty; and obtain higher degrees of glory by such crimes, as (to use their own expression) deserves all the fires of Heaven and Earth and Hell. If *Sathan* could inspire all other Sects with this Catholick Doctrine, it would be an expedient to satiate his enmity to mankind: this would turn the world into a shambles, and no sort of men should escape unbutchered, but such who could find no party able to force

(a) Heretici -- siquidem potest fieri, sunt proculdubio extirpandi, si autem non possunt quia --- sunt fortiores nobis, & periculum est, ne si eos bello aggrediamur, plures ex nobis cadant quam ex illis; tunc quiescendum est. De Laicis. lib. 3. Cap. 22. p. 1319.

them to the Slaughter-house ; yet this is the way to Heaven, and transcendant glory, for those who will follow the *Roman* conduct, and believe what passes for most infallible amongst them.

Sett. 6. There is another crime which passes for an eminent virtue with them, and is so esteemed and practised, that is, *Sorcery* and *Conjuring*. In the Books of Devotion published, for the use of their Exorcists, there are such horrid practices in and upon the Devil, as fully answers the Titles of the Books, one of which is called *Horrible Conjuratation*, and another *Diabolish Exorcisms*. He that has not seen them can scarce believe, that such things should be practised by any that bear the name of Christians ; nor can they be heard without conceiving a horror at them. But they have been mentioned by others, I will only insist on that which may seem more innocent, but has indeed too much of Sorcery and Inchantment, and that is their Sacramentals with things of like nature and supposed virtue. Of this quality is their Consecrated water, Salt, Oyl, Bread, Waxen-Tapers, Branches of Trees, Roses, Bells, Meddals and *Agnus Dei's*. To such things as these, they ascribe marvellous and supernatural effects, a virtue to save and sanctifie Souls, to blot out sins, to expell Devils, to cure Diseases, to secure Women in Travel, to preserve from Burning and Drowning. *Pope Alexander* in the decrees which they ascribe to him, asserts, that water mixed with salt, and Consecrated ; does (*b*) *Sanctifie the people, Purifie the unclean, break the Snares of the Devil, and bring health to Body and Soul*. The form of exorcising salt, which we have in their authorized Books, tells us, it is exorcised, that it may be to all that take it (*c*) both *health to Body and Soul*. The exorcised water is to (*d*) *chase away all the power of the Devil, and root him out*. The virtues of an *Agnus Dei* are discribed by *Urban 5.* in verse, wherewith he sent some of them to the Greek Emperour.

(*b*) *De consecr. D. 3. cap. aqua.*

(*c*) *In salutem credentium ut sit omnibus sumentibus sanitas animæ & corporis.*

(*d*) *Ad effugandam omnem potestatem inimicæ.*

If you will believe a Pope, who may be infallible in Rhime, as well as in Prose, (e) it drives away lightning, and all malignancy, delivers pregnant Women, destroyes the force of fire, secures from Drowning, and which is more, destroyes sin, even as the blood of Christ does. Bellarmine sayes, (f) they are of power for the blotting out of Venial sins, for the chasing away Devils, for the curing of Diseases. Others ascribe to (g) them, a power to excite gracious motions, even *ex opere operato*. Now it is acknowledged, that the natural power of these things, cannot reach such effects; and that there is no vertue in, or of themselves, to produce them; no more than there is in such things, by which Magicians and Conjurers work their strange feats. Nor has the Lord instituted them, or any where promised to impower them, for such purposes; no more than he has promised, to make the charm of any Sorcerer effectual for marvellous operations. Bellarmine confesseth, 1. that such things have their force not by any promise of God expressed. And Suarez 2. sayes the effect thereof is not founded in any special promise of God, because (as he had said) it does not appear there is any such promise. And they confess there's a tacit invocation of the Devil, in using things for effects, to which they have no power natural, or divine. There is such an invocation of the Devil, sayes Cajetan, (h) when one uses any thing, or word as having power for such an effect, for which it appears not to have any vertue, either natural or divine: for then he tacitly consents to the aid of the Devil. And so (i) Sylvester after Aquinas If the things made use of for such effects, appear to have no power to produce them, it follows, that they are not used for this purpose, as

(e) — *Omne malignam*

Peccatum frangit ut Christi sanguis, & Anger. 1. lib. *Carem.* c. ult.

(f) *De cultu sanct.* l. 3. c. 7. p. 1594.

(g) *Tribuitur Thomæ, Cajetan, Soto in Suar. Tom. 3. disp. 15. Sect. 4.*

(1) *Vim habent ejusmodi res non ex pacto Dei expresso. ibid.*

(2) *Non est fundatus in speciali aliqua Dei promissione, quia ut dixi, de tali promissione non constat. ibid. p. 187.*

(h) *Sum. verb. divinatio.*

(i) *Sum. v. superstitio. n. 10.*

causes, but as signs (or Sacramentals) : and consequently they belong to some compact with the Devil. And this, even the Jesuites will acknowledge. Thus Cardinal Tolet, (k) it is to be generally observed, that there is a tacit invocation of the Devil, when a man attempts to do any thing, by that, which neither of it self, nor by Divine power produces such effects. And Fillincius, declaring the several wayes whereby a Magical operation may be discerned, (most of which are applicable to their Sacramentals) gives this as the reason of them all, (l) because when the effect cannot be expected from the power of such causes, since they have it not ; neither from God, who has not instituted them ; it follows, that it must be expected from the Devil, who is therein tacitly invoked. They take it for evident, that the efficacy of such things is not from God, if he did not institute them, (m) not from God (sayes Fillincius) since he was not the institutor. So (n) Sylvester will have the Magical signs, referred to Diabolical compact : because (having no such power of themselves) they are not of Divine institution, plainly signifying, that if their Sacramentals were not instituted of God, they could be no better, than what he refers to the Devil. Now what evidence is there that their Sacramentals are of Divine institution ; and appointed by God for such purposes ? they say so, and that's all, and so may the Magicians say, if they please, and prove it as well too ; for from the word of God (the only proof in this case) neither of them have a syllable. The Authour and Original of this strange power, may hereby be discerned ; and the means they use to derive it, helps the discovery. They have it they say by vertue of their exorcisms ; but if they can consecrate or exorcize, a thing into a power which is above it self, and yet comes not from God, their Consecrations hereby will prove no better, than Conjuring. And in-

(k) *Instrum. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 14. p. 634.*

(l) *Tract. 24. cap. 7. n. 170. p. 82.*

(m) *Nec a Deo, qui eorum institutor non est. ibid.*

(n) *Siqua sunt supervacua cum non sunt Divinitus instituta, sicut sunt Sacramentalia, & consequenter pertinent ad pacta quaedam significationum cum demonibus. ibid.*

deed he that reads but their Consecrations, may have cause to think they are no other, for instance, their form of Consecrating salt, in these words. (o) *I conjure thee Creature of salt by the living God, the true God, the Holy God, that thou mayest be made a conjured salt, for the Salvation of believers.* And the like conjuring they use, for the making of holy water, and other things. There is a charm in *Alexander Trallianus* a Magical Doctor, which is exactly like these, (in what the form of an inchantment requires) to convey a vertue into an Herb, for the cure of a Disease. (p) *I exorcise, or conjure thee, by the great Jah, and Sabaoth, the God that founded the Earth, &c. Take the Spirit of thy Mother-earth and its vertue; and dry up the Flux of feet and bands.* He that will count this a charm, will have no reason to deny but the Papists form of Consecration is an inchantment, and indeed the common notion of inchantment is applicable hereto. They define it to be the conveying of a marvellous power into a thing, by vertue of the words of the Inchanter. Now it is a marvellous power which they will have conveyed by their Consecration, since it is a power above the natural capacity of the things, and such as inables them for spiritual and supernatural effects: and they think it conveyed by vertue of the words of the Consecrator, as in the other case by the words of the Magician; for as soon as the words are pronounced, they believe the things so Consecrated, are indowed with the power. They will say indeed, that they expect the power from God, and use his name accordingly in their Consecrations. And so might Inchanters and Magicians say, with the like reason: for they were wont to use the name of God in their charms and incantations as *Origen* assures us. Many sayes he, (q) *of the Egyptians when they are conjuring Devils, insert in their incantations, the God of Abraham, and he sayes, not only*

(o) *Exorcizo te creatura salis per Deum verum, &c.*

(p) *ὁρκίζω σε ὄνομα μέγα Ἰαὼθ Σαββαθ, &c.*

Vid. annot in Orig. p. 17.

(q) *πολλοὶ τῶν ἐπαδόντων δαίμονας κερῶνται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τῷ. ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ.* Contr. Gellsum. lib. 1. p. 17.

the Jewish exorcists did invoke the God of *Abraham, Isaac and Jacob*: (r) but almost all others who meddled with Conjurat[i]on and Magic. O! but this vertue comes from the Churches prayers, sayes Bellarmine, by these prayers I suppose he means, their forms of Consecration; yet in them there's no praying, but rather plain conjuring, for the words are all of them directed to the things Consecrated, and not at all to God, as is evident to any that reads them. And if they should use some prayers besides the forms of Consecration; a Magician may do so too besides his charm, and yet be no less an Inchaunter. Origen tells us, (s) that some invocation of God, and use of his name, is often found in conjuring Books. And what would it mend the matter, for either of them, to pray to God to bless an inchauntment, or make his conjuring effectual? if the *Ephesian* Magicians should have invocated God at the recital of their γράμματα. (t) Or the Conjurers among Jews or Gentiles, in the use of their *Suffumigations*, (u) and other Magical tricks. Or the *Simonians* (x) for their *Agogima*. Or Eleazar in the application of his Ring and Root: (y) the practice had been no better on this account, it would be still, at least, a tacit invocation of the Devil; from whom alone such vertue must be expected, as is neither in the nature of the thing, nor from Gods appointment; yea it would have been worse, to make so bold with God, as to invoke him for the service of the Devil. But indeed Popish prayers themselves, as they use them, are as like charms at they can look. In their prayers there are barbarous, i. e. unintelligible words (like those of

(r) ἀλλὰ γὰρ χεῖρόν κ' πάντας τὰς τὰ τῶν ἐπωδῶν καὶ μαγεῶν πράξεις τευομένους. lib. 4. p. 184.

(s) Εὐρίσκεται γάρ ἐν τοῖς μαγικοῖς συγγράμμασι πολλαχῶς ἡ τοιαύτη τῶ θεῷ ἐπίκλησις, καὶ παραλήψις τῶ θεοῦ ὀνόματος. ibid.

(t) Clemens Alexandr. Strom. l. 1. c. 18.

(u) θυμιάμασι καὶ καταθέσμοις χρῶνται. Just. Martyr. dial. ad Tryph. p. 94. Edit. Sreph.

(x) Exorcismis & incantationibus utuntur. Amatoria quoq; & Agogima apud eos sicut & exorcismis. Irenaeus. l. 1. 20. p. 76.

(y) δακτύλιος, ἔχων ὑπὸ τῇ σφραγίδι ρίζας. Joseph Antiq. l. 8. c. 2. p. 257.

the Magician in 2. *Pausanias*) which the people, or Priests many times, understand no more, than the hard words in the charms of Conjurers, were understood : such as *Jah, Zebaoth, Elohim, Sadai* ; or those which *Cato* sayes (a) were used in a charm, for curing members out of joynt ; or the name *Abraham*, which though the Conjurers in other Countreys used, yet they knew not what it meant (b) sayes *Origen*. They are tyed to the same syllables as Conjurers are in their charms ; and that they may not vary, must, as the *Persian* Magician, (c) read all out of a Book, yea though they have it by heart. It is not requisite by their Doctrine (as we saw before) to mind the God of Heaven in their prayers, more than the Prince of darkness. The meer muttering of the words they count effectual, as in charms and inchantments, yet have they no promise from God, that the bare recital of their forms, without any inward Devotion or Attention, shall prevail more than a Magician has, that such a pronouncing of the words he uses in Conjuring, will be prevalent : or more, than that the words of a prayer, which one carries in his pocket (e) (another charm in use amongst the Papiſts) will be effectual. So that *Salmeron* had more reason than he expressed, to say, that *their prayers, were like the words of a charmer*. They had need first excuse their prayers from this crime : before this will serve, to excuse their Sacramentals.

Secl. 7. There is another crime, no less hainous than the former ; and yet in their account, it is a necessary duty, and a most excellent service, and that is the destroying of Christ, which by their doctrine and Laws of their Church, they are to do daily in the Mass. To clear this, take notice of these severals : They teach that Christ is really in

(2) *ἑρπεταὶ καὶ ἑδαιμῶς συνεταῖ.* lib. 1. *Eliacor*.

(4) *Cato de re rustica luxata membra hac cantione sana fieri tradit. Danata daries dar-aries aspararies, &c.* Polyd. *Virgil. de prodigijs* lib. 1,

(b) *ὃ καὶ ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἀβραάμ.* ibid. lib. 1. p. 17.

(c) *ἐπὶ δὲ ἐπιλεγόμενος ἐκ τῆς ἑσθλῆς* *Pausan.* ibid. vid. *Soto de Justit. lib. 10.* q. 5. art. 3.

(e) *Vid. Horæ B. Virg. Paris edit. an. 1525. p. 63.*

the Mass, not only as he is God, (and so every where) but as he is Man, Soul, and Body, Flesh and Blood, and there not only mystically in signes and representations, or spiritually in vertue and efficacy; but as to the very substance of his body, some say *Corporally*, others after *the manner of a Spirit*; but all say the true substance of his Flesh and Blood, is as really on the Altar, as his Body was on the Cross, when nailed to it; yea, that it is there visibly, and may be (though it be not ordinarily) seen. 2. They hold that Christ is truly and properly Sacrificed in the Mass, and his Body and Blood there offered, as much as any Bullock or Lamb was Sacrificed under the Law. The Council of Trent (f) declares that the Sacrifice in the Mass, and that offered on the Cross, is the very same for substance, *and differs only in the manner of Offering*, and denounces a Curse against any that shall say, (g) *that it is not a true and proper Sacrifice*, or that Christ in these words, *do this*, did not command the Disciples and Priests after them, to Sacrifice the Body and Blood of Christ. 3. They maintain, that in every true and proper Sacrifice, that which is Sacrificed, is *really destroyed*. So Bellarmine, to a true Sacrifice, it is required (h) *that what is offered to God in Sacrifice, should be plainly destroyed*. And if it be a live thing that is offered, that it may be a true and real Sacrifice, it must of necessity be slain and deprived of Life. A true and real Sacrifice, says he, requires the true and real killing of it, since in the killing of it, the essence of the Sacrifice consists. Hence it clearly follows, and it is their own inference, that Christ being truly and properly Sacrificed in the Mass, he is there really consumed, killed, or destroyed; he is as really consumed in the Mass, as Incense, when it was burnt for an Oblation: (k) The

(f) Sess. 6. cap. 2.

(g) Can. 1. & 2.

(h) Et omnia omnino, quæ in Scriptura dicuntur sacrificia necessario destruenda erant; si viventia per occisum nem, &c. De Miss. lib. 1. c. 2. p. 685. ad verum sacrificium requiritur, ut id quod offertur Deo in sacrificium, plane destruat, ibid. p. 688. vid. lib. 1. cap. 27. p. 760.

(k) Christi corpus ad Dei honorem super mensam ponitur ut consumatur.

Body of Christ, says the Cardinal, for the honour of God, is laid upon the Table, that it may be consumed. He is as really destroyed, as the whole burnt offering was destroyed when it was totally burnt. The consumption of the Sacrament, says the same Author, as it is done by a Sacrificing Priest, is an essential part of the Sacrifice, for it is a real destruction of the Sacrifice, (l) and is counted correspondent to the burning of the Holocaust. He is as really killed in the Mass by their doctrine, as a Bullock that was slain for a Sacrifice. If in the Mass, says he, (m) there be not a true and real killing and slaying of Christ, it is not a true and real Sacrifice; adding this reason, because the essence of a Sacrifice consists in the killing of it. So also Doctor Allen (n) says, Christ is killed there indeed, and sacrificed to God: And Vega (o) Christ is truly slain, and offered in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, as he is truly in the Sacrament; and they think him to be as truly there, as they believe him to be in Heaven. (p) Aquinas favours this Opinion, and Gabriel insinuates it; Soto, Ledesma, Canus, and the modern Thomists, do plainly deliver it, besides Bellarmine and other Jesuits. Canus says, (q) they believe that to the perfect sacrificing of an Animal, it ought to be destroyed and slain, if it be truly Sacrificed. He says also, that the Body of Christ, in the Mass, is a living and breathing Body, even the very same that is in Heaven, and that it is truly Sacrificed. What then can follow from hence, but that the living and breathing Body of Christ in the Mass, is truly killed. This is not

(l) Consumptio quæ fit a sacerdote sacrificante — proprie combustioni holocausti respondere censetur, ibid. p. 759.

(m) Vel in missa sit vera, & realis Christi mactatio & occisio vel non. Si non sit, non est verum & reale sacrificium: Sacrificium enim verum & reale, veram & realem occasionem exigit, quando in occisione ponitur essentia sacrificij, ibid. p. 760. Sect. denique.

(n) De Euchar. Sacrific. c. 10, 11, 12.

(o) De miss. Theol. 12, 23.

(p) In Suarez. Tom. 3. in 3. Thom. disp. 73 Sect. 5. ratio præcipua hujus sententia est quia de essentia sacrificij est, & præsertim holocausti ut tota victima consumatur — nam hoc sacrificium est holocaustum, in quo victima debet perfecte consumi, &c.

(q) Loc. Theol. lib. 12. p. 675, 676.

denyed, only they say it is an *unbloody death*. And this indeed is their doctrine, Christ is put to death in the Mass, as he was upon the Cross; it is the same death for the substance, that he dyes by the Priest, as he dyed by the *Jews and Romans*, only with some difference in the manner of it: It was a bloody death on the Cross; it is an unbloody death in the Mass, but he is put to death in both: and why should they say it is an unbloody death that he suffers by the Priest, since they profess that *his blood is there shed* and poured forth (r), the very same blood that was shed on the Cross? This may seem strange, and they cross themselves here sometimes; but nothing must seem strange in the Mass, for it is such a heap of absurdities and contradictions, as never entred into the fancy of any men waking, and in their wits; nor could have entred into theirs, if the spirit of delusion, and the dream of infallibility had not distracted them. However, this they do, and must hold whatever come of it, that Christ is killed or destroyed in the Mass; they are as much concerned to do it, as all their Religion comes to; for if Christ be not really destroyed in their Mass, they have no true and proper Sacrifice; and they tell us (to prove us altogether irreligious) (s) *Where there is no proper Sacrifice, there can be no Religion*. Hereby it is very manifest that the Office of their Sacrificing Priest, is, daily to offer deadly violence to Christ: That Christ in their Mass is every day slain or consumed, and that the highest devotion of the Romish Church is the destruction of Christ. 'Tis true, Christ is above their reach, whatever they fancy, they cannot offer him this violence, or destroy him as they do his Members; but they really design to destroy him, when they would make a Sacrifice of him; and they verily believe they do it, and they do all which they count requisite in order to it; and therefore they are destroyers of Christ by their own Rule, (t) *to will to do it, is the*

(r) The blood is shed in the Mass, but it is shed unbloodily, *Hart in Rainold Conser. p. 618.*

(s) *Nulla unquam fuit religio, sine externo sacrificio.*

(t) *Voluntas faciendi & ipsum factum sunt ejusdem malitie.*

same wickedness with the doing of it. The horridness of this will be more apparent if we take notice, wherefore they will thus use Christ. Their Church does it for the honour of the Saints, and of his Mother. In that part of the Mass, which is called the Offertory, they say, we offer thee this Oblation in honour of the blessed Mary, for ever a Virgin, and of all the Apostles, and of all the Saints, that it may be for their honour (n). So that they Sacrifice the Son to honour the Mother, and destroy the Lord in honour of his Servants. If one under the Law, had but offered a Pigeon, or the meanest Sacrifice, in honour of Abraham or Moses, it would have been counted a Crime worthy of the worst of deaths; for this had been an advancing them into the place of God; and yet to Sacrifice the Son of God, that is, to destroy him in honour of a Saint of the Popes making, is a meritorious act. Further, the Priest will not venture on such a fact for nothing; he has no reason to destroy Christ, more than Judas had to betray him, without some valuable consideration. He is to Sacrifice Christ for the living and the dead: For those that are dead, if they have bequeathed any thing to the Church for this purpose, or if their Friends hire him to do it. For the living, those that are frugal, may be secretly mentioned in the *momento* of a common Mass for a piece of money; but if any will go to the price of a particular Mass, the Priest is ready to Sacrifice and destroy Christ on purpose for them in particular. In fine, they do not offer this to Christ for spiritual respects only; but for temporal and worldly advantages, and such often as are of no great moment (*). Christ is to be destroyed for the health and safety of any body that is Catholick; yea, for the curing of a diseased Horse, or the recovery of a sick Pigg, or the preserving of their Fruit from frost, or a blast. They think it not amiss for such matters as these, to make a Sacrifice of Christ, and to destroy him, it is done amongst them ma-

(n) *ut illis præficiat ad honorem.*

(*) *pro incolunitate, says the Missal. pro bonis temporalibus, says Innocent 3.*

(*) *pro qualibet necessitate, says Lindanus.*

ny thousand times daily. And though the Apostle seems to make it a horrid crime for one to *Crucifie again, the Son of God*, yet for them to do that daily, which for the substance of the thing is as destructive to Christ as the first Crucifying was, is the principal part and office, and the most eminent and meritorious act of their Religion.

These and such like are the prime Vertues of the Romanists, most needful to be observed and practised: And if things of such a quality be so far from being relinquished, where shall we find any thing which God hath made a sin, that can be thought worthy to be forsaken? But I have stayed long enough here, let me proceed to the next head propounded, to satisfie us that they count it *needless to forsake sin*.

CHAP. VIII.

Crimes exceeding great and many, are but slight and Venial faults by the Popish Doctrine.

SECT. I.

THere are innumerable Evils which they call Sins, yet they count it not necessary in point of Salvation, for any to forsake them; but give all encouragement to live and die therein, as sins for which they can never be condemned. Such are those which they count *Venial*. Let me shew you what sins they are, which they reckon to be of such a quality: and thereby it will be discerned how far their Doctrine gives warranty to sins of all sorts, and to continue in the violation of all the Commands of God. And this I shall do out of their own Authors, such as are unexceptionable, declining the *Jesuits*: and thereby it will be more manifest how little reason there is to excuse the practical Doctrine received in their Church, by charging their impious and licentious Principles upon the Society.

To hate God, (y) if it be out of inadvertency, and not with deliberation, is no mortal sin, and this they say of actual hatred; for habitual enmity against God is, with them, no sin at all. Acts of *infidelity*, when they are led thereto by fear; (z) or *worshipping an Idol*, (such as not only we, but themselves count Idols), are no worse than Venial. (*) Unbelief and perplexing distrustfulness of God, about the things of this life, is as innocent. To present the body only before God, in all religious Exercises, in Prayer, the Sacraments, yea the

(y) Navar. Manual. cap. 11. n. 18.

(z) Angel. sum. verb. fides, n. 9.

(*) Idem verb. sollicitud.

Eucharist it self; without any actual disposition suitable to the nature of the duties, without any good motion in mind or heart; without any inward Attention, Reverence, or Devotion; without any act of Faith, Fear, Love, Desire, or any other Grace or holy Affection, though the want of these be voluntary, is but a Venial fault. It is no worse, not only to make base and earthly things, the end why we worship God; but to make that which is a sin, our design in any part of his Service: yea, to propose it as the chief and principal end, why we worship him. Though this be no less than to prefer sin, and the pleasure of the Devil before God, and his honour. (a) To make use of a Witch to dissolve some witchcraft, is scarce so much as a Venial sin. And so to use the Devils assistance instead of Gods; and employ others disposed thereto, to act as Witches, and to practice with the Prince of darkness by a deputy in Diabolical Arts, is not unlawful. To deal with the Devil for to get some knowledg by him, or obtain other things of him, by such converse; is but a Venial fault: for Example. (b) If an Exorcist require the Devil to satisfy him in some curious questions (such as tend nothing to the expelling of him:) if he believe him not, but does it out of lightness and curiosity; he offends but venially. To use (c) adjurations to God, or Man, or Angels, or Devils, or irrational Creatures lightly, without reverence of the Name of God, or any necessity; is but a slight fault.

(a) Si est aliquis dispositus actualiter facere aliquod maleficium ut aliud destruat, possum illo nisi ad bonum meum, Petr. Aureolus in 4. dist. 34. q. 2. Angelus sum. v. l. persil. n. 13.

(b) Si autem exorcizator imperet demoni, ut dicat curiosa, et nihil ad expulsiōem facientia, non quia illi credat, sed quadam levitate et curiositate ductus; est peccatum grave, licet illud non videatur mortale. Sylvest. sum. v. adjurat. n. 3. Graff. l. 2. c. 7. n. 4. Sorus, de just. et jur. l. 8. q. 3. art. 2. Cajetan. & Navar. in Suar. l. 4. de Adjurat. cap. 2. n. 9.

(c) Si (adjuratio) fiat ad Deum, vel homines, vel Angelos, vel Demones, aut irrationalia leviter, i. e. sine reverentia divini nominis, aut necessitate — modo septimo videtur veniale, sicut et juratio levis. Sylvest. ibid. n. 5.

SECT II.

BY vertue of their Doctrine concerning Venial sins, they have formed Rules, to encourage men in the practice and constant use of all sorts of prophane and wicked Oaths. They (*d*) acknowledge that the Oath is sinful, unless it be made *in truth, and judgment and righteousness*; when that which is sworn is not true, or not just and righteous, or not with Reverence and Discretion; yet they teach, it is but a Venial fault, to swear without (*e*) *reverence or discretion*, or *without righteousness* also, *if that be not much*. So that though Swearing be an Act (as they tell us) of Gods Worship wherein Divine Honour is given to him, whom we swear by: yet this may be done without reverence, and discretion, (as the rest of their Worship is,) and God may be solemnly called to witness, that the man intends to sin against him, if it be not much; and this without any great fault. (*f*) A habit of Swearing thus, or worse, is no sin, (for habits of what wickedness soever, are not forbidden); to use this habit (*g*) frequently so as to swear Customarily, almost at every word, (*tertio quoque verbo*); unless he regard not at all, whether he swear true or false, yea though he regard not that, as much as he ought; is no more a fault. So to swear (*b*) out of lightness and vanity, upon any the slightest

(*d*) *Vid. Bonaventur. 3. dist. 19. art. 2. Angelus sum. v. Jurament. 3. n. 8.*

(*e*) *Veniale est regulariter dum deest iudicium, vel reverentia. Lopez, cap. 42. p. 225. Veniale vero cum non deest nisi iudicium, sive reverentia, vel iustitia levis. Navar. cap. 12. n. 3. Juramentum assertorium cui deest tantum iustitia, quatenus contra religionem est, regulariter est veniale. — Est assertio communis & facilis. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 12. n. 7. (f) Malus jurandi habitus non est mortale peccatum, quia non est actus, Victorel. ad Tol. l. 4. c. 22. p. 681. Præcepta non dantur de habitibus. Aquinas 22. q. 31. art. 4. Vid. Suares de Juram. l. 3. c. 6. n. 1.*

(*g*) *utrum jurans sine iudicio discretioris peccet mortaliter, sicut faciunt illi qui in quolibet verbo jurant? — Si jurat verum, sic non erit mortale peccatum. Angel. sum. v. Juram. 3. n. 10. Lopez & in 10 Jo. de la Pina & Medina, cap. 42. p. 226, 227. Cajetan, sum. v. præcepta. p. 475.*

(*b*) *Qui in re levisima, atque inani jurant, sive etiam frequenter, et absque necessaria causa, sicut ementes & vendentes sepe facere novimus, peccant quidem, sed venialiter tantum, si veritas non defuerit. Grass. l. 2. cap. 15. n. 5. Sorus, ibid. l. 8. q. 2. art. 3. Sylvest. ibid. v. juram. 2. n. 8. secundum annos doctores.*

occasion, without any advantage, or the least necessity; is as innocent a practice according to all their Doctors. And the common practice of their Catholicks, is correspondent to these conscientious Rules: *You can scarce find any one (says (i) Soto) who will either begin or end the least discourse without an Oath: for they use Oaths for Ornaments of speech, at every word. But should they not at least endeavour to leave this Custom of Swearing? No, never to endeavour it, is but a small fault. Although (says one of their most approved Casuists,) he sins venially who swears true without any necessity, and so the custom of swearing be evil and pernicious: yet he sins not mortally who labours not to break off that Custom, because it is but an occasion of falling into venial faults.* Hereby they have encouragement, not only to accustom themselves to this impious practice (wherein so much profaneness, irreverence, and contempt of God, is expressed;) but also never to give it over, yea never to endeavour it. And the reason whereby they warrant this, reaches all the wickedness which by those conscientious Divines is counted Venial: they may commit it customarily, continually, and need never go about to do better; all will be but a fault so small as is next to nothing. They need not regard in what terms their Oaths are dress'd. They may swear by God, on blood of God, by *Cajetans* (k) leave: yea, Though they swear by such parts of Christ's body, or such members of the Saints, or the Virgin-mother, as are not to be named (*per (l) inhonesta membra*); it is but Venial, if without contempt and scandal, which will make an act in it self lawful, to be criminal. And though they seem to give caution, that

Juramentum assertorium cui ingit veritas sufficienter cogitata & cognita, solamque illi deest necessitas vel utilitas, nunquam est in individua peccatum mortale, dummodo absit contemptus. Assertio est communis omnium theologorum & summissarum. Suar. l. 3. de juram. c. 12. n. 3.

(i) De justit. & iur. Ibid. p. 270.

Non tamen peccat mortaliter, qui non conatur hujusmodi consuetudinem evertere, eo quod ipsa non est occasio nisi labendi in venialia. Per a S. Joseph, de 2. præcept. art. 1. p. 83. approved by the Doctors of Paris.

(k) Dicere ad sanguinem Dei, vel ad corpus Dei, sive invocando sive invocando in rixa aut turbatione, peccatum est grave non tamen mortale, quia non contra sed præter Deum est. Sum. v. Blasphem. p. 49.

(l) Qui per Christi inhonesta membra jurat, si contemptus deest & scandalum, venialiter tantummodo peccare creditus est. Graff. l. 2. c. 14. n. 10. Sylvester sum. ibid. n. 10.

what

what is sworn be not false; since this cannot be excused by any Artifice, from being damnable: yet they try, what may be done, to make this go down as easily as the best. If the thing sworn be false and he knows it, yet swears it by his faith, or troth, or this Fire: such perjury is Venial, *non peccant mortaliter cum perjurant Angel.* after Aureolus v. *perjurium*: (m) To swear that which is false in jest, is a harmless Venial, by the Gloss upon their Law. (n) Commonly to swear that which is false, without considering whether it be false, or no; or whether he swear or not; is as harmless. This is the judgment of Aquinas and their common Doctrine; so that if a man heed not what he does, he may do what he will; and as it were wink a damnable crime into a slight fault. By this expedient he may swear false, as commonly as true, without any considerable hurt; this is enough one would think to render their worse sort of swearing, *perjury itself*, practicable, in ordinary, with ease and safety.: Yet as an over-plus, they add, *be that swears what is false through gross or careless ignorance, thinking it to be true, though if he use due diligence, be sins not at all*; yet if he use some diligence, but not enough; he offends no more than venially, if Aquinas or the common Doctrine may be credited; for this is it, faith (o) *Nam*. And that, which way soever a man turns himself, he may have liberty to be perjur'd; they teach, that, (p) *He that swears the truth, believing it to be false, and takes notice that he swears, but minds not what he*

(m) Gofredus asserit perjurium jocosum esse peccatum veniale: et Angelus v. *Perjur.* non esse amplius quam veniale jurare falsum jocandi gratia. Solennis gloss. cap. *veniens de jurejur.* et gloss. in c. *unum*. nunc.

(n) Communiter jurare falsum, non considerando an illud sit falsum, vel an juret, non est amplius quam veniale secundum S. Thom. et communem opinionem. Navar. c. 12. n. 6. Lopez. c. 42. p. 226. Graff. lib. 2. c. 16. n. 7.

Scotus 3. dist. 39. art. 1. dicit communiter concedi, quod unicum perjurium leve, non est peccatum mortale: in Suar. l. 3. de juram. cap. 4. n. 1.

(o) Qui per ignorantiam quam crassam vel supinam vocant, jurat falsum, credens se jurare verum, quamvis si debitam adhibere diligentiam, nihil peccat, si tamen aliquam adhibet, sed non quantum debet, non amplius quam venialiter delinquit, secundum eodem c. 12. n. 7. (Aquinas, Soto et alii in Suar. ibid. c. 5. n. 3.)

(p) Qui jurat veritatem credens esse falsum quod jurat; si quod jurat advertit, non advertendo se jurare illud, vel contra advertit se jurare non advertendo quid jurat, non peccat mortaliter. Si autem neq; hoc neq; illud advertit, immo utrumque sine deliberatione et consideratione facit, peccat quidem, sed. tamen veniale leve. Idem ibid. n. 7.

swears,

swears, sins not Mortally : Or if be neither regard the one, nor the other, but does both without consideration; it is only a little little fault, unless this inconsiderateness was wilful, and out of contempt, for then perhaps it may be worse, upon the account of contempt; probable error will excuse perjury from mortal guilt, as if one appeals, thinking there is reasonable cause for it, though he has sworn before not to appeal. So, Panormitan. and Angel. Sum. v. Perjur.

He that hears a thing from a person of credit, may swear it is true, only not in Court, unless he expresses his reason. *Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 3. n. 7.* But as if it were not sufficient, for a man to swear false himself; they conclude he may without harm draw others to do it also; for, 1. They say he may induce others to swear; when he is not satisfied, whether they will swear true or false; that's the opinion of *Aquinas*, and (q) their common Doctrine. Further, he that knows another will swear false, may yet put him upon it, if he be a publick person, that's also the opinion of *Aquinas*, and (r) commonly embraced by their Doctors; yea moreover any (s) one whosoever, may put him to swear whom he fears, or knows will forswear himself, if he be disposed to swear. Let us see in the next place, whether they may not be as perfidious in promissory Oaths, as they may be false in others; and upon as easy terms: In all cases good or bad, or indifferent. He that swears he will not go to or pass by such or such a place, though he do it for no end, that is honest or profitable; (t) sins not mortally, if he go contrary to his Oath. (v) *He that swears he will do*

(q) in *Suares. Jurament. l. 1. c. 14. n. 9.*

(r) *Ibid. n. 10. et 11. Richard de St. victor. in Angel. sum. v. juram. 3. n. 11.*

(s) *Non credo tamen mortaliter peccare eum qui dat juramentum, etiam in persona privata, illi, quem scit falsum juraturum; quum ille est jam dispositus jurare. Angel. ibid. Graff. ibid. c. 16. n. 10. Turrecremata in cap. quamvis. 22. q. 1. 161.*

(t) *Non peccaret mortaliter contra faciendo, quia juramentum esset vanum, juxta Cajetanum et mentem St. Antonini. Nav. c. 12. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 15. n. 7. et c. 18. n. 3.*

(v) *ubi minimum est quod promittitur, tunc non observare, non erit saltem mortale peccatum—Idem quando id quod jurat est indifferens, ut notat D. Ant. de Butrio. Idem ibid. S. Antonius, Sylvest. Sorus, Corduba, alii in Suar. ibid. c. 16. n. 4. et in Navar. ibid. n. 10. Tenendum videtur cum communi, peccare quidem venialiter, qui juramentum de re parva et levi non implet, non autem mortaliter, quod ipsum de voto rei levis dicemus. Cum parva res est pars minima materia juramenti, non implere potest esse veniale—ut qui promisit non ludere, et parum temporis in parva quantitate ludit. Cajetan. Covarruv, Corduba, Philarchus in Suar. l. 3. c. 16.*

a thing

athing lawful, and does it not, sins but venially, if it was a small matter; this is the common opinion, which Navar attempts to prove with several reasons. As, if a woman swears she will give her Children Apples to quiet them, and gives them none; or swears to chastise them, and does it not (which are *Cajetans* instances, though he vary from the rest in the general conclusion,) or if a man swear he will say (y) an *Ave-Mary*, and says it not; or swears to say a (z) *Pater-Noster*, or to give a small matter, and gives it not; or not to take place of his friend, and yet does it; or to game no more, and plays a little: In such cases any breach of promises, confirmed by Oaths, is but a small fault. And consequently it will be no worse, in all matters not only small but great; for the obligation of an Oath, rises not from the quantity of the matter sworn, but from the concern and interest of God in an Oath, he being invoked therein as witness. Now this is always the same, whether the matter be less or more; and so if they be not obliged, to keep Oaths in less matters, neither are they bound in greater. But by their rules of Conscience, they are set at liberty to break all: *He that swears to give a Whore 100 Crowns for the act of fornication, is only bound to give her that part of it, which persons of his condition are wont to give such Women*; Because a Prodigal ingagement confirmed by Oath obliges only to that proportion in which there is no profuseness. *Bannes et alii in Diana, v. promiss.* If a man swear to be true to a whore, and she to be faithful to him, so as to entertain no other, the Oath doth not oblige either of them to such honesty. *Idem, v. juram. n. 10.* Whether the matter be small or great, when one is drawn by fear, or brought by law to swear, if he break his Oath that is promissory: he sins but venially. *Pet. Aureolus Job. Andreas, et multi alii et placet Angel. Sum. v. Perjur. n. 7.* He that swears he will not observe some (a) evangelical counsel (that

Quando est tota materia est veniale. Antonin. Silv. Angel. de Butrio, Graff. Soto, Navar, Joh. Andr. Hostiensis, Panormit. Aureolus. *ibid.*

(y) *Idem ibid. c. 18. n. 7.*

(z) *Graff. ibid. n. 14. et n. 17.*

(a) *Qui jurat se non facturum aliquid ad quod non tenetur, est tamen secundum se melius facere quam non facere; si forsan erit aliquid ad consilia evangelica pertinens—neq; S. Thom. neq; S. Antoninus dicunt hoc esse mortale.* Cajetanus Jo. Tabienna, et glossa communiter recepta, tenent non esse lethale. Nav. *ibid. c. 12. n. 16.*

which.

which is not only lawful, but excellently good, and better in their account than what the Law of God requires,) offends but venially: so their Authors (*b*) generally. And yet to these Counsels they have reduced a great part, almost all, which God has made our duty, as we shew'd before; so that a man may call God to witness, that he is resolved not to do, what he has made his duty. (*c*) As for one to bind himself by Oath, that he will not lend to his Neighbour, nor be surety for any, nor give alms to any in great necessity, nor do any of those important things, which they count works of supererogation; is but a small Venial. Such Oaths, they say, do give obstruction to the Spirit of God, yet they may be kept without sin. (*d*) He that swears he will return to prison, and does not; is no more guilty, if he was not duly imprisoned. (*e*) He that swears he will commit any sin, if it be but a venial; offends but venially, this is the common Doctrine well declared by Cajetan and Navar, as he tells us. As if a man should swear, that he would never use to speak without an Oath; or never avoid any of those horrid acts, which they mince into Venials; to call God to witness, that he purposes thus to dishonour him; is it seems, no great contempt of him, or else a great contempt of God with them is but a trifle. This is to threaten God to his face, and call upon him to take notice of it, that they will do these evils against him. Soto and others say, it is such a threatening of God, when they swear to commit mortal sin: and no difference can possibly be here discerned, but that the one is a threatening God with a greater evil, the other with a less. However this is their common Do-

(*b*) Cajetan. *sum. v. perjurium*, p. 464. *perjurium secundum quid incurritur*. Graff. *ibid.* c. 15. n. 6. *qui jurat elemosinam non dare, vel aliud supererogationis opus non facere, venialiter tantummodo peccat: et c. 18. n. 11.* Nav. *ibid.* vid. plures in Suar. *ibid.* cap. 16.

(*c*) Docuit S. Thom. hujusmodi juramenti Spiritui sancto apponi obstaculum. Idem Navar. *ibid.*

(*d*) Qui juravit redire ad carcerem, si carcer est injuriosus, non tenetur redire—est enim quando vult evadere illud quod indebito sustinet, et sic ut evadat jurat, non intendit se obligare. Angel. *sum. v. juram.* 5. n. 37. Nav. *ibid.* c. 12. n. 18. Graff. *ibid.* c. 18. n. 25. secundum glossam communiter approbatam. Sylv. *sum. v. juram.* 4. n. 26.

(*e*) Cum jurat quis, se facturum aliquid quod solum est illicitum venialiter: Non enim erit tunc amplius quam veniale secundum communem sententiam a Cajetano optime et a nobis explicatum. Navar. *ibid.* n. 3. Cajetan, sensible that this is capable of great aggravations, mentions some, but concludes, though it seem, and be a grievous sin, yet it is but a venial. unde grave videtur et est hoc peccatum, non tamen mortale. *sum. v. perjur* p. 464. ctrine,

ctrine, *Affertio posita communis est.* They give as much liberty for fraudulent Oaths, whereby God and man are abused; to swear with equivocation or mental restriction, so as those to whom Oath is made, are deluded, is with them, in many cases, not so bad as a venial Evil; of which in due place. To take an Oath outwardly, (f) without an intent to swear, is but a small fault, though it seem a mocking of the Divine Majesty, and is cross to the end of an Oath; if it be unduly required. So they determine also in case one swear without an intention to oblige himself. Angelus enquires, whether he sins, who takes an Oath, with a mind not to be obliged; he tells us, (g) Panormitan affirms, that if he be a perfectionist (id est, a Votary) who so swears, he sins venially, other wise not; but himself says, *Whether he be perfect or imperfect, he sins not so much as venially*, and proves it by their Law. He takes an Oath, which in its own nature obligeth, without an intention to be obliged; he calls God to witness when he is deluding men; he abuses the Name and Authority of God, for a cheat; and yet offends but venially, whoever he be, says one; and sins not at all, says another: but then he explains it, (h) *Understand this when in swearing, he had a mind to use an Oath, for reverence to God, but not for obliging himself.* So that must be for reverence to God, which mocks him; and he must be invocated, in a way that is most obliging, without any intent to be obliged. And further to prevent falseness (where there is nothing but fraud) he must swear, with a mental reservation. For example, I (i) *promise thee an hundred (pound), with this in-*

(f) Sorsus in Suar. ibid. c. 17. n. 6. quando juramentum est iuramentum exigent, vel quodlibet voluntarie, & sine obligatione, & sine alio noamento vel injuria coram esse mortale, Sorsus tenet, et multi sequuntur.

Juramentum simulatum, etiam si promissorium sit, intrinsece non continet perjurium, non grave peccatum; si absque injuria et ex honesta causa fiat. — Conclatio est communis. Angelus. Navar. Lud. Lopez in Suar. ibid. n. 12.

(g) Dicit Panormitan. quod, si est homo perfectus peccavit venialiter, sed ego dico, quod nec perfectus nec imperfectus peccavit etiam venialiter. simul v. juramentum. q. n. 9.

(h) Intellige hoc quia jurando habet animum solum inducendi juramentum ad reverentiam dei, non ad obligationem suam. ibid.

(i) Et in mente habet aliquam circumstantiam debitam qua verum jurabas; puta promitto quod dabo tibi centum, cum ista subadditione, scilicet si sum tibi obligatus ex debito: licet hoc non exprimat ut hujusmodi, quoniam sic utitur filatione licita quodlibet, ut in eo utilem 22. q. 2. ibid.

ward reserve, not expressed: If I be bound to pay it for such concealments, says he, are lawful, and quotes their Church-Law for it, as allowing that, which all other Laws of God, or honest men condemn. 'Tis plain by the Premises that their Doctrine encourages the Roman Catholicks to venture upon all sorts of Oaths, in many cases, whether they be rash or injurious, or fraudulent, or false; as slight and trivial faults. No more do they make of perjury, though it be frequent and customary. If more evidence be desired, take notice only of the determination of Dominicus Soto (a grave and learned Doctor, and one who was a principal Divine in the Council of Trent:) he having premised something concerning the hainousness of Perjury, that the (k) Lord forbid it, with a particular EMPHASIS more than other sins; that it is a greater crime than murder, and is most grievously punished both by God and man; his tamen non obstantibus, all this notwithstanding he lays down two Conclusions, in which he maintains Perjuries of all sorts, id est, both in promissory, and assertory Oaths, to be no worse than Venial. (l) 1. Every assertory Oath though it be vain and unlawful, and in a sort perjury; is not a mortal sin, but oftentimes venial. 2. There are many promissory perjuries, (promissoria perjuria) which are no greater faults than Venial; and reduces these Perjuries to four general Heads, (under which many thousands of particular cases may be contained): and all must pass for Venial. Then, for customariness of such Perjuries, how commonly, how often soever a man is guilty thereof, that makes them not mortal, he speaks of some mentioned by Scotus, who thought that a light Perjury was no worse than venial; but if it were customary, it would be mortal: But he confutes this opinion, by a Principle generally received, (m) that a multiplication of the same acts, do not change the nature thereof; that is, ten

(k) De just. et jur. l. 2. q. 2. art. 3. p. 269.

(l) Non omne juramentum assertorium, licet sit vanum atque illicitum, et subinde quodammodo perjurium, est peccatum mortale: Sed etiam veniale. Plura sunt promissoria perjuria que non sunt gravioris culpæ quàm venialis. ibid.

(m) Cum frequentatio actuum non sit distincta ab ipsis actibus, non est per se peccatum ultra numerum multiplicatarum actionum: consuetudo speciem juramenti nec mutat nec aggravat, ibid. p. 270. col. 2.

thousand Venials acts, do not make one mortal sin and concludes (n) if the perjury be but Venial, (as it may be by his determinations now mentioned, in many thousand instances) how habitual and customary soever it be, it is not thereby mortal. So that if a man, how talkative soever, should never speak while he lives, but with an Oath, or such Perjury as he here excuses: yet all the Perjuries of a whole life, would not be a mortal sin.

SECT. III.

They determine in their Schools, (o) that of all sins those are the greatest and most hainous, that are against the Theological Vertues and Religion; of those against Religion (which are counted sacrilegg) there are three degrees, and in the highest of all, (containing crimes against the Deity and being of God:) as the most grievous they place *Perjury*, *Blasphemy*, and the *sin against the Holy Ghost*, (and those in the same rank with these) yet for practice how little they make of Perjury we have seen. *Blasphemy* meets with the same measures: they teach it may be but a Venial fault, in any of those cases, wherein they describe it: whether by *denying Gods* infinite perfections, his Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Providence, &c. or by charging what is *reproachful* to him, as Injustice, Partialty, Impotency, Cruelty, Ignorance, &c. or by *ascribing* his incommunicable Excellences to others, as calling a friend our God; or *attributing* the divine Perfections to the Devil; or else by way of *detestation*, decrying, renouncing, cursing God, with imprecations against his *Blessedness*, or *Being*; or else by way of *derision*, &c. Now it will be but a Venial fault to *Blas-*

(n) Si perjurium fuerit leve ut veniale—quantumcumque fiat ex habitu et consuetudine non officitur mortale. ibid.

Juramentum prolatum sine advertentia formali—non est in se novum & proprium et speciale mortale peccatum, propter solam pejerandi consuetudinem, etiam non retractatam. D. Thom. Bonavent. Durand. Major, Scotus, Sylvest. Navar. in Suar. l. 3. de juramentis c. 7. n. 31.

(o) Vid. Suarez, tom. 3. disp. 66. sect. 2.

pheme the divine Majesty in such a manner, (p) when it is out of lightness of mind; or (2) when it is sudden from passion; so Sylvester, (q) after Aquinas. And (r) Navar after Angelus adds, that it is not material though the passion be without just cause, or in gaming, or from drunkenness, or any unlawful employment; such passion and excess, will be so far from being great sin, that they will lessen the greatest, or (3) (s) when it is from wicked custome, with contempt of ones own Salvation. When one is so habituated in the practice of reproaching God, that Blasphemies break from him, without observance or consideration. So Cajetan and So us, and Navar after Sylvester. Thus by their rules, the more a man ~~is~~ in the most horrid instances, the less will his sin be. To blaspheme God customarily may be a slight fault, when to do it rarely, will be a most deadly crime. Here's a course described, to make such blaspheming of God, as a Soul that has any sense of his Majesty, can neither think nor speak of without horreur, to be familiar, and practicable, without danger; let him, then blaspheme God at first out of levity or passion; he may do it thus customarily, with safety; and the *finer* he does it, the more he secures himself, for when he hath so perfected this habit of wickedness by custome, that Blasphemies will issue from him, without his notice or observance; he may, even when he is not heated by passion, reproach God at every

(p) Blasphemia si ex levitate veniunt, esset tantum veniale. If a man blaspheme God, so it be in jest, that makes it so small a matter, that it may pass for Venial. *vid.* Bonacin. Tom. 2. p. 211.

(q) Cum quis subito ex passione in verba contumeliosa prorumpit quorum significationem non considerat, et tunc est veniale. *sum. v. Blasphem. n. 4.* Aquinas 22. q. 13. a. 2. Lopez c. 15. p. 262.

(r) Neque quidquam ad rem facit, an subitanea illa ira ex injusta causa originem habeat, vel ex ludo, ebrietate, vel aliqua occupatione circa rem illicitam secundum Angelum. *cap. 12. n. 84.*

(s) Si Blasphemia procedat ex quadam consuetudine depravata, cum contemptu salutis animae: si inconsideratio sola fuit causa prolationis blasphemiae, taliter quod si adverteret non proferret, non erit mortale tunc secundum Cajetanum ita est, et in hoc consensit Sotus, Lopez, *ibid.* Neque satis est ad peccandum mortaliter quod talis inconsideratio, ex depravata quadam consuetudine, cum propria salutis contemptu, vel ex culpa lata procedat, juxta Sylvestrum, dummodo illa inconsideratio prolationis talis Blasphemiae causam dederit. Navar. *ibid.* Cajetan. *sum. v. Blasphem. Graff. l. 2. c. 19.* This caution rejected as impertinent, Suar. l. 3. de Juram. n. 7. c. 7.

word

word, while he lives; and breath out his Soul with Blasphemies, when he dies; and yet be saved, for all this will amount to no more than such faults, as never endanger the Soul of a *Roman Catholic*. There needs no more to make mortal sins Venial, but to get the perfect habit of them, *that is*, if a man be but wicked enough, there is no great danger.

SECT. IV.

FOR the sanctifying the *Lords day*, or any other which they count holy, all that is necessary, *is the worship of the Mass only, with abstaining from servile works: (*) this is enough on any festival for the avoiding of mortal sin.* It is their common Doctrine, and there is not any thing wherein they more generally agree. So it is to be observed, that the total sum of all the holiness, which is necessary for these *Catholics*; even at those times, when it should appear if ever, and all which they themselves are obliged to exercise, consists in their *being at Mass*, and *avoiding servile work*. What holy attendance at the *Mass* they count necessary, we saw before; they may spend the time in sleeping, or talking, or laughing, or scoffing; only with some little intermissions, that they may stand at the *Gospel*, and kneel at the *Consecration*, and bow at the *Elevation*; but therein no inward (u) act being necessary, all the holiness requisite, lies in their legs, which should be ordered, as the *Priest* gives the signal; yet even this, they are not obliged to, who neither hear, nor see what is done; and it is not needful at the *Mass*, for any of the people, so much as to use their senses. When the *Mass* (which (x) may begin at break of day or before) is dispatched in such a holy manner, (with such attendance as would scarce be counted civil, at least sufficient, at a *stage-Play*) they

(*) Licet cum abstinentia a servilibus, solius missæ cultus sufficiat in festo ad evitandum mortale peccatum. Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 316. Regula generalis est, hoc præceptum colendi deum in die festo, quatenus affirmativum est, non obligare ad exercendum intra illum diem alium actum divini cultus, sive internum sive externum, præter missam. Assertio est communis. Ratio unica est, quia ecclesia nihil aliud præcipit. Suar. l. 2. de festis, c. 16. n. 1.

(u) Vid. Bellarm. de miss. l. c. p. 837.

(x) Secundum Paludanum semper licet, missam facere, ita ut finis missæ incidat in initium novæ. vid. infra. may

may spend the rest of the day, according to this beginning. *Th* (says Cajetan) *(y)* who after Mass vainly consume the rest of these days in sports, in jesting, in idle vagaries, in hunting, in seeing Shows & Plays, and any thing of this nature: by such acts, because they are no servile works, (upon which account they say, that no other acts of wickedness are a prophaning of these days, or a breach of that Precept, *they incur no mortal sin.* But then he (who is more precise herein, than the generality of their Divines), brings an after-reckoning: *Yes,* says he, *(z)* hereby because they neglect that divine Worship, for which these days were instituted, they sin greatly; How can that be, since he said immediately before, that they sin not mortally? why there is a multitude in their venial Faults, some are great, and some less; and so with him, to neglect all Worship but the Mass, is a great sin of the *little sin*: he gives the reason, *because hereby they give not to God the things that are Gods, and as much as in them lies, make the Festivals of Christians ridiculous, according to that Lam. 1. 7.* So that by him, those who after Morning-Service, spend this day in such Passimes, they rob God of his due, and they render Christians, in their pretences to the sanctifying of the Lords day or others, ridiculous to the World: and yet, this is but a Venial Sin: or at worst, but a great little-Fault, not so great, as any man need fear; no not he, who is most afraid of damnation. Navar adds another reason, why it should be a sin though but a Venial, to consume these days in Recreation; *because in such Employments many mortal sins occur, according to An-*

(y) Qui festos dies post missam vanè consumunt ludendo, jocando, otiosoque vagando, ut venando, sportaculis intendendo, et hujusmodi, licet ex ipsis operibus, utpote non servilibus, mortale non incurrant, sum. v. fest. de actibus corporalibus Massice. — ut agitionibus corporum, quæ in saltationibus, choreis & tripudiis fiunt. Vid. Angel. Sylvest. Rosall. Abulen. Suarez, l. 2. de fest. c. 27. n. 4. aliqui addunt, si totus dies festus, etiam audiet missâ, in his actibus consumatur, graviter peccare, quia festa Christiana ridiculo exponuntur. — non intelligunt autem esse mortale, sed veniale, ut diserte declarant — non refert quod intentio est vana, vel turpis, vel principalis, ibid.

(z) Ex omissione tamen divini cultûs ad quem festa instituta sunt graviter peccant: quia non reddunt quæ sunt Dei Deo; & quia quantum in se est, ridiculo exponunt Christiana festa: juxta illud, viderant eam hostes, & direferunt sabbata ejus. Ibid. Armill. v. fest. n. 23.

(a) Quia in hujusmodi occupationibus, multa occurrunt peccata mortalia secundum S. Antoninum. ubi ait omnium lachrymis defendam esse Christianorum Cécitatem, qui gravius Deum offendunt diebus festis ejusdem divino cultui dedicatis, quam tota hebdomada ad vitam parandam instituta. Cap. 13. n. 15.

TORINIS,

roninus, who says, *The blindness of Christians is to be lamented with the tears of all men, who more grievously offend God, on the days appointed for his Worship, than the whole week besides.* Notwithstanding, this is their way of sanctifying the Lords Day, and all other times, for Devotion, of their own; with prophane and irreligious Divertisements, such as render their pretences to Religion ridiculous (as the Cardinal notes): accompanied with such debaucheries, as make their holy-days the prophaneſt, of all other. It is but a Venial fault at most (for many count it not ſo much) to conſume the whole day herein without any other religious Act, or Exerciſe of any ſort whatever: (b) they need hear no *Sermons*, nor attend their *Vespers*, nor uſe any *Prayers* publick or private, nor read the *Scriptures*, nor ſing the praifes of God; nor meditate on him; nor have any one act of Love, or Communion, nor any other act of inward *Worſhip* at all; nor of outward *Worſhip* either, but only part of the *Maſs*: this will ſerve for all, ſo highly divine and religious a Service it is; though they declare themſelves not obliged therein, either to mind God, or divine things: yea though they hear *Maſs* (when nothing elſe is needful for the ſanctifying of the Day) out of contempt of the day; yet the Precept is ſatisfied. But if they be not at *Maſs* on thoſe days, (though preſent at *Maſs* may make all other holy Duties unneceſſary in other caſes, yet) ſhould they not make up that defect with ſome other prayers, or religious Exerciſe; leſt God ſhould have no ſervice at all, nor ſhew of it, in publick or private, on thoſe days which alone are ſet apart for that purpoſe? no, (c) if they neglect *Maſs*, either upon reaſonable or damnable occaſions (to wit, if they ſpend the time when they ſhould be at it, in any other wickedneſs); yet are they not obliged to Prayer, or any other act of *Worſhip*, on thoſe days afterwards. This is the Doctrine not only of their famous Navar,

(b) Vid. ſuprà cap. 1. et Suarez. l. 2. de feſt. c. 16. & Victorall. infrà.

Qui audit miſſam in contemptum diei feſtæ—ſatisfacit præcepto. Bonacin. Tom. 2. diſp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9. n. 1.

(c) Qui abſq; excuſatione, ut peccando mortaliter, omiſit ſacrum, non tenetur eodem die aliis actibus colere & orare Deum; ergo multo minùs tenebitur qui excuſatur: eſt enim optimum conſilium, nullum tamen eſt latum ea de re præceptum & latius docent, Navar. cum Antonino, Adriano, & aliis, Suarez. Tom. diſp. 88. ſeſt. 6. p. ult.

but of Pope Adrian, and their Saint Antoninus, with others: Yea after all other holy Exercises are cashiered as needless on any of their holy times; the Mass it self may be dismissed too for company. And because all their Religion necessary for the people, consists in this, at all times, when any thing religious is by their Doctrine needful for them; it will not be amiss, to observe, how easily they may be excused from this: whereby we may discern, of what moment it is in their account, to have nothing at all of Religion amongst them. Cardinal Cajetan will satisfie us herein; he determines, that (d) it is no mortal sin, to neglect the Mass on a reasonable occasion, though it be but such an occasion as is not urgent. Yea, he says, (e) It is but a Venial fault to omit it, upon no sufficient reason, and universally it is no great fault to neglect it, if a man thinks really he may be excused from hearing it, on if besides his intention, out of some negligence it be omitted. Yea, they may be excused by custome; for so he says (f) Maids are excused from hearing Mass, till they be married, (and their Mothers too who are obliged to stay at home with them) because so is the custome. If so were the custome, it seems, all the rest might be excused. So many ways at least, may these Catholicks be excused from all their Religion: by custome, or necessity, or opinion, or (which alone may suffice) by an insufficient reason; it will but be a Venial fault at most, together with all religious Exercises, to omit the Mass too; and that at thole

(d) Quia sola missa communiter est in precepto, ideo sine rationabili causa, omittit missam in festo, peccatum mortale reputatur. Et hic esto prudens, admitrendo pro rationabili causa omne motum rationi humane consentaneum, etiamsi non fuerit legitimus. Ibid. p. 304. Angelus in Feria, n. 42: Citans Richardum, quodl. 1. q. 19. negat missionem missæ in die festo esse peccatum mortale, nisi ex contemptu formalis vel virtualis fiat, quod etiam affirmavit Sum. Rotella. v. miss. & Turrecremata, Suar. ibid. sibi initio. Sequitur posse Pontificem in hoc precepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum Ecclesiasticum sit, only to dispence with one, that he should not all his life hear Mass, when no reasonable occasion hinders him, is not expedient. Idem ibid. in fine, vid. Bonacini infra.

(e) Quamvis si minus sufficiens sit ratio, peccetur venialiter. Et universaliter scilicet, quando quis bona fide putat se excusari ab auditione missæ, & ideo omittit illam: Cyprian. ibid. Et simile est, si prater intentionem ex aliqua negligentia missa omittatur. Ibid.

(f) Hinc enim excusantur puella, non euntes ad missam, quia sic est consuetum. Ibid. p. 305.

times, when alone (if ever) they are obliged to them. Such being their Doctrine, we need not wonder, if Religion be starv'd to death among them, the life of it cannot be sustained (no more than God can be honoured by man-kind) without some acts of Worship and religious Exercises in ordinary practice : their Teachers assure them, that they are not ordinarily obliged to any of these, on *common* days ; and to none of them all, but the *Mafs*, on their days for Worship ; nor to any religious attendance on God or their Souls, in that ; nor to any attendance on it *at all*, but what they may decline, without mortal sin. If the life of Religion be preserved amongst any, without its necessary supports, and proper nourishment, it must be by a Miracle : but they seem so far from regarding the *life*, or the *power* of it (on which the honour of God, and the salvation of Souls depends) ; that they are not concerned for the *carcass* of it, in exterior acts, no, not that of the *Mafs* (when they have reduced all to that) further than the fear of a Venial sin will oblige ; ten millions of which cannot as they teach, damn a man. As for *servile works*, abstaining from which they make the negative part of this Precept ; the avoiding of these is but, that we may with more leisure attend on divine Worship : it cannot be expected they will much insist on the means when they have overturned the end. In short, they determine that (g) *they who do any servile or forbidden works, on the Lords day ; if they do it not, with a design to prophane it, offend but Venially*. Thus if they never all their life, perform one religious act which God has commanded, on his own day or others, they scarce sin Venially ; or if they neglect that, which themselves have made the religious Duty of these days, they may do it without greater fault or danger. And for the negative part, if they consume these days in servile works (without an intention needlessly perverse) ; or which is worse, in prophane diversions ; yea, or in acting the most enormous wickedness (as we shall see in its place) ; yet by their Doctrine they do nothing, against this Precept, or nothing which any of them need regard. Thus their Doctrine of Venial sins, is improved to possess them with a conceit, that

(g) *Sive id quod committitur, sit opus servile, sive ab Ecclesia prohibitum si vero nec intentio sit violandi festum — non incurritur peccatum mortale. Cajetan. ibid. p. 310.*

They may make what breaches they will upon the Commandments of God; without doing any thing at all (or any thing dangerously) against them; and so to render all sorts of ungodliness practicable with safety. We have seen it in instances against precepts of the first Table; let us see if those, who make so bold with God, in the Duties which more immediately concern himself, will be more tender; as to those which respect man.

SECT. V.

THE Duties which Children owe their Parents, (to instance for briefness onely in those which the Lord hath made the exemplar of the other; and by which we may pass a judgment on the rest) they reduce to those three, *Reverence, Love, and Obedience*. In reference to the first, They conclude that those who have no more respect for their Parents, (b) *than to count it a disgrace and a shame to be counted their Children; if it be for the inconveniences of a sinister opinion, or such-like cause, sin not mortally: and the fault may be less still, if the Parents consent to it expressly, or tacitely, to avoid some inconvenience*. It seems, the Command calls for no such Reverence from Children; but they may be ashamed of their Parents, if they be poor, and low in the World. (c) *Children may curse their Parents if they do it but with their lips, and this whether they be alive or dead, the offence is but Venial*. And indeed, they allow Parents, to give their Children occasion enough to curse them: when they will not have them obliged under mortal sin, to teach them any more (k) *than the sign of the*

(b) *Filius qui — sibi dedecori & contumeliæ futurum esse existimaret se pro filio illorum haberi — si absque contemptu id facit ad vitandum aliquod incommodum sinistræ opinionis, vel ob aliam hujusmodi causam, non peccaret mortaliter, maxime si parentes tacite vel expresse in eo consentirent. Navar. c. 14. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 53. n. 12. Lopez. c. 54. p. 279.*

(c) *Filius qui ex animo maledicit, sive vivis, sive jam sæculo defunctis, si tamen ore tenus tantum maledicit, non amplius quam venialiter offendit. Navar. ibid.*

(k) *Sylvest. Sum. v. Scientia. Graff. l. 2. c. 58. n. 14. Ea quæ parentes tenentur facere sub peccato mortali, ut filiis addiscant, est signum crucis, ut Credo parvum, et Paternoster.*

Cross, the small Creed, and Pater-noster; nor teach them these in a language (l) they understand. However Parents may come even with their Children, and if they love and reverence their Father and Mother so much as to curse them; their Parents may (m) curse them again, upon as easie terms, only they should not desire mischief to them in their heart, though their words express that desire. *When Parents curse their children, having no inward desire of their mischief, it is never a mortal sin, says Soto. (n) (and it may seem strange considering the account of it immediately added,) Although it be indeed a wicked custome, and not at all for correction, besides that the heat of cursing, often raises anger into hatred, and so alters the mind, that they often desire, that all the mischief imprecated may befall them: besides the appellation of the Devil, can scarce be excused from a mortal Evil, for it is a kind of blasphemy and scandal, to wish eternal death to any.* Yet all this it seems may be excused from deadly sin, though not very easily.

For Love, they may rejoyce at the death of their Father (o) because of some outward advantage they gain thereby: *They (p) may accuse their Parents of Heresie*, though the effect of that will be a cruel death to those, who gave them life. As to Obedience in things that pertain not to (q) paternal government, it is no mortal sin to disobey them. In any things whatsoever, (r) *it is but a Venial fault to disobey them, out of negligence, or sensuality.* And so there's room enough for a continued disobedience, while they live. In matters of great importance, where, if ever, disobedience would be mortal; they

(l) Navar. Cap: 11. n. 22.

(m) Idem Cap. 23. n. 117.

(n) Cum parentes filiis maledicunt, nullum intus habentes mali desiderium, nunquam est peccatum mortale: quamvis consuetudo profecto pessima est: de just et Jur. l. 5. q. 12. art. 1. Graff. l. 2. c. 58. n. 20.

(o) Navar. C. 15. N. 10.

(p) Si filius scit patrem esse hereticum, & non solum sibi ipsi, sed & alijs prava sua doctrina nocere potest debet eum accusare. Alexand. Alenfis. secundum eum Graff. l. 2. cap. 55. n. 8. quamvis tenetur filius ad denuntiandam heresim patris, & ad testificandum de illa, Nav. c. 25. n. 50.

(q) Idem ibid. C. 14. N. 12.

(r) Circa rem familiarem—in necessariis ad salutem sicut sunt spectantia ad bonos mores.—est veniale non obedire ex negligentia vel sensualitate, Sylvest. sum. v. filius n. 23.

exempt it from such guilt. (f) They may enter into a Monastery, before they are at age, though their Parents charge them, not to do it: They may dispose (t) of themselves in marriage, without their Parents consent: because according to Aquinas, in the choice of their condition, they are not subject to their Parents, and their Parents concurrence herein is for decency not out of necessity. Not only in things of great consequence as to th's life; But in matters necessary to their Salvation, it is but a venial fault if they disobey them; so it be not out of contempt, that is, out of obstinacy and pertinaciousness. (v) Thus Sylvester and others, de Grassis is more particular herein, (x) a Son should not be disobedient to his Father in things which belong to the Family, and his salvation, as in avoiding pernicious company, and unlawful games, and Whores, he should not disobey him herein out of contempt, by which (says he) I understand obstinacy and pertinaciousness, so that, not to be obedient (herein) out of inconsiderateness, or negligence, or sensuality would be Venial. They encourage a Maid not only to dispose of her self in marriage without consent of Parents, but also to give up her self to uncleanness. If she willingly be deflowered, they conclude it is no injury to her nor to her future Husband, nor to her Parents. Their reason is because she has the disposing of her own body, and so may use it

(f) Queritur, utrum intrare possint pueri vel puella in anno pubertatis? Et dico quod sic, etiam parentibus prohibentibus. Sylv. v. Relig. 1. n. 12.

(t) utrum filius potest nubere sine licentia patris? Resp. quod sic, tam masculus quam femina: quamvis non expediat. Angel. sum. v. filius n. 24.

In electione status filius vel filia, non subijtur parentibus secundum S. Thom. 22.q.104. art. 5. In Tabienna. v. filius n. 14. Vid. Aquin. 3. q. 45. art. 5. addit Aquinas puella sicut potest monasterium ingredi absque parentum consensu, cum sit persona libera, sic & nubere, vid. Gratian, Petr. Lombard, & alios in Elpenczo de Clandest. matrim. c. 9. & 10.

(v) Sum. v. filius n. 25.

(x) Inobedientia crimen filius incurrit in iis, que pertinent ad res familiares, & ad salutem anime, ut fugere noxia sodalium contubernia, ludos prohibitos, & meretrices, modo non obediatur ex contemptu, per contemptum hinc intelligo, obstinationem & pertinaciam animi, unde non obedire ex inadvertentia, aut negligentia, vel sensualitate, esset veniale. Sylv. v. fil. q. 22. Nav. c. 14. n. 12. Graff. l. 2. c. 55. n. 15.

* Pet. a S. Joseph. de 6. precepto art. 1. (& alii). Cum illa habeat dominum in suum corpus non parentes, vel futurus sponsus; ideoque illa possit libere licet non licite uti ad explendam libidinem.

freely

freely for the satisfying of lust, though not lawfully; yet lawfully too so far that they will have this lewdness to be no wrong at all to the party, most concern'd, her self or others. If she be unchast herein, yet not unrighteous; She owes not so much obedience to her Parents as to keep her self honest; nor have they authority to oblige her not to be a Whore, no more than not to be a Nunn. By this we may take an estimate, of the honour which other Superiours must expect, by their rules of Morality. I must not descend to other particulars, fearing tediousness.

SECT. VI.

They hold that (y) *he breaks not the sixth (in their account the fifth) Commandment, who desires, or procures, or does any mischief, to anothers Soul.* It seems it is no murder, to kill the Soul. It is a rule with them that (z) *sins in heart, word and deed, are of the same kind.* So they yield to Christ in this, that *anger and hatred*, may be a kind of murder: yet they think fit to exempt these, for the most part, from mortal guilt. When there has been such hatred and enmity betwixt two, as neither of them will be induced to speak to the other; yet both are to be absolved (says (a) *de Grassis*). When there is such indignation, that will admit of no affability, or converse. *It is a fault*, says (b) *Cajetan*, for the inordinacy of the passion, yet commonly Venial. They would reconcile us to anger when both the measure, and the effects of it, seem intolerable; when (c) it is so extra-

(y) *Non autem (infringit illud) qui vult, procurat aut operatur detrimentum animæ, ut ipsummet concilium sensit.* Nav. c. 15. n. 1.

(z) *Aquinas, 1. 2. q. 72. art. 7.*

(a) *Grass. l. 2. cap. 71. n. 6.*

(b) *Peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem: & communiter veniale.* Sum. v. Indignatio.

(c) *Quando est inordinata quantum ad modum irascendi, non habet ex suo genere, rationem peccati mortalis.* Sylvest. v. Ira. n. 4. *potest à recta ratione, ita discordare quantum ad modum irascendi puta, quia nimis ardentius intus quis irascitur, aut secundum exteriores motus nimis excaulescit. Et sic si excessivus modus sit nudus, peccatum est veniale.* Cajetan. Sum. v. ira.

vagant

vagant, as that it both burns excessively within, and flames out no less in external significations of its excess; yet such an excess, is a small fault. It will be as harmless though it be revengeful too, if it seek not a great revenge; yea a man as innocently seeks and takes the greatest revenge, if he do it inconsiderately. This they deny not, when they tell us withall, that the passion may be but Venial, when it makes a person inconsiderate: So that a man may destroy all that he is angry at, if his passion be but quick, and great enough. (e) To desire that he whom we count our enemy, were killed; or to rejoyce that he is murdered, if it be for some good that ensues upon it, is no Crime. No more it seems than it is for the *Cannibals*, to delight too have others killed; it is for the good they reap thereby, they have the advantage to feed on them. They will scarce be able to persuade one, that it is unlawful to act, what he may lawfully desire; yet they count it no sin to desire the death, not only of those that are mischievous, and do or may do them hurt, but of such as are innocent: not only of strangers, or such as they count enemies, but even of their nearest Relations. *A Woman may desire the death of her daughters, because they are unhandsome, or poor; so that she cannot marry them according to her mind.* And the reason (which must clear this from guilt) is because, *this is not a hatred of enmity to their persons, but only a hatred of abomination, as to their unhandsonness and poverty.* Thus she may hate her own Children to any degree of abhorrence, so far as to will them the grandest evil in this world, death it self, because they are not rich; or because they are not comely, she may kill them so far as her mind and heart can do it, upon this account; and sacrifice them inwardly to her covetousness or ambition, or curiosity; and this very innocently. (f) *As affecting to kill ones enemy without consent,* is but a Venial fault with *Cajetan*. If he actually kill him, so it be done indeliberately, he does

(d) *Possit est veniale, propter imperfectionem actus, quia scilicet prævenit deliberationem; vel est de aliquo modico, ex S. Thom. Sylv. v. ira n. 4.*

(e) *Licet mihi optare, ad bonum, mortem alicujus, Idem v. maledicere mortem alicui optare possumus, licet nobis concedat via, n. 2. perditionis ingressum ire. Soto, de Just. & Jur. l. 5. q. 12. art. 1. Nabar. c. 21. n. 25- Lopez. Cap. 64. p. 321, 322. (Bonacina, r. 2. de leg. disp. 3. q. 4. p. ult. n. 7.)*

(f) *Affectus ad occidendum inimicum absque consensu rationis: Gum. v. Votum.*

no great harm. The rule received by them without exception, will warrant it, (g) *surpise and inconsiderateness excuses from mortal sin*. Thus if a man kills any he meets with, without any deliberation at all, through natural hastiness, drink, or passion, 'tis no mortal sin; yea it may be done as easily, with some deliberation, if that be not full, and perfect: and there are so many things, which they tell us of, to hinder it from being full; that killing of others may be a common practice, with little or no fault. But when it is more voluntary, there are more cases wherein they make murder no sin at all, than so much as a Venial fault, of which in its proper place.

SECT. VII.

Proceed we to the next command. Some of their *Doctors* have determined, that fornication is not intrinsically evil, nor forbidden; because it is evil, but only evil because it is forbidden. (b) So *Martinus a Magistris*, and after him *Durandus*, held, that fornication is not condemned by the law of nature, as a sin deserving eternal death; but is only prohibited by a positive law, *Deut. 23. Eph. 5*. And so it will be no worse, nor deserve any more than a Venial fault; since a positive law neither adds to the penalty, nor makes it a greater evil, but only declares the native evil of it, more expressly. Not only fornication, but also adultery, even in the Clergy, has passed amongst them as a lesser sin, and is so expressed in the Pontifical Law. For some crimes Clergy-men were to be deposed, for others the Bishop might dispense with them, to wit, when they were lesser faults. Amongst these lesser *Pope Alexander 3* reckons adulteries; but for Adulteries, saies he, and

(g) *Inferre notabile damnum in proximam personam — subreptio & inconsideratio ejus quod aggrediebatur ipsum excusare possit à mortali*: Navar. c. 15. n. 8.

(b) *Affirmat Martinus — quod fornicatio non est sua natura mala, et ideo prohibita; immo ab id tantum est mala, quia prohibita nempe lege veteri — & eodem applaudit Durandus, 4 dist. 33. q. 2. Soto de Just. & jur. l. 5. q. 3. art. 3.*

(i) *Decretal l. 2. tit. 1. c. 4. de adulteriis vero & aliis criminibus, quæ sunt minora, ubi Episcopus post peccatam penitentiam cum clericis dispensare. Alexander 3. Sa-lentiano Archiepiscopo respondens de adulteriis ut aliis criminibus minoribus, Episcopo cum clericis penitentibus dispensandi jus fecit, Espac xus, de digam. l. 2. c. 7.*

1. 14.

other

other lesser crimes, the Bishop after they have done penance, may dispense with the Clergy. They teach, that for a whore, though she be a married woman, or a Nun, to seek or receive a reward for prostituting herself, is but a Venial fault, if any. Only they differ how she should have it. (k) Some say as a gift or gratuity; but (l) others as a hire, legally due in justice. By which it is evident, that either they must think such uncleanness not to be intrinsically evil; or else, that it is as warrantable to seek and receive rewards for other such acts of wickedness (as for slandering, robbing, assassinating men, or firing houses, &c. The (m) use of matrimony, before the marriage be solemnized, if it be without contempt, is no mortal sin, saies Cajetan; because neither the violation of rules, nor of custome, through the weakness of passion, can be mortal: others concur with him herein. Nor do Antoninus and John Tabienna much mend the matter; who will have the first act to be a sin, but none of the rest after. (n) He or she who first contracts marriage with one privately, and after with another publicly, is not mortally, if they lye with the former, without scandal; but is bound to live with the latter, the Church commanding it, if there be no danger of coming together. As though they could cohabit together, as man & wife, without such danger. This is in effect to determine, they may lie with both, and they that have a mind to it, may have warranty from the (o) Master of Sentences for the latter; and from the Master of the sacred Palace (p) and others, for the former. A woman whose Chastity is

(k) Medina, Navar. c. 17. n. 39.

(l) Cajetan, Soto de Just. l. 4. q. 7. a. 1. Graff. l. 2. c. 123. n. 2.

(m) Si tamen desit contemptus, non est peccatum mortale consummare matrimonium ante benedictionem: quia nec statuti nec consuetudinis violatio ex infirmitate passionum, infert peccatum mortale. Cajet. Sum. v. matrimon. Angelus, v. debitum Sylvest. (4ter, Aquinas and others) v. debet, sect. 11.

Navar. Cap. 16. n. 38. pro Cajetano videtur textus. Conc. Trident.

(n) Non tamen peccaret qui absque scandalo eam (rem) haberet (cum priori), tamen utem posteriori convivere Ecclesia id jubente, si absque periculo habendi rem cum ea vel n. id facere possit. Idem ibid. n. 39.

(o) In 4. dist. n. 28.

(p) Sum. v. dubitum n. 14.

attempted with some force, (q) *though she cry not out*, though she call not for help when it may be had, *though she make no resistance at all with any part of her, though she do not so much as any may move to hinder it; yea though she take natural pleasure in the act: yet if her will, do not deliberately consent (though they say) in any court. she could not in such circumstances, but be presumed to consent;)* she sins not mortally: thus Soto with others. They confess that (r) *a woman can scarce ever do this and be honest*, and yet give this encouragement, to all, to do it. Here's a way to have all women corrupted, that are but attempted with eagerness, if the rules of those, who have the guidance of their practice and Consciences be but complied with: impetuous lust may make the essay upon any, without fear of so much as a check, or any resistance: and those who are engaged by the Laws of nature, God, and man, to make opposition; may innocently give place to it, without struggling; yea they may be chaste enough though they yield to such lust with pleasure; so it be no more than sensual, and these delights be not jumbled together in practice, which in the Doctrine of their Teachers is sufficiently distinguished and parted for them. They bid fair also to make that uncleanness to which persons are drawn by the power of Courtship and insinuation, pass as innocent; for they say, that is no sin which is involuntary, and that is not voluntary to which we are necessitated; and Cajetan (s) tells us (in a case much akin to this) *that our passions excited by exterior persuasion, do as it were, offer us violence; after he had informed us, that what Whores extort by flatteries more than their hire,*

(q) *Neque clamore se defendere — suis propriis, membris se defendere sed immota manens nihil agat — etiamsi de actu ipso delectationem aliquam percipiat, modo neque in ipsum actum, Neque delectationem voluntate deliberata consentiret.* Nam talis delectatio non esset voluntaria sed naturalis — quamvis quoad forum exterius presumereetur consensisse. Soto. de Just. & jur. lib. 5. q. 1. art. 5. p. 141. Navar. cap. 16. n. 1. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 10. Vega in Jo. Sanc. disp. 10. n. 17.

(r) *Credo paucas honestas repertum iri, quæ aliquo modo non resistant, saltem sine clamore, &c. ibid.*

(s) *Passiones nostræ ab extrinseca suavitæ illatæ quasi vim faciunt — meretricum blandæ valde extorsiones supra debitam mercedem — omnis similis actio causans involuntariam donationem rei suæ quia non minus necessitatur ex hujusmodi humanus animus, &c. Sum. v. restitut. p. 509.*

Ex sententia Cajetani (& Navarri) sequitur licitum esse invitare ad fornicationem, eum qui paratus est alias fornicari in Vasq. opusc. moral. dub. 3. p. 24.

is an involuntary gift, the mind being this way necessitated : and sure, flatteries in reference to the act, as well as the reward, may as much necessitate, and make the one as involuntary, as the other ; further, it man or woman need neither force nor importunity, but be ready to commit uncleanness without more ado, one may without sin invite them to it. (t) Self-pollution is no mortal sin, in any that desire, it may befall them in their sleep for the ease of nature: nor is it a sin to be pleased with it when it is (u) past for a good end, and so Aquinas, Paludanus, and the common Doctrine: Nor to be pleased with it as future, if the pleasure do not cause it: Nor to be pleased with it when it befalls them awake, (x) if the pleasure be but sensual, and not rational. Under the favour of this distinction they may act uncleanness, either natural, or against nature, and that with delight too : for though the lower faculties take pleasure therein, yet if the superiour either check it, or run not into a full compliance there with, they are safe. They encourage them to venture upon, and continue in such occasions of uncleanness; as those who think it needful to avoid the acts, cannot but judge necessary, to be abandoned. They (y) that eat hot meats, such as provoke and cause uncleanness; or otherwise eat excessively: if they do it not with such an intention, but to satisfy their gluttony, or for other cause: yea though they doubt uncleanness will be the issue of it, offend but Venially. Carnal (z) touches used, for sensual pleasure, without designing the act of un-

(t) Antoninus, Sylvestre, Cajetan. in Navar. in Lopez. c. 74. p. 252. tenent quod ita licet cupere et ita complacere. Vid. Navar. Cap. 16. n. 7.

(u) Ibid. S. Thomas, Paludanus ut communes assunt non esse peccatum complacere sibi de præterita pollutione ob sanctum finem. Vid. Sylvest. v. pollutio post placentia non faciat præteritam pollutionem esse peccatum.

(x) Non est autem peccatum saltem mortale, pollutio illa, quæ incipit evenire alicui, dum dormit, & finitur postquam est exsurrectus, si voluntas superior, sive rationalis deliberata, in illam non consentiat quamvis sensualitas, ea delectetur, &c. Navar. ibid. n. 8. & Cardin. Turrecremata.

(y) Non esse peccatum mortale, comedere nimis, aut calida edulia, ob quod pollutio evenit, dummodo non comedat ea eo fine, sed solum ut sue gula satisfaciatur. Navar. c. 16. n. 8. Si non intenditur, sed quid tale fiat propter gulositatem aut aliam causam, cum dubio tamen secuturæ pollutionis, esset veniale. Sylv. v. Pollut. Lopez. Cap. 74. p. 354.

(z) Martinus de Magistris, Gabriel, Javellus, Navar, Soto, Nider, Antoninus, & alii in Sanch, l. 9. de matr. disp. 46. n. 6. & Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 318.

cleanness

cleanness, or the delight of it (though it be confessed, that of all other occasions, this leads most directly, and most dangerously to the consummation of the act): yet are they but Venial faults, with many of their Writers. (a) To go to the place, or company, where is danger of sinning mortally, by reason of the sights, persuasions, opportunities, or any thing of this nature, though it be done without any cogent necessity, is not a mortal sin with them; and the reason is, because it rests in the mans free will, not to sin mortally, though such occasions of sinning be offered. Filthy (b) discourse when it is out of lightness and curiosity, without any other ill design; or when it is meerly for the pleasure taken in the obscene talk, without any further intention; is no worse than a Venial fault. The filthiness which the Apostle forbids, Eph. 5. 4. Bellarmine (c) understanding thereby filthy words, will have it be but a Venial, and the same he determines, not only of filthy talking, but scurrility; and Cardinal Cajetan (d) before him, says, in its own nature it is not a mortal sin, though he describes it to be shameless mirth; and Alensis (e) refers it to lascivious affection; and in Angelus (f) it is a provoking others to laughter, either by idle or obscene words. A woman sins not mortally, who being moved with the affection of a little vain glory, without any other deadly intention; does paint or adorn herself, although she believe, that some who see her in such a dress, will be inflamed with mortal lust: when it is certain

(a) Ire ad locum sive ad societatem, ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter propter aspectum, persuasiones, commoditates, aut aliquid hujusmodi, non est ex suo genere peccatum mortale, licet sine urgente necessitate fiat, ad peccatum incautelæ spectet. Hec est Cajetani, & probatur, quia in suæ libertatis arbitrio restat non peccare mortaliter, etiam presentibus talibus occasionibus: Lopez. cap. 20. p. 112.

(b) Antoninus de Graff. Cajetan. & alii in Sanch. ibid. n. 39. Cajetan. Navar. Graff. Rebellus (in) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 318. n. 18.

(c) De Amiff. Grat. l. 1. cap. 9. p. 78. Doctæ volibat tria posteriora (turpia verba, stultiloquia & scurrilitatem) debere quidem esse aliena ab ore sanctificato fidelium, non tamen ex genere suo talia esse, quæ excludant ab hereditate Christi & Dei.

(d) Scurrilitis quæ homo ad risum provocat inverecande — non est mortalis ex suo genere, Sum. v. Scurril. (e) secundum Halensem refertur ad lasciviam affectionis. Angelus. sum. v. Scurril.

(f) Non peccat mortaliter ab hoc solum mulier, quæ vanæ gloriæ et vniuersalis desiderio tacta, absque alio fine mortali se fucat et ornat, licet credat aliquos, quæ ipsam sic fucata & ornata videbunt, in ejus concupiscentiam mortalem exarsuros. Attamen certum est, eam absque incommodo verecundiæ, et dedecore suo, posse ab hujusmodi ornatu temperare. Navar. cap. 14. n. 27.

also, that without any disparagement or inconvenience, she might abstain from such a garb; (g) yea though she so track up her self, that some may be induced to love her honestly but carnally; or with a dishonest affection either, only not beyond the bounds of Venial uncleanness. This being their Doctrine, no wonder if Christian purity be abandoned in their practice. Navar tells us, (h) theres such a deluge of unbridled luxury amongst them, who are so neer a kin, that he dares not express it; and amongst the married, and unmarried; amongst Virgins consecrated, and not consecrated: that divine and immense goodness, may send upon them a horrible deluge, of all calamities, not only corporal but spiritual. And because it is not lawful for one to take the profession of a Nun, if she have committed uncleanness before; he sayes, (i) that there are few grown up that without cation can be lawfully consecrated for Virgins.

SECT. VIII.

FOR theft, they teach, that to steal any thing of small value is but a Venial fault; for this is the Rule they universally proceed by, (k) the smallness of a thing in all causes, excuses from mortal sin; and thus far all are encouraged to steal, not only strangers, but Children from (l) their Fathers, and Wives from their Husbands, and Servants from their Masters.

1. A Servant may be excused from mortal guilt, if he steal from his Ma-

(g) Non autem (probat mortaliter) si facit illud, ut ametur honeste, licet carnaliter — imo neque si id facit quo ametur inhoneste, sed non mortaliter ad luxuriam videlicet tantum venialem. Idem c. 16. n. 14.

(h) Cap. 16. n. 3. — diluvium tam effrenate luxurie, etiam inter cognatos adeo propinquos & affines, ut non audeamus exprimere & inter conjugatas et virgines tam sacratas quam non sacratas, &c.

(i) Ob quod forsitan paucis grandiorum sine cautela licite consecrari possunt. ibid.

(k) Aquinas 1, 2. q. 88. art. 5. & 6. & 22. q. 3. art. 5. & q. 59. art. 4, 5. Antoninus. 2. per tit. 4. c. 5. Sect. 7. & 8. Adrian. quodlib. 8, in Navar. c. 17. n. 2.

(l) Cajetan sum. v. furtum. Adrian in 4. de restit. Navar. c. 17. n. 138. Sylvest. sum. v. furtum. n. 16. Graff. l. 2. cap. 92. n. 25.

1. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct. ult. n. 2.

ster by little and little; though in time it come to a considerable sum; provided he convert it to his own use; he should not, it seems steal for others too, unless he do it out of Charity.

2. A Son may steal more from his Father, than strangers or servants may do; he must be regulated herein by his fathers Estate; this love and indulgence to him, the greater that it is, the more he may steal from him. They excuse him if he steal from his Father the sum of three Crowns; they say not, that it may not be a greater, but only it should not be a far greater sum.

3. Accordingly he may spend what he gets from his Father, in gaming, or in recreations, not only such as are honest, but also luxurious, without any more guilt.

4. If his Father allow him not, what others of his condition do, he may filch from him privily, what a prudent Confessor thinks fit. Thus mens Estates will be at the Confessors discretion, and as much may be stolon from them, as their Priests please.

5. Or if he do business for his Father, his expences deducted, he may keep to himself as much as a stranger would have for such Service.

Now that we may know, when theft will be a mortal crime, it must be known of what value the thing stolon must be, to make it so: and this not being determined by any law natural, divine or humane; they agree, that (m) *this must be determined by the judgment of a good man*; and who better than the Casuists, since they ought, and are presumed, to be, both knowing and Consciencious? let but them conclude (and they have done worse, in many cases) that things of greater worth are not of value sufficient, to make the stealing thereof, to be a mortal sin, and then theft neither little nor great will be criminal.

2. Pet. Navar. et Bonacin. ibid. punct. 1. n. 5. longe majorem summam.

3. Lopez. Navar. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. in ludos—recreationem etiam luxuriosam.

4. Saitus Saronius & alii cum Bonacin. ibid. possit filius clam accipere juxta prudentis confessorii arbitrium.

5. Angelus. Navar. Bartolus. Baldus & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8:

(m) Quæ tamen parvitas excusat a peccato mortali, communis est opinio, standam esse arbitrio boni viri. Graff. ibid. n. 20. vid. Navar. cap. 17. n. 2.

Thus.

Thus this command of God (as the rest are) will be made of none effect by this distinction. An engine which (as they work it) serves to destroy both Law and Gospel ; and to sink Christianity, in morals, many degrees below Heathenism. Let us see what progress they have made herein, and whether they have not done it in effect already. They teach, (*n*) that to steal *anything, though in it self small, yet of great value in the account of the owner, and of much consequence to him ; so that the damage he suffers by it, and the trouble it gives him, is really great : yet if the thief did not, or could not know it, it is but Venial.* Yet the reason, why they count the stealing of a small thing, to be but a little fault ; is (*o*) because, the owner is presumed, not unwilling, the stealer should have it, it being no considerable loss, or trouble to him : but this cannot be presumed in the now mentioned cases. And if theft whether of small or great consequence, whether with or without that, which makes little theft to be Venial, be still no worse than Venial, than will no theft be mortal. They also teach, that (*p*) *those who are in need, though it be not extreme, but such only, as would be counted great, may steal from others for their relief : (q) nor are they bound to make restitution, when they have got a good estate.* Thus theft will be made as common as moderate indigence : and the practice being continued, as long as there is need, it may amount in a while, to a considerable sum ; yea when the necessitous are grown rich, those whose estates are impaired by such thefts, shall have no reparation. Thus a wide door is

(*n*) Navar *ibid.* Graff. *ibid.* n. 16.

(*o*) *Si minimi erit pretii-nemo mortalem esse culpam affirmabit ex D. Thom. et ratio est quia presumitur non esse omnino contra voluntatem ejus qui hoc patitur.* Graff. l. 1. c. 14 n. 5. Nav. *ibid.* n. 5.

(*p*) *Tradunt Medina. Angelus. Pet. Navar Malderus & Plures alii in Dian. p.2.l.3. mis. res. 29.*

Quamvis non sit in necessitate extrema excusari tamen potest a toto, furtive subripiendo Sylvest. sum. v. futur. n. 10. Navar. *ibid.* *vid.* Angelum. *One in extream necessity may kill the owner if he would hinder him from stealing, si a domino impediatur potest se tueri et occidere impediendum.* Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 8. punct. 3. n. 4.

(*q*) *Communis est opinio quam refert Sylvest. quod non teneatur ad restitutionem si ad pinguiorem fortunam pervenerit is—qui in magna necessitate surripit.* Graff. l. 2. c. 93. n. 11.

opened, for common thievery in considerable quantities; without any restraint, either from respect to sin, or to satisfaction. Further, (r) when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruine them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more then a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft (s) (say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say (t) others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, (u) *that any Inn-keeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town.* And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought (x) alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stolen, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. I. A (y) man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their

(r) Corduba. Navar. Lopez. pars. 2. Cap. 93. p. 414.

(s) Navar. c. 17. n. 139. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18. (t) Angestus in Lopez. *ibid.* p. 416. (u) *Tabernarius seu quilibet negotiator posset ditescere sine mortali, et statum decentem fundare, et singulos emptores in modico mensuras curtando defraudare, totam civitatem sic depilando.* *ibid.* p. 14.

(x) *Nihil refert, an paulatim, an simul aliquot interimas, vel spoliis.* Jerom. *ibid.*

(y) *Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existente in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit.* Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navar. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct. 2. n. 9.

good works : and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacriledg) in their best acts ; arrogating that to them, which is Christs peculiar ; *satisfaction and merit*. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stoln, is the (z) common opinion. Also one may steal (a) *money from another, rather then he shall venture it in gaming*, for it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, (b) and that not only in other sins (as Fryer Joseph would limit it) *but such as are intrinsically evil*: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a *holy ad*) to beseech, and perswade him to commit fornication. Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty ; and so perswade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to perswade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a (c) woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin *ibid*. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever *inconsiderately*, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not : since they hold that (d) *no man is bound to*

(z) *in Navar. ibid.*

(a) Antoninus quem sequitur. Nav. *ibid*. n. 5. p. 282.

(b) *Licet inducere ad minus malum paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuadere percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata que non sunt intrinseca mala sed censu sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navar. cap. 14. n. 40.*

Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant—non tantum licere juadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Valsq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin de rest. disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9.

(c) Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navar. cap. 17. n. 154. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:

(d) Adrian. 4. de restit. fam. ad 8. Sylvest. v. culpa. q. 4. in Fill. tr. 32. n. 32.

make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the fault be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as (*) a small fault, not to make restitution, how much soever be stoln inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make *thievery* small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, *that to take away heretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft*; Bonacin. *de reſtit. diſp. 2. q. 8. puncti. 1. n. 1.* So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.

They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to *stealing*, and like unconſcionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; (c) *a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for.* Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, (f) for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value (g) though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor (h) needs he declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that *false measures and weights* may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damaged, and the custom it self to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, (i) *if they do it for their own security, or for mo-*

(*) Sylvest. & alii *ibid.*

(c) *Iustum pretium reputatur quod absq; fraude extorqueri potest.* Ita, Bannes, Medina, Arragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in *Dian.* 1. p. tr. 8. ref. 55.

(f) *Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest.* — Et secundum hoc licet cuilibet carius vendere, aut vilius emere quantum potest. *Sum. v. Emptio. n. 10.*

(g) *Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. Emptio, p. 138.*

(h) *Emptor non tenetur ei explicite affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alias, nude possit inquirere et scire. ibid.*

(i) *Tavernarii dantes vini mensuram diminutam secundum Arc. non excusantur: quia accipiunt & damniſiunt emptoris, non obſtante contraria consuetudine, que est corruptela: nisi hoc faciant ad suam indemnitatem, vel lucrum moderatum: puta, quia si darent plenas, oporteret pretium augere, ut consequenter nullos aut paucos invenirent emptores.* *Sylv. Sum. ibid. n. 20. Vid. Soto, de just. & jur. lib. 6. q. 2. art. 2.*

derate gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in *Soto*: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may sell it (k) by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a (l) man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for *Rhenish*, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would give for *Rhenish*, though it be not. So he may (m) mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price, as for example; (n) In case Wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth; he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give. So (o) Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Countrey which is most esteemed, though it be of another. These conclusions, he says, are collected out of *Aquinas*, and to compleat these Cheats, he tells us (p) that if perhaps the Seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm, that to be *Rhenish* Wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, &c.) it would not be a mortal sin. And *Sylvester* determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his Commodities, or making them better than they are; (q) the lies, if they do not much damnifie the Buyer, are but Venial. They allow persons also to deceive those who intrust them to dispose of their Estates, or Goods. As, if one be employed to sell what is anothers (r) at a certain price, if he sell it for more;

(k) *Soto*, *ibid.* p. 198.

(l) *Ibid.*

(m) *Eadem ratione*, & aqua possit vinum diluere. *Idem ibid.*

(n) *Ibid.*

(o) *Idem ibid.*

(p) Forſan venditoris mendaciam in talibus casibus, si alioquē predicto modo ſervetur iuſtitia, non eſt pernicioſum. *Idem ibid.* p. 199. quem ſequitur in his omnibus, *Tol. in ſtr.* l. 8. c. 49.

(q) *Sum. ibid.* n. 22.

(r) Si accipit certo pretio vendendum; retinere poſſe id quod pluri illud vendiderit, niſi exceſſerit pretium rigorosum. *Navar. c. 23. n. 97.* he

he may keep the over-plus to himself; yea, say (f) some, though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.

Further, *Panormitan* (t) takes notice, that their *Canon-law* allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained or, (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per Cent. in a bargain) But then to save the reputation of the Law (which he like a true Canonist, says, was formed by the instinct of the holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but *Sylvester* who sees no ground for that, uses another shift; (u) he says it may be understood, either of deceit in the thing, or fraud in the persons, which their Law tolerates, but approves not. *Cajetan* grants so great deceit (x) is lawful, by humane constitution: but says, it is condemned by the law of God; and so we leave this shameful Deceit, lawful by the Popes Decrees, but damnable by Gods Word.

SECT. IX.

LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds. A lye, as they define it, (y) is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to de-

(f) Angel. Sum. in Sylv. *ibid.* n. 25.

(t) Dicit etiam Panormitan quod jura Canonica permittentia deceptionem usque ad dimidium, intelligi debent quando venit deceptio reipsa, in Sylv. *ibid.* n. 9.

(v) Ego dico quod loquitur in foro contentioso, sive deceptio sit ex re, sive ex dolo: non quia illum approbat, sed quia tolerat. *Ibid.*

(x) Jure humano dicitur licitum decipere citra dimidium justii pretii: sed lex domini immaculata est, &c. Sum. v. emptore.

(y) Aquinas, 2. 2. q. 110. art. 1.

liver (a) what is false, if not on purpose, though it be without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lye with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, *videntem dicere falsum quis vitat?* to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell (b) lies when he list, out of meer pleasure, to be telling lies: yea (c) or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, (d) when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injur'd, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholics, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted; either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, (e) received by all Catholics, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to

(a) Si dicatur falsum sed desit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprium aut perfectum, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adhibita, est veniale, 2.2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylv. Sum. v. mendacium. n. 1.

(b) Quod sit sola mentiendi libidine quod procedit ex habitu: nam mendax ex eo quod talis est secundum habitum ipso mendasio gaudet, & Ethic.—reducitur ad jocosum, cum sit delectabile mentienti. Idem ibid. nec mendacium erat mortale ut in jocoso & officioso, ibid. n. 3.

(c) Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, & non propter aliud. Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.

(d) Officiosum (mendacium) quod sine alienius injuria dicitur, ut alicui profit, & hoc etiam est veniale. Cajet. ibid. v. Mendac.

(e) Lex de non mentiendo jocosè aut officiosè sine damno alterius—(istas) transgressio est solum venialis, secundum omnes Catholicos. Navar. c. 23. n. 5.

show false Reliques, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth. For, all this falseness is *officious*, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over mens Consciences; and it does the world no *hurt*; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, *Jews, Turks, Heathens*, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for *truth*, than these Catholics: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsifie any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledg of it? yet this practice with the *Romanists* (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a *great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion*, as some (f) of themselves do acknowledg it has been accounted. To proceed, (g) there are five or six several sorts of lyes, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the *pernicious* Lye only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is *against justice*; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withall, it be against *Justice*: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, (h) and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only *by accident*; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and *by accident* they

(f) *Fuerunt qui magne pietatis loco ducunt mendaciola pro religione confingere.* Ludovicus Vives, & Espensæus, *Com. in Tim.* l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.

(g) Sylvest. *ibid.* n. 5.

(h) *Mendacium si aliam non habet maculam quam falsitatis, non est genere suo mortale, patet, quia neque est contra religionem (Romanam) neque contra iustitiam.* Soto, *ibid.* l. 5. q. 7. art. 4. p. 168.

may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that *these* have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lyes need be shun'd, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lyes, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the (i) greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intend it to be great; or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even *pernicious* lies will be *harmless* Venials. They may by their Rules, *lye* to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but *when* it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Lyar cannot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with *lies in point of Religion*? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. (k) To

(i) *Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quæ fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quæ fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navar. c. 18. n. 1.*

(k) *Mendacis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcumque multiplicatur & continnetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, &c. Graff. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10.*

Excusari tamen à mortali cum qui utitur amphibologia in contractu cum juramento, &c. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.

use lies, says de Graffis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgment of their Doctors, who hold, *that a Venial how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal.* We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious Lye which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.

Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsely, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Countrey, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. *Bonacin. de contract. disp. 3. q. 1. punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7.* Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lyes are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsly) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offer'd them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. *Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 31;* after others; yea, if they not only lye but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great dammage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in *common conversation*, or in *commerce*; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in *Judgment*, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgment is *destructive of humane Society*, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lye in Court, if the end of it be but delight; (1) is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lye there seriously, if they do it

(1) Durandus & Sylvester. *ibid. n. 3.*

not as Witnesses, and in (m) matters judicial : and (n) the Judge too, if he lye not as a Judge. Further, (o) they may bear false witness in favour of another : a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them ; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lye is Venial, whether it be for, or against another. So Navar (p) and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lye is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor) ; which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lye be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge, in the face of the Countrey. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Lyar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lye, saies Sylvester (q) in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal ; because it subverts the truth of Judgment, which tends to the ruine of the Universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited in things, in which the Lyar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to

(m) Navar. secundum Cajetanum. cap. 18. n. 3.

(n) Mortalia sunt iudicis ut hec mendacia, reliqua sunt per accidens & ideo venialia. Cajetan. Sum. v. Mendac.

(o) Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortale : neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere : quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Præceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4.

Victoria visum est non esse damnandum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum teneatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultro offerentibus ad testificandum falsum—jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.

(p) Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, eo solo, quod, in iudicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censetur in iudicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navar. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.

(q) Mendacium de his que ad iudicium pertinent est perniciosum & mortale : quia subvertit veritatem iudicii, quod tendit, in perniciem universitatis, quod limita quantum ad ea, in quibus qui mentitur, tenetur dicere veritatem, non aliter. Ibid. n. 3.

any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lye plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgment), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Ansonius Corduba determines, that a person otherwise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witness too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying (r) I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual * form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navar holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and (s) Lopez after him. Sylvester (t) concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the person not subject to the Judge, in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lye be not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judges sense, (u) and true

(r) Licet sibi & testibus injuste interrogatis sic respondere: (quando tunc respondere nescio, non recordor non prodassit) non furatus sum, intelligendo, ad jure revelandum tibi.— alias tenemur per verba, & modos assuetos, licet equivocos injuste, interroganti, respondere. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 264.

* Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. 1.

(s) Intelligendo intra se quod isto vel illo mense non fuerit id res furatus—Navarre opinio testimoniis Gabriel Adriani, Paludens & Vincent. Justiniani, rata habetur. Ibid.

(t) Quum juridice non procedat, vel quia accusatus non est ei subiectus simpliciter vel in hoc casu, aut quacunq; alia causa, tunc licet mendacium sic illicitum, non est tamen mortale—Immo non erit etiam veniale, si respondendo cautelose, & ut aiunt Sophistice, dicat aliquid falsum, apud sensum judicis, & apud sum verum; quia eo casu cum non sit ejus subditus, non tenetur dicere veritatem ad ejus intentionem. Rationem dictorum assignat. Hen. de Gan. Sylv. Sum. v. accusatio. n. 10.

(u) Licet ei uti equivocatione, Soto de just. l. 3. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem rem posse dicere non feci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 3. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Tol. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.

in his own; since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alleges *Henricus de Gandavo*, with his reason for it. *Doto* allows him to use Equivocation. *Cajetan* permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? (y) *AGUINAS*, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, because he knows it not as a man. And according to *Vercellanus*, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer he knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this *Richard. de Sancto Victore*, *Bonaventure*, *Scotus* and *Panormitan* agree; yet *Angelus* thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be deny'd, but that he knows it AS A MAN: (z) but this, saies *Sylvest.* is said against the judgment of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though (a) the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruine), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lye, and swear falsely in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority

Non tenetur respondere etiamsi iurasset dicere veritatem secundum, Henr. de Gand. — sed dicetne mendacium? Resp. quod non sed utetur aliis verbis duplicibus & siliis. Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. 1.

(y) Quid, si iudex instat, vel exigit juramentum a sacerdote an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Et dico quod secundum, S. Tho. & omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo queritur, de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciat quod audivit in confessione jurare potest, se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo — Secundum *Vervec*, si alio modo iniquum iudicem declinare non potest: respondere potest se nihil scire, quia subintelligitur ut homo — Et consentiunt *Rich. Bonav. Scot. & Pan. Sylvest. v. confessio 3. n. 6.*

(z) Quod ejus dictum est contra omnem doctrinam suorum Doctorum et contra C. si sacerdos intellexit juxta communem doctrinam: quia ibi dicitur sacerdos hoc scire ut Deus.

(a) Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republica ab ingenti malo temporali aut spiritali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum *Akiba* repetit. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard. Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis, Adrian. Medina. Viver. Sylv. & alii summissa, videlicet Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navar. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Stat. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.

of

of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as the gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.

But though truth suffer so much by them in *evil* things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their *divine* Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their *Altars*, in their *Pulpits*, and at their penitential *Tribunals*. Their *Lyturgies* have been stuffed with *Fables*, and *Eyes* made both the ground and part of their publick devotions. Their own (1) Writers take notice of (2) *plain lyes rected in their daily Prayer*. And what store of them there were in the *whole*, we may guess by a *part*. (3) *Peter Abbat* of *Cluny* declares, that in a Church-hymn in *praise of Saint Benedict*, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lyes at least. Some reformation hereof was thought requisite, for shame of the *World*. But though the old sore smelt noisomely even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, least nothing at all of the old Service should be left. *Melechius Canus*, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of *Trente* where he sat), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are *uncertain*, *contradictory*, *frivolous* and *false* too; but yet he thought it not advisable, to have this thoroughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. *They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories*

(1) *Vid. Espenc. com. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.*

(2) *Nuper Raphael. Volateranus ausus est scribere dolendum, aperta in horis Canonicis legi mendacia. Ibid. p. 424.*

(3) *Noski quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nuge canora mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurima sunt — mendacia ad minus 24. canticum id. citato percurrente animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 423.*

In res sacras hanc quoque mentendi licentiam irrepisse, seu potius aperte invasam esse, Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espenc. in 1. Tim. digr. l. 12. c. 12. p. 146.

Que in Ecclesia legi solent — quanquam nonnulla eandem tuerentur sunt, apocrypha levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911.
In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dum redirem curant, capite incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesie officium usque 30. preter solitam immutant, ut viz. ulla antiqua religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.

instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any part of the old Religion seems left in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lyes or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the *Trent-Council*, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there, but of something worse too, in these words: (b) If the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their Missals and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would he set them out? for our prayers are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops. He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that ancient Bishop Agobardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries; declaring expressly, that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where it bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lye, by Cajetans (c) leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lye in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; (d) he may mix his Sermons with false stories, (if they

(b) Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missalibus & antiphonariis superflua, falsa, ridicula; blasphemica phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea conspiceret Deum immortalē? quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt enim preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcate: com. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 357. Espenceus; in the words of Linacrus.

(c) Sām. v. mendacium; p. 439. omne mendacium predicatoris contra veritatem spectantem ad predicatoris officium (est mortale) — quoniam haec tantum sunt predicatoris ut sic — mendacia & reliqua sunt per accidens, & ideo venialia: nisi rationes scandalī aliud occurrat censendum.

(d) Queritur utrum sit peccatum mortale predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eis quae non spectant ad doctrinam pura, si dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylv. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graff. 1. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.

besetious) to please his auditory, (e) that's commonly a Venial. He may (f) tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit: this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lye too, as a serious Divine; and in-fill false Doctrine into the people, without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so *Summa Angelica*, and *Rosella*, with others, conclude. (g) They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other. (as we have shew'd before); they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lye instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; enjoyned; or but advised; they may lye at as easie a rate, if (b) it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publickly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some shew of modesty, and caution. *Sylvestr* takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lye in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly; and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lyes as

(e) *Immiscere predicationi facetas fabellas delectandi gratia quod B. Ambrosius reprehendit quia non debint, in tam gravi actione de rebus tam arduis qualia sunt divina verba, immisceri jocosa & ridicula. Communiter tamen est hoc veniale. Cajetan. summi predicat. p. 481.*

(f) *Qui concionant fabulam & facietas, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed communiter non plusquam venialiter, juxta eundem; imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navar. c. 25. n. 142.*

(g) *In pertinentibus ad doctrinam tenent. Sum. Angel. & Rosell. quod non sit mortale, nisi ratione scandalum vel contemptus doctrine annexi: vel nisi in his que sunt de necessitate facienda, intelligit etiam omittenda, secus si ex consilio, Sylvest. v. mendaci. n. 4.*

(b) *Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacre scripture vel morum — quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navar. c. 18. n. 4.*

(i) *Credunt non esse mortale mentiri in ambone, nisi ut illi dicunt, predicant maximas falsitates, que deinde a secularibus deprehendantur. Ibid.*

the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful; he that reads the *Legends*, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired *Ahab's* Prophets. And where they are now disused: its not with any acknowledgment, that such notorious *lies*, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: (k) *The law, saies he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils.* That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) *Espenceous* calls, *Devilish prodigies*. And (l) *false-likes, or miracles, they allow to be shew'd, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, (m) if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.*

And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from *lying*; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a

(k) *Verum lex perit à sacerdotibus; recitant pro Historia fabulas, pro serijs joca, pro veritate mendacium, — pro virtute Dei ficticia miracula ne dicam portentosa Dem-piorum. Espenceus, Serm. 1. De officio pastorum.*

After he hath premised something of the preaching and writing off false Miracles, he adds: *At facilius Anglia stabulum, quam talibus fabellis multorum tam libros, tam conciones repurges, in 2 Tim. c. 4. digr. 21. p. 424.*

(l) *Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis questus. Navar. cap. 17. v. 169. Graff. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis questus fiat, id est, eo sine aliquid accipiendi pro offensione earum.*

(m) *Navar. Ibid.*

crime,

crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that ~~men~~ can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion: they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for *lying* and deceit: and that where-ever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to *lye*. 'Tis the (u) common Doctrine, that they may *lye* in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confitent may deny (o) that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, (p) or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, (q) if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny (r) that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have (s) two Confessors, one a

(u) Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9. Nav. c. 21. n. 37. Grass. l. 1. c. 12. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salontus, &c. in Fill. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10.

Quoniam eas circumstantias, quæ nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis, non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendacium, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale propius quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (vix. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma; Armella, Angelus, Sylvest. Soto, Navar. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3 & 6.

(q) Navar. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusculis de secretis membr. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est etiam mendaci in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in qua omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (vix. jam laqueati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.

(r) Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali — non esse peccatum mortale per se loquendo; hoc est scilicet scandalum & contemptum, tenet Angelus, Sylvest. Soto, Pen Soto, Navar. Idem ibid. n. 7.

(s) Sylvest. ibid. vel affirmando. Idem in Suar. ibid. n. 10.

(t) Non peccare mortaliter, ut diximus, confitentem negantem se admisisse peccatum mortale, alias legitime confessum. Navar. ibid. n. 38.

(f) Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam amittant, confessario eundem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscena, & postea alteri probò & gravi solum leviora, quod de se non est malum, & si finis venialis fuerit, peccatum veniale erit, & si mortalis, mortale, & si bonus qualis frequentius, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.

lewd.

lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lyes, so likewise with equivocations. *Job. Sanchez* (no Jesuite) offers us several instances; *Select. disp. 9.* He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, *I have no such custome, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present.* n. 7. yea he may deny it, though he believe the Priest would absolve him, n. 8. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal; may, using equivocation, deny it, n. 9. Or if the penitent be known to the Confessor, who well understands that he has a Sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin: he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, Country, and the like, without plain lying; yet using equivocation (n. 10. after *Navar*) yea though he be a Religious person, he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (*ibid.*) And as the penitents may thus delude their Confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise: pretending to absolve them, when they neither do it, nor intend it, *Idem disp. 35, n. 1. n. 7, & 8. Antonin. Dian. resol. v. equiv.* Let the world judge where we may be assured of truth and honesty in *Romanists*, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their Doctors give them); since they think not themselves obliged thereto, in any of the cases specified. If by their Doctrine, they may without danger be false to private persons, to *Magistrates*, to their *Priests*, to their *God*: where can they have credit? if they may practice lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in Doctrine, in Worship, in Courts of Justice, and before that which they count *Gods Tribunal*; where may they be trusted?

SECT. X.

They give as much liberty to violate *Faith*, as truth; and no less encouragement to *perfidiousness*, and breach of promises: either where faith is engaged mutually, as in *compactis*, and agreements; or singly as in *pollicitations*. They distinguish *perfidiousness* as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a *pleasant* *perfidiousness*, another which they call *officious*, and a third *pernicious*: to be *perfidious* merely for delight, is *Venial*; to deal *perfidiously*, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is *pernicious*, to pass for innocent. (t) *Cajetan* gives this reason, why the two former sorts of *perfidiousness*, are but *Venial*; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; (u) To make a promise, without an intent to be obliged, is but *Venial*, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should ingage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but *Venially*. If all men should

(t) *Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mensendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reducitur creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversatione humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.*

(u) *Navar. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.*

take the liberty, which this rule gives *Roman Catholics*, (x) humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which *Navar* after many others, determines elsewhere, does it more fully. He (y) that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lye; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjur'd innocently, because he promised, as a perfidious knave. *Sylvester* Inquires, (z) whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters, signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And *Navar* expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, (a) that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one, than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, (b) great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of

(x) *Nisi fide sit respublica opibus non stabit.* Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. *Fides* hac non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est opissimum justitiae fundamentum. *Cicer.* 1. de off. pertinet convitiis humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent homines, in promissis fraudem fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam veniale. *Lopez.* p. 2. c. 30.

(y) Qui promissit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promissit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promississe, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, *Vid. Navar.* in C. humane aures 22. q. 3. q. 1. & 2. pro hoc doctrina adducit, *S. Thom.* *Scotum*, *Paludan.* *Ricard.* de Sancto Victore. Major. *Adrian* & alios.

(z) Queritur utrum ex sola promissione sive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conscientia: & dico quod sic sub peccato mortali in rebus scilicet alienius importantie. *Ibid.*

(a) Nec violatio promissae rei exiguae erit mortalis, quamvis venialis sit. c. 18. n. 7. *Soto*, *Canus*, *Victoria*, *Sylvester*, in *Lopez.* pars 2. c. 30.

(b) Quando non per se est perfidus, non incurrit mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocuumtum seu scandolum. *Cajetan.* v. perfidia.

injustice

injustice, is no crime; a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withall unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, (c) *that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow.* Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revcked, without mortal sin. *Panormisan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3.* yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. *Idem ibid. n. 2.* And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any ingagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concern'd, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easie a rate. The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to *Cajetan, (d) through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness* (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or *out of confidence in him, to whom he is engaged* (the good nature of one party concern'd, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or *for any cause, which he thinks reasonable.* He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and

(c) *A mortali excusantur qui — parva pollicentur (& non implent) quamvis juramento, aut voto id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonia. Sylvest. Soto.) Navar. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.*

(d) *Excusatur a mortali — ex parte forme; hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit — sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia facti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promisit, aut ex causa quæ sibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.*

faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there is any that *seems* but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. *Sylvester* after others tells us, a (e) man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble; (to feign that he is engaged, when he did not mean it): for, saies he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloibs to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f) that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an University, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those foremenzioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g) that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so *Panormitan*, *Angelus* and *Rosella*, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly

(e) Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi scilicet si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fingendi: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex præcepto obligandi: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quæ ad hoc obligaret de necessitate præcepti, puta, promissi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligandi si. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.

(f) utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod sic quando pollicitus civitati, universitati, clero Ecclesie, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujusmodi: secus si fiat prædictis sine causa: vel aliis à prædictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi prætextu promissionis aliquid contulerit. Ibid. v. pollicitatio. Ita & eisdem verbis. Angelus sum. v. pollicitatio.

(g) In Sylvest. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia — hoc autem sum. Ang. & Rosell. & est limitatio Coll. quem sequitur Panor. quando exprimitur causa promittendi.

done

done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. *Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.* Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no other wise, may break any promise without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. *ibid. n. 11. (b) Lopez,* that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; *that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it:* and so in promising (as he saies), *unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, saies he, a multitude of scruples is removed.* And he saies true, for hereby a man may without any scruple, break any promises that are not under (*) his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that *(i) he who promises in word, without mind, or intention to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it:* and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all faith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidioulness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruine humane society; and to render

(b) ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adfit animus in promittente, dum promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit iuramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se constant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p. 175.

(*) Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Nayar. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss. Fix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.

(i) Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione se obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176.

Secundum communiter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi se. Angel. sum. v. pactum. n. 4.

Roman Catholics, less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than seditious Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.

SECT. XI.

Hitherto, thus much of deceit and lyes, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisie is a lye indeed, both are equally sinful. (k) *Aquinas* after some of the *Antients* asserts, that it is all alike to lye in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signifie and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a sword, or an axe, as they expresse it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. *Sylvester* inquires (l) whether to make a false shew of sanctity be a sin? he answers, that if it be for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good; then it is a sin: because it is a false ostentation of sanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So *Cajetan* (m) will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine

(k) *Paria esse factis aut verbis mendari, Vid. Navar. cap. 18. n. 8.*

Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, natu, vel facto mendari; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.

(l) *Sum. v. simulatio n. 4. ne pallietur iniquitas, & ipso bonus putetur, quod est peccatum — ad honorem Dei, & proximorum adificationem — & hoc non est peccatum.*

(m) *Si scias ille sit bonus (puta, ad adificationem aliorum) nihilominus peccatum est, quia non sunt facienda mala ut bona eveniant. Sum. v. hypocrisis p. 340.*

that

that (n) bare Hypocrisie, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lye, and be design'd to deceive others, (o) otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. (p) Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving shew, (q) for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisie will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, (r) which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisie, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicite, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicate. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisie. It is amongst the commendations of Saint Denitnick himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject *de sancta ejus Hypocrisie*, shewing that it was not on-

(n) Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis fraudata sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim habet. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navar. c. 18. n. 8.

(o) Facere opera quibus, bonus appareat, cum non sit, sine intentione ostendendi se bonum, non est etiam veniale, juxta mentem omnium. Idem ibid.

(p) Alias erit veniale, puta, cum in ipsa fictione delectetur, — magis vanus videtur quam malus. Sylvest. ibid.

(q) Si a bono finis ille sit vana gloria, non tamen ita quod in ea ponatur ultimus finis, peccatum est veniale quidem sed duplicatum. Cajetan. ibid.

(r) Quae opera ad Dei servitium naturaliter ordinata sunt sunt jejunium oratio elemosyna facit ex intentione non serviendi Deo, sed ob gloriam humanam, hypocrisis peccatum incurrit formaliter, implicate tamen. Cajetan. ibid. p. 341.

Nonnumquam etiam fratres suos admonuisse, ut aliquam ostenderent virtutis, apparentiam in abstinentiis, vigiliis, verborum ac gestorum disciplina, quum apud seculares essent; & sic eos sancta quadam hypocrisi, ad fidei reverentiam, & virtutis amorem propensius invitarent. Specul. histor. l. 12. c. 105.

ly: the practice of their Saint, but that he commended *the holy thing* to his Brethren (the *Fryers Predicant*). Hypocrisie being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. *A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits* (so *Rosella v. Hypoc. n. 1.*) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shews of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the *Romanists* are concern'd to speak favourably of Hypocrisie; and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shews of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisie as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.

SECT. XII.

Disgracing and defaming others to their face by *contumelies*, or behind their backs by *detraction*; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the *Canon Law*, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial; in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a *Maxime* with them, that the (*s*) *quality of sins in words, is regu-*

(/) Aquinas, & Alexander, Aletis, in Sylv. sum. v. contumel. n. 2.

lated by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which *Cajetan* often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t) of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him : for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him ; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite ; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u) materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it ; but then withall they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial ; all agree in this saies (x) *Sairns* : To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. *Pet. Navar. Sairns, & alii communiter in Bonacin.*

(t) Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui spernit proximum ut spernat proximum : sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat. &c. *Cajetan. sum. v. contemptus.*

(u) Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione debonorandi) possunt verba contumeliosa etiam absque ulla peccato dici. *Ibid. v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 10. ar. 2.*

(x) *Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4.*

Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. *Navar. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.*

ibid. n. 9. Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness, which they count Venial. Thus they may caluminate any man, and without crime charge him falsely, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Liar, a Perjur'd Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholics, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z) revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward act; this is not mortal, because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a) if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known; and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and fame are of like account. Or you (b) may charge those falsely

(y) Imponere vel detegere veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navar. ibid. n. 24. Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his que sunt modice importantie, ut venialia que communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navar. Arragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.

(z) Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, que & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel huiusmodi que sumi possunt & pro naturali inclinatione & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpretari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graff. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navar. Sayrus, Arragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.

(a) Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de aliis, & si non de isto. Angelus, ibid. Idem est in mortalibus notoriis secundum Archiepiscopum quia non leditur fama jam lesa. Sylvest. ibid.

(b) Meretricis es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere jamam, non est peccatum mortale. Graff. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur a peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suam existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.

for committing a crime, when they did it not ; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c) may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known ; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretick, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresie. Or you may accuse others of any (d) wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of : as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation : for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e) with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a vertue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather than the Apostle : and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do (f) it out of levity, or pleasure in tatling ; unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g) by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (b) is not believed

(c) Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoria, sicut non est infamia notorio homicida & furi, quod sit fornicatus. Sylvest. ibid.
 (d) Si sunt personae quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo laedit, ut juvenes seculares — quod simile est de adulterio apud multos. Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. 28.

(e) Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est virtutis Eutrapeliæ, quatenus intra limites moderatæ facetiæ continetur : quando scilicet urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.

(f) Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat : peccatum est plurimum veniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.

(g) Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.

(h) Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita fides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.

or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i) for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k) through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiour rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful *eos defamare esse licitum, absolute responder.* Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invented (such as *Bolsec* and *Cochleus* would have fastned upon *Luther* and *Calvin*) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholick need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the *Jesuites*, but the common Doctrine of *Aquinas* his Disciples, as *Ledesma* a *Dominican* assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 *Doctors*, which *Caramuel* says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this *maxime* they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: *We are they who declare it no crime to ca-*

(i) *Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendum, &c.* Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9. art. 2.

(k) *ubi vero nonnullus est cautela defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut sepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infime Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conperant, ut in buccam veniant.* Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9.

illuminate most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard; they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (1) not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruine his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.

SECT. XIII.

FLattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m) praise one for the vertue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extoll the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n) when a man is to be praised for a good work, though you

(1) Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittitur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas fama. ibid.

(m) Est adulatio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis. pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.

(n) Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si fiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 hore sunt dici, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina misericordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.

know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, but may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruine: because (saies Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o) applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and fardid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and incouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p) a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q) it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easie a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r) to curse in words (if

(o) Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquam utilitatem consequendam, vel non impediendam, ut de se pater. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.

(p) Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae — sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis — Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quale adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.

(q) Imo virtus est consentire laudi, siue se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitet. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.

(r) Ori tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes filiis, & coloni, & mulieres bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.

not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted) ; to imprecate any mischief or misery to them ; to (s) with Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it , he may *curse the Devil too.* (t) *'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due.* Cursing (u) may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, (x) *when cursing is used for honest recreation.* And he may (y) *curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man : in these cases, it is only a Venial fault.*

SECT. XIV.

I Have been long in viewing their account of *Venial* sins ; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification ; Will excuse me. They venture hard,

(f) *Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.*

(t) *Peccat qui maledixit diabolo ratione sue nature quia illa bona est & a Deo facta scius se ratione sue culpe, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.*

(u) (Quum) *malo usu hujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.*

(x) *Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo — talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affectu penantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale — quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali cavere possit, ut se fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestæ.*

(y) *Si penitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.*

to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style *mortal*, or *capital*: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the *mortalness* so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the *mortalness*; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.

Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (2) *simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity*. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to *liberality*, or to *justice*: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a) *as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin*: thus Navar (b) and Sotus (c) and all after Aquinas. (d) So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial

(2) *Simpliciter & absolute non est peccatum mortale ex suo genere quia non est contra, sed præter-charitatem. Sum. v. Avaricia.*

(a) *ut contrarietur liberalitati, & sic significat inordinatum appetitum pecunie: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.*

(b) Cap. 23. n. 70.

(c) De Just. l. 4. q. 3. art. 2. p. 11 m

(d) 22 q. 133. art. 4.

fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signify no such thing, unless *injustice* be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of *misers* can be: yet if he be not withall, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e) *In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime.* They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawfull, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed; with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable. I have shew'd before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f) Venial, though it be not only out of an *ordinate*, but an *excessive* desire of *gaining*, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so

(e) ut opponitur iustitie & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiendi seu retinendi alium, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, fures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.

(f) Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur; et negotiatione ad lucrum — ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Navar. cap. 20, n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.

that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the perswasion of them all: for says Navar, (g) we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people ply for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they sign fit no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h) such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i) sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted which will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloyster'd pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance; for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an. titulum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navar seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar, Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that do will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently. Ibid. To say nothing that (k) their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shews that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful

(g) In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videmus magnam pecuniariam summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & a confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod facere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccarent. Navar. ibid. n. 11.

(h) Queritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus aleæ sit peccatum? & dico quod hic ludus non est peccatum, vel est veniale quum ludatur aliquod modicum, &c. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.

(i) Navar. ibid. n. 3.

(k) Peccat clericus vel monachus qui ludum mortaliter malam spectat, si multo tempore spectat, sacris s. parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.

to (l) restore what is wickedly gained. *Sylvester* after others, says (m) that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope *Adrian* and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, *Vid. Lopez. ibid.* Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So *Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. punct. 3. n. 2.* Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judge for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassin for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n) that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving,) is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judge that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o) if he pass a just one, he is

(l) *Nullus tenetur cum fame periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19. n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.)* This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse — qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.

(m) *Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum Rodfred, sed de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.*

(n) *Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ita ut ab utraque parte admittitur turpitudine, nulli est de precepto restituendum; S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angelus, Sylvester, (in) Navar. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 38. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem — ut in Simonia — lucro meretricis, &c. idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vazq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.*

(o) *Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est iudici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctissimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. & c. 25. n. 45.*

obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p) a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, *Idem ibid. n. 3. Per. Navar. & alii.* So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; *Per. Navar. & alii cum Barnab. ibid. n. 10.* And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it; though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q) that restitution to the poor is *liberum, et non obligatorium*, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to do villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only *disquietum mentis* (r) through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also *hardness of heart* (s) against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in

(p) *Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonac. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.*

(q) *Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis; quod restitutio, quæ non est faciendæ alieni certæ personæ, sed pauperibus non debetur ex præcepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.*

(r) *Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.*

(s) *Per duriciam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties tenentur de præcepto obligante ad mortale — alias enim hoc venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.*

their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent as its cause, no worse than *Pontius, unless*, when one is obliged under pain of mortal guilt to afford relief. And when is that? only (1) in extremum necessity, when the starving man may (u) sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x) to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y) to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be imbittered with one act of charity: he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dinr in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (*) yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (4) if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, (b) is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal act, and so there is no need to confess it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and liberality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?

But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extremity; (c) *pure prodigality is no mor-*

(1) Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.

(u) Idem c. 23. n. 95.

(x) Vid. supra.

(y) Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.

(4) Idem ibid. n. 55.

(*) Idem c. 24. n. 5.

(b) Quia hæc fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, qui sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quæ per prædictam avaritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 23. n. 75.

(c) Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est, quia minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quoniam si pura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed præter illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.

not sin, because it is a less fault than covetousness, contrary to liberality, which is manifestly of itself an mortal sin; and the reason of both, neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d) Navar, prodigality (including both the loss of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this also (e) Aquinas.

SECT. XV.

Pride is another capital crime, they stile it (f) the Queen of mortal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, not such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas (g) it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him and his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, &c.) but out of contempt. So (h) Cajetan also, and others after him. Navar says (i) they make it an actual contempt of being subject to God; and adds, thanks be to God, this is but found in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world.

(d) Cap. 18. n. 28. supra.

(e) 22 q. 120. art. 2. & 3.

(f) Ipsa vitiorum regina, superbia. Gregor. moral. 31. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 161. art. 8.

(g) Ex parte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis non movetur a Deo aversionem vel propter ignorantiam vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter desiderium cuiuscunque alterius boni. Sed superbia habet aversionem a Deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult Deo & ejus regule subesse. Cujus natus est Dei contemptus. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 162. n. 6.

(h) Sum. v. superbia, vid. Sylvest. v. superbia.

(i) Requiritur iterque Thomas communiter recepti ad ejus essentiam actualem contemptum subijcendi se Deo & legi ejus cum id (Gratia Deo) pauci Christiani faciant & nec omnes aliquo modo superbiamus, c. 23. n. 5. certe paucissimi Christiani, c. 2. 6.

It is questionable whether *Scorus* did count that pride mortal, which *Aquinas* judg'd to be so, he says (k) *few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it.* However (l) *Cajetan* ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: *He that shews himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it.* Likewise when one is so affected, as to be secure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is left; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spie in his mind or fancie, the defects of others, or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Huseenly countrey, for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce awake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citizen, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours: the love of God where it is, producing (those) great things. And likewise is reference to his Neighbour's crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience in enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, as shew, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then stroaks all gently over, calling them Venials. (m) These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are

(k) *Quilibet tenetur vitare omne peccatum mortale, tamen non tenetur scire in quo gradu, superbia est peccatum mortale, quia nec multi experti sciunt.* *Scorus, in St. Clem. Probl. 15. p. 94.*

(l) *Sum. v. superbia.*

(m) *Sunt autem hæc & multa alia, quæ imperfectæ sunt superbiæ, communiter venialia peccata, propter imperfectionem actus, dum per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmodi peccata valde vitam spirituum: utpote ex genere superbiæ existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 348.*

summary

commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) binder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height; (n) *Aquinas* out of *Gregory*, and (o) others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, (p) *When one thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not.* If their great *Aspilcuera* could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and veneration before him; either his sight fail'd him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, (q) where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondred why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What *salvo* they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that sounds like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is

(n) 22 q. 142. art. 4.

(o) *Angelus. v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navar. c. 23. v. 7. alii communiter.*

(p) *Secundum hoc sumuntur due prima superbie species, scilicet cum quis à semetipso habere estimat quod à Deo habet, vel cum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit. Sic est ratio species superbia cum scilicet aliquis iustat se habere quod non habet. Aquinas, ibid.*

(q) *Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus infidelitatis. Navar. ibid. n. 8. In universali dicere bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc pertinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. superbia.*

(r) *say*

says Cajetan, frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledge, or goodness, or authority than he hath; and again, it is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God, as the King of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this, except the Pope, who has the Law in his own hand); or against others by Tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it: and affecting it is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent; which, with him is (1) not deadly); or unless it be made ones ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines, that (2) arrogancy is commonly a Venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it, we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.

SECT. XVI.

Ambition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judge it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; *stilo curia*, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, (u) whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers, negatively it is not

(v) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dum absque prejudicio proximi astat quis se plus scientie, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum, aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in hujusmodi elatione ponatur. Ibid.)

(f) Ibid, v. vovendi condit.

(t) Utrum sit mortale peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit que sit mortalis — alias communiter peccatum veniale erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.

(u) Utrum ambitio sit peccatum mortale? Resp. quod non simpliciter sed pro ratione finis — vel secundo ratione rei que appetitur. Sum. v. ambitio.

so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in it self lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be a crime; but that is accidental, and still *ambitionfiness*; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus *Cajetan* he will yield it more than (x) Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by *Sylvester*, (y) with *Navar*, (z) regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal virtues had been concern'd; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.

SECT. XVII.

Vain glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many other; they define it to be an inordinate affecting of humane glory; and yet determine, that an (a) inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a Venial sin; only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases, this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common Doctrine, *Cajetan* will have it to be mortal (b) then only, when one glories

(x) Non est autem mortale peccatum, nisi vel ex parte rei in qua appetitur honor: puta, si quis vult honorari ob crimen aliquod; vel ex parte finis — quia vult haberi ut Deus. *Cajetan*. v. ambit.

(y) Sum. v. superbia. n. 7.

(z) Quamvis regulariter, appetitus inordinatus honoris, non excedat metas culpa venialis, Cap. 23. n. 15.

(a) Appetitus eorum etiam inordinatus regulariter est venialis. &c. Idem ibid. n. 9.

(b) Solum peccat mortaliter, qui gloriatur de aliquo quod est peccatum mortale; secundum qui ponit summum finem ultimum in gloria humana. Sum. v. glor. van.

in mortal sin (but to glory in Venials they count it a small fault) or set his ultimate end in vain glory. (c) Angelus collects out of Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of itself imports not any thing contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, (d) that if love of humane glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not Mortal. And Sylvester (e) delivers this as the sense of their Oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal. Angelus (f) concludes, that this may be a mans end in all things, but the Scripture and the Sacraments; but this limitation is too strict in the judgment of their Doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are (g) principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls for vain glory as his chief end, as for example, be that in Preaching, or Praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his Principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but Venially. Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navar after them. Aquinas the Angel of their Schools, was it seems of this perswasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did (b) contradict, not only the truth, but Saint Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a mans own glory, as the Sacraments and the Scripture. And they are highly concern'd to maintain this,

(c) Colligo ex Alex. in 2.2. & Thom. 2.2. q. 132. & Henr. de Gandavo in quodl. 1. q. 24. quod vana gloria de se non dicit aliquid quod sit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 1.

(d) Inanis gloria non est mortale peccatum, nisi charitati perfecte adversatur. Aquinas 2.2. q. 132. art. 3.

(e) Intendit ergo S. Tho. quod appetitus vanae gloriae ex suo genere non sit mortale. Sum. v. van. gl. n. 2.

(f) Si aliquid aliud, quod non pertinet ad divinam scripturam vel sacramenta propter gloriam faceret, peccaret venialiter. Sum. ibid.

(g) Navar. Cap. 23. n. 13. supra. Quamvis eximus vir ille Angelus teneat, concionari, missam celebrare & alia principaliter divino cultus dedicata facere propter bonum aut inanem gloriam, esse mortale, contrarium tamen tenendum est, ut latissime demonstravimus. Idem c. 21. n. 40. Vid. Soto, de Suarez. supra.

(b) Contra S. Tho. & veritatem dicit, quod est mortale quando ea, quae ordinata sunt ad gloriam Dei quis principaliter facit ad gloriam suam, ut sacramenta & scripturae facit. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 4.

for says he, if (i) *this were a mortal sin, the whole Clergy in a manner were in an ill condition*: he means they were in a state of damnation. So that it was high time for the Roman Doctors to form a Divinity of new Maxims, since those of Scripture and Antiquity, left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a peccadillo, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not Preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian: but he that will allow it under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of Salvation, (k) *advances it higher*. He (l) *that takes a Church-living or Spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit, offends but Venially*, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance, or other defect. So that in their Church, for any or all of them, from the Pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end, in taking the charge of Souls, or other place or employment, which concern the worship of God, or the Salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times over, would never hazard their Souls. These two last conclusions will help us to discern of what complexion Popery is, upon what it is founded; for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without, or against any conscientious or Spiritual consideration: And why they may make Religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There's no danger in all this; it's a harmless Venial by their Doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferiour place, below their honour and profit; even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his

(i) *Alias. si is qui gloriatur de sacris vestibus, aut cantu divinarum, vel conditione theologiae, actualiter nullum alium finem intendens, peccaret mortaliter, totus populi clerus esset in malo statu.*

(k) *Vid. Navar. c. 20. n. 11. & c. 21. n. 40. & c. 22. n. 101.*

(l) *Peccat. Qui accipit beneficium Ecclesiasticum spirituale principaliter propter honorem aut utilitatem temporariam, secundum S. Antonio. Quid sit modo procedere in eo qui est eo indignus ob ignorantiam, vel alium defectum. Nam supra diximus, quod saltem est esse mortale, sacra ordinata ad cultum divinum principaliter ob bona temporalia. Idem c. 23. n. 15.*

Sovereign Honour; this is a fault, with them, next to nothing. If they should in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger, lest they should too much oblige him: for thus to joyn God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is (m) a meritorious act, according to Aquinas. Further (n) vain glorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much; is only Venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vain-gloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false; or something that is evil, (o) if it be not deadly; and yet offend but Venially, when he does no great mischief to others.

SECT. XVIII.

A Versation to; or grief at Spiritual and Divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called *Acedia*. The object is God, as to mans friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto: the act they express by sloth, and lothness to meddle with these things, coldness tepidness about them; not caring for them, nauseating and accounting them a grievance. This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one

(m) Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est facere illa principaliter propter Deum, vel quia honesta sunt & Sancta, & secundario propter gloriam, vel laudem humanam in finem aptum velatum. Idem ibid. post Sanctum Thomam.

(n) Peccat.

Qui per jactantiam se aut suos laudat cum irreverentia notabili Dei, aut cum injuria vel scandalo proximi notabili: alias enim solum est veniale juxta S. Tho. receptum. Alexand. Allens. Idem ibid. n. 16.

(o) Idem ibid. n. 13. Cajetan. sum. v. jactantia, Angel. sum. v. van. glor. n. 1.

may have a great averſation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define (p) it by *an agrievedneſs at what is Spiritual and Divine*, quatenus eſt divinum, as it is Divine, and not otherwiſe: not (q) *becauſe it is laborious or troubleſome to the ſiſh, or any impediment to its pleaſures*, which are Aquinas words; but under that formality, in that it is divine, (r) as his followers underſtand it. So that the greateſt diſaffection to ſpiritual things, if it be becauſe they are unfuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the fleſh it's eaſe and pleaſure (which is the common and ordinary cauſe of it), if it be not on an account (s) *that rarely falls out*, as they acknowledge, and which a man can ſcarce ever deliberately be ſubject to; it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tell us, (t) *if a man not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this (viz) that he is to be a Citizen with the Saints and one of Gods family*); becauſe he little cares for the happineſs of this Divine friendſhip, neglecting to attain it, becauſe, he gives up himſelf to other delights; he is not guilty of this ſin. Angelus, that he may diſcover when this diſaffection to Spiritual and Divine things is mortal, and when Venial, tells us, that (u) *when it conſiſts in the omiſſion of things not neceſſary to Salvation, it is Venial*; that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worſhip, all the acts of grace and Chriſtian virtues, are

(p) Deſignari poteſt, eſſe vitium inclinand ad triſtandum de bono ſpirituſali divino, quatenus eſt divinum ſecundum mentem utriuſque Thomæ 2. 2. q. 35, art. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 124. Triſtitia de bono ſpirituſali in quantum eſt divinum. Sylveſt. ſum. v. Acedia. n. 12.

(q) Non prout eſt laborioſum vel moleſtum corpori aut delectationis ejus impeditivum. 22 q. 35. art. 2.

(r) Navar. ibid. Sylveſt. ibid.

(s) Peccatum eſt valde grave, generoſque ſuo mortale, cum deliberato, & advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere. Navar. ibid.

(t) Si vero de hoc (ut ſit triſtis ſanctorum & domeſticus Dei, &c.) non triſtetur ſecundum affectum, ſed ſecundum effectum, quia parum de hujusmodi amicitiis bono curat, negligens adipiſcendum, quia vacat delectabilibus humanis, peccatum Acedia non incurrit. Cajet. ſum. v. Acedia.

(u) Aut (conſiſtit) in omiſſione eorum quæ non ſunt neceſſaria & ſic eſt veniale peccatum. Sum. v. Acedia. n. 1.

Si omittit ea quæ ſunt de neceſſitate ſalutis, peccat mortaliter: ſi vero alias debita peccat venialiter. Cajetan. ſum. v. Inconſt.

omitted:

omitted : for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to Salvation, and by the premises it appears that they do not. It is Venial, says Sylvester, (x) when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to. Angelus expresseth it more significantly ; by this it appears (y) says he, what is to be said of him, who counts grievous, and abominates Divine and Spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to Salvation, and he declines them or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally. So that Spiritual and Divine things (all that they count not necessary ; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be *abhorred*, without any mortal guilt. And herein the two *sums* agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, (z) says Sylvester, (not limiting it to things necessary) that abominating of Spiritual things, is always a mortal sin. Accordingly he determines, that (a) rancour against those who would induce us to Spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God or the things of God), is a Venial fault. It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who persuade to what is Spiritual (so as not to induce to hear or see them), whether Preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal ; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for Venials ; yea, there are some amongst them, who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself, and in its effects, to be no mortal sin. *Laisius Turrian. ibid. sect. 3. n. 2.*

(x) Est autem veniale, quando homo quidem in operando attenditur, sed tamen ea ad que tenetur, non omittit. Ibid. n. 2.

(y) Et ex hoc patet quid dicendum de eo qui attenditur abominatur divina & spiritualia : quia nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, & ea dimittat vel deliberate disponat dimittere non peccat mortaliter. Sum. ibid.

(z) Falsum est, quod dicta abominatio (spiritualium) semper sit peccatum mortale. Sum. v. malitia.

(a) Rancor i. displicentia hominum inducentium ad spiritualia & est veniale. v. Acedia n. 4.

Neque mortaliter peccat, qui fastidium, indignationem, & quandam aversionem concipit in eis, qui spiritualia consulunt, ut in concionatores, aut a'ios. Bonacin. l. p'cepte d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. sect. 1. n. 6.

SECT.

SECT. XIX.

Anger stands in their general account, as another capital crime. I have touch'd it before, but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the *mode* or *degree*; and the *tendency* or effects of it. As to the *degree* of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one, inwardly or outwardly, *(b)* it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the passionate person, neither which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but merely *Verbal*, as *(c)* we saw before. The *tendency* of it, that which it leads to, is *revenge*; and as to that, it will be Venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too if the passion be but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion *(d)* prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays: both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be Venial. So that if one be angry enough, he may Blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little, or no fault. Thus by their Doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a virtue, than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and Venial.

(b) Attenditur ordo rationis in ira — ut scilicet motus iræ non immoderate servetur interius vel exterius, qui ordo si prætermittatur non erit sine peccato — sed non erit mortale ex genere suo: sed possit esse mortale peccatum, puta si ex vehementia iræ excedat à dilectione Dei vel proximi. Angel. sum. v. ira. n. 1. Sylvest. ibid. n. 4. Cajetan. sum. v. ira.

(c) Navar. c. 23. n. 117. & alii supra.

(d) Passiones nisi ad deliberatum consensum vindictæ inducant, veniales sunt. Cajetan. v. ira. possit esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia prævenit deliberationem. Sylv. v. ira. n. 4. Angelus ibid.

Other

Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. (e) *Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly Venial.* (f) *Audaciousness, in it self, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to Charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason. So Intimidity, or (z) Fool-hardiness is Venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none.* Also (b) *incontinent desires, or Lusts: Love-like, whether of the Flesh, or the World. Of the former thus Angelus; (i) Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body, and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from Luxury, yet it is commonly Venial, when it causes not other mortal acts, or neglects. As for love of the world (k) to love it for necessity, is no sin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.*

SECT. 19. *Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as (l) a Devilish wickedness; yet when they come to give particular rules for Conscience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their Catholicks: the general notion of it, is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet, who grieve at others good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it.* So

(e) *Indignatio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno sua affabilitate, conversatione & hujusmodi), peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem; & communiter veniale. Cajetan. Sum. v. Indignatio. Sylv. v. Indignatio. Angel. sum. v. diligere. n. 2.*

(f) *Audacia si pura est communiter est, peccatum veniale: Sicut immoderata iracundia, & immoderatus timor; quia non contrariantur charitati, sed a recta exorbitant rationis regula. Cajetan. v. audacia.*

(g) *Veniale autem peccatum hoc est, quando ex stultitia excusabili procedit—tantaque possit esse stoliditas, quod nullum esset peccatum.*

(h) *Idem. ibid. v. Incontinentia.*

(i) *Amor sui est, quum quis nimis diligit seipsum querendo delectationes corporis nimia, & quietem carnis. & procedi ex luxuria, quod est peccatum mortale solum, si propter eum non implet precepta aut facit contra: aliter communiter est veniale, Sum. v. Amor sui.*

(k) *Diligitur ad necessitatem, & sic non est peccatum—Est etiam diligere mundum i.e. longo tempore velle stare in mundo propter delicias, & sic est veniale peccatum. Idem. ibid. v. diligere. n. 3.*

(l) *Soto de Just. & jur. l. 4. ar. p. 176.*

far a man may envy all in the world, who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. (m) *This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals, which when it is excessive, is of it self, by their doctrine, but Venial. Or they may grieve at others good, (n) because they think those who have it, unworthy of it. Grief or Indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of it self a Venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan.* But why evil at all? the reason is because, *since that which is grieved at, is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the Dispenser of these things.* All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions as a harmless Venial. If this last mentioned be not Envy, what is? why a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth, to have it so over-look'd; and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse Envy: it must be *betwixt equals* (o), and so Grief at the prosperity of Inferiours, or Superiours at least, will be acquitted. Also, if it be *for little things*, (p) it is Venial. Now all Temporals are little things to him who has the Eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only (q) object of envy. And if envy, upon a small ground, may

(m) *Si vero sit circa temporalia, potest esse cum peccato vel sine, eo modo, quo & appetitus temporalium.* Sylv. Sum. v. Invidia. *ut si mediocris homo tristetur, quia non est rex, quia non est papa: & hoc veniale est ex se.* Vid. Cajetan. v. Invid.

(n) *Idem. ibid. n. 2. quia indignus est tali bono, hujusmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. & Cajetan. — mala est & ex se veniale; Nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec sit malum culpe, nec pene, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, & dolere, quasi injustitia sit ex parte Datoris, in Tol. l. 8. c. 67.*

(o) *Invidia qua homo tristatur de prosperitate alterius similis sen equalis, Cajetan. Sum. v. Invid.*

(p) *Nec etiam (est mortale) si bonum de quo dolet, sit quid minimum, Sylv. ibid. n. 2. (Cajetan. ibid.)*

Postunt magna videri non aspicientibus eterna. Idem. ibid.

(q) *Cajetan. ibid.*

be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion, will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable. They might as well have concluded directly, and without *circumlocution*, as *Lorca* the Dominican doth, that Envy is no more a mortal sin than Vain-glory or Covetousness, which they count Venial, unless heightened with some such circumstance, as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil (*).

Señ. 20. Intemperance, which they call *Gula*, comprizing both *Gluttony* and *Drunkenness*, may well pass for a *Cardinal* crime; yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor Venial (r). They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, (*viz.*) to excess, not for necessity but for pleasure. This when it is excessive every way in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, (s) *is not in its own nature a mortal sin, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a Capital Vice, and the cause of many other.* But then it may be deadly by accident, (t) *if it be grievously hurtful to the body.* So it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance, be not grievous, (u) or if it prove so great, yet if the Glutton do not observe it; or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent, that he is bound to observe it, it will be Venial still. But *Cajetan* troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes

(*) *Vid. Bonacin. 1 præcept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. Sect. 2. n. 3.*

(r) In general with them, all sins against temperance and modesty are regularly Venial, *vid. Nav.*

(s) *Dico secundum S. Thom. (2.2. q. 148. art. 1.) & secundum mentem ejus in multis locis, quod (Gula) non est mortale ex suo genere, licet sit vitium capitale, id est, ex quo vitia multa nascuntur, Sylv. v. Gula. n. 2.*

(t) *Quando quis scienter comedit vel bibit, in grave corporis nocumentum secundum, S. Thom. Idem. ibid.*

(u) *Si hoc (grave nocumentum) fiat inadvertenter, non est mortale, nisi adeo frequenter fiat, quod tenetur advertere, sicut de ebrietate dictum est. Similiter nec si nocumentum sit modicum, Idem. ibid.*

(x) it may be Venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniencies, but other sins; and particularly when it is prejudicial to health. He has but one case wherein it will be more than Venial; (y) then only is it mortal; says he, when this pleasure in eating is a mans chief end, and his belly his God; that is, when for the pleasure of it, he (not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but) has no regard of any command of God, or the Church; as if a man will Steal to play the Glutton, &c. It seems this sensual Lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, (z) as to condemn God, and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratifie it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his God; yet there's no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect Epicure, like the rich Glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape. (a) When one, says Angelus, for delight of his Appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (Gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, &c. this is near to mortal sin. It seems then it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the Epicure, not only near Hell, but into the torment of its flames. Yea further, if Intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul, but the body loathsomely, if the Glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease it self in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault; (b) Intemperance, says Navar, is regularly Venial, though without any profit.

(x) *Frequenter autem est veniale & quandoque valde grave, ut cum delectatio cibi alliciat ad comedendum usque ad vomitum, aut alia inconvenientia, & similiter cum inducit ad alia peccata: puta ad nimium sumptum, vel ad nocendum propriæ sanitati, & ad quæcunque alia peccata, Cajetan. v. Gula.*

(y) *Tunc solum est mortale, quando delectationem cibi habet quis pro ultimo fine juxta illud; quorum Deus venter est: hoc autem cognoscitur ex hoc, quod homo ob delectationem in comendo, non curat transgredi præceptum Dei aut Ecclesiæ: ut si propter hoc furetur, &c. Idem ibid. vid. Sylv. ibid. Angelus. v. Gula. n. 2. paratus facere quæcunque ut eam consequatur.*

(z) *Sylvest. ibid.*

(a) *Quia propter talem delectationem appetitur, ducit totam vitam hujusmodi delectationis deperire, sicut Dives qui epulabatur quotidie. Et hoc est multum vicinum mortali. Sum ibid. n. 2.*

(b) *Gula regulariter est venialis, etiamsi absque utilitate usque ad vomitum, etiam intentum sese quis cibo & potu ingurgitet, ut sentit Cajetan, Cap. 23. n. 119.*

and

and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to Vomiting. If he eat so much till he Vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandizing, it is no worse Uncleanneſs, ſays (c) *Angelus*, which is the iſſue of Intemperance, when one provokes himſelf to Vomit, that he may eat the oftner; or when he eats ſo much, that he muſt of neceſſity Vomit, is commonly a venial fault. (d) *Cajetan* more fully. Uncleanneſs is uſed for the ſin of voyding Excrements exceſſively, as of meat by Vomiting, and the like, proceeding from Intemperance; it is frequently a Venial ſin, ſince it is neither againſt the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, ſince it brings with it even bodily naſtineſs. So that intemperance, even when it bewrays it ſelf, and vents it filth, by all the paſſages, that oppreſſed Nature can find in the Gluttons body, is but a ſmall fault. To be half Drunk is no mortal ſin. So *Lopez* (e) after (f) *Aquinas*; herein they all agree, ſays a learned (z) *Cardinal*. Take their ſenſe in the words of *Cajetan* (h). Drunkenneſs not complete, (when one by drinking Wine is made too merry, or is diſturbed in

(c) *Immundicia eſt filia gula, quum quis provocat ſe ad vomitum, ut ſepius comedere poſſit: vel tantum comedit quod neceſſe habet evomere, communiter eſt veniale peccatum, Sum. v. Immundicia.*

(d) *uſurpatur pro peccato inordinatæ emiſſionis ſuperfluatorum, ut cibi per vomitum, & ſimilium ex gula procedentium, & ſic ponitur filia gula, frequenter eſt peccatum veniale, utpote nec contra Dei nec proximi dilectionem: turpe tamen, utpote etiam corporalem immunditiam inferens, Sum. v. Immundicia.*

(e) *Quando aliquis bene potatus, ita bene conſortatus eſt capite quod rationis incompoſ non eſt factus, & tamen ſibi videtur quod domus moveatur, hæc ſemiplena ebrietas, ſicut non eſt mortalis, licet ſit grave peccatum, quia ſecundum m. item. (f) D. Tho. & Cajet. ibi. ratio non obumbratur, cap. 2. n. 11. 22. q. 150. art. 1. & 5.*

(g) *Quando ebrietas non eſt perfectæ, ſed imperfectæ, quæ turbat aliquo modo rationem, ſed non omnino, tunc eſt grave veniale. In his omnes conveniunt, Tol. Inſtr. l. 8. c. 61.*

(h) *Ebrietas non plena (quando aliquis potu vini redditur nimis lætus, aut turbatur in phantaſia, dum videtur ei quod domus gyretur, aut huiusmodi aliquid incurrit: non tamen perdit uſum rationis) peccatum proculdubio grave eſt, niſi cau. medicinæ fiat: quia immoderatus eſt potus ſecundum quantitatem vel qualitatem, & hoc ſi advertenter aut negligenter accidit. Pejus tamen, ſi ex intentione: eſt enim tunc prope mortale: non tamen eſt mortale, quia nec attingit ad completam ebrietatis rationem; nec notabile damnum rationis eligitur, Sum. v. Ebrietas.*

his fancy, so that the House seems to whirl round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of Reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared) unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently: But it is worse, when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself); because then it is almost mortal (there's no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the complete notion of Drunkenness, and is without signal damage to reason. So that if a man be not dead Drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil. In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand Drunkenness as a most deadly Vice; yet the Roman Doctors have discovered two admirable Vertues in it; one is that the full dose, (perfect Drunkenness) will make the highest impieties the greatest Outrages and Villanies to be no sins at all. So (i) Angelus, who proves it by the Canon Law. So likewise Rosella (k) after others. Those of their Writers which seem most cautious, (l) except culpable Drunkenness; as to this only, when such outrages are the usual effects of it. So that unless both Drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the Drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new Argument, to prove Mahomet a false Prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his Law so severe against wine; which in its greatest abuse, is of such sovereign efficacy, as to drown so much mortal sin, and to

(i) Quoad culpam excusat a toto quod fecit in ebrietate ex quo est sine usu totali rationis. Sum. v. Ebrietas. n. 3.

(k) In Sylvest. v. Ebriat. n. 5. Tol. l. 5. c. 10. Rosella, v. Ebriat. n. 2.

Actus vel omissiones contra precepta contingentes tempore somni, vel Ebrietatis, etiamsi fuerint voluntarii in causa, non denominari tunc peccata, sed tantum effectus peccati precedentis; ut late defendit Valquez referens pro ea sententia, Paludan, Major, Gabriel, & Adrian. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 7. n. 7.

(l) An actus mali, quos Ebrius facit in ebrietate existens, sint peccata, si fornicetur, si occidat, &c. ad hoc Respondent, S. Tho. 1.2. q. 150. art. 4. Cajetan. Sylvest. & responsio in hi. consistit—quando culpabilis fuit ebrietas—quando non erat solitus talia mala facere, nec timebantur, tunc non sunt nova peccata, in Tol. l. 8. c. 61.

make all crimes what-ever, lose their deadly quality. But that *Impostors* head was not so intoxicated, but he might discern, that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a *Prophet*, as to fore-see, that in after-times, any thing under the disguise of Divinity, should stumble at this. The other virtue of this sin, is, that the moiety of it (half Drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. (m) *Weakness of judgement* (saies one) *such as they have who are half asleep, or half drunk; though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal.* When those, saies (n) another, *that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing what-ever, since they are plainly under weakness of judgement, they are quitted of mortal guilt.* So that if any one will but make himself *half Drunk*, every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely); he may, what-ever wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life: and thus, he that lives all his days like a Devil, may escape Hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half Drunk.

There are multitudes of particular sins which they comprise under these seven Capitals, and call them their *Daughters*, after Gregory and *Aquinas*; but they need not be taken notice of as mortal, by common Confessors, much less by their *Consenters*; for such Confessors need not know whether they are mortal or no; (o) as *Angelus* tells us after *Henricus*, and so must Absolve Sinners, though they never resolve, or think of leaving their sins.

SECT. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many sins may pass for Venial in the Church of Rome; and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a (p) Je-

(m) *Parvitas judicii, qualem habent semidormientes & semiebrii vel adeo turbati, licet sufficiat ad veniale, non tamen ad mortale.* Navar. prælud. 9. n. 12. (n) *Quando semidormientes, vel semiebrii quidvis paraverint, cum parvitate judicii aperte laborent, & levis culpa redduntur immunes.* Graff. l. 1. cap. 14. n. 4. Bonacin. de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. ubi. Navar. Cajetan. & alij Communiter.

(o) *Alii sunt peccata, quæ sunt filia peccatorum Capitalium, & de talibus non ordinarius non tenetur scire, utrum sint mortalia vel non. Sed curatus Ordinarius, ut Episcopus, Archiepiscopus & ceteri alij superiores tenentur scire.* Sum. v. confessio. 4. n. 3.

(p) *Ex Scripturis divinis quamvis de multis peccatis constet, quod sunt mortalia, tamen vix de ullis expresse satis videtur constare, quod sint tantum venialia,* Greg. de Valent. Tom. 2. disp. 6. q. 18.

suit will acknowledge. The *Maxims* they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. (q) *Many sins are believed to be venials, which are mortal*, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them. So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no not their own, but they are encouraged to venture upon all this wickedness, in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given, may serve for a tast, there is a world more, nor have I pickt out all the worst, more time and diligence may discover more, as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that what-ever the Lord hath forbidden in his Law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of *Venials*; for the whole matter of the divine Law, is, in it self, either of less, or greater weight; if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently upon that account, it is not mortal: what-ever appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or our selves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. (r) *Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God, or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are Venial.* Whatever is not in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one Member of the three, is in a manner, wholly shrivell'd away into Venials. (s) A man can scarce do any thing against himself, which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of. Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count *small*; but if they cannot choose but think it *great*, they have other expedients to level it (according to the exigence of mens Lusts), and diminish it into a *Venial*. To make it more, they

(q) *Multi enim creduntur esse venialia, que mortalia sunt, & difficillimum est in talibus discernere, 2. dist. 24. n. 53.*

(r) *Mortale non potest a quoquam committi sine grandi corruptione sui, aut contemptu Dei, aut gravi lesione proximi; & reliqua omnia esse venialia, vid. St. Clar. Probl. 54. p. 8.*

(s) *Quando sunt contra bonum proprium tantum, sunt magna ex parte venialia.*

require so very much, that a Sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so scape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness. That any sin may be mortal, there must be *judicium integrum* (t) an intire judgment, not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their *Canon Law*: Also there must be (u) *perfect deliberation*, 'tis venial (how grievous soever otherwise), where there is not perfect deliberation: If by any means, deliberation not only in it self, but in its perfection, be either prevented (and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it,) or hindered (while it is under debate) it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a (x) *sufficient presenting of the evil in its object*, and its circumstances. If the mind only consider the advantage, or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger; 'tis but a *semi-deliberation*, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides it will require (y) *time* to perfect it, and here they may favour the Sinner as much as they please by determining what time is sufficient for humane frailty; but if he be in haste, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin *Venially*. Finally, there must be full consent of will. If the *inferiour* and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing; yet so

(t) *Ad constituendum peccatum mortale judicium integrum requiritur*, Navar. cap. 16. n. 8. *Ad constituendum peccatum mortale integrum judicium requiri debet*, cap. 1. de delict. puer. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 4. *requiritur plena advertentia*, & non sufficit semiplena, qualis in semiebrijs, semidormientibus, & iis qui alio distrahuntur ut Cajetan, Navar. & alij communiter cum Bonacin de Matr. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. p. 313.

(u) *Vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 79. & Tol. l. 4. c. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. mores. p. 112.*

(x) *Veniale ex imperfectione operis, licet in re gravi, ubi deest perfecta deliberatio, vel presentatio sufficiens malitiae in objecto, &c. St. Clar. ibid.*

(y) *Per sufficientem deliberationem intelligit (Bonaventura) tempus sufficiens ad deliberandum postquam ratio advertit. Sylvest. v. Consens. n. 1. Intelligitur si advertentia sit satis deliberata. Nam si est motus surreptitius, adeo ut sit subita deliberatio non autem plena, poterit esse veniale (perjurium): scilicet si tempus non suppetebat ad plene deliberandum, Soto de Just. lib. 8. q. 2. ar. 3. p. 271. Sufficiens advertentia & deliberatio non habetur sine discursu: discursus autem in tempore fit, Suar. de Vor. l. 1. c. 9.*

long as the *Superiour* takes no notice of it, there's no harm (*z*), 'tis certainly no more than a *Venial*: Or if the *superiour* part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every (*a*) inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but *full consent* of will, such as is perfectly deliberate; neither is a tacit and *constructive* consent sufficient. (*b*) A neglect to repell or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctance of reason, is with *Bonaventure* constructive consent, *which in the opinion of many Doctors is no mortal sin*. Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridlest crime that can be perpetrated will be a *Venial*. If a man should Blaspheme God, or Curse Christ, or renounce the Faith, or Murder his own Father, or Ravish his own Child, or Mother, or fire Citys and Countrys; yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgment, deliberation, and consent, as is expressed; it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this, as not to hurt him. Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy natural or accidental, levity, passion, custome, or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work) the opinion of their *Doctors*, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it; any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin, as if it were *Venial*. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be Absolved by their *Doctrine*, though he de-

(*z*) Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis, ante adversionem delectationis, & hoc est sensualitatis, & absque dubio est veniale peccatum. Bonaventura 2. dist. 24. n. 74.

(*a*) Vid. Bonavent. ibid. n. 64.

(*b*) Negligentia repellendi complacentiam, cum displicentia rationis de ea secundum Bonaventur. est consensus interpretativus: quod non est mortale peccatum secundum multos magistros, Sylv. v. Consensus, n. 1. Necessaria est positiva complacentia & non sufficit consensus interpretativus, Cajetan. & alii in Bonavent. ibid. n. 8. Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 21. n. 3. & ibi. Adrian. Cajetan. Armilla. Navar. D. Thom. D. Bonavent. & 30. alij.

clares, that he will not forfake such a sin. (c) The *Confessor* ought to Absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgment of other Divines also, it be a mortal crime. This is their *common doctrine* delivered (d) by multitudes of their *Writers*. So that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the Consciences of all that will regard their Doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of, are by this and their other *maxims*, become *peccadilloes*, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by virtue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach) would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly, how very needless holiness of life is in that Church (which pretends to a Monopoly of all the holiness on earth) since by their doctrine they may not only neglect acts of Piety, Righteousness, and common Honesty; but may live securely in practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in customary Blaspheming of God, in common Swearing and Perjuries, in Perfidiousness to God and Men, in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine worship, In a total profanation of all time which is indeed, or in their account holy, in impioussness and disobedience to Parents or Superiours, in divers degrees of uncleanness and Murder, in variety of Cheats and Stealing, in Unfaithfulness as to breach of Promise and compacts, in all Fallenness and Ly-

(c) *Si penitens nollat agnoscere tale quod peccatum, nihilominus absolvat eum, &c. quia ex quo ille credit opinionem quam sequitur esse veram, innixus auctoritate probabili, non videtur peccare mortaliter: & sic debet absolvi.* Sylvest. secundum Gosfredum. v. Confess. 3. n. 11. *Si diversitas esset inter Doctores, & penitens ex aliqua rationabili causa vult adhaerere uni opinioni, non est sibi deneganda absolutio: sed sue conscientiae relinquenda.* Caveat igitur confessor, ne sit praeceptum in dando sententiam de mortali, ubi sunt variae opiniones doctorum Angel. Sum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3. & 13.

(d) Gosfredus, Antoninus, Rosella, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Conradus, Ledesma, Soto, Medina, Navar. in cap. 23. n. 31. & in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 5. & Victorel, l. 3. c. 20.

Near 50. of their *Authors* are produced for this by Jo. Sancius, disp. 33. n. 54. p. 223, 224. Vid. Bonacin, & in eo alios, Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 7. punct. 4. n. 26.

ing; every where and upon all occasions; in Slandering or Detraction, in Covetousness or Prodigality, which they will; in Unmercifulness and Outragious passions; in Pride and Ambition; in Vain-glory and Hypocrisy; in Flattery or Curling; in Gluttony and Drunkenness, &c. In Sins against God and Man, against Godliness, Righteousness, Mercy, Charity; in any of these, a little modified. in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They may persist in them impudently to the death, and yet (if Impostors may be trusted rather than the Word of God) not fall short of Salvation; their doctrine gives them encouragement to live in them without Conscience, and dye in them without Repentance. It takes off the motives which might work upon either *fear* or *love* (the main principles of such motions in us) to forsake them. They are taught by their best *Authors* that these sins may stand well with their love to God, that they do not so much as (e) *impair the habit of Charity*; that they do not hinder the *increase* of (f) *Grace*, or the *effects of their Sacraments*; that they do (g) *not stain the soul*; that they hazard not Gods favour thereby, (h) *that they displease not God*, that they are not *against his will*; that they are (i) *consistent with a perfect fulfilling of the Law*; that (k) *they have not perfectly the nature of Sin*; that they are not (l) *against the Law, but only beside it*; or if they be against it in any respect, as some of them think, (m) *yet against no precept*; the observance of which, is necessary for salvation, or (n) *not against the end of the*

(e) *Ex consensu omnium neque tollunt neque minuunt habitum charitatis*, Bellarm. de Amist. grat. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91. (f) *actuale peccatum veniale non esse obicem in---*Eu-
charistia (docet) D Thomas, unde à fortiore idem diceret de ceteris Sacramentis que minus digna sunt, de Baptismo affirmat Scotus, ---frequentiores Theologi, Suar. tom.3. disp. 7. p. 132.

(g) *Aquinas proprie loquendo peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima*, 1.2. q. 89. art. 1. (h) Bonavent. 2. dist. 42. Soro de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 4. p. 132.

(i) *Neque obstant quo minus iusti, perfecti etiam dicantur*, Soro, ibid.

(k) *Non habet perfectam rationem peccati*, Aquinas 1, 2. q. 88. art. 1. ad 1mum.

(l) *Non est contra legem sed præter legem*. Idem. ibid. Lombard. 2. Sentent. dist. 35. Bonaventur. 2. dist. 43. Scotus a quo vocatur consilium, quod infringitur per peccatum veniale, in St. Clar. ibid. p. 79. Bellarm. de Justific. l. 4. c. 14.

(m) Durandus, Major, Vega. Rada. Herrera.

(n) Estius. Becanu.

Law, which is Charity; (o) that they are but as specks or motes, (p) we may look on them as nothing, that without the interposul of mercy, they are (q) such in their own nature, as ought to be past by, they (r) deserve pardon. They do not (as they teach) deserve eternal punishment; (s) and the Lord (as they Blaspheme) would be unjust, if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of Hell, nor desire of Heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply, or abound in them: if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life; this would not damn them: (s) for all the Venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin. They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand (t) out of contempt. They (u) may praise themselves or others for them; they may (x) boast of and glory in them; they may per-

(a) *Iste ergo vitiorum atque lapsuum quotidiani nevuli licet Christiani hominis vitam quasi pulvisculo aspergant baudquaquam tamen deficiant turpiter* Lindanus, (p) *Modicum pro nibilo censetur* Cajetan. (q) Bellarm. De Amis. grat. l. 1. c. 14. p. 95. (r) *Veniale ex se venia dignum*, Aquinas 1. 2. q. 88. art. 1. *Veniale dicitur quod est venia dignum*, Bellarm. *ibid.* p. 81. Cajetan.

Estius 2. sent. dist. 42. Sect. 6.

(s) *Negamus*—posse Deum juste punire peccatum quodlibet etiam veniale, pena omnium gravissima, quæ est mors æterna, Bellarm. *ibid.* p. 92. & de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.

(t) *Etiamsi omnia peccata Venialia simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale*, Bellarm. *ibid.* p. 91

(u) *Non quasi ipse contemptus & vilipensio venialium sit mortale—quia nullibi est præceptum ut istam curam habeamus, sed consultius tantum*, Sylvest. 2. peccat. n. 4. *peccare venialiter ex contemptu infra limites venialis, non est peccatum mortale*, Cajetan. Sum. v. contemptus, Lopez. cap. 1. p. 8. Metina *ibi*. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 8. *ibid.* Aquinas 2. 2. q. 107. art. 3.

(x) Navar. cap. 23. n. 13. & 16.

(y) *Secus etiamsi gloriaretur de re peccati Venialis solum, quoniam sic non esset mortalis vana gloria*, Angel. Sum. v. van. Gl. n. 1. Cajetan. Sum. v. glor. vana. *Est mortale cum—laudent alios & jactant de peccatis mortalibus quæ fecerunt, secus esset de Veniali, quoniam non est contra Deum*. Angel. v. Jactantia, n. 1.

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petrate them (y) *out of malice*. They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault (z), *to bind themselves by Oath to commit them*, and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They (a) *may dye with resolution to continue therein*, if they might live; yea, they may breath out their souls with delight (b) *and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved*. To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality, and number of them, or guess thereat by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious *Doctors*, and *Casuits*, and taking but part of that liberty which the *Roman Divinity* allows; such a man would pass for a good Catholick with them, and be holy enough, according to the Holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet even by the rules of Heathen morality, he would appear little better than a Monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the Maxims of their new Divinity, that sober Heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical Popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality, and triumphant splendour of it consists, *Innocency and Purity*. If an Atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a Minister of Unrighteousness, and the Gospel a licentious doctrine, tending to de-

(y) *Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus, esse Veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentire, & non propter aliud, Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.*

(z) *Juramentum de peccato Veniali peccatum est, si tamen fiat cum proposito implendi illud, non est mortale, Cajetan, Soto, Antoninus, Sylvest. Tabien. Navar. in Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 19. n. 3.*

(a) *Potest quis dum moritur, habere voluntatem permanendi in peccato Veniali, Bellarm. de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.*

(b) *Potest quis mori in complacentia peccati, Idem. ibid. cap. 10. p. 1370.*

Cum Venialis complacentia potest mori ac salvari, Sylvest. Sum. v. Contritio. n. 3.

hauch mankind; he would need no more, but perswade them that the maxims of the *Roman Divines* were conformed to the rules of the Gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the *Alcoran* the Christian Gospel.

CHAP. IX.

Many enormous Crimes are no Sins at all in the Roman account.

SECT. I.

Proceed to those sins which they will have to be no sins, but need not stay long here, having given a large account of those which they make Venial; since betwixt these, and *no sins*, there is little difference in their Doctrine; and none in their practice. I need not stay to shew, how it is no sin with them to vilifie the Scriptures (the written Word of God), or to rob him of the sole glory of his Mediation, and to give much thereof to others; in all its parts and specialities, merit, satisfaction, intercession; or to put their trust in others besides God, for things which he alone can give, and for which he only is to be relied on; and this not only in *Saints* and *Angels*, but their *Images*, and their imaginary *Reliques*. And how it is no sin in their account to abide in ignorance, unbelief, impenitency, or to live without the love and fear of God, and the exercising of other graces; by what is already premised, this is sufficiently manifested.

(*) To resist the inspirations of God, drawing us to the observance

(*) Si tamen contingat speciales inspirationes dari a Deo, quando se offert occasio frangendi aliquod præceptum, & homo resistens inspirationibus præceptum transgreditur, nullo modo speciale peccatum committit, quia resistit inspirationi, Jo. Sanc. select. disp. 7. n. 11. R. 36.

of

of his commands, or withdrawing us from wickedness, is no special sin, *i. e.* we contract no other kind of guilt thereby, than if we had sinned, without any such inspirations to withhold us from it. Thus it will be no fault at all to quench the motions of Gods spirit, inducing us to turn to him, to love him, to repent, &c. or diswading us from Blasphemy, Perjury, Adultery, Murder, or any other crime. And yet if a man be ready to commit any wickedness, it will be no sin for another to invite him to do it. Thus far men may promote all sin in others, & resist the spirit of God, moving against it. As for evil Spirits, they conclude it no sin, (*a*) for good men, by special instinct or revelation to make use of the ministry of Devils: they tell us that to apply themselves to Devils (*b*) to know, or obtain any thing of them, is to have some familiarity and society with those damned Spirits (unless it be the better to expel them out of the possessed) yet they teach it is no sin to inquire of the Devil in a possessed person; *what his name is, and wherefore he vexes that person, and what Devils are his associates, and the like.* But he must not believe the Devil, though he tell him (*c*) for this would be as bad as Necromancy: yet if he believe him not, none can tell how the Devils answering him in those inquiries can contribute any thing to his expulsion. They declare also (*d*) that *it is lawful to use adjurations to the Devils, who possess no person, nor to assist those that do, or to apply themselves to the great Devils, to cast out the less.*

Seci. 2. So far we see (and further) they may deal with the Devil; how they may deal with God we saw before; though the whole body of Popery be corrupt, yet there is nothing more *leprous* than their worship; they think it not needful that it should be conformed to the di-

(*) *Ex sententia Cajetani & Navar. in Vasquez, Opusc. moral. dub. 3. p. 24.*

(a) *Sylvest. Sum. v. adjurat. n. 2.*

(b) *Si quis eos adjuret — ad aliquod obijciendum, aut ad aliquod obsequium per eos consequendum, est illicitum 1. quia hoc pertinet ad quandam societatem, vel familiaritatem cum ipsis, Sylvest. Sum. v. adjura. n. 2. Licite adjuramus in omnibus ut de corpore expellatur, ut puta, quod suum nomen fateatur — similiter ut dicat causam vexandi hominem — licet non credamus, &c.*

(c) *Quod si ei crederet, ut necromantici, credo esse mortale, quia pertinet ad amicitiam, ibid. n. 3.*

(d) *Hac etiam ratione non solum licet adjurare Demones non obidentes, ne adjuvent obidentes: sed etiam superiores, ut expellant inferiores, id. ibid.*

vine rule in any thing, either as to the *End*, or *Manner*, or *Matter*, or *Object*; yet it is transcendently good in their own eyes, no sin in it, even when there is nothing else. For what fordid and wicked ends they think it fit to worship God, we have discovered already, and also in what an *irreligious manner*. To this latter let me add, what I meet with in *Angelus*, (e) when he is inquiring, whether *attention*, or *devotion* be necessary in their divine service (a strange question it might seem among any called Christians, if their divine Service were the worship of God) he tells us their *Gloss* maintains that it is *sufficient to say it* (their Service) *with the mouth, though not with the heart, and that many other Canonists agree therein*. Thus it seems they understand the Pope's Law for divine worship; so as to approve that in plain terms which *Christ* expressly, and the *Prophets* before him, condemn; so as to declare to the world, that the Church of *Rome* makes no other worship necessary, than what *Christ* hath openly branded as vain, false, and hypocritical, *Isa.* 29. 14. and *Matthew* 15. 7, 8, 9.

The sense of their Divines agrees so well with the Canonists, and as little with *Christ* (though it be expressed in other terms): that the contradiction to him, is not so open, though it be as full. (f) *Angelus* himself, and (g) *Sylvester* after him, with others, determine that *wandering in one that observes it, when it is but as to the inward act, though it be temerarious and grievous, is not mortal, unless it be out of contempt*; the plain English of which, is this, the departing of the mind and heart from God in worship, willingly and wittingly, how great

(e) Quoad attentionem vel devotionem Queritur utrum peccent mortaliter non dicendum officium devote & studiose? Resp. Glossa tenet, quod sufficit dicere ore, licet non corde, & cum ea concurrunt multi Canonistæ in c. dolentes. Angel. Sum. v. horæ. n. 27.

Similiter non peccat mortaliter qui verba quidem dicit, sed ad illa non attendit: quoniam cum præceptum de dicendo veras sit de jure positivo, non refertur nisi ad ea, quæ sub judicio humano cadere possunt: & ista sunt quæ exercentur per actus exteriores, non autem interiores. Et hoc idem videtur voluisse Scotus in 4. Hostiensis etiam. Idem. Pet. de Palud. Sum. Rosel. v. Horæ.

(f) Verb. horæ. n. 27. supra.

(g) Evagatio autem advertentis secundum actum interiorem solum, licet sit temeraria & gravis forte, non tamen est mortale, nisi propter contemptum, Sylv. v. horæ. n. 13. Rosella. v. horæ. secundum, Petr. Paludan.

soever it be, is a small fault, if any, unless to this neglect of God, a greater contempt be added; whereas the contempt of God herein is very great: his reason is, that which others give, (h) *because the Church is not to judge of mere inward acts*; and therefore (i) if a Minister of the Church, when he is at Service, mind something else, he seems to be no transgressor of the Precept by that act.

He tells us out of *Aquinas* (what we saw the rest of them do before) that they need not continue actually attentive in worship, but only virtually; *id est* (k) if they intend to perform Service when they are going about it, that will make them pass for attentive enough all the while, though their minds be carryed away after other things, when they are at it, and never heed the worship in hand. This is the common sense of their *Authors*, as if they should gravely tell us, that a man who goes into company with some intent (actual or virtual) to be sober, but presently falls to his Cups, is overcome and continues Drunk divers hours; yet he may be said to be Sober all the while he is Drunk, by vertue of his first intention. And so we should wrong the *Romanists*, if we did not think they would have as much of true Worship and Religion in their Service, as that man has of Sobriety, all the time he is dead Drunk.

Sect. 3. But there is not any more horrid abuse of divine worship, than that which they are guilty of in reference to its object: for besides what they determine concerning divine worship, to be given to other things, besides God, it is no sin with them to worship the Utensils of their worship, the Vessels, Books, Tables, Linnen and Priestly Vestments, being once dedicated to divine Service, and made holy by the

(h) *Quia Ecclesia non habet judicare de actibus interioribus mere, Uterque, ibid.*

(i) *Propter quod Minister Ecclesie, licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet; non videtur transgressor precepti ex natura facti, Angelus, ibid. Rosella. ibid.*

(k) *Tunc videtur manere secundum virtutem, quum accedit ad orationem cum intentione aliquid impetrandi, vel Deo debitum obsequium reddendi: etiamsi in prosecutione mens ad alia rapiatur, idem. ibid.*

Adverte tamen quod intentio debita & actualis, si adsit in principio vocalis orationis licet postea mens evagetur (nisi talis evagatio interrumpat primam intentionem per contrariam intentionem) sic est meritoria & impetrativa oratio vocalis sine attentione per virtutem primae intentionis, idem. v. oratio. n. 10. Rosella, v. hora. Scotus, ibid.

charm

charm of a Consecration. *Antonius Corduba* says, they are to be worshipped (*l*) for themselves, and in the judgment of (*m*) *Clyctovius* they are to have a worship, distinct from his worship, to whose honour they are dedicated. *Vasquez* (*n*) will have them worshipped relatively (as Images to whom he gives Divine adoration) with respect to him, in whose service they are used.

'Tis no sin to worship the word *Jesus*, whether it be pronounced or written, and some will have honour given to the word for it self, so (*o*) *Corduba* and others. (*p*) Some will have the word worshipped together with him, that it signifies: as the Image and the exemplar are both worshipped together; So that they will have the word *Jesus* to be worshipped, as the Image of *Jesus*.

'Tis no sin to worship the *Accidents* of Bread and Wine in the Eucharist, where the object worshipped is not only Christ there, nor is it the *substance* of Bread and Wine (for they say there is no substance left): but that which they worship, is the colour, figure, or taste of the Elements. The colour, when there is nothing that is coloured: the tartness, when there is nothing that is tart: the roundness, when there is nothing that is round. To these wonderful (not to say monstrous) accidents, some will have a single (*q*) worship due, but *that*, the very same worship that is due to Christ, and besides that Divine adoration, which is common to them with Christ, will have also a proper worship given, without reference to Christ: but all of them

(*l*) *Vasquez* de adoratione l. 2. disp. 8. c. 10. n. 342. posse secundum se, cultum deferri rebus sacris, sic docet *Antonius de Corduba*, & alij recentiores.

(*m*) *Vasis* & alij rebus sacris inanimis concedit cultum aliquem distinctum a cultu illius, in cujus honorem dicata sunt. idem. ibid. c. 11. n. 360. (*n*) Ibid. c. 10. n. 344.

(*o*) Ipsi etiam voci secundum se, censet honorem aliquem tribui. Ibid. n. 342.

(*p*) Simul-- cum Christo quem significat vox illa. Ibid. n. 343. Idem quod de imagine, de voce quique; *Jesus* & alijs rebus inanimis, manifeste sequitur & quamvis dicemus, quia imagines exemplaribus substituantur, ideo cum ipsis adorari; quis audeat asserere, vocem *Jesus* aut scriptam aut prolatam, in locum significati non subrogari? &c. Ibid. n. 344.

(*q*) Alij vero recentiores-- eodem modo de speciebus Sacramentalibus atque de imaginibus docent: nempe eas adorari posse eodem motu, & adoratione Litria cum Christo sibi ipsis contento: posse etiam secundum se, propria adoratione coli, quæ non referatur in Christum ibi contentum si ut in terminum proximum adorationis: sed tanquam in motum remotum sicut de imaginibus, & de nomine *Jesus*, docuerunt. Idem. Ibid. c. 11. n. 360.

agree, that they are to be adored with (r) Divine worship, and some say that this adoration is terminated on them, as the worship of the Exemplar upon the Image. They will not only have the *Manger* wherein Christ lay, and the *Thorns* wherewith he was Crowned, and the *Spear* that wounded him, to be worshipped : (s) but the Picture of these, when they are but painted, they are to have the same worship which the true Cross has, that is, *Divine Adoration*; and so are natural *Thorns*, or a common *Manger* or *Spear* to be worshipped, when they are made use of to adorn the Cross, or to set off the passion of Christ, as they are wont Theatrically to represent it.

'Tis no sin to worship any thing that Christ *touched*, or that *touched* him, how injuriously soever. Therefore they teach that the *Ass* upon which Christ rode is to be worshipped, *hereby it appears*, sayes (t) *Vasquez*, how rightly the *Ass* upon which Christ did ride may be worshipped; and that the very (u) lips of *Judas* (that Traitor and Devil as Christ calls him) for kissing Christ, when he betrayed him; for that very act wherein he shew'd himself a Traitor and Devil, are to be worshipped. If they had but those Traitors lips, they would reverently and devoutly kiss, that is, adore them; and it is strange if they have them not among their Sacred Relicks, since they say they have

(r) Eandem adorationem qua Christum ibi colimus, ad eas terminari, dicendum est (ut docet Claudus Cello. 6.) Sed per accidens, sicut adoratio exemplaris in imaginem quoque terminatur. Id expresse tradit. Algelus. l. 2. de Euch. c. 3. idem. ibid.

(s) Si autem pingeretur Sacrum præsepium, vel lancea, vel spinea corona, vel aliquid simile, non minus quam ipsa crux in veneratione esse debere. Id vero quod de pictura vel sculptura dicimus, de iisdem rebus naturalibus dicendum esset, si in ornamentum crucis, & monumentum passionis, vel alterius mysterij, publice ponerentur, &c. Idem. ibid. l. 3. c. 6. disp. 2. n. 73.

(t) Inde etiam constat, quo pacto recte possit asinus, cui Christus insedit, adorari. Ibid. n. 76.

(u) Nil tamen obest, quo minus aliquis sincera fide, & recta intentione, affectum & animum solum in Christum intendens, labia Judæ, & aliaque injuste Christum tetigerunt, reverenter osculetur. ibid.

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the (x) foreskin of Christ, cut off at his circumcision, and his very (y) countenance impressed by him upon a white cloath; for one would think these as hard to come by, however in diverse places they worship something at a venture, which they count so.

It is no sin to worship the imaginary blood, which flowes from a Crucifix or Image of Christ, when it is wounded, for they being given up to believe the most ridiculous lyes, (a) do believe, that such blood hath issued from a mere Picture or Image, (b) they keep it as a most Sacred Relique, and it is to be (c) worshipped with the same worship they give to Christ himself.

It is no sin to give Divine worship to any man, not only the Saints in Heaven, or holy persons on earth, but any men whatever in the world (the wickedest not excepted) may together with God, have divine worship, as the Image has with the Exemplar, (d) since every man is the living Image of God. This is not only the doctrine of Vasquez, but of Alensis, of Waldensis, and of Cardinal Cajetane. only in the practice of this there must be caution for Albertus Magnus

(x) *Ex dictis inferitur Christi præputium & sanguinem relictum in terris, sive sit sub forma sanguinis, sive sub alia, non secundum se, hyperdulia, sed ex affectu latræ circa Christum eodem motu adorationis cum ipso, sicut alias ejus reliquias, adorandum esse, ut notavit Corduba & Sylvest. Idem. ibid. disp. 4. n. 125.*

(y) *Antiqua etiam traditione constat vultum sanctum Domini, tempore passionis sue in linco expressum fuisse. Qualis Romæ — & in Hispania ostenditur — Taurinus quo magna cum veneratione servatur, & nec minori religione colitur sudon, quæ Christus in Sepulchro fuit involutus: cui impressam reliquit sui corporis figuram. Idem. ibid. l. 2. disp. 3. c. 1. n. 29.*

(a) *Vid. Aquinas 3. q. 54. art. 2.*

(b) *One at Berytus in Syria, pierced by a Jew, related in a Book, ascribed to Athanasius falsely (as Bellarmine confesses de script. Eccles. p. 78.) of which our Author l. 2. disp. 3. c. 1. n. 29.*

(c) *Idem dicendum de sanguine, qui ex aliqua imagine Christi fluxit, nisi quod ille non ratione contactus, sed representationis tantum adorandus est, idem ibid. l. 3. disp. 4. c. 1. n. 125.*

(d) *De homine qui est viva Dei similitudo & imago, nec aliqua institutio in cultum Dei dedicata docent Alexander, Waldensis & Cajetan, cum posse esse adorationis materiam, sicut de imagine picta dixerunt: hoc est, in illo & per illum ita Deum adorari posse, ut ipse etiam homo, eodem motu, & signo submissionis colatur sicut imago cum exemplari: atq; idem de Angelo dicere debent. ibid. disp. 1. c. 1. n. 4. & cap. 3.*

n. 17.

and

and Aquinas say, there is danger least a man, being of more excellency than an Image, divine worship should be given him, not for Gods sake, but his own dignity : (e) *but where this danger is not, they would not deny but any man may be so worshipped*; even with divine worship. So that if Paul and Barnabas, with the Lycaonians, *Act. 14.* had but proceeded with the caution of these Doctors; and taken care, that those people should so worship them only for Gods sake; they might lawfully have admitted the worship offered them, though they (not learned in this kind of Doctrine,) chose rather to be stoned than so honoured.

It is lawful to worship not only rational Creatures, (f) but any thing else in the whole world, whether living or liveless. Any beast or creeping thing may be worshipped as the Image of God, which they hold is to be honoured with divine worship. So that not only the Planets, Stars, the Queen and the Host of Heaven, may be thus adored (for which the Lord condemns *Israel* and *Judah* as Idolaters); but the vilest Creature that lives on Earth, a Fly, or a Frogg, or a Serpent, or a Toad may be thus worshipped. Yea meaner Creatures than any that have life, any inanimate thing whatsoever, though it be but a wisp of Straw; that is our Authors own instance, whereas, sayes he, (g) *the Wickliffites object, that Christians who worship Images, may as well worship a wisp of Straw (modulum straminis the same Leontius (upon whose Authority he grounds all) would as freely grant this, of a bit of Straw; as he does it of every thing else in the World, so far is it from being counted absurd; yea, they may worship not*

(e) ubi periculum non esset, non negarent adorari posse sicut imaginem pictam. *ibid.*

(f) Quævis etiam alia res mundi sive inanima, & irrationalis, sive rationalis, ex natura rei & secluso periculo, rite cum Deo, sicut imago ipsius adorari potest. Hanc opinionem tradit. Cajet. n. 2. 2. q. 103. art. 2. ad dub. 4. id docuit. Leontius. *ibid.* c. 2. n. 5.

(g) Frustra igitur wickliffite objiciebant Christianis imagines colentibus, ipsos quosq; modulum straminis adorare posse --- idem ep̃m Leontius, de modulo straminis, quod de quacunq; re mundi, libenter fateretur; tantum abest, ut absurdum judicari debeat. *ibid.*

n. 10.

only vile but fordid things, (b) and not only God, but Angels and Saints in them, *quævis alia res mundi*, any thing what-ever in the World, whether liveless, unreasonable, or rational; may rightly have divine worship with God. And this is not only the judgment of their famous *Vasquez*, but of *Cardinal Cajetan*, and in consequence, of them all; for those great witts, well discerned, that the adoration of other things, approved and practised by the *Romanists*, could never be defended without extending their principles to such a Latitude. Thus it is manifest, that whatsoever the Apostate *Israelites* adored, or the *Egyptians* worshipped, or the *Laplanders* do worship, or the grossest and the most ridiculous Idolaters in the World, ever made an Idol: all that, with much more and worse, may lawfully be worshipped by Popish principles; there never was any Idolatry so absurd or horrid in the World, but may have Patronage, or excuse by this doctrine.

And now Heaven and Earth being furnished with their Idols, one would think they need go no further, but be satisfied, without seeking Hell for any: yet there is an inquiry which reaches that too. 'Tis a question amongst them, if (i) the Devil should appear in a beam of light, or the form of a *Crucifix*, whether that apparition may be worshipped? *Antisiodorensis*, *Alexander*, *Aquinas*, *Marsilius*, *Adrian* and others, will not allow it should be worshipped, unless conditionally, and with a condition express'd: but *Vasques* is for adoration hereof absolutely, (k) no condition express'd, and he has those, who are otherwise minded, at a great advantage; because they conclude for

(b) In brutis animantibus & rebus sordidis, Deo exhibere notam submissionis primo aspectu indecens apparet: id tamen non obest, quo minus suapte natura in qualibet re mundi Deum ipsum adorare liceat: imo & sanctos homines seu Angelos, si eos cum rebus illis cogitatione nostra possimus conjungere. *ibid.* n. 11.

(c) An sit peccatum adorare radium luminis, vel speciem Crucifixi, sub qua Dæmon delitescit. *ibid.* disp. 1. c. 5. n. 30. vid. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 3. q. 1. punct. 4. n. 9.

(k) Quare nec conditionem expresse addere oportet, ut recte & legitime adoratio fiat; & multo minus ea exprimenda est, quando Eucharistiam adoramus; ut optime tradunt *Alexand. S. Thom. Bonaventura*: qui cum dicant, necessariam esse expressam conditionem, quando adoratur Christus in specie Crucifixi, ubi Dæmon delitescit: affirmant tamen, eam non esse necessariam, ut adoretur in hostia consecrata. Idem sensu *Gabriel. Quinimo* ut *Cajetan. Hosseianus & Claudius Sajnetes*, docent, male faceret qui adderet conditionem, ut securus adoraret. *ibid.* n. 34.

worship absolutely, in a parallel case: for they will have a consecrated Host to be worshipped, without condition, though the Devil were in it, or lurked under it; and if they think he would be worshipped in the former, without the interposal of a condition; he will be worshipped in the later, where they will have no condition to exclude it. I conclude this, with what (1) *Holcott* determines, *a man may merit by a mistaken belief, although it so fall out, that he worship the Devil.*

These decisions were necessary to justify their devout persons, who have met with such adventures. A great part of Popery is grounded upon Visions and Apparitions; these were much affected and admired by their reputed holy Men, and Women too, who were admired and adored for them. Satan in the darkness (wherein this mystery did best thrive) had the advantage to put store of Cheats upon them. Many Monks and Heremites (says a *Lapide*) were deceived by him. Particularly among the rest *Valens* the Monk was thus deluded, the Devil frequently appearing to him as an *Angel*. In fine, Satan in an apparition feigned himself to be Christ, and the Monk went, and for Christ worshipped the Devil (*Idem* in 2 *Cor.* 11. 15.) They are concern'd to plead for that worship, which had the same original with much of their Religion.

Señt. 4. For Oaths or Perjury, I will only instance in those which are *Fraudulent*. First, they determine, that he who (*m*) takes an Oath, and intends not to swear, the Oath binds not; it is no sin to go against it.

(1) *Hominem posse mereri per fidem erroneam, etsi contingat ut adoret Diabolum. Refert. Humphred de vita Juel. p. 120.*

(m) *Quid ergo si quis exterius juret proferendo verba, & tangendo evangelia, intus tamen non habeat jurandi animum? Respondetur in illo casu, non esse verum sed fictum juramentum. Sed nunquid in conscientia qui sic jurat, tenebitur adimplere? Respondetur minime quidem, &c. Soto de just. & jur. l. 8. q. 1. art. 7. p. 262. Grass. decis. aur. l. 2. c. 17. n. 5. ut obligationem inducat necessarium est, ut ab intentione jurandi procedat, hoc certum est apud omnes. D. Thom. Cajetan, Soto, Covarruvias, Panormitan, Glossa in Suar. l. 2. de Jurament. c. 7. n. 2. Necessarium est ut intentio jurandi sit sufficienter libera. Communis est. Idem ibid. n. 3.*

(n) Secondly, when a man intends to swear, but intends not to be obliged by swearing; there he is not obliged, but may lawfully break it, as the antienter *Casuits* and *School-Doctors* generally determine.

There is real evidence for the practice of this from the *Conclave*: for, as their excellent *Historian* tells us, (*) *in the Vacancies of the Sea the Cardinals use to compose certain capitulations, to reform the Papal Government, which all swear to perform, if they be assumed to the Pope-dome; though it appear by all precedent examples, that every one sweareth with a mind not to keep them, in case he shall be Pope. For so soon as he is Elected, he saith, he would not bind himself, and that he is at liberty by gaining the Papacy.* This was remarkably exemplified in *Paul 4.* who resolving to break one of the Capitulations he was sworn to a little before, and some of the Cardinals being ready to put him in mind of his Oath, he declared in *Consistory*, (†) *that it is an Article of Faith that the Pope cannot be bound, and much less can bind himself, that to say otherwise was a manifest Heresie: and threatened the Inquisition to any that hold it.* It seems it is damnable error, deserving something like a Hell upon Earth, *to believe that his Holiness intends to be honest, whatever he swear.* It's true, every one has not the priviledg of a *Pope*, to have it counted *Heresie* for any to believe that he can be bound to keep any Oaths, or ever to intend it: but all have this liberty by their Doctrine, that they may take Oaths without any intention to keep them; and are not bound to keep them, if they do not intend it.

Thirdly, to elude an Oath, and deceive those who give it, or are concerned in it, by æquivocation, or other artifice of words; yea, or

(n) Tenet S. Bonaventura quod universaliter non obligat juramentum si jurans animum se obligandi non habuit. Sylvest. jurament. 4. n. 19. vid. plures ibid. n. 7. & n. 17. Nec qui sic jurat, peccat. Angelus v. juram. 5. n. 9. & Sylvest. v. juram. 4. n. 7. Qui jurat cum intentione non se obligandi, non obligatur ex vi juramenti. Ita—
D. Thom. Bonaventur. Scotus. Gabriel. Richard. Sylvest. Angelus Medina. Gutierrez. Navar. Glofs. Felinus. Abbas. Jo. Andr. in Suar. l. 2. de juram. c. 7. n. 9. Hos & alios vid. in Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 7. n. 3.

(*) Hist. of Counc. of Tr. l. 1. p. 71.

(†) Ibid. l. 5. p. 396.

by mental Reservation, is no sin : and that in^(o) many cases. As when a man has no mind to swear, and thinks he is not bound to do it; when he is drawn to it by force, or induced by fear, or brought to it by importunity; or when the Judge is incompetent (as they count all that are Hereticks or Excommunicate: and that have not lawful jurisdiction); or if the Judges are competent, yet when^(*) they proceed not juridically. In these and other cases; either^(*) for avoiding harm, or inconvenience; or when it may be for their advantage in any respect, they think it lawful to use these methods of deceit in swearing. Indeed the reason they give to justify the practice in these cases, will make it as lawful in any other: for they say what is so sworn is true, in their own sense, though not in the sense of the hearers; and so they will have it in strictness to be neither Lie nor Perjury, nor any mortal sin, even when there is no honest, nor reasonable occasion, for swearing or promising, in this fraudulent manner.

(o) Si iudex iuramentum exigens talis (competens) non fuerit, vel esto quod sit competens, interrogat tamen contra iuris ordinem, vel est alius homo privatus, qui per metum aut importunitatem iuramentum extorquet, tunc jurare poterit quod secundum suam mentem est verum, falsum autem secundum mentem alterius, cui exhibet iuramentum. Siculi fecisse B. Franciscum firunt, qui rogatus qua perrexisset quidam homicida, respondit, non transisse illac, intelligens, per illas manicas — Cum Adriano qui sic inique interrogatur, potest optime respondere, quod nescit, intelligendo, non eo modo se scire, quo illud dicere teneatur. Navar. cap. 12. n. 8.

(*) Vid Navar. c. 18. n. 57.

(*) Qui alio sensu jurat quam alter intelligat, non peccat, modo justam habeat causam ita jurandi — iusta autem causa utendi his verbis (ambibologicis) est necessitas aut utilitas corporis, aut honoris, aut rerum familiarium — Ex quo sequitur, non esse illicitum uti verbis ambibologicis, addendo restrictionem aliquam in mente retentam, quoties aliquid incommodi, vel injuriæ nobis impendit loquendo ad mentem interrogantis, adistens in iusta causa ita loquendi. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. quest. 1. punct. 12. n. 2. 3, 4.

Ejusmodi autem æquivocationibus uti, addito etiam iuramento absq; causa, non est peccatum mortale, modo ne id fiat in fraudem tertij, aut in iudicio, dum iudex juridice interrogat. Ibid. vid. Dian. v. æquivoc.

Videtur esse communis sententia iuramentum simulatum, id est, cum iusta & prudenti ambibologia factum, non obligare. D. Tho. Cajetan. Soto. Abbas. Tabiena. Covarruvias. Navar. in Suar. l. 2. de juram. cap. 8. n. 2. Iuramentum autem dolosum cum injustitia obligare — sed tantum secundum proprium sensum. Scotus, Bonavent. Richard. Gabriel. Sylvest. Angelus. Antoninus. ibid. n. 5.

And

And that you may perceive the *Jesuits* are not the prime Masters of these Arts; I shall instance in other Authors, who were either before them, or not addicted to the Society.

For equivocations, or other flight of words in swearing, they are justified by (*) multitudes of their *Writers*, viz. *Saius* after *Aquinas*, and their *Glosse*, *Paludanus*, *Gabriel*, *Johannes Major*, *Adrian*, *Hen. Gandavensis*, *Angelus*, *Sylvester*, *Soto*, &c. The instances which *Soto* gives, may serve for a tast; as for example (p) when one instead of saying *I swear*, uses a word which signifies another thing: but so pronounces it as the difference is not discerned. Or if the (q) word *GOD* in the language wherein the Oath is taken, may signifie some other thing; he that swears may mean something else by it, when he that gives the Oath, understands the God of Heaven. (r) Or if the Oath be formed in this order, *I swear to you to pay so much Money*, he that swears may mean not to pay him, but some other: when he to whom the Oath is made, understands it, intended for himself. Such an (s) Oath says *Soto* is true, just, prudent, because then simulation is profitable, having said before (t) that it is lawful, with such fraud to deceive one who forces him to swear, since he who puts him to swear, hath no right to do it; and these forementioned, are the very same instances which *Sanchez* (u) uses; by which we see, the *Jesuit* was not the inventor hereof, but learn'd them of a *Dominican*.

(*) *Licet jurare cum equivocatione.* D. Tho. Scotus, Paludanus, Richard. Major. Adrian. Navar. Covarruvias. Sylvest. Glosf. Ibid. l. 3. cap. 9.

(p) Si injurius ille nequam scrogaret, juras mihi tantam numerare pecuniam? & alter responderet, sic uro (absq; j.) non esset peccatum mortale, sed simplex mendacium: quia forte tunc nihil ureret. Soto. ibid. p. 263.

(q) Item si Dei nomen lingua illa qua fit juratio, diversum quoq; aliud habuisset significatum, liceret illud intelligendo, dicere testis mihi est Deus, quamvis alter Deum eali intelligeret. ibid.

(r) Aut si altero interrogante, juras mihi numerare pecuniam? alter responderet, tibi juro numerare, non esset sensus, numerare tibi, hoc est solvere aut tradere, sed tibi jaro apud me pecuniam recensere, quandoquidem numerare utrumq; significat.

(s) Quare tale juramentum esset verum, justum & prudens quoniam tunc simulatio (quoniam absq; saltitate fieret) utilis esset.

(t) Quando vero vi illata petitur, licitum est ex fraude potentem deludere. Ibid. Similis est equivocatio quam in verbo est ponit Glossa in cap. neque. 2. 2. q. 2. & quam in nomine sororis notavit Glossa in c. ult. 2. 2. q. 2.

(u) Opp. Mir. l. 3. c. 2. n. 37.

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Of mental-reservations justified by their chief (*) *Authors*, who were no *Jesuits*, instances might be given in abundance; for example, if (a) a man will have his Wife swear, that she is not an Adulteress, though she be guilty, she may deny it with an Oath, and swear what is false in his sense, if it be true in her own, by the addition of some secret reserve. (b) If a man swear to give another a Hundred Crowns, with this inward reserve, *If he owe it him*: he sins not, though he swears false, in the sense of him, who is to have the money. (c) A Woman who because of some secret impediment will not live with her Husband, and is Excommunicated for it, she at the point of death, that she may be absolved; being put to swear, that if she recover, she will live with him, may swear it absolutely in shew, with this conditional reserve, *If she may do it without sin*; yet if she do it not, she is not forsworn. So *Sylvester* and *Navar*, according to the deter-

(*) *Navar*, *Sylvest*, *Angelus*, *Lud. Lopez*, *Tabien*, *Armilla*, &c. And among those who seem to dislike it. *Soto* fatetur licitum esse alicui jurare, se nescire quod revelare non potest, aut non tenetur; subintelligendo, nescio ut tibi dicam — quando judex non potest legitime interrogare de occultis rebus illi responderi, non feci, subintelligendo publice, &c. Et ita etiam concessit aperte *Cajetan*. & *Adrian*. in *Suar*. ibid. cap. 10. n. arr. 3.

(a) *Sylvest*. sum. v. jurament. 3. n. 2. *Navar*. cap. 12. n. 18. quia id injuste agit, potest illa jurare, quod secundum suam intentionem verum est, falsum autem juxta mariti mentem & *Angelus*. v. juram. 4. n. 1. Nam cum talis inique a tali confessionem exigat, poterit jurare secundum suam intentionem, quod verum est: licet secundum intellectum audientis sit falsum, secundum *Rodo*. quem sequitur *Astensis*:

(b) Si maligno sensu intendebat facere, quod jurabat, licet non in sensu ejus, cui jurabat: ut quia juravit dare centum, subaudiendo in animo suo, si debuero: tunc non peccat: quia non tenetur jurare secundum intentionem ejus, cum non sit suus judex: sed utitur simulatione licita, quæ licet: ut in c. utilem 2. 2. q. 2. *Sylvest*. ibid. 4. n. 7. *Navar*. c. 12. n. 14. Neque peccat jurando, neque etiam non implendo amplius quam ipse intellexit; quoniam non tenetur aliquis jurare secundum intentionem illius qui perperam ipsum ad jurandum cogit.

(c) *Aquinas* & *Jo Major*. in *Navar*. c. 11. n. 9. *Sylvest*. ibid. 3. n. 2. *Angelus*. Sum. v. juram. 4. n. 1. Quum quis ex juramento exigat ab aliquo quod ipse non potest sine peccato implere: potest habere intentionem, cum jurat illud facere scilicet. Quantum poterit sine peccato. Sic & *Sylvester*. Sic secundum *Rich. de St. Victore* obstetrices non peccassent, licet non respondissent ad intentionem *Pharaonis*, quia non fuit ei data Auctoritas ad aliquid agendum contra Deum. Secundum *Innocent*. in c. veniens de curia. in juramento de re scripto super aliquo singulari, sic interpretatur in foro anime, secundum intentionem jurantis. *Angel*. ibid.

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mination of *Aquinas*, and *Jo. Major*. He (*d*) that in the time of Pestilence comes to a Town, where the Officers, before they admit him, will have him swear, that he came from no infected place; though it be not true, he may swear it, if he think himself have got no infection. If (*e*) you have not a mind, or are not bound to give or lend any thing in your possession, which another desires; you may lawfully swear that you have it not, with this inward reserve, *That you have it not, to give or lend*. (*f*) If a man threaten to kill a Confessor, if he will not tell him, whether his Wife hath confessed her Adultery to him; though she have confessed it to him, yet the Priest may absolutely say, and swear, that she has not; with this reserve, *So that he should be bound to tell it*. (*g*) He that is examined upon Oath, concerning crimes that he knows, and swears to declare all he knows; may concerning some that are not known to others, though they be to him; swear without Perjury, that he knows them not, with this secret reserve, *He knows not to discover them*.

If one promise to another, or contract with a Woman outwardly, without an intention of promising; and is demanded of a Judge upon Oath, whether he promised or contracted: he may plainly deny

(*d*) Sylvest. v. juram. 3 n. 2. Navar. c. 12. n. 19. Bonacin. ubi supra.

(*e*) *An qui jurat se non habere rem aliquam ab alio petitam, ut ab ea danda vel accommodanda se excuset, peccet? responderi enim debet, peccare si mens ejus verbis consonat: sed non, si non tenetur addendam vel accommodandam, neq; respondendum juxta mentem petentis, & ea mente juret, quod non habant illam, ad eam illi dandam aut accommodandam.* Navar. c. 12. n. 18. Bonacin. ibid. Idem. c. 8. n. 19. Lopez. cap. 37. p. 217.

(*f*) And this they maintain not only in this case, but as to all sins confessed. *Quod si iudex instat vel exigit juramentum a sacerdote, an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Dico quod secundum S. Thom. & omnes doctores. Sacerdos si ab eo queratur de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciat, quod audivit in confessione: jurare potest se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo, &c.* Sylvest. v. confels. 2. n. 6. Sic Angelus. v. confels. 8. n. 4. secundum Scotum & Richardum, &c. Graff. l. 1. c. 23. n. 2. For the Seal of Confession must not be violated; no, not to secure the soul of the penitent, or the life of a King, or a whole Commonwealth from temporal or spiritual destruction. Vid. ibid. n. 4. & 20. auctores contra unum Altfiodorensem in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 33. Sect. 1.

(*g*) *Quamvis juret se dicturum, quod scit, vere respondere potest se illa nescire absq; perjurii metu, intelligendo intra se, illud se non ita scire ut de se gere teneatur.* Navar. c. 18. n. 61. vid. cap. 17. n. 1:6.

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it, because he may have this sense, I promised not with a promise obliging me, and he has just cause so to answer, because since he cannot otherwise prove his want of intention, he will be condemned to pay what he owes not, or to cohabit with her, whom he truly contracted not (*). A witness, either when he is not interrogated juridically, or when he has good occasion not to bear witness in judgment, as if he fear great damage to himself thereby; may answer, that he knows not, or saw it not, or the like, with a mental Reservation (*). He that out of necessity, or for any profit, offers himself to swear of his own accord, may therein use such fallacy (*). He that hath good occasion to hide his goods, lest they should be seized by his creditors, being for his livelihood, and to keep him from beggery; may swear that he has not hid any, understanding not any that he could not hide, or any that he is bound to discover. The same may the witnesses swear for him (*viz.* That he hid none) knowing that he hid them lawfully (*). Such fallacious Oaths may be used also in Contracts and Bargaining. Those who cannot otherwise get a just price of the buyer, may swear, in a sense that he perceives not, that the Commodity cost them so much (*).

Here are a few instances, but they have rules (some of them are premised) which Licence it in cases innumerable: so that it may be a common practice, and they may use it, upon any occasion which they think reasonable.

These things considered, with others Authorized among them. I cannot devise what course can be taken to *bind* those who follow their doctrine; or to get from them the least *security* by an Oath. They have declared, that if you put an Oath upon them, which they think, ought not to be imposed, they may lawfully deceive you if they can, and put a cheat upon you, even in a Solemn Oath. Contrive then what Oath you will for your security, they will *take* it, so far as you

(*) So Navar. in cap. humanae aures. 2. 2. q. 5. q. 1. & 2. *alleging for this Doctrine.* Aquinas. Scotus. Paludanus. Richard. Major. Adrian. and others, *vid.* Suar. l. 3. de Juram. cap. 9. n. 5.

(*) Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. *Clavis Regia.* Navar. & alij. *ibid.*

(*) *Idem. ibid.*

(*) *Idem. ibid. & alij.*

(*) *Idem. ibid.* Sayrus. Rebellus & alij.

can judge, as much as any man in the world takes an Oath ; yet if they did not *intend* to Swear (which none can tell but themselves) by taking this Oath ; they have not Sworn, they are not obliged. Or if they had a mind to swear, as well as to make you think so, yet if they did not *intend* to *oblige* themselves thereby, their Conscience by their principles is free, the Oath does not touch them ; or if they have a mind to be obliged by that Oath, yet need they not bind themselves to *that, it was designed for* ; but to quite another thing : for they may swear in a sense, vastly distant from what you intend or imagine ; and thus they are taught to do : and it is practicable, either by the slye and undiscerned change of *one letter* in a word, as they may pronounce it, which will turn the sense as far from yours, as *burning* is from *swearing*, which is plain in a former instance. Or else by the *ambiguosness* of some word in the Oath, affording another sense than you are aware of ; they may fix upon that, and leave yours to your self, and so bind themselves to nothing you are concerned for, when you think you have them fast bound to all. Or if such care be taken, that in the Oath there be no *ambiguous* terms, which may give them the advantage to delude you by a sense forraign to your intendment ; yet, do what you can, they may put forth a sense upon it by a *mental restriction* ; for thereby adding something reserved in their mind to what is expressed in the Oath ; the sense is quite changed, and the thing they swear is nothing at all of what you would have sworn.

Yea, or if they swear, that they will observe the contents of your Oath, according to the plain and natural meaning of the words, without any *equivocating* or *mental restriction* ; yet at the same time they may mean, *without any mental restriction, that they will tell you of* ; and so delude you with a mental reservation, when they are swearing against it : nor is this an imaginary supposition of a thing that they never practis'd ; for thus their Priests and others have taken the Oath of Allegiance, and by this art eluded it ; (*) and so they are instructed, and

(*) Quando quis inique interrogat excludendo omnem equivocationem, posse interrogatum ut equivocatione, apponendo aliquam particulam in mente, &c. Idem dic de teste. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. & ibi plures. Quoties gravis causa occurrit, ob quam licet uti verbis ambiguis, vel mentali restrictione, ejusmodi usum esse licitum, esse interrogans urgeat, ut sine amphibologia, aut restrictione loquaris. Pet. a S. Joseph. de a precept. art. 1.

may do still, and defeat any Oath that can be devised. Yea, by their doctrine they may do it lawfully, and without sin; for in all this juggling, they teach, that they do not swear false, but by the artifice specified, it's true in their own sense, though not in theirs who give the Oath. Indeed this is a cheat (where God is called to witness) nor do they deny it: But they say such *deceit* is lawful, as in many other cases so, always when the Judge is *incompetent*: And that is our case in *England*, we have none from the Throne to the lowest Bench, that, in their account, have any jurisdiction (*b*); we have none that have power to put an Oath upon them; they may choose whether they will swear or no, or whether they will cheat them all in swearing. No Oath which can be given them, can oblige them, but in their own sense, how distant soever from the true sense of the Oath, or of the Imposer of it. This our *Roman Catholics* were assured of long since, by (*i*) instructions sent them from *Rome* in *Queen Elizabeth's* time. So that they need make no Conscience (if they will follow the best Guides of their Consciences) to practise all their contrivance upon us in Oaths: (much more in promises, contracts, &c.) even such as the light of Nature has ever condemned in the world, as not only impious in point of Religion, but destructive to human society, and those which tend to subvert the main grounds and foundations of it. We can never oblige them by Oath at any time, but *when* they please, nor any further than they list: we can never tell when they *swear*, though they take Oaths, nor when they are *obliged*, though they *swear*: we cannot possibly know when we may be sure of them. When we think them *fast*, by all the rules that men of Conscience and common Honesty proceed by; yet they can *juggle* themselves loose by the *Roman* rules, at pleasure, and make sport with God and man, even in Oaths where God himself is a Witness, and the greatest of men concerned as Parties.

Seci. 5. There needs no other demonstration of the *Irreligion* of the *Roman Church*, and its utter regardlessness of God and the souls of men,

(b) *Judex hereticus aut schismaticus amittit omnem jurisdictionem.* Vid. Conc. Lateran. sub Innocent. 3. in Crab. *Supra*.

(i) *Juramentum exactum a iudice non competente (quales nunc omnes sunt in Anglia) in jurisdictione Ecclesiastica, non obligat nisi secundum intentionem jurantis in Abb. de mendacio. p. 49.*

then

than their doctrine concerning the observance of the Lords day, and all other which they pretend to be set apart for holy employment. If any man would understand *what Religion* is left among them, he may see it there in short, and needs look no further; since there he may be satisfied that they have no design for the honour of God, or the salvation of souls. For when they have discharged the people from all duties of Religion, at any other determinate times (*k*), and reserved all which they make necessary for them, to Holy-days; yet even on these days, by their doctrine, nothing is made their duty, to which any regard of God, or of their souls, is needful. All that they are obliged to, is only to be present at (*l*) *Mass*, no other act, or duty of Religion or Worship is necessary; no *internal* (*m*) act at all, nor any (*n*) *external*, either publick or private, but only the *Mass*: And that may be so *external*, that neither *God*, nor any *divine* thing, need to be minded in it. For this I have produced evidence enough already, let me only add this; they are wont to speak of a three-fold *attending* at

(*k*) Vid. *supra*. cap. 1.

(*l*) *Sola missa communiter est in præcepto*. Cajetan. *sum. v. fest. p. 304*. *Missæ audienda diebus festis ex præcepto, non tamen Concio, non preces fundende; non exercendæ aliis actus cultus Divini ex præcepto (excipe diem paschatis, quo sumenda est Eucharistia)* Viñet. *addit ad Tol. l. 4. c. 25*.

(*m*) Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 122. art. 4. Cajetan. *Sum. v. fest. p. 305*. Soto. *de justit. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. Navar. c. 13. n. 2. &c.*

No act of *love* Bellarm. *de cult. Sanct. l. 2. c. 10*. Nav. *c. 11. n. 7*. Soto. *ibid. ar. contrition*. Soto. *ibid. Sylv. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8*. Canus. *relect. de penit. pars. 4. p. 864*. or *sincerely* no need to have that Devotion in the heart, which they outwardly make shew of. No necessity of a good end in their worshipping. For that they commonly maintain after *Aquinas* that the end of the command for worship, is not under command *vid. supra*.

(*n*) Not hearing Sermons. *Sylv. sum. v. Dominic. n. 8*. Viñet. *Supra*. Nor other prayers, private *Sylv. ibid. Navar. c. 21. n. 6. vid. Suar. de fest. l. 2. c. 1. n. 4*. or publick. *Vesperas ceteraq; Divina officia, diebus festis, non audire, non est peccatum mortale, neq; veniale; nisi ratione voti aut juramenti*. Graff. *l. 2. c. 34. n. 12*. *Nemo jure communi regulariter tenetur audire de præcepto alia Divina officio, etiam vespers* Navar. *c. 21. n. 1*. They are not obliged to any prayers, but those in the *Mass*; which indeed are not theirs, nor need they concur in them, otherwise than by a virtual wish, that the Priest may be heard, *satis est vel ex longinquo missanti adesse, & surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos, qui pro omnibus loquitur, orat & sacrificat, a Deo exaudiatur*. *idem. ibid. n. 8*.

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Mass

Mass (as before was shew'd at their divine Service.) One^(*) to what is said and done by the Priest, as Sacred: A second, to the meaning of what is said or done: And the third, to God and divine things. Now the first of these, they say, (o) is enough, though it be the worst of all: therefore the second (to regard the meaning of what is said or done); and the third (to mind God or Divine things) is more than needs. So that plainly, all that is required of a *Papist*, by their Doctrine, in order to the honour of God, and the salvation of his soul, on any of those days, when these ought to be most minded, is only, being present at *Mass*, without understanding what is said, or done; and without minding God or any thing divine. Such is their worship of God, and care of souls, in the Church of Rome; this is the sum of their Religion; when it appears set forth to greatest advantage in its solemn exercises; he that understands it, and can be in love with it, must be under the power of some other consideration, than that of God and his soul.

Having seen how these days are sanctified, or prophaned rather, by their worship, we might view, what observance they have in reference to servile works. And here they have little, but what may be done without sin; and indeed, as they order the matter, it may seem less sin to follow the works of their callings, than to forbear them, since their abstinence from them, is not, that they may better attend the worship

(*) This all the praying of the people (when they have reduced all their Religious acts to this,) in Popery. All that the Church makes necessary, or leaves possible to them in publick, which yet is no praying, otherwise, than one while he is at *Paris*, may be said to be praying at *Rom*; because he virtually wishes success to a Priest saying Mass there: Or then one in their Purgatory, may be said to be praying at the same time in Heaven; because he would have the supposed intercession of the Saints there, to be successful.

(o) *Hæc satis est, licet omnium imperfectissima.* Fill. tr. 3. n. 214. Suarez. Having, premised, that he believes, there is no dissention or difficulty amongst them concerning attention at the time of Mass: reckons after Aquinas the 3. sorts of attention and adds of the first. *Hæc attentio est infima omnium, tamen sufficiens: quia illa satis est, ut illa missæ auditio seu præsentia sit humana, moralis, & ex objecto religiosa.* Tom. 3. disp. 88. sect. 3. This being sufficient, the Second and Third are more than needs: and yet in the third (this excluded as needless), he acknowledges all inward reverence and worship is included. *Sub hac autem attentione ad Deum omnis interior reverentia & cultus, omnis oratio & petitio includitur, ut eleganter describit Gregorius 10. in c. decet. ibid.*

of God; (for they think it not needful to worship him, unless he can be said to be worshipped when he is not heeded) but that they may be idle, or worse employed than in their daily business. However, whether it be to indulge their ease, or serve their lusts, or to make shew of some rest, (though far enough from a holy rest) they will have some works forborn; but herein they will be regulated by (*) custom, not the divine Law. Paludanus (p) and others will have them excused, who use manual labours on these days, if they omit not the Mass. And Sylvester says, this is reasonable, because Custom, the interpreter of Laws, will have it so. This may so far regulate them, that every (q) Province and City must observe those days, and those alone, in that manner, and so far only, as custom requires. Yea, it must so far prevail, that if it were the custom to observe these days, no longer than till Noon, or only till Mass were ended, (which may be dispatched in half an hour, and that before (*) Sun rise) the rest may be spent in servile works. They account it worse to spend these days in servile labour, than prophane divertisements (for this, with them, is only a Venial fault, or (*) none, but that may be a mortal sin); yet they declare there is no sin in the worst, but what custom makes (they are like to make Conscience of it, when their own

(*) Dicendum consuetudine fieri posse, ut aliqua persona licite possint in Die festo aliqua opera servilia, vel aliter in festo prohibita, exercere. Antoninus. Sylvester. Cajetan. Soto. Tabiena. Armilla. Navar. in Suar. l. 2. de fest. c. 33. n. 13.

(p) Per (Dominicum) intelligitur generaliter omnis Dies festus de pascepro, secundum Pet. de Palude, quod sentire videtur etiam Jo. Ault. & doctores dicentes aliquos in Diebus festis excusari, nisi missam amittant. Et est rationabile; quia consuetudo legum interpres, ita habet. Sum. v. missa. 2. n. 1. & 2.

(q) Undeque provincia, aut civitas, observare tenetur illa, eo modo, & tantum, quae, quomodo, & quantum consuetudo ipsius praecepit observari. Navar. c. 13. n. 5. Si usus haberet, ut solum ferventur usque ad meridiem, vel usque ad solemnia missarum peracta, postea possent opera servilia fieri. Idem. ibid.

(*) Gabriel cum Scoto dicunt, licetiam esse inchoare missam, una hora & quarta parte alterius ante ortum solis—Non erit peccatum hora & dimidia ante ortum solis sacrificare: Imo addit Paludanus & clarior Victoria posse licite inchoari missam dimidia hora ante crepusculum, ita ut finis missae sit sub initium crepusculi, plus minusve. Et hoc est in praxi servandum Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 80. sect. 4. So Mass may be ended, not only before Sun-rise, but about break of day; above an hour before the Sun is up.

(*) Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. p. 277. n. 25. p. 274. n. 3.

wills and practices are their rule. This (as many other by their doctrine, which makes voyd the commands of God at pleasure), is but a sin at discretion; they may make it none when they please, and render all days alike, as easily as they can bring up a custom (*), such a one, to which nature is forward.

But no wonder, they think not these sacred days violated by *working*, since they teach they are not prophaned by any acts of wickedness. Their *Divines* (r) generally agree herein; (s) *Contrition for sins, and the avoyding of other sins is not enjoyned*, says Cajetan. The day is not prophaned by Fornication (t) says Soto; nor by Lying, Murder, or Blapheming, says Bellarmin (u); nor by any wickedness whatsoever, is holy time prophaned, but only by those opposie thereto (viz.) not bearing Mass and bodily labours. So that the days may be sanctified well enough, according to the holiness of that Church, if after an *irreligious* presence at Mass for half an hour; (the precept for which may be satisfied without minding God, or abstaining from wickedness, while they are at it) the rest thereof be spent in beastly Drunkenness or Gluttony, in Perjuries, Blasphemies, or Cursing God or Man; in Murders, Whoring, Sodomy, or Bestiality, or the most enormous debauches. And though they are not bound, as they teach, to be at the pains of one good act of

(*) *Observatio Diei Dominicæ non est de jure Divino, sed Canonico, ut a iunct communiter Doctores — & consequenter posse consuetudine, vel humana potestate abrogari.* Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. n. 4. p. 272. Sayrus & alij ibi.

(r) Cajetan. Soto. Sylvester. Victoria. Navar. Covarruvius & alij, quos refert & sequitur Suarez. de fest. l. c. 18. n. 3. inter quos etiam recenset S. Thom. vid. Bellarm. de cultu sancti. l. 3. c. 10. Graff. l. 2. c. 33. n. 8.

(s) *Non continetur sub hoc præcepto contritio peccatorum, nec vitatio aliorum peccatorum.* Sum. v. fest. p. 305.

(t) *Non quod per fornicationem violetur festum.* de iust & iur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4.

(u) *Non enim violatur tempus sacrum per quæcumque peccata, sed solum per ea, quæ opponuntur ipsi tempori sacro, qualia sunt non audire sacrum, & operari corporaliter.* Ibid. l. 3. c. 10. p. 1610.

Secunda opinio asserit — peccatum etiam mortale in Die festo commissum, non habere ex illa temporis circumstantia speciem malitiam; quæ in confessione necessario aperienda sit: illam docent Cajetan, Corduba. Soto Victoria. Almayn. Sylvester. Armilla. Tabiena. Angl. Navar. Covarruvias. Gutier. pro hac etiam sententia potest referri D. Thomas. in 4. dist. 32. art. 5. q. 1. Suarez. l. 2. de festis. cap. 18. n. 3. vid. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 5. p. 274.

mind, or heart, in serving God, at the only time set apart for his Service (*Scotus* is almost worried by the Herd of their Divines (x) for *seeming to think that a good act of mind towards God was enjoined on these days*), yet they may spend their bodys, and toyl themselves more in the service of their lusts, without prophaning them, than in *servile work*. The reason why they hold, that no excess of wickedness does prophane these days, is (y) *because wicked acts are not servile works*. It seems, slavery to *Sathan*, and the service of the vilest lusts is not *servile*, whatsoever *Christ* or the *Apostle* thought thereof, *John* 8. 34. *Rom.* 6. 16. that is consistent enough, with the liberty and honour of such Christians as they are. However, hereby it is manifest, that their Religious observation of all holy times (*and so all the Religiousness which that Church requires of her Catholics*) is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery.

In fine, God can have no honour from men, nor they salvation from him without Religion; this cannot be kept up in the world, without the solemn exercises of it; these cannot, (or will not) be performed without time for that end; therefore hath the Lord appointed time to be set apart for these purposes; the Church of *Rome* hath reduced all religious Exercises at the times appointed by God, or themselves, to the peoples bearing of *Mass*, and there will not have the precept oblige them to any real Religiousness, not so much as to a thought of God, or any thing Divine; yea, or the forbearance of wicked thoughts and acts, while they are at *Mass*. Thus far is Religion (upon which the interest of God and Man so much depends) sunk among them. And it must of necessity sink (all but the shadow or froth) in any part of the world, where these principles prevail. But though they declare them not obliged to serve God any better at this, or at any other time, yet they maintain for them as much liberty to serve the Devil and their Lusts on these Holy times, as any other. Let all concerned, judge of the Ra-

(x) *Scotus sentire videtur hoc nos præcepto juberi, diebus festis bonum habere mentis actum circa Deum. Soto de just. & jur. l. 2. q. 4. art. 4. p. 51.*

(y) *Nec valet dicere inter ista servilia computari peccatum: quia hoc falsum est. Sylvest. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8. --- nisi esset opus servile in festis prohibitum, quale non est peccatum juxta S. Thomam. in 3. sent. dist. 37. art. 5. q. 2. Navar. c. 6. n. 10. probatur a Cajetano & cæteris --- quia opus peccati ut sic non est servile. Suar. ibid n. 6.*

man Religion and Holiness hereby; if there were nothing else, by which the measures thereof could be taken, this would suffice.

Sec. 6. In the next place, in reference to Hereticks; to go no further (for that is far enough, since in their Charity the far greatest part of Christians are no better) all Relatives are discharged of their respective duties enjoined them by the Laws of God or Man. Their Decretals (the Law of their Church which presumes to over-rule all other Law, Natural, Divine, or Civil) deprives Hereticks immediatly of all (a) due fidelity, right, duty, observance, which any whosoever do owe them; (b) They lose all which they have by civil right. (c) Subjects owe no Allegiance or duty at all to Princes or Magistrates. (d) Children owe no duty to their Parents; they have (by their Law) no power over them, and this from the first day of their Heresie. (e) Wives owe not conjugal duty to their Husbands; and if (f) they knew they were not Papists, when contracted, they lose their Dowry. (g) Servants are freed from all Fidelity to, and observance of their Masters. (h) Yea,

(a) Ipso jure privatos esse hereticos omni debito fidelitatis, Domini, obligationis, &c. (equi), quo illis quicunque tenebantur astricti—Decretal. Gregor. 9. l. 5. c. ult. heret.

(b) Amittunt omnia quae juris civilis sunt. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 12. privantur juri Domini naturalis, aeconomici & civilis vid. Ovandus in 4. dist. 13. p. 347.

(c) Eorum vassalli absoluti sunt a debito fidelitatis & totius obsequii—& idem de vassallis Dominorum, qui contra hereticos sunt negligentes. Sylvest. v. haereses l. n. 14. Angelus v. heret. n. 15.

(d) Perdunt patriam potestatem, quia non habent filios in potestate. Graff. ibid. Fidei hereticorum ipso facto quo sententiatum est contra eorum parentes de haeresi, efficiuntur sui juris, & effecti intelliguntur a Die commissi criminis. Angel. ibid. n. 10. Sylvest. ibid.

(e) Viro debitum reddere non tenetur. Simanca. Instit. Cathol. c. 45. n. 27.

(f) Uxores scienter cum hereticis contrahentes perdunt ipso facto dotem. Sylvest. ibid. Angelus. ibid. n. 11.

(g) Et quicunque alij aliqua obligatione astricti: ut famuli, liberti, & hujusmodi ipso facto liberantur. ut dicitur & notatur in c. si. eo. ii. Angelus. ibid. n. 15. Sylvest. ibid.

(h) Omnes hereticos obligatos ex juramento, fidelitate obsequij, pactione vel promissione, liberari, ita habetur c. ultimo de Haeret. Propterea si aliquis promississet hereticis solvere sub pena vel juramento certo Die, non tenetur, ut notat Glossa ibid. Ego teneo quod eo ipso quod est manifestum in haeresin incidisse tales absoluti sunt, quantumcumque sententia non feratur contra eos. Angel. ibid. n. 15. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. Armilla. v. haeres. n. 12. Ovandus in 4. dist. 13. propof. 30. p. 348.

Deb-

Chap. IX. Debetur bouni Follo which Bu allow they n their guilt ticks the t a yea very Eng Caro it in we a that Mur S fenn with ther Sift may chi wit Th

(H) e. (C) Ca da ba (C)

Debtors are freed from paying what they owe to Hereticks, though bound thereto, either by Penalty or Oath. They hereby oblige their Followers to make nothing of such dutys, without the observance of which, Man-kind would become worse than Brutes.

But this may seem a smaller matter to them; they go higher, and allow any one to kill a Heretick, as though Murder were no sin; (i) *they may be killed with impunity*, says *de Graffis*, and proves it out of their Church Laws. Pope (k) *Urban 2.* declared *that they are not guilty of Murder, who kill any that are Excommunicate*: Now all Hereticks are Excommunicate by the Council of *Lateran*, under *Innocent* the third; and the Sentence which lyes dormant there, is roused once a year. The Pope in person denouncing it in a solemn manner, and very gravely with a Peacock-tail on either side his head. We in *England* particularly are under Excommunication to this day; and Cardinal *Barbarin* thought fit, not long since, to give special notice of it in a Letter to some of the *Irish*. They forget not how obnoxious we are, and we may remember, how much we are obliged by them, that any of us are suffered to live, when they may kill us without Murder.

Sec. 7. But we may the better bear with them in this, because they seem not very tender of killing one another. A man is not to be punished who kills his Wife, taken in Adultery, and the Adulterer together with her. (l) He may Kill his own Daughter in like case, or his Sister, yea, or his own Mother, if his Father give order for it; and he may do it as safely though these his Female Relatives be quick with child. *For the Child in the Womb* (say they) *being the same morally with the Mother; he that may kill the Mother, may kill the Child too.* Thus a private person may be judge in his own cause, and proceed to

(i) *Posunt etiam impune occidi. Facit. Gloss. sing. in Capital. falic, &c. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 11.*

(k) *Non enim eos homicidas arbitramur, quos adversus excommunicatos, zelo matris Catholicæ Ecclesiæ ardentes, aliquos eorum trucidasse contigerit. Refert ex Ivo & laudat Baronius. an. 1089. n. 11.*

Omnia hæreticus sive occultus sive manifestus, est ipso jure excommunicatus. Rosel. v. hæret. n. 14. Quoting their Law for it.

(l) *Pet. a S. Joseph. de 5. præcepto art. 6. p. 258. 259.*

mortal.

mortal execution without Trial, and sacrifice the guilty and innocent, both at once, to his own or anothers passion, and destroy together the Body and Soul of his nearest Relations; and all this with impunity. They deliver it for certain, that a mother in danger, may lawfully use a Medicine which tends directly to her cure, *though it be probable that it will make her miscarry.* (m) And because she may take such a course to secure her life, or recover her health: they conclude it lawful to do this, *to preserve her state, or reputation.* (n) *So that if a Maid or married Woman, have prostituted herself to anothers lust, shee may procure abortion, when otherwise the Crime might be discovered, and her life or credit in hazard.* Thus neither Families, nor Parishes, nor Monasteries need be pester'd with natural children, how many soever be got: the shame of their birth, and the pain too, may be prevented, and the trouble and expence of their education avoided, by a receipt approved by the Roman Doctors, if it be but taken in time. As for the censures of their Church in this case, or worse, there's no fear, for even (o) *a Nun got with Child may procure abortion, and not be Excommunicate* (so much more favourable is New-Rome to her Vestals than the old was, though their crimes be doubled.) Any who are so disposed, have encouragement enough, to venture upon both. For as to the murder, they are secured from the Laws of God by this Doctrine, which makes it no sin; from the Laws of the Church by her natural indulgence; and may be from those of the state, by their own private conduct: And as to the Whoredom, they may be quitted upon as easie terms, as they would wish. For the the Priest, if he get the child, is impowered to absolve the Mother; and he need not be so strict, as to injoyne for penance, the avoiding of the sin. Yet for all this, they

(m) *Videtur etiam satis certum.* &c. Idem. ibid. art. 2. p. 218. vid. Corduba, Pet. Navar. Arragon. Lopez in Fill. tr. 29. n. 104.

(n) *Liceret etiam procurare abortum nondum animatum cum ad famam & statum conservandum opus erit.* Basil. de Leon, de matrim. l. 10. c. 13. n. 2. *Liceret etiam famina nuptæ, aut virgini fornicanti idem efficere, quando nullo alio quesito medio sui consilere possent, ne crimine detecto, fama vitæq; jacturam facerent.* Pet. Navar. l. 2. de Restit. c. 3. diff. 2. n. 130.

(o) *Secundum Sylvestrum Monialis sollicitans abortum non est excommunicata, quia non injuriam sibi sed proli facit.* Lopez. cap. 64. p. 322. vid. Naldum in Bonacini. de restit. d. 2. q. ult. p. 7. n. 6.

seem so tender (which may amuse us) of unborn Infants in other cases, thus they will have (p) *it lawful to cutt up the Mother quick, and she obliged to suffer, yea procure it, that the child in her Womb may not perish un-baptized.* Thus their Doctrine will have them more regard the Reputation of a Whore, than the life of an honest VWoman; yea the child may perish without regard of its wanting Baptism, when the credit of a Strumpet is concerned: but a chaste VWoman must be killed in the other case, that the Infant in her VVomb may have it. Yet one would think the issue of VWhoredom in as much danger for want of Baptism, as the fruit of lawful Matrimony.

They teach further, that a man may kill another, either to secure his own person, or his Goods, or his Reputation. In defence of his person they hold it lawful to slay any one; (q) *a Servant may kill his Master assaulting him unjustly, or a Monk his Abbot, or a Subject his Prince, or a Child his own Father.* This is their common Doctrine, and thereby there is warrant for it, not only to secure ones life, but to avoid a wound or a blow (r). Any one may do this at any time, (s) *even a Priest while he is celebrating, may kill one that invades him: and when he has shed his blood, may go on with his other Sacrifice, which will be unbloody notwithstanding.* If he that (t) assails him be Frantick, or in Drink, yea or asleep, and has no sense that he offers any wrong; he may innocently kill him for all that, whoever he be, if he cannot otherwise avoid the injury; yea though the aggressor have had the highest provocations, (u) *by intolerable reproaches, or the loss of*

(p) *Aliqui affirmant non tantum id licere, sed etiam matrem teneri talem sectionem procurare, & ferre, ne illius infans sine Baptismo intereat.* Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 220.

(q) Bonacin. ibid. punct. 8. n. 4. ubi Sylvester, Julius Clarus & alij communiter.

(r) *Si non possum effugere qui me percutit, nisi te interficiam, licite te interficio.* Angel. Sum. v. defens. n. 4. ibi Bartolus, Florianus, Navar. cap. 15. n. 4. Lopez part 1. c. 62. Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 221. Bonacin. ibid. n. 3. & alij communiter.

(s) Angel. Sum. v. homicid. 3. n. 2. Sylvest. v. homicid. 1. n. 13. Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 8.

(t) Bonacin. ibid. n. 5. ibi. Bartolus, Gomez. & alij.

(u) Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid. p. 222. & 230. Bonacin. ibid. p. 3. ubi Ret. Navar. Sorus, Julius Clarus, Rodriguez.

his Estate, or the defiling of his bed: yet in this case he that has given the occasion, and done the wrong, may kill the sufferer; the Thief may lawfully slay him whom he has Robbed; and the Adulterer may kill the Husband, after he has abused the Wife, or deflowred his Sister, or Buggar'd his Child. He may not only kill the aggressor, but an innocent person also to escape himself (x). *As if he cannot be secured from Peter, without killing Paul, he may be the death of them both*; or state it thus, and they cannot stick at it, if he cannot escape his Father without killing his Mother, he may slay both Father and Mother at once. Thus they may deprive any of life, not only when they are actually assaulted, but before any blow is given. (y) *When a man perceives one coming towards him with his Weapon ready, and fears he is not able to deal with him, he may shoot him dead at a distance*. Nor need he be hindred by the consideration, that killing him in such circumstances (since he is in mortal sin) will be the destruction both of Body and Soul together. Soto objects this to himself, but abates nothing of his conclusion notwithstanding. Yea he answers, that to hold it not lawful to kill in this case (with the destruction of the slain mans Soul too) is both to pervert the Law of nature, (z) and to render the sweet and easie yoke of Christ intolerable. They give further instances wherein they will have it no sin to kill a person, that has not yet touched them; it is sufficient, in their account, if they know that he is prepared for it, yea or does but design it. (a) In case one be shut up in a House or a City, so that he cannot get out, and knowes there is one in the Town that designs upon his life, and waits but an opportunity to execute it: he may prevent the designer, and fall upon him unawares, and kill him. They declare it lawful for a man to kill his Wife taken in Adultery: but then they allow the Adulterers to be before-hand with

(x) Petrus a S. Joseph. de 5. præcept. art. 2. p. 123. Pet. Navar. de restit. l. 1. c. 3. n. 147. Bonacin. ibid. punct. 7. n. 1. ubi Julius Clarus. Corduba. Cajetan. & alij.

(y) Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 4. Soto de Just. & jurc. l. 5. q. 1. art. 8. p. 143.

(z) Ibid.

(a) Graff. l. 2. c. 64. n. 5.

her Husband, and kill him first if she can ; (b) she may dispatch him with the poyson prepared for her , or stab him with the Weapon he has ready, and so secure her Adultery by Murder, and yet be innocent.

They maintain it is lawful to kill others to secure their goods. (c) So it is no sin with them, to take away the life of him, that would take away part of their Goods by night or day ; yea if he that steals makes no resistance, or defence, but flies, he may be pursued and slain, to recover what he has taken. And although the Goods may be recovered otherwise, and in a legal way, (d) yet if it be not certain, that he may get them with the greatest ease, but doubtful that it may give him some trouble, he may use his liberty, and send him to Hell to save himself a little trouble. But of what value must the Goods be? (that we may discern at what rate they set the life and Soul of a man). It must not (sayes Soto) be a vile thing, it should not be so little worth as 2 or 3 Duckats (e). So that it seems, if what is stoln, be of the value of about Twenty shillings, a man may be kill'd for it, and his Body and Soul destroy'd together. And since a Crown or a Shilling may be more to some than Twenty to others ; those who follow him, might well infer from hence, that a mans life might be taken away for a Crown or less : yea for an Apple, since to some persons that may be of more value, than the sums mentioned. Accordingly, they conclude expressly, (f) that he who takes a thing, the owner or keeper of it seeing, and offering to hinder him, may be lawfully slain for it ; though it be but of the value of one Crown or less either , because thereby he offers an

(b) Navar. c. 15. n. 3. Lopez. c. 62. p. 311. Bonacin. de restit. d. 2. q. ult. p. 9. n. 2. ubi Julius Clarus, Bannes, Rodriquez, Corduba & alij.

(c) Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 17. Lopez. Cap. 61. Navar. c. 15. n. 2. ibi Cajetan. Antoninus, Silvester.

(d) Non licet furem occidere — si spes esset certissima quod facilimo negotio recuperari posset — ubi autem res esset dubia, posset liberum esse Domino jure uti suo, Soto. ibid.

(e) Ibid. p. 144.

(f) Etiam si res sit valoris unius aurei aut minoris — videtur posse occidi Bonacin. de restit. d. 2. q. ult. p. 10. n. 1.

affront. That's another ground of their Lawful murder. (g) A man; they avow, may kill others for his Honour or Reputation; for though it be so slight a thing, that it will be scarce a fault in a man to throw it away himself (as we heard before): yet they will have him maintain it at the expence of the blood, and life of others, and his own too. For example, (h) If he sees one approach to assault him, though he might avoid the danger by retiring, yet he may kill him rather than so avoid it; because it would be a disparagement to him to fly, and so rather than suffer the least, in the repute of the injudicious Rabble, he may be the death of any person; and be a man of blood, that he may be the Master of such honour, as a truly generous spirit must despise. They advance further yet; if one should offer to (i) give a person a blow with a Cudgel, or a light Switch; he that is offered such an affront may lawfully kill him for it, especially in Spain, where this is counted a great injury says Soto. And elsewhere a box on the ear may be resented, as such an injury. Accordingly others determine, that he who gives it, may lawfully (k) be slain for it, yea or he that does but offer it. If he be any person of any moment that is thus attempted, he need not stay till he feel it, but may prevent it by killing him that offers it, if there be no other honourable way to avoid it: He need not fly to avoid it, if that would be a disgrace, for he is not obliged to suffer such an inconvenience, though by retiring he might save both his own life, and the aggressors, says Bonacina after others. In this manner when one smites them on the Cheek, do they turn the other; and thus do they comply exactly with Christ's advice by stabbing him to the heart, who smites their Cheek, or does but offer at it.

(g) *Comuniter omnes docent, Vid. Viſtoriel. add. Tol. l. 5. c. 6. famam suam---negligere & prodigere potest sine peccato. Pet. S. Joseph, de 8. præcept. art. 2. vid. Navar. c. 18. n. 27.*

(h) Soto *ibid.*

(i) *Si quis quempiam aggrederetur, ut eum fuste levissime percuteret, posset id alter etiam hostem interimendo repellere. ibid. Viſtoria. Navar. & Sylvester in Fill. tr. 29. n. 50.*

(k) *Ad vitandum vulnus vel alapam---potest occidere. Navar. c. 15. n. 4. Lopez; P. l. c. 62. p. 316. Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. & alij.*

The same they determine of ill-language, that is with them a sufficient ground to kill men. *In the judgment of all (l) (says Navar) it is lawful to kill him that gives reproachful words, when there is no other way to avoid the injury* (and the words being once past, there's no preventing them). Thus killing men may be as common as provoking language, when such language by their Doctrine may be as common as any they speak. They teach that it is but a venial fault (10000 of which he may commit every day, or every hour without indangering his Soul) to give one the ly, to call him a Fool, a Bastard. (m) &c. And then they declare it lawful to slay men for such words: as if it were their design to have it thought tolerable for men to do nothing else but kill one another; and shedding mans blood were no more to be avoided, than such faults as they incourage the continual practice of. They proceed further yet, and conclude it lawful to kill one, not only for contumelious words, (n) but for *mere signs* of such import, when an ill word is not spoken (suppose such motion of the tongue, or lips, or nose, or fingers as are accounted an affront). This is after the Roman mode to imitate Christ; and comply with the Apostles rule in laying down their lives for their Brethren; when they take away their lives, for a foul word, or an untoward gesture. But what if one who gives such a blow, or such language, or the like affront, should run for it, when he has done; is it lawful to pursue him to force satisfaction from him, though it be by the loss of his life? yes say they, the person affronted, *may pursue him, and strike him till he have reparation of his honour, though it be by killing him (o).*

(l) *Ex omnium sententia licet contumeliosum occidere, cum aliud non manet remedium eam injuriam arcendi.* de restit. l. c. 2. 3. n. 376. vid. Bonacin. & apud eum plures infra.

(m) Vid. Navar. c. 18. n. 23. 24.

(n) *Posse occidi qui afficit contumeliis atrocibus sive per verba sive per signa,* Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. ult. p. 10. n. 7. ibi. Gmez. Rodriguez, Lopez. Per. Navar. Julius Clarus & alij.

(o) *Posse eum persequi, & percutere tantum, quantum ad sui honoris defensionem opus esset etiam occidendo.* M. Navar. c. 15. n. 4. Per. Navarra. ibid. n. 380. Rodriguez Lopez, & alij in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8. pluries apud Henriquez. Sum. l. 14. c. 10.

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They speak favourably of Duels. *Cajetan* says (p) Princes may permit them lawfully among their Subjects; as the Stews are permitted upon reasonable considerations. So that it seems, they may farm out this liberty, as the Pope does the other. *Bannes* determines, that an innocent person may either accept, or offer combat; not only to secure his life or estate, but his Reputation, when he cannot otherwise do it. (q) Such a person, when one goes about to accuse him falsely before a Judge, and he is like thereby to be defamed, may challenge him and kill him lawfully. This he reports as *Cajetan's* opinion, and counts it more than probable; But there's no need of Duels in the case, they discover a way to dispatch men more effectually with less notice, and less hazard to the murderers, allowing them to kill any privily, to secure their Repute. The same *Dominican* in the case mentioned concludes, that (r) if the accuser being admonished will not desist, the aggrieved person in defence of his concerns, may kill him. Not only judicial accusations, but more private aspersions, are counted a sufficient ground to kill men. (s) He who by whispers and detraction endeavours to wrong, and bespot another, if the infamy and disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided, it will be lawful to slay him. So *Pet. Navar*, who gives reasons why he thinks it more adviseable to kill a defamer privily, than in a Duel. Nor need he stay till he be actually aspersed, but when one threatens, or signifies he will do it, he may lawfully prevent it, by killing him. Forty nine Doctors are produced in favour of this. *Prado* (t) an eminent *Dominican* says it is the common Doctrine of *Aquinas* his followers.

These are some of the *Maxims*, which serve so much to furnish those who design upon mens lives, with lawful occasion to murder;

(p) Sum. v. duellum.

(q) In 2. 2. q. 64. art. 7. dub. 4. concl. 2.

(r) Ibid.

(s) *Qui murmuratone, & detractiōe injuriam, maculamque inferre conatur, licebit, si aliter infamiam & dedecus fugere non potest occidere.* De reskit. l. 2. c. 3. n. 376. *Calumniatorem occulte occidere licet, Duvallius Doctor Sorbonicus de Charit. q. 17. a. 1.* Sayrus. Cas. Conf. c. 17. n. 22, 23.

(t) Theol. Moral. tom. 2. c. 16. q. 4. n. 14.

and tend so plainly to fill all places with blood, and slaughters, with-
out leaving any man security of his life: that even some *Jesuits*
though they deny not that they may be probable in speculation, yet seem
thly to allow their common practice. But this is rejected by others,
(and so the *Jesuits* cautiousness and moderation counted unreasona-
ble) seeing (*) that in matters of morality, what is speculatively
probable *i. e.* safe and lawful, in point of Conscience, must, as such,
be admitted in practice (*). Indeed though there be no charge more
odious upon the Society, than their Doctrine of murder; yet so far
as I can discern, they are out-done here by others, both in numbers and
extravagancy. However the Maxims, to diminish the horror of
which the *Jesuits* seem solicitous, are now the common Doctrine in
that Church: the Divinity of her Schools and Doctors generally,
being advanced to such a pitch, as to bid defiance to common huma-
nity. And if the civil Laws did give as much liberty to murder, as
their rules for Conscience do; Desolation would soon be brought
upon the face of the Earth.

Seci. 8. For uncleanness they are very favourable to it, they seem
to condemn the *consummation* of the act; but scarce any thing else,
and not *that* neither in every kind. They give up the *outworks*, which
should secure them from this sin, they admit its *approaches*, they in-
courage Sinners to venture upon the *occasions*, even such as have very
often insnared them in this wickedness. Any Confitent (they teach)
ought to be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid any occasions
which lead to it; unless they be such, (a) *as he does or ought to believe
he can seldom or never use, without perpetrating the deadly act.* So that
though he very frequently fall thereby into uncleanness; yet unless he
believe that they will *quasi semper* (b) in a manner *always* overthrow

(*) *Opinio speculative probabilis, est practice probabilis* Serra, Leander, Spinola,
Jo. Henriquez, Narbona, Aversa, Machado, in Diana, part. 10. tr. 11. Resol. 47.

(*) Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 44. n. 63. & disp. 54. n. 11.

(a) *Quæ credit, vel credere debet confessarius vel penitens nunquam vel raro, usum
ea, sine peccato mortali,* Navar. c. 3. n. 14.

(b) *Non vitare hujusmodi occasionem est peccatum mortale, at talis est occasio, qua credit
se fere semper ad sic peccandum impulsus* *iri.* *ibid.*

him.

him, he may make bold with them. To (c) go into place or company, where the sight of any, their persuasions, or opportunities, expose him to danger of sinning, though he do it without necessity, is of it self no great fault says *Cajetan* and if he find, that he can for some time with-stand the Temptation, and do not in a manner presently fall (d); (*statim aut quasi statim*) though he find himself weak, yet he may venture on them, without any necessary occasion, as the Cardinal leaves us to conclude, from what he there adds. A (e) Confessor does well, who absolves those, who will not express any purpose to avoid converse with such Women, by which he hath very often sinned every way, both by desire, words, shameful touches, yea and the very act of uncleanness: because this is such an occasion, as is not deadly in it self, nor does make them fere semper commit deadly sin. Those (f) Women or Servants who have committed lewdness with their Masters, or others in the house, yea though they be their Kinsmen: may be absolved, though they still live together; if they cannot leave them without great inconvenience or damage, provided (g) if they be truly sorry for what is past, and intend to sin no more, and think they shall not, yea though after this, (h)

(c) *Quando ad locum sive societatem ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter propter aspectum, persuasiones, opportunitates aut aliquid hujusmodi. Et hoc quidem si sine urgente necessitate sit, ad incautelæ peccatum spectat. Si experientia teste didicit se non subsistere in hujusmodi, sed statim aut quasi statim cadere, nulla necessitate vincatur, ut illuc eat, aut ibi moretur, Sum. v. peric. peccandi.*

(e) *Recte faciunt confessarii absolvendo multos adolescentes, qui versantur inter mulieres, emendo, vendendo, laborando & conversando absque cobabitatione in eadem domo: licet non proponant perpetuo abstinere ab occasione peccandi, quam id illis præbet, quamvis sæpius peccent voluntate, verbo, aut tactibus impudicis, & etiam copula, quia occasio quæ ex hoc præbetur ad peccandum, non est ex se peccatum mortiferum neque hujusmodi, ut fere semper faciat mortaliter peccare eos qui ea utuntur, Navar. ibid. n. 17.*

(f) *Possunt absolvi, sine separatione, cognatæ, ancillæ, ac famalæ, quæ rem habuerunt cum suis consanguineis Dominis vel his in quorum domo degunt, concurrentibus 4 prædictis: quorum quartum scilicet causæ notabilis, est quod non possunt sine magno incommodo, & detrimento separari, n. 21.*

(g) *1. Vera penititudo præteritorum. 2. Verum propositum non peccandi. 3. Credulitas quod Deo juvante non peccabit. n. 15.*

(h) *An possint absolvi prædictæ iterum absque separatione si reciderint? v. videtur nobis posse concurrentibus prædictis 4. Et idem dicendum arbitror de tertia & quarta vice, quia non solum semel aut bis, vel septies, sed etiam septuagies sexties est parcendum. ib. d. n. 24.*

they

they fall many times into the same wickedness (of Fornication, Adultery or Incest) and do not avoid the occasion ; yet still they may be absolved. And this liberty is not restrained to houses where they live together ; (*) he extends it to other houses also. (i) He that hath secretly committed filthiness diverse ways with a Friend or a Kins-woman in another house, may be absolved, though he do not intend to forsake that house. Or if the occasions he meets with in private houses, do not satisfy him ; he may venture into the common Stews, but then it ought to be with a good intent. A (k) man may go to a common Whore, with confidence that he may convert her, though there be danger, and it is probable that he will commit filthiness with her. And so any (their Religious Brothers or Fathers not excepted) may seek the Conversation of common Whores, though they see imminent danger that they shall make no better use of the Strumpets, than those who come to them, with the worst design.

They are as indulgent to unclean thoughts, as to lewd and insnaring company. To (l) entertain filthy thoughts, to delight in those thoughts, and (m) to consent to that delight ; is either no sin, or but venial says Sylvester and others. They distinguish betwixt the unclean act, and

(*) Those that keep Concubines, may be rightly Absolved upon the same terms, without parting from them. x. 19.

(i) Idem dicendum est de illo, qui occulte rem, aut impudicos tactus habet cum aliqua consanguinea, aut alia sibi amica in alia domo agente scilicet. cum absolvi posse, sine proposito nunquam ingrediendi eam. n. 22.

(k) Si quis certus esset de convertenda muliere prostituta, si accederit, ad persuadendum illi viam salutis, potest juvare accedere, etiam si ex tali accessu, imminet sibi probabile periculum peccandi cum illa. Soto, in Lopez. cap. 53. p. 275. prudentis charitatis fervor nonnunquam hominum animat, ut ad convertendas perditas mulieres, cum aliquo suo periculo earum colloquium adeat. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 1. art. 6. vide plurimos sequentes D. Thomam dicentem, quod exponens se periculo peccandi, causa urgente, non peccat, Navar. Cordub. Cajetan. Armill. Castro. &c. in Jo. Sanc. disp. 10. n. 8.

(l) Si quis de modis & inventionibus fornicandi pecculetur, sola quidam novitate, & curiositate intelligendi hos modos adductus, non erit mortale, Lopez. c. 74. p. 355.

(m) Non tamen est peccatum mortale consentire in delectationem cogitationis, que est de peccato mortali, sed est Veniale quando cogitatio est inutilis : vel nullum, puta cum quis utiliter cogitat, Sum. v. delect. n. 2. Lopez. ibid.

the thought of it. Cajetan (n) though he would not have the act to be the object of the delight; yet he allows any to take pleasure, not only in the thought, but in the special manner of the act. If (o) a man do not observe what he is delighting in, while he is pleasing himself with such thoughts, yea if he do not fully consider it, though he entertain himself with this mental pleasure a whole day together, it will not be sinful delight. Last with an imperfect inadvertency will not be mortal, when the delight of it so invades the mind says Lopez, (p) nor needs he resist such delight or repel these thoughts; if (q) he believe they will not engage him further; or if he thinks that by resistance they will grow upon him; or (r) if it would hinder him from some necessary, or profitable, or honest employment, such as the study, or reading of filthy things, which provoke such delight, is in their account. They are no more rigorous as to obscene words, filthy Songs, lascivious Writings,

(n) Si delectatio sit de miris & similibus modis, non est delectatio morosa: quam modis sint admirabilis, & naturaliter delectabiles cogitanti animæ. Sum. v. delect. moros.

Sicut nec est (mortale) delectari in modo operandi scelus aliquod: licet non in ipso scelerato opere, ut in modis occupandi regnum---sicut etiam in speculatione variorum modorum coituum, dum absit periculum consentiendi. Lopez. c. 75.

(o) Si circa id non adverteret, quamvis diem integrum delectatio perduraret, non peccaret mortaliter. Neque satis est advertere nisi integre advertat secundum Cajetanum. Navar. 11. n. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delectat. p. 111. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 2.

Si vero advertire incepit & pravalente impetu concitata passionis non plene advertit: sed antequam plene advertit delectatio facit suum cursum, peccatum non mortale sed veniale intervenit, Cajetan. ibid. Non sit signum sufficiens ad probandum consensum tacitum, sola perseverentia delectationis post advertentiam. ibid.

(p) Ad mortale requiritur advertentia plena, quia non satis est imperfecta, quæ ex pravalente impetu passionis solet causari, libido cum tali inadvertentia imperfecta non erit mortalis, quando sic ejus complacentia impetit mentem, cap. 85. p. 359.

(q) Navar, cap. 11. n. 13. Lopez. ex mente Cajetani & Metin. ibid. Graff. l. 2. c. 77. n. 2, 4, 5. Cajetan. ibid. p. 113.

(r) Non esset culpa---si delectationem illam omisisset expellere, ne suam occupationem honestam & necessariam, aut utilem dereliqueret, quale est studium & lectio rerum impudicarum, ad hujusmodi delectationes provocantium, Navar. ibid.

and

and Discourses. They sin not says *Navar* (s) whether they be Men or Women, *who see, or read, or hear, or speak any filthy things*, Men to Women, or Women to Men, such as provoke to uncleanness, if it be upon an *honest occasion*; now it must needs be an honest occasion when this is done, while they are at Church for Divine service, and there they have used it. *Church* (t) *Musick is now so licentious* (says one) *that filthy ditties, are sung to the Organ, and keep time even with the Canon of the Mass* (the most sacred part of that which they count most sacred) and *Cajetan* informs us, that in their Church, this is the practice (u) every where, to sing to the Organ amorous and filthy (x) songs; and that such cleanly stuff is in the person (y) of the Church offered to God, instead of Reponsals and Divine praises, (a) *and that experience witnesses that the hearers are thereby excited to prophane and filthy things*, he allows not this indeed, but in some, and with limitation; laying the blame of the rest, upon (b) *the Pastours of their Church, who seek not* (as he says) *the things of Christ*, and would have us believe, the Church approves it not; when yet he allows it, to be the common practice (c) *every where*. It seems, she does but tolerate filthiness in the Church, as she does in the Stews; that she may be holy uniformly every where. However, *if any one should out of simplicity,*

(s) *Qui ad prædicandum, &c. aut alloquendum feminas ex causa honesta cum sint ipsi viri, vel contra viros, cum sint ipsa femina, vident, legunt, audiunt, aut dicunt aliqua turpia, aut talia, quæ illam provocant. Si enim quamvis possint, non sunt tam obligati ad omittendum id quod faciunt, quo pollutionis eventum impédiant. Idem. c. 16. n. 7.*

(t) *Hodie vero tanta est musicæ licentia ut etiam una cum missæ ipsius canonis obscenæ cantiancæ, etiam in organis pares vices habeant, Corn. Agripp. de Vanit. Scient. c. 17.*

(x) *Turpes & amatorias cantilenas.--- (y) loco antiphonarum & divinæ laudis offeruntur, ex ipsa Ecclesiæ persona, prophana hæc a salarjjs ministris, Sum. v. Organ. p. 453.*

(a) *Audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa prophana sua turpia ut experientia testatur, ita quod non est locus infirmitati. ibid. 454.*

(b) *Quia ecclesiastici pastores non quaesierunt quæ Jesu Christi sunt.*

(c) *ubiq; sic vident fieri.*

(d) *Si aliquis rustica simplicitate putaret licere dicino cultui recreandi animi gratia, miscere cantilenas profanas & turpes, quia videt communiter in his usum invaluisse: excusaretur a mortalibus ita Navarrus cujus sententiam esse veram judico, si loquatur de simplicibus rusticis, &c. cap. 51. p. 263.*

think it lawful, to mix prophane and filthy Songs, with Divine Worship for Recreation sake; because he sees, that this custome hath commonly prevailed; Navar would excuse him from mortal sin, as Lopez tells us.

And so will Lopez excuse him too, provided the Songs mixed with Divine service, be not too grossly filthy and excessively lascivious. (*)

And so he may well excuse those (e) who sing obscene and lascivious songs in the Church, but not in Divine service, as he seems to do those who sing to one another filthy rhimes on the Evening of the Nativity, when they are asking benedictions. It seems that's the usual way to get their Church blessings, but the custome of that Church needs no timorous advocate, this can plead for it self, and is wont to stand as good as any Law what-ever, that of God, (f) not excepted.

Their Sacrament of penance, also is an honest occasion and there in confessions, as one of their Bishops informs us, the Priests inquire after such obscene and shameful things (instilling thereby into their ears, unheard of filthiness and lasciviousness) as cannot without the blushing of the confitents of either Sex, and without provoking the wanton appetite of the Confessor, be well expressed in any words. (*)

Further they allow persons to entertain themselves with pleasure conditionally, upon supposal that they were (g) married together; if the act be not respected as present. They grant liberty to make

(*) *Unmodo tales cantus non sint adeo patenter turpes, & nimis lascivi. part. 2. cap. 31. p. 188.*

(*) *Quibusdam interrogationum formulis, circa scrupulosas peccatorum differentias, obscena & impudica quedam exquirunt, quae sine utriusque sexus interrogati (cujus auribus inaudita turpitudines & lascivia instillantur) rubore, & interrogantis inhonesti appetitus titillatione, vix ullis verbis, aut ne vix quidem, enuntiari possint. Pontius Tyardus. Episc. Cabilon. p. 35.*

(e) *Addit vero Navarrus, non esse libale crimen, sic extra divinum officium cantare in ecclesia cantilenam turpem & lascivam, videtur quae excusare contra Solum ritibus turpes sibi occinentes in nocte nativitatís Domini, tempore quo petunt benedictiones, licet non aperte eos excuset. ibid. p. 264.*

(f) *The custom of the Church is of equal Authority, and to be received with the same pious affection with the Scripture. Conc. Basil. resp. Synod. tom. 4. Surg.*

(g) *Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. p. 116. Medina & Victoria in Lopez. c. 75. p. 356. 357.*

use of such things as provoke lust. He (b) may be absolved, who by eating of hot meats, hath fallen into grievous Temptations of the flesh, and has been drawn to consent to pollution or fornication; though he hath no purpose to avoid such provoking meats, this being done, with the provokes fore-mentioned. They are no more severe against immodest touches or shameful sights (i) to suffer such touches, from one who is thought to do it out of honest love, or custome, is no great fault: but if it proceed from lust, in order to the act of uncleanness or impure delights, the sins if he avoids them not; and this holds, if she can avoid them without scandal (say they) which signifies they account it no sin, to yield to this impure treatment: since none are obliged to give way to sin, for the avoiding of scandal. He (k) that by insinuating sights, viewing anothers nakedness, &c. hath been often drawn to sin; may be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid such Temptations, with the forementioned cautions.

Men and Women viewing one anothers nakedness (*pudenda vel partes vicinas*) may be excused, if it be but for curiosity, and a short time, without danger of great commotion. (*)

The (l) beholding of filthy sights, for natural or sensual pleasure,

(b) Absolvi potest ille, qui ob esum rerum calidarum incidit in adeo graves carnis tentationes, ut eam aliquando impulerint ad consentiendum pollutioni vel fornicationi, sine proposito nunquam in posterum sic edendi. Concurrentibus 4. prædictis. Navar. c. 3. n. 24.

(i) Non peccat mortaliter, quæ patitur tactus vel oscula ab eo, quem credit moveri honesto amore, secus vero si ab eo quem credit moveri libidinoso amore ad actum venereum, vel delectationem carnalem. Quod procedit, quando potest vitare sine scandalo eorum, qui de libidine non suspicantur. Grassi. l. 1. c. 74. n. 11. Lopez. cap. 75. p. 360. Neq; pati tactus impudicos licitum est femina, quando sine scandalo potest eos vitare.

(k) Idem dicendum est (i. e. absolvi potest) de persona. Qui quia videt lavantes feminas in flumine, aut viros natantes, aut ex aspectu pedum, crurium, pectorum, &c. aut aliorum ejus generis, sepe peccavit. Navar. ibid. n. 27.

(*) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 3. 8.

(l) Cajetan. Navar. Medina, in Fill. tr. 30. n. 215. Videre feminas aut viros — ad solam delectationem carnalem, quæ ex visione insurgit, solum est veniale ac notat Cajetan Idemq; dicendum de auditu & locutione rerum venearum, si delectatio non transit ad respiciendum in Tol. l. 5. c. 14.

when

when there is no danger of passing into unclean thoughts (*id est*, passing through the mire, when there is no danger of being dirtied) is no crime. Those (*m.*) who upon pretence of spiritual mortification, make Women strip themselves naked, to discipline them; sin mortally, if lust were the principal cause of it, says Sylvester, leaving us to think, that, if lust be but a less principal motive to do it; it is but a small fault, or none. In fine they account it no crime, to offer no hearty opposition unto Temptation. (*n.*) He (says de Grassijs) who coldly resists Temptation, so that it returns upon him, and invades his Soul, a second and a third time, because he resists so coldly; sins not mortally, if there be no danger of consenting; as if there could be no danger to consent, when there is little or no mind to resist.

They teach that a man suspecting his Wife is an Adulteress, may with a good intent, offer her the occasion to commit Adultery, without sin. (*) Also that a servant is excused (when declining it would be a great inconvenience) if he accompany his Master when he goes a whoring: because here's a just occasion, and the action is of it self honest. And a Maid too if she go along with a Whore to the house of her lover, to act filthiness with him, or opens the door for him on such occasion. And so is a servant likewise to be excused, when he is sent to bring a Whore to his Masters lodging, or carries presents, or an Epistle, or a Message, or writes Letters, when the contents are to have a Whore come to him, at such a time; or any such (with them) indifferent thing; unless there be an expresse desire of the filthy act. (*)

Such encouragement they give to use the preparatives, and play with the incentives, and dally with the Temptations to lust and actual

(*m.*) *Quid de his qui sub specie spiritualis mortificationis faciunt mulieres coram se nudare ut disciplinas inferant? Et dico quod non est dubium, eos peccare mortaliter, si libido sit principaliter in causa. Sum. v. delect. n. 7.*

(*n.*) *Non peccat mortaliter is qui cum tepide resistit tentationi, ut secundo & tertio regrediat ad pulsandam mentem, eo quod solum tepide resistit, secluso periculo consentiendi. Sylv. v. delect. Grass. l. 2. c. 77. n. 9.*

(*) Jo. Sanc. disp. 35. n. 12.

(*) Bonacin. Tom. 1. p. 323. ibi, M. Navar. P. Navar. Zerola. Rebinus. & 7.

uncleanness; for the act it self, how little they make of *self-pollution* we have seen before, they conclude that single pollution (though a sin against nature) is of it self, (o) no sin at all, and so they may (p) desire it before-hand, or (q) delight in it when it is past, for an honest end, and use the incentives, if it be but for gluttony. Moreover Whoredom it self has excessive favour and encouragement, from this holy Church. This is too plain by their Authors, and their practice, to be denyed; and too hainous to be excused by any, but those, who have a mind to have mortal sins, to pass for small, or no faults. It seems it is no sin to build *Stews* for the entertainment of common Whores, and the best accommodation of them for their Trade of uncleanness. Pope Sixtus did it, as *Cornelius Agrippa* (q) tells us, and they were so multiplied long since, that as one of their Doctors observes, (r) *under Christ's Vicars, and Peter's Successors, urbs est jam tota lupanar, Now the whole City is one Whore-house.* 'Tis no sin to farm out Whoredom (s) and to take so much a head of the Strumpets weekly, for their practice: the Popes Holiness hath done it long at Rome, and does it to this day; and the Whores daily commit lewdness, not only for themselves, but for the Pope their Benefactor's advantage, who is to share in their gain; they drive this Trade for him. And the number of his Farmers was so great long since, that they brought him in yearly an *intrado* of above Twenty thousand Duckets, a great sum then, and probably very much improved since. Such an abomi-

(o) *Non est in se peccatum secundum omnes. Navar. c. 15. n. 7.*

(p) *Cajetanus, Sylvester. & alij ibid.*

(q) *Aquinas. Paludanus & Communis. ibid. Si autem placeat ut est exoneratio naturæ non creditur peccatum—appetere pollutionem in somnis sine omni delectatione propter alleviationem naturæ, non est peccatum; sed dare operam, utendo calida, vel alio modo, esset mortali peccatum, si propter hoc facit. Sæpius si faceret propter voluptatem, dubitando nihilominus de ea, quia sic esset veniale peccatum. Angel. lum. v. pollut. n. 2.*

(r) *Recentioribus temporibus Sixtus Pontifex maximus nobile admodum lupanar Romæ extruxit. de vanit. scient. cap. 64.*

(s) *Nunc vero sub Christi vicariis & Petri successoribus, ut alius quidam cecinit—urbs est jam tota Lupanar. Espenceus de continent. l. 3. c. 4.*

(s) *Romana scorta in singulas hebdomadas julium Pontifici pendunt. Agrippa. ibid.*

nable Tribute nature, even corrupted, blushes at: but that Holiness at Rome, thinks it no shame, to maintain his honour and state, as Christ's Vicar, by the hire of Whores. Evagrius extolling Anastasius the Emperour for abolishing such a detestable practice, brands it, (†) as a wretched Tribute, abominable to God, and shameful to the most barbarous people; as that which was a Reproach to nature it self, and the civil Government; as that which did, as it were, by a law Authorize this wickedness. Nor do the Popish Writers deny, that it is as bad, as he represents it; and yet since the Pope hath made it a custome, they have the confidence to justify it. Here one of their prime Penitentiaries, (u) the gain says he, or Tribute for Whoredome, is by the common Law, a deadly crime, and Nicephorus says it is a filthy gain, detestable, absurd, hateful, and which the most savage Barbarians may be ashamed of, what then? is he or the great Bishop ashamed of it? you may know how, by what he adds immediatly, (*) yet says he, because of the custome, which passes for a Law, the Pope consenting to it in the Lands of the Church, non est peccatum, it is no sin, it ought to be paid. So that the Pope's will, and interest, passing into custome can make that to be no sin; which Nature, Law, History, and their own Consciences condemn, as a most horrid crime, and that well becomes his Holiness, which the worst Barbarians would detest. No wonder then, if they conclude it lawful, for any to let their houses to Harlots, though they know they take them for the practice of Whoredome; the Trade is so good, they can pay higher Rents than others. No wonder their Casuists and Divines determine so many things in favour of Whores; what

(†) Τέλος ἐλεεινόν τε καὶ δεισιμαστὲς, καὶ καρτερὰν αὐτῶν ἀνάξιον, &c. l. 3. cap. 39. p. 567. Hist. Eccles.

(u) Lucrum vel tributum ex meretricum opera querere, inspecto jure communi peccatum mortale est, & a Nicephoro. l. 16. c. 40. Hist. Eccl. dicitur ventrigal impurum, detestabile, absurdum Deoq; invisum, feris quibusc; barbaris indignum, & execrandum peccatum.

(*) Ratione tamen consuetudinis, quæ pro lege habetur & consentiente rege in terris suis, & Papa in terris ecclesiæ, non est peccatum, ideo est solvendum. Graff. l. 2. c. 123. n. 5.

they

they receive for their detestable practice, is not to be accounted (y) a Reward only, but a *lawful Debt*; thus their Divines conclude, while their Conscience extorts this from them, *dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum*. And so they may demand it, and recover it, and have Patrons and Officers for their assistance; that Whoredom may be practised by rules of Justice, and they may (z) force the payment, though there was no price agreed on, (a) nor is the Whore bound to make restitution, though she take more than her due, (*) nor is it necessary she should give any of it to the poor. And they are as punctual in resolving prostitutes and their customers, about the price of this (*) *staple Commodity*; as about the lawfullest negotiations in the World. Who may sell themselves to serve the lusts of others, at what Rate, what Liberty they have to take a price, answerable to the just value, how the value may be computed, and how they may improve it, &c. (b) Though filthiness in a Woman be a fault; yet it is no fault, filthily to set it to sale. A (c) *man may satisfy the lust of a female, at a price: and he is so far from being obliged to (*) restitution, that it is*

(y) *Meretricem promissam, ob turpem usum corporis, mercedem tanquam debitam posse petere, negat Navar. aiunt probabilius Lopez. Soto. Cajetan. Covarruvias. — nam pretium illud debitum est jure naturæ: dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum. Viñetorel. in Tol. l. 5. c. 19. vid. Soto. de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. p. 128.*

(z) *Qui illis statum pretium non solveret, cogeretur in foro judiciali idem. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 3. n. 8. potest illud meretrix petere in judicio. Illis solis lege decreta sunt pretia. Soto. ibid.*

(a) *Graff. ibid. n. 2. Navar. c. 17. n. 34.*

(*) *Graff. ibid. n. 2.*

(*) *Ratio Cajetani, viz. quod usus meretricis est materia vendibilis & non rei Sacre: quam Soto & recentiores magni facere videntur. in Navar. c. 17. n. 35.*

(b) *Licet turpiter faciat quod sit meretrix non tamen turpiter accipit. Aquinas. in Nav. ibid. Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid.*

(c) *Imo utraq; ratione posset etiam masculus a femina pretium recipere: quin vero equius, quia plus præbet: sicuti Alexander in jure naturæ posuit a duce illa Amazone quæ illum gratia recipiendæ prolis invisit, quod & prece & pretio, ut fertur, impetravit. Nam illi feminarum generi in more erat, pretio accersere viros qui ad illas ingrederentur. Soto. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 7.*

(a) *Qui a femina propter opus libidinosum accipit pretium non tenetur illud restituere, quin vero equius est ut illud accipiat, cum plus præbeat sicut Alexander, &c. Item si causa salus quispiam emissionem illa egerit, posset amplexum illam pretio coemere. Soto ibid.*

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more than equal it should be paid him; he parts with more for it, (there is not only Justice, but Equity, and Conscience for him, in the case) and there is invincible proof for it, since Alexander himself took hire upon this account, and the Amazons were wont of old, to hire men to do this work.

Any VVhore what-ever may retain the price of their filthiness (*) only a VVhore is bound in Conscience to restore what is given her by their Religious persons (*). This it seems is the peculiar priviledg of their Votaries, that Harlots must serve their turn gratis: and they have so much encouragement more than others to practise VVhoredom, since in Conscience it must cost them nothing. But if a Sæcular person give a Religious man money, or any thing else for the Religious mans VVhore, that is not to be restored (*). It would be too hard to part with his VVhore for nothing. Yet one incumbrance there is, but very gently laid on them. If the Religious man have goods in his power to dispose of, he may (it is not said he must) satisfie a VVench when he has deflowered her, &c. for this is a pious use (*).

A (d) VVoman that commits lewdness secretly, may take the price of Fornication, more justly than a common Harlot (though she does it justly enough) because in her it is more valuable, the price may rise, being an honestest Whore. If a married VVoman fall into (e) Adultery

(*) Adrian. Sylvest. Covarruv. Soto. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Antoninus in Vasquez. Opusc. Moral. p. 124. dub. 2.

(*) Idem. ibid.

(*) Ibid.

(*) Paludan. Palac. ibid.

(d) Porro autem crediderim has multo justius posse recipere pretium: quippe que ob majorem honestatem pluris sunt estimandæ. Idem. ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 6.

(e) Quod si de alijs scisciteris que sunt puelle aut maritate que semel aut bis collapsæ sunt — & illis quoque liceret pretium recipere: tenebiturque in foro conscientie, qui illis promissit solvere, nisi excessus iustæ estimationis provatione personarum immodicus esset. Et ratio est eadem S. Thomæ. Nam licet flagitia illa sint lege vetita, dario tamen non est prohibita. Et ideo jure naturali standum est: quo utique jure concessio illa corporum æstimabilis est pecunia. Soto. ibid. potest nuptia que semel aut bis collapsa est pretium recipere absque nexu restitutionis, & adulter tenetur iudicio anime illi solvere, &c. Graff. ibid. n. 8. & Covarruvias ibi.

once and again, she may take her price without charge of restitution (it is more lawful gain than to have any such burden annexed) and the Adulterer is bound upon his Soul, to lay it down; for though Adultery be illegal, yet to buy and sell it, is no sin; if the price be not excessive, and much above the just value of the thing, the quality of the persons considered. And it must not be forgotten, (f) that the Adulterers is not to be accountable to her Husband, for what she gains by this Traffick; or a Maid to her Parents, when she prostitutes her self for hire in her Fathers house: but may convert it to their own use, as that which they earn by hand-labour; unless they grow very wealthy by the Trade. And if these (g) VVomen do but take moderate sums for this filthy Traffick, of those who are not at their own disposing, they are not bound to restitution: because it is presumed that those who have the charge of those *Minors*, do allow such expences. This was necessary to be added, that Harlots might not be discouraged, from admitting Boyes under age, among their Customers. Lastly, a (h) Nun playing the Whore, may both do it for hire, and with a good Conscience keep it when she hath done. It had been hard measure for their Votaries, if some provition had not been made for them, that their Trade might be gainful, then their own Authors tell us, it is so common. There was no reason to be partial, and make much difference betwixt them, and other prostitutes, when their (i) *Clemangis* could see no difference, betwixt their Nunneries, and the common Stews. But to proceed with the latter, while they are giving rules

(f) Soto. *ibid.* idem esse iudicium atq; de alijs, quæ operis manuum suarum acquisierint, &c. *8a* Graff. *ibid.* n. 9.

(g) *Stres est modica pro qualitate persone, etiamsi a filio familias recipiat, retinere potest. Nam presumitur pater scire, rataq; subinde habere ejusmodi expensas.* Soto. *ibid.* Graff. *ibid.* n. 10.

(h) *Quinimo ut inquit Covarruvias, Nec monialis pecuniam recipiens ob mercedem sui coitus tenetur illam restituere in foro animæ.* Idem. *ibid.* n. 10.

(i) *Nihil distinguit inter sui temporis virginum monasteria, & meretricum lupanaria.* *Elpenc. de contin. l. 2. c. 12.*

for Conscience, they tell us (*k*) the Law countenances Fornication so very much, that it compells publick Whores to commit lewdness with anyone whomsoever, giving her her hire. And so indulgent is the Church to VWhoredom, that Harlots who live there many years. (even as long as they can get Custom), do incur no (*l*) Ecclesiastical censure. So that at Rome, made so purely Christian by its Popes, VWhoredom is as lawful, as when it was most Heathenish, and is objected as the shame of it, by St. Augustine, (*m*) that there the use of Whoredom was a lawful practice. Hereby the People under Popery are so well edited, that they cannot easily know whether Fornication committed with common prostitutes be a sin, as one of their (*n*) Doctors tells us; for many of the common people (says he) who know not how to distinguish betwixt sin permitted, or not forbidden as to the punishment, and not as to the sinfulness; because that simple Fornication, is not punished, and Whores have the privilege of impunity: they make account it is no sin to deal with them (at the Popes rate) and this is very common in Cities, otherwise well instructed in the Faith and Religion (of Rome) as those who hear Confessions well know (*). It seems Confessors have something to do, to perswade the People, that, that is a sin, which the Pope publicly allows: and they might have more to do, if the Peo-

(*k*) Et in tantum lex tolerat hujusmodi fornicationes, ut etiam cogat publicas meretrices ad fornicandum cum quocumq; juxta tamen mercedem. Graff. l. 2. c. 74. n. 4.

(*l*) Though one continue a Whore for Twenty years, yet doth she not incur the censures of the Church. Vid. Vivaldus candelabr. aur. tit. de confess. n. 60.

(*m*) Tutus sancte pater Augustine. Quid vero terrene civitati velut exprobas, quod scortorum usum licitum fecerit, ut quem nulla ejus lex vindicet, cum eadem turpitudine in nostra, hoc est Dei civitate, neq; minus permittatur, neq; magis puniatur. Espencus de contin. l. 3. c. 4. Ratio vero quam prædictus Segobienfis, (Soro) secutus aliquot alios sentit, viz. quod lex permittit, & facit justam operam meretricis, non tamen alias prædictorum operas, Sec. Navar. c. 17. n. 35.

(*n*) Fill. tr. 30. c. 2. n. 51. p. 203.

(*) It is not the common people only that have this good opinion of it. Nee badie Aristippei quidam desint, qui simplex hoc stuprum pro crimine non habeant. Espenc. de contin. lib. 3. cap. 4. utinam non essent in orbe atq; nomine Christiano, qui libellis publice editis, quasi quibusdam fornicandi flagitiis, mulieres, & quidem omnes, nihil aliud in vita communi esse putarent, quam rem explendæ libidini natam, Idem. ibid.

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ple did not suspect, that the Pope is a man like themselves, and for all his *infallibility*, may in matter of VVhoredom err, as they usually do.

But if any man be not disposed to take this liberty so freely offered, of haunting the common Stews; he has encouragement by the Law of their Church to have a Concubine at home, and that without any great hazard, it will not cost him so much, as the loss of the Communion, for the *Canon Law* provides. (o) *That he who has not a Wife, but instead of a Wife a Concubine, shall not be kept from the Communion: So that he be satisfied with one Woman, either a Wife or a Concubine.* Now since they tell us sometimes, that none who are in mortal sin, may partake of the Communion; it should seem, that with them, to live in Fornication, is either no sin, or none that is mortal.

Their Doctrine is as indulgent to those who will not put away their Concubines, as such persons need desire. Absolution is not to be denied him, *who having lent his Concubine whom he keeps in his house 100 Crowns, has no hope to recover it, if he put her away.* Or on the contrary, *if the Woman be not like to recover the like sum owing her, if she leave the house of the Whoremaster.* For, as was said before, none are bound to avoid the next occasion of sin, to their great loss. (*) Nor is he bound to put away his Concubine, *if she be very useful for the gaining of temporal goods by way of Traffick.*---It is enough that he intends not to sin hereafter. Yea if the Concubine be very serviceable for the delight of the Whore-master, so that his life would scarce be pleasant without her, and other Cates would be very distastful to him, and another Woman, so much for his purpose, would hardly be found: the Whore-master will not be obliged to put her away (*). Neither is absolution to be denied, if he

(o) Decret. dist. 34. c. 4. *Is qui non habet uxorem; & pro uxore concubinam habet, a communione non repellatur.* Rabanus. l. penit. c. 10. alleges a Spanish Canon for this. And Gratian. dist. 34. and Espencæus de contin. l. 2. c. 7. Jacobus Curio. l. 2. Chron. says of Gregory 7. *Quasi celibatum perpetuum concubinitus temperamento mitigavit, sacerdotem unius concubine societate contentum ab officio non repellendum statuens.* Vid. ibid.

(*) Jo. Sancius, disp. 10. n. 20.

(*) Ibid.

might lose his Reputation by quitting his Whore : Tea or if the Concubine would be disgraced thereby ; It is enough if he firmly promise, not to sin more with her, since it is in his power not to sin, although there be present danger of it, while she stays in his house. (*)

But what if he sin with her still, after such promises to the contrary ? That will not hinder, if he repent still, and he may truly repent (in their way) and be absolved when there is no appearance of amendment. So he determines in a like case, after others (*) According to Bonacina determines, a Confessor may absolve one, who keeps a VVhore, and will not put her away ; if he cannot do it without much disgrace or scandal, or other great inconvenience (*). And him also, who sins but seldom with his Whore, 3 or 4 times in a year (or thereabouts), and hopes he may not relapse further (*). And so may a youth be absolved who keeps a VVhore in his Fathers house, with whom he sins customarily, though he put her not away, so that he have a firm purpose to desist. (*) But what if after such a purpose he relapse still ? he may be absolved still (as we heard before) even innumera- bly innumerable times, because so oft we are to forgive our Brother (*).

Or if a Concubine at home will not satisfy an unclean person, but he commit Fornication with others, yet if he make but himself drunk before : that Fornication will be no sin ; or but an inconsiderable fault, if he be but half drunk.

Nor will Adultery be a sin in that or many other cases ; Christ teaches, that he who puts away his Wife, saving for the cause of Fornication, causeth her to commit Adultery, *Matth. 5. 32.* Yet they teach that where the marriage is both firm and consummated by con-

(*) n. 21.

(*) *Absolvendum fore toties quoties vere penituerit, non solum quando aliqua emendatio notatur ut tenent. Suar. Graff. Navar. Coriolan. Lopez. — quod possit absolvi penitens, etiamsi nullus appareat profectus, tenet. Vivaldus. ibid. n. 16.*

(*) De Matrim. disp. 4. punct. 14. n. 11.

(*) Ibid. n. 12. juxta Graffium & alios.

(*) Ibid. n. 13. ita Graffius. Lopez. & alij.

(*) Jo. Sanc. ibid. n. 16.

jugal injoyment; yet the parties may be separated as to cohabitation, and as much divorced as they can be for Adultery (by their Doctrine): (p) either for outward danger, or when one tempts the other to mortal sin, or for that which they call *Hereſie*, or if either of them will enter into a *Monastery*. And if there had not been carnal knowledge after the marriage, though it be firm and valid; yet if either of them will make the *Monastick* profession: the other is at liberty to marry another, and live together as Man and Wife, the parties whom they first married still living. So that if a wife will turn Nun, she may put away her Husband (doing (q) it, *eo ignorante vel invito*) and he may marry another Wife.

The Council of *Trent* confirms this to purpose, when it curses those who hold that *lawful Matrimony not consummated, is not dissolved by a solemn Religious vow*. (*) It is acknowledged by (1) *Boniface 8.* and (2) *Gregory 13.* that this of *Matrimony* is a bond made firm and indissoluble by God himself; and the other of a *vow*, but a *Church Constitution*: yet (as was observed long since), the *Trent* Prelats will not only have a humane bond to dissolve a Divine; but will have those accursed, who will not believe, that an institution of man, born many hundred years since the Apostles, should prevail against a Divine institution, made at the Creation of the World (*). Thus in behalf of their pretended chastity, they have opened a broad way for real Adultery, and who could expect more reasonable decrees in such a case.

This for their *Laiety*, then for their *Clergy* and *Monasticks*, their Doctrine is, (r) that Adultery is not so much a sin as marriage; no nor

(p) Vid. Sylvest. Sum. v. divor. n. 10. & n. 2. *Quantum ad vinculum, matrimonium ratum salve potest per mortem civilem i. e. professionem tacitam vel expressam religionis approbata: ita quod remanens in seculo potest libere cum alia contrahere. ibid. (vid. Maldonat. Summ. quæst. 14. art. 13.)*

(q) Idem. ibid. n. 6.

(*) Sess. 8. Can. 6.

(1) 6 Decret. l. 3. tit. 15.

(2) In bulla ascendente Domino)

(*) Vid. Hist. of Counc. of Trent. l. 8. p. 790.

(r) Marriage of them who have vowed chastity, is the worst sort of incontinency. Rhem. Annot. in Cor. 7. 9.

Incest or Sodomy, or Bestiality, so that they may better venture upon any of these abominations, than upon that state which the Lord hath authorized and honoured. And he is more capable of *orders* amongst them, (s) who hath kept *two Whores*; than one who hath been twice Married, or but once Married a Widdow. *An incestuous person* (saies (t) Erasmus) *is admitted to be a Bishop, a Murderer, a Robber, a Sodomite, a Sacrilegious wretch, a Parricide is admitted, and who not? Solus digamus, one that has been twice Married is only excluded from this honour, though he alone be blameless.* The Apostle commends Marriage to prevent the heats of Lust, which he calls *burning*; but burning Lust is with them innocent. (u) *To burn* (says Valentia) *does not signifie to burn with the flames of Lust, for this in it self is not evil.* The Apostle determines it better to Marry than to burn: but Bellarmin says (x) it is worse to Marry, how-ever our Adversaries gain-say (where he puts the Apostle with us, amongst his Adversaries) especially for her who is under solemn Vow; and a little after he tells (y) us, *she that Marrys after a simple Vow, in a manner sins more than she that commits Fornication: his reason is, because she one makes her self incapable of keeping her Vow, which she does not, who plays the Whore.* Where we see what their Vow of Chastity is (the argument wherein they triumph, to prove the holiness of their Church); its a Chastity which consists well enough with Whoredom, and is only violated by Marriage. Accordingly the Clergy have liberty to haunt the publick Stews. It is in reference to

(s) Aquinas, Comment. in Tit. 1:

(t) Annot in 1 Tim. 13. *admittitur incestus, admittitur homicida, admittitur pirata, admittitur Sodomita, Sacrilegus, parricida; denique quis non? solus digamus extulatur, qui solus nihil admisit.*

(u) *uri non idem significat quod flamma libidinis uri; hoc enim per se malum non est, imo materia potius virtutis.* l. de Cœlibat. Cap. 6.

(x) *Non utrumque est malum, & nubere & uri; imo pejus est nubere, quicquid reclamant Adversarii, presertim ei, quæ habet votum solenne,* De Monach. l. 2. c. 36. p. 1213.

(y) *Quæ autem nubit post votum simplex, illa verum matrimonium contrahit, tamen aliquo modo magis peccat, quam quæ fornicatur, quia reddit se impotentem ad servandum votum, quod non facit quæ fornicatur,* ibid. p. 1214.

those who are (a) Unmarried, (to wit, the Clergy) that the Stews are held to be so very necessary; that no consideration could move the Pope or his Council, to think any thing more fit to be done against the common Whores; but only some diminution of their Pride and Luxury, as one of their Doctors intimates. And as if that would not serve, they have been heretofore allowed (b) to keep Whores at home, paying a yearly Rent for that liberty: Yea, those Priests that would not keep Whores (that they might not want temptation to it) were forced to pay the Rent, because they might have had the liberty if they pleased. For a Monk or Fryar to lay aside his habit is a crime, by which he incurs Excommunication; and yet if he lay aside his habit, that he may commit Fornication the more expeditely, without the incumbrance which his Monkish weeds would give him in the act, they declare him upon that account freed from censure. (c) Excommunication is not incur'd, says Navar) for every leaving of his habit, which is temerarious, or deadly, because he incurs it not by laying it aside, that he may the more readily indulge himself in Fornication. Sylvester had made such a decision before him, so understanding Paludanus, that he is under Excommunication, (d) who puts off his habit to disguise himself in reference to others, that he may not be known; but not he, that lays it by, with a respect to himself, (viz.) for the pleasure (of Fornication). So that the cen-

(a) Mirum certe tales tantoque viros consuluisse, minuendum modo scortorum fastum & luxum, non-etiam ea semel evigilanda, an vero propter tam multos ibi celibes necessario retinenda? O rem horrendam! Espéncæus de contin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 734.

(b) Turpissimum est quod (Officiales) permittant (Clericos) cum concubinis, moretriciis, & pellicibus habitare, liberosque procreare sinunt, accepto ab ijs certo quotannis censu: atque adeo alibi a continenribus. Nam habeat (inquiant) si velit. Et quoties enim quisque talis, cum tales tam multi sint, hodie aliter punitur? Idem in Tit. c. 1. p. 479. Corn. Agrippa de Vanit. Scient. c. 64.

(c) Non incurritur etiam ob quamlibet dimissionem temerariam mortiferam, quia non incurritur, ob dimissionem ut expeditius fornicationi indulgeat, Navar. c. 17. n. 131.

(d) Si quis habitum dimittat ut fornicetur secundum Per. de Pal. sine dubio est Excommunicatus, quod ego verum crederem quando habitum dimittit relative ad alios, puta ne cognoscatur: secus relative ad se, puta propter voluptatem. Sum. v. Excom. 9. n. 53. Non afficit excommunicatione qui se vestibus spoliatur—ut liberius & voluptuosius peccet Bonacina Tom. 3. de Excom. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 6. n. 3. Sayrus & alij quas magno numero refert Sanctarell. ibid.

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fured dismissing of habit, is, as he distinguishes, *that which is fraudulent, so as to put on another, but not that which is for an hours pleasure, while he is quite stript.* Panormitan concludes that an Oath is never (g) to be given to him, of whom there is vehement suspicion, that he will not observe it, and he that gives it in that case, sins mortally. Hence Pope Alexander would not have Priests bound by Oath to forsake their Concubines; because, it seems, there was strong presumption, they would venture on perjury rather than leave their Whoredome. (b) Hence Erasmus had so much cause to complain, that among so vast multitudes, who were unmarried, and under the Vow of Chastity; so exceeding few did live Chastly, so innumerable many did wallow in Uncleaness. And Cassander (i) (another moderate Papist) says, that a man could not find scarce one in a hundred of them, that abstain'd from Women.

Before these, the Gloss on the Canon Maximianus, dist. 81. tells us, (k) *it is the common opinion that no Priest should be deposed for simple Fornication, because there are but few Priests free from it.* If all Fornicators had been deprived, their Church would have been made desolate, and left in a manner Priestless. This was a great reason then, and is, it

(e) unde dico illam admissiōem debere intelligi, quando habitus demittitur dolo cum assumptione alterius ad utendum eo, secus ubi dimitteretur ad horam voluptuose, nullo alio sumpto. ibid.

(g) In c. Clericus. de coha. Cler. & muli. Concludit quod nunquam est deferendum juramentum illi, contra quem est vehemens suspicio de transgressione, & deferens peccat mortaliter & facit optime textus dicti, c. Cleric. ubi non vult clericos cogi jurare dimittere concubinas, Angel. Sum. v. juram. n. 11. Navar. c. 12. n. 20. ne in fornicationem reverius perjuri quoque reatum incurreret, Espenc. de Cont. l. 2. c. 7.

(b) Cum ubique tam ingens sit sacerdotum turba, quorum quotus quisque castam agit vitam? de conscrib. Epist.

Si quis prependat horum temporum statum, quotam hominum portionem monachorum gregis occupent, quotam sacerdotum & clericorum collegia: deinde perpendat quam pauci in tanto numero viri servant castimoniam, tum in que libidinum genera quam innumeri divergant, quanto cum probro complures palam incesti sint, & impudici, &c. Annot. in 1 Tim. 3.

(i) In concilio Neocesar, magis puniatur sacerdos qui fornicatur quam qui publice contrahit — jam coeres rediit ut vix centesimam invenias, qui ab omni commercio seminarum abstineat, Consult. art. 23.

(k) Communiter dicitur quod pro simplici fornicatione quis deponi non debet, cum pauci sine isto vitio inveniantur, dist. 81.

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seems, of the same force still; for at this day, a Priest is not to be deprived for simple Incontinency. The *Congregation of Cardinals* (much concerned for the propagation of the holy Church) declared it to be *Law* (l) *that the penalty of deprivation proceeds not for simple incontinency*, as *Garzias* observes; only they must not keep Whores in the capacity of Concubines. It may be that came too near Marriage, to have so much favour as vagrant Whoredom. Yet if a Priest keep a Whore at Bord and Bed, and use her constantly, as if she were his Wife, he is not therefore irregular: Indeed if he Marry her, or an honest Woman, all the world cannot excuse him; for though such Whoredom never disables a Priest, yet chaste Marriage utterly spoils him. Yea, if he keep in that capacity *more Whores than one* (I know not how many more, for they are not limited to numbers) yet still he is not irregular (as innocent *Bigamy* would make any one, though he were an Apostle) *but the Bishop may dispense with him*. So Pope *Innocent 3*, determined, and it is now as good Law as their Church has any; and the more remarkable, because the *Doctors Gloss* on it, would have it noted as admirable, (m) *that Whoredom has, with them, more privilege than Chastity*. Where we may suppose the *Gloss* speaks the sense of such as are Strangers to Rome; for that Uncleanness should be preferred before Chastity, is in that Church nothing wonderful nor strange at all, but ordinary and obvious. That Pope (whom they magnifie as the singular glory of their Law), decrees (n) *that the Bishop may dispense with Priests who keep many Concubines, to exercise their Office, as he doth also with those who are noted for simple Fornication*. And how the Bishops were wont to dispense with them, is known, their own Writers declaring, it the custom, as before, to let out those Women to them at a yearly rent; and that they were so hard---Lords, that if a

(l) *Que tamen pena privationis beneficii non procedit in simplici incontinentia, absque qualitate concubinatus, ut constat ex declarat. adducta a Garcia. Jo Sanc. disp. 59. n. 10.*

(m) *Si presbyteri plures concubinas habentes poteris cum eis tanquam simplici fornicatione notatis, quod ad executionem sacerdotalis officii, dispensare, Extra. de Bigam. tit. 22. c. quia circa.*

(n) *Notandum mirabile quod plus hic habet luxuria quam castitas.*

Priest had no mind to the Bishops Tenement, and did not take it, yet he must pay for it no less than the forwardest Farmer.

Sodomy abounds most in *Italy* (for it was requisite that *Rome* should be, as it is in the Prophetick style, *Sodom*; and not incongruous, that the vilest wickedness should thrive best under his Holiness wing), yet as if they would have it as common every where, and more there than it is, their decisions are exceeding favourable to it, and treat it very indulgently. Married persons may practice *Sodomy* together, the beginnings of it, all of it, bating the last complement of the act, without mortal guilt (*o*). Unmarried persons, their Clergy, may act it without restraint to the uttermost, and be neither suspended nor irregular. There (*p*) is no danger of it, if they do it but 2 or 3 times now and then, yea, they are safe, unless they make a custom of it. The strictest decree that we find any *Pope* ever made against *Sodomy*, is that of *Pius 5*. which yet was formed in such terms, on purpose that it should not reach any Ecclesiasticks, but such only as made a trade of it by continual practice. This *Navar* had from the mouth of *Gregory 13*. (*q*)

And if they do make a trade of it, yet still they are secure, if it be not notorious and publick: and it (*r*) will not be counted notorious, though it may be proved, though it be commonly reported, though it be confessed; nor publick, unless it be manifest to all. Thus if any Ecclesiastick will practice *Sodomy*, provided he do it not continually; or if he will make a daily trade of it, yet so he do not keep an open Warehouse; the *Pope* has taken special care (even in the severest order, that his Zeal against this wickedness could ever be brought to make) that the *Sodomite* shall have his liberty without any fear of losing Office or Benefice in holy Church.

Further they declare that mental Heresie (*s*), is a greater crime than

(*o*) Zerola Graffius. & alij apud Dianam. 2. p. tr. 3. ref. 37. Angelus, v. debitum. n. 25. vid. Navar. c. 27. n. 250.

(*p*) Bonacina de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 11. n. 2. ibi. Navar. Quaranta. Riccius. Mattha. Duardus Garzias, & alij.

(*q*) Cap. 27. n. 249. vid. Bonacin. ibid. n. 3. ibi. Navar. Rodriquez Lazarius.

(*r*) Navar. ibid. n. 248. publicum definitur esse, quod patet omnibus, Bartol. ibid. n. 255.

(*s*) Navar. Manual. c. 27. n. 249.

Sodomy.

Sodomy. As suppose a man should believe that the publick worship of God ought to be in a known tongue (such a Heresie as they cannot acquit the *Apostle Paul* of) the secret belief of this, though never manifested by expression or practice, is in their account, worse than Sodomy. What Conscience are they like to make of this, while such is their judgment? Moreover, some of them (t) say, that the stealing of 30. Rials (about 15. shillings) is a greater sin than Sodomy. Yet Theft is wont to be counted one of the less crimes, and this is none of the greatest Theft. Of what value the thing stoln, must be to make Theft a mortal sin is, they say, to be determined by the judgment of a prudent man. (u) Those who have the reputation of great prudence amongst them, declare, that to steal 100. Crowns, in some case is no mortal crime. If they should any of them determine that the stealing of 29. Rials, or thereabouts, is but venial; there will but be about six pence difference betwixt Sodomy and a Venial fault. Its true, they do not commonly deliver this conceit in the terms expressed; but it is clearly inferred from the doctrine of *Aquinas* (and *Scotus* too) generally embraced; for he concludes that (x) Justice is a more excellent Virtue than Chastity; and that the sin is more hainous, which is opposite to the nobler Virtue (y): upon which ground, not only Sodomy, but Copulation with a Brute or a Devil will be a less sin than petty Theft. In short, if their Divines (whether followers of *Thomas* or *Scotus*, betwixt whom they are all in a manner parted) will be true to these principles, since they cannot deny but there is injustice in stealing one Rial; they must hold that Sodomy is no more a sin, nor more Conscience to be made of it, than of stealing six-pence, when their doctrine of Theft has left no Conscience of that. Thus far they have advanced to secure Sodomy against the Laws of God, and by those of the Church: as for any secular Laws, they may laugh at them, for Sodomy has Ecclesiastical immunity. (z) By the special care of *Pope Gregory*, Sodo-

(t) *Vid. Vasq. 1. 2. q. 71. art. ult. Montefinum 1. 2. tom. 1. q. 73. art. 3. d. 5.*

(u) *Aragon & alij in Pet. Navar. vid. Bonacin. de Restit. d. 2. q. 3. p. 1. n. 7.*

(x) *Justitia major virtus quam castitas 1. 2. q. 66. art. 4. (y) Quod majori virtuti opponitur, gravius peccatum, q. 73. art. 4.*

(z) *Bonacin. in 1. præcept. d. q. 7. p. 5. n. 14. colligitur reos Sodomici criminis immunitatis privilegio non privari, quia in bulla Gregorij non exprimentur.*

mites were not mentioned amongst those who are excluded from that privilege. The civil Law (I suppose, before the Unmarried Clergy were Law-givers) Ordains that *Sodomites* should be burnt, but the Church has provided that no fire may touch them, if they can escape that from Heaven. Besides other Sacred places, the Palaces of Cardinals and Bishops, all Monasteries, yea, the House of every Parish Priest and Ecclesiastick, are all Sanctuaries for *Sodomites*. They could not well proceed further in favour of this crime, since the eyes of the world was open about them. It is not now so seasonable for the Popes Legate (as he did before) to praise Sodomy in Print, as a pious act. These rules and examples considered, who can think that they count Uncleanness of any sort, a sin much to be avoyded? Or who can wonder, if Rome became hereby, in a literal sense, *the Mother of Harlots and Abominations*? Or yet think strange, that they should be most taken with Papal holiness, who are most addicted to Whoredome and Uncleanness?

SECT. 9. Further, it's no sin for the Romanists to take from those whom they count Hereticks (from Protestants particularly) all that they have: This will not be *Theft* or *Robbery*, but an act justified by the Laws of their Church, which oblige them to do it; for this is one of those many punishments, which that Law will have inflicted on us; (k) *the goods of Hereticks are by sentence of Law immediatly confiscated*. There is no question of this amongst them; only as to the execution, there is some doubt, whether Hereticks are bound in Conscience, as soon as they are such, to give up their possession themselves, and deliver all they have to *Roman Catholicks*; or whether they may not without mortal guilt, keep possession, till the *Papists* see it fit to put them out, and seize on all they have. Their famous (l) *Panormitan* concludes that the Hereticks are bound, under the pain of deadly sin, to do

(k) Concil. Later. sub Innoc. 2. bona ipsorum ipso facto applicantur fisco, Angel. Sum. v. heret. n. 5. sunt ipso jure, vel ipso facto confiscata Sylvest. v. heret. c. 1. n. 12.

(l) Cujus regula est, quod ille cujus bona sunt ipso facto confiscata, non potest illa cum bona conscientia retinere, quia statim sunt acquisita fisco, in Soto de Just. & jure l. 3. q. 6. art. 6. p. 21.

this execution upon themselves, not expecting any other Sentence, or Executioner. And there is a pretty Army of Doctors (*longa Doctorum phalanx*) do maintain this with him: but *Soto* and some others determine, that they need not be so hasty to give up all they have of their own accord, but may stay for a *declaratory* sentence, and *seizure* upon it; but then a (*m*) general sentence will serve, without particular process or examination who are personally guilty, and a (*n*) sentence by some Ecclesiastical person may suffice.

But all of them agree in this, that Hereticks lose all *title* and *property* in what-ever they possess, and that for them and their heirs; and this before any declaratory (*o*) sentence, even from the first day of their pretended heretical pravity, as the (*p*) *Directory* for the *Inquisitors* determines.

To lose all *title* to their Estates, may seem a small matter, considering that they lose all power and jurisdiction, all right to *Honour* and *Fame*, (they and theirs being infamous) to *Liberty* also, and *Life* it self: But because loss of *Property* is great in consequence, let us stay a little on it. All that these pretended Hereticks have, being *confiscated*, they are liable to a *Seizure* presently; and though their convenience will not serve them to seize on all, a long time after; yet in the *interim*, the poor Hereticks are responsible; for all the (*q*) *mean profits* (it may be in our case, for a hundred, or two hundred years past); and all this while, they have no power to alienate or dispose of their Goods or

(*m*) Sylvest. ibid. n. 12.

(*n*) Idem. ibid. & Angel. ibid. n. 5.

(*o*) Idem. ibid. v. *pæna*. n. 3. Graff. l. 2. c. 11. n. 10. fine.

(*p*) *ut etiam tenet Director*. l. 3. tit. 9. qui etiam dicit, quod dictatione damnatorum propter hæresim, vel hujusmodi ad seipsum pertinent a Die commissi criminis, Sylvest. ibid. n. 13.

Condemnatio illa vetro agitur usque ad articulum quo hereticus omni ignorantia nudatus, hæresim studio asservit. Assertio est Jo. Aud. Sed nulla opus est authorum citatione: nam lex est expressa. — Et universalis usus & practica St. Senatus inquisitionis sic habet nempe secundum normam directori. l. 3. tit. 9. Soto. ibid. p. 23. vid. Sylv. ibid. n. 14. Graff. l. 2. c. 21. n. 17.

(*q*) Talis clausula ipso jure vel facto, operatur restitutionem fructuum medij temporis... n. m. a Die commissi criminis, confacit fructus suos, sed statim debentur fisco Fel. in cap. Rodolphus de rescript. Graff. ibid. n. 21.]

Estates, by *Gift, Sale, Will*, or otherwise; yea, not of any of it, by way of Charity, for they are not their own to dispose of. Hence all Wills, Sales, Contracts, for this purpose, (it may be for some ages together) are (r) null and voyd. And if the Heretick will venture to alienate any thing he has, he that buyes it, does it at his peril (r); for though it pass from hand to hand many years, yet it may be taken away from the Purchaser, with whom it is found, (t) without restoring the price that was paid for it: and he that sells it, is a Cheat, and (u) sins mortally, if he gives not the Purchaser notice of the hazard, and tell him, that when he sells his Estate, or Goods, he has no right to sell them. If the pretended Heretick dye, and leave what he has to his (x) Children, it is no better than if he left them another mans Goods, which he had no title to. Yea, though the Children be (y) Catholics, they lose their portion. But who are those that may take from

(r) *Dona io vel alienatio facta per hereticum ante damnationem non tenet* — sicut facta damnatione bona alienare non possunt, sic nec ante illam a die commissi criminis, Sylv. ibid. n. 14.

Habetque eouque vim talis sententia, ut omnes contractus, nempe donationes, venditionis, atque alij, etiam causa dotis, quos hereticus ab illo articulo fecerit, habentur pro infectis, Soto. ibid.

(s) Navar. c. 17. n. 106.

(t) Si hereticus alienavit, fiscus vel inquisitores non tenentur restituere pretium emptori, quia ipse illius damnationis reus erabitur, Sylvest. ibid. fiscus nullo emptoribus restituto pretio sibi adjudicat dicta bona. Soto. ibid. res quaelibet per delinquentem alienata a fisco vindicari possit a die commissi criminis, pretio ipsi emptori minime soluto. Graff. ibid. n. 17. Non solum revocabit rem. pretio non restituto emptori, qui emit ab heretico: verum etiam nec ei qui emit, quantumcumque per plures manus transferit, a qui non habuit jus vendendi, hęc Jo. Manald. Archidiaconus, & Jo. Andreus & idem Directorium in Sylvest. ibid.

(n) Navar. c. 23. n. 89. Sylv. ibid.

(x) Nihil habebunt de bonis parentum filij, nec etiam agnati Angel. ibid. n. 7. Si aliquis sit declaratus hereticus, statim potest fieri executio in bonis ejus, exclusis filiis, etiam de legitima. Graff. ibid. n. 10.

(y) Si habuerint Catholicos filios nihilominus confiscantur secundum Gloss. in Sylvest. ibid. Angelus. ibid.

Quinto veniunt privandi ipsi filij Catholicæ etiam legitima ita notatur per Genzelinum — quem sequitur Zabarella & ratio est, quia legitima est quota honorum, quæ pater habebat tempore mortis, sed pater eo in tempore nihil habet quando bona sunt confiscata, Graff. ibid. n. 9.

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Protestants (or others whom they count Hereticks) what they possess? why, *any that will*: Authority is given to *all who-ever* to Rob, spoil, or bereave us. So Sylvester, and others, quoting the Rabbies of the Pontifical Law for it. It is their determination, that in point of Law and Conscience, (*æ*) *all that will, have Authority to spoil us* of what we have. What he adds, is matter of caution for more plausible proceedings in the spoil and robbery. *It seems safe that this be not done but by special edit of the Prince, or of the Church*; this is convenient, *least otherwise one might seem to do it, rather out of Covetousness or Revenge, than out of Justice and Obedience.*

By this we may understand in what condition Protestants are, by the Laws of the Romish Church, and how Papists are obliged to look upon us, and demean themselves towards us. No Protestant from the (*) Prince to the meanest Subject, has any *Title* to Lands, Houses, Money, or any thing else which they possess; or can justly call it *their own*. All rules of Righteousness, which concern *property*, are voyd: Papists owe them no observance. In reference to us, we are not capable of *Injury* upon this account; whatever they do against us, in respect of our Estates, they *wrong* us not, they *sin* not, for we have no *Title*. If they take from us any thing, or all we have, they steal not ought from us, they rob us not, because they take nothing from us that is *our own*. If they burn our Houses over our heads, and fire Towns and Citys (as they have done, and their famous (a) *Simanca* says they may do) they

(*) *Si aliter fieri non potest, manu armata sunt eis omnia bona auferenda ut, 23. q. 3 c. 1. Sicut tamen dicit Raynuc. & Gofredus licet Ecclesia videatur dare generalem auctoritatem Omnibus expoliandi eos: tamen satis videtur tutum, quod non fiat nisi speciali editio, vel principis vel ecclesie: ne aliter videatur quis potius ex cupiditate vel ultione, quam ex iustitia & obedientia pugnare, Sylvest. ibid. n. 12. Infidelitas hereticorum est pessima, utrum infideles qui non recognoscunt dominium Ecclesie licite possint suis rebus spoliari? Resp. Hostiensis, quod sic per illud Mat. ult. data est mihi omnis potestas, &c. quam quidem transtulit in vicarium suum, Angel. Sum. v. infidel. n. 3. & n. 7.*

(*) A Constitution of Pope Paul 4. subscribed by all the Cardinals, declares that all Prelats and Princes, even Kings and Emperors fallen into Heresy, should be, and should be understood to be deprived of all their Benefices, States, Kingdoms and Empires, without farther declaration, and incapable to be restored to them, even by the Apostolick See; and their Goods, States, Kingdoms, and Empires shall be understood to be common, and to belong to those Catholics who can get them, Hist. of Council. of Tr. lib. 5. p. 409.

(a) Institut. Cathol. Tit. 45. Sect. 13.

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do us no injury, they sin not on this account; because the Houses and Goods consumed, are none of *ours*. If they deprive a Protestant Prince of his Throue and Dominions, they sin not; he is by their Law and doctrine but an *Usurper*, and had no just (*b*) title to his *Crown*. If they draw any of his Subjects into war against him, at home or abroad, they do him no wrong; for they are (*c*) not his *Subjects*, no more than the Popish Clergy, who are sworn to another Sovereign. Or if he intrust them with the commands of *Forts* (*d*) or *Garisons*, they may betray them to the Romanists, and not wrong *him*, because they were not *his*. If they take all (*e*) places of trust, or profit, from Nobles or Commons, they do them no *wrong*, because they had no *right* to them, nor have their Children after them any, for some generations. If they pay no (*f*) *Debts* to Protestants though they were not only under the obligation of a promise, but of solemn Oath, they may justifie it; they *owe* them nothing. If *Trust* be reposed in them, or any thing be (*g*) deposited in their hands, or they borrow any thing of us, they may detain it; they need not restore it, for they have nothing of *ours*. In a word, there can be no *Parliaments*, or Convention of the three Estates of a Nation, because there are none in that capacity. As there are no per-

(b) *Tenens regnum contra formam juris & mentem papæ dicitur tyrannus*, Mascon. de imper. Reg. pars. 1. c. 2.

Propter hæresin rex non solum regno privatur, sed & filij ejus a successione regni pelluntur. Simanc. ibid. tit. 9. Sect. 259. Post latam sententiam declarativam de crimine hæresis, injuste princeps possidet regnum, & principatum, & excercet jurisdictionem in subditos: tenenturque subditi eximere se ab ejus obedientia, & bellum gerere contra illum, si vires illis suppetant, Bannes in 22. q. 10 p. 614. Yea, Bannes says, it is the more common opinion with Aquinas and his followers, that before the sentence declaratory, Subjects may lawfully, if they have strength, exempt themselves from the power of the Prince. p. 590.

(c) *Vassalli hæreticorum ipso facto liberantur*, Angel. Sum. v. hæret. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. principibus apostantibus a fide non est obediendum, Aquinas 2. 2. q. 10. Concil. Lateran. cap. 3.

(d) *Absoluti sunt subditi a debito fidelitatis etiam custodes arcium* Simanca, ibid. tit. 46. Sect. 73. Concil. Lateran. ibid.

(e) Angelus. Sum. v. hæret. n. 8. Sylvest. ibid. n. 14. Concil. Lateran. infra.

(f) *Si quis promississet eis solvere certo die sub juramento, vel pœna, non tenetur ut ibi notat gloss.* Sylv. ibid. Angel. ibid. n. 15. Armilla, v. hæret. n. 11. Ovandus. infra.

(g) Simanca, ibid. tit. 45. Sect. 27.

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sons of Honour for Peers, all being (*b*) infamous, so can there be no Free-holders to choose, or to be chosen for Commons, since there are no Proprietors. And as no Laws can be made, can be valid, there being none who have any power to make them: so there can be no Aids or Subsidies granted, or required, since they cannot be given or required of those who have nothing of their own to give.

Thus by the Popish principles, the foundations of the civil constitution in England, and other Countrys in like circumstances, are quite blown up, as if they had been at the mercy of Faux. And those who will follow their conduct, must hold, that we have no Government, no King, no Subjects, no Parliaments, no Laws, no Libertys, no Property; and indeed, none of the rest, because not this last. And all that will be true to the Doctrine and Laws of Popery, must believe this, and may lawfully deal with us accordingly; they sin not if they do, there is no Conscience in the case to hinder them, or secure us; nay, they are bound to do it, if that which they account most sacred, can oblige them, and that as soon as they can. That which restrains them, is not the fear of God, but of the penalties of our Laws, which yet are of no more force by their determination, than the agreement of a company of Robbers, or the constitutions of mere Usurpers, which will stand in their way no longer than till they can master the power which bears them up; against that which the Roman Decrees and Edicts have made equity and justice, in despite of the Laws of God and Nations.

SECT. 10. Moreover, they may bear (*i*) false witness, either privately, or in open Court, for their advantage; and if it do not much wrong another, it is but a small fault; so that if it do no wrong at all, it will be less than a small fault. On this account they may bear false

(*b*) Ipso jure sunt infames, ut neque ad publica officia seu consilia seu ad eligendos ad hujusmodi aliquos; neque ad testimonium admittuntur. Sunt intestabiles etiam, nec ad successiones admittuntur, Angelo Sum. n. 21. ibid. For this there is a decree of one of their general Councils (that of Lateran under Innocent. 3.) involving not only Hereticks themselves, but expressly all the receivers, defenders, and favourers of such. Ex tunc ipso jure sit factus infamis, nec ad publica officia seu consilia, nec ad eligendos aliquos ad hujusmodi, nec ad testimonium admittitur, sit etiam intestabilis, &c. cap. 3. in Crab. Tom. 2. p. 948.

(*i*) Soto. de. just. & jur. l. 5 q. 7. art. 4. *supra*.

witness against a *Protestant*, or any other, whom they count Hereticks, even when Estate or Life is concerned; for by their Laws and Doctrine his life is forfeited, and his goods confiscated, and so though by false testimony he lose both, yet he has no wrong, because he had no right to either. They may use fraud and deceit in bargains, to get what a Protestant sells, for little or nothing, yea, or to cheat him of all he has; for the deceit is not considerable in point of Conscience, but for the *wrong* it does; and here is no wrong in the case, for he cheats the Heretick of nothing that was his *own*, and so do's him no *injury*. They may use perfidiousness in breaking Compacts, Agreements, or Promises; for Perfidiousness, when it is (*k*) officious, and does but a little injury to those concern'd, is one of the least sorts of faults by their doctrine; therefore, when it does no injury at all, it is less than the least: but by breaking promises, or any such Bond of faithfulness, which concerns the Estate of a *Heretick*, they do him no injury, because he has no Estate of his *own*, by their account. So that if a *Papist* should make a thousand promises, and confirm each of them with an Oath to a *Heretick*; that he will pay what he owes him, or restore to him what is his own, he sins not, though he never pay, nor restore a farthing of it; because nothing is due to a Heretick, nor is there any thing he can call his own. And this is not my inference only, but they themselves declare it to be the consequence of their principles; and what they (*l*) deliver in express terms, amounts to as much as this charge comes to.

SECT. 11. Thus they leave *little* that can be *sin* in *Papists*, one towards another, but *less* towards *Protestants*. 'Tis no sin not to keep *Peace* or *Faith*; not to observe either *Truth* or *Honesty* towards *Hereticks*. 'Tis no *deceit* to equivocate with them in private dealing, or

(k) Cajetan. Sum. v. perfidia.

(l) Si aliquis promississet eis hereticis solvere sub pana vel juramento certo die, non teneatur ut Gloss. Et hoc intellige, si est manifestum ipsum in hereticam incidisse perfidiam, & dici Phil. idem etiam si est occultus, dummodo probari possit — Panormitan. ibid. ult. quod a die commissi criminis sunt liberi, Angel. Sum. v. heret. n. 15. Armilla. v. heret. n. 1. Sylvest. v. heret. n. 14. H. that fails, being bound by Oath or otherwise, to make payment, sins not, because the Creditors Heresy hath discharged him. So Ovandus. in 4. dist. 13. prop 30.

publick transactions; 'tis no *Dishonesty* to cheat them of what they have; 'tis no *Perjury* to break Oaths with them; 'tis no *Theft* to rob or spoil them; 'tis no *Inhumanity* to burn their Houses over their Heads; 'tis no *Murder* to kill them; in a word, 'tis no sin for all Relations to deny them, what God hath made their respective duties.

Self. 12. Finally, natural Corruption, after Baptism, has nothing in it that can be charged with sin, no, not in wicked men, who afterwards by mortal sin, are quite destitute of grace. So that by their doctrine, a fixed averfeness and contrariety to God and holiness, an habitual enmity against him; (*) a propensness to all ungodliness and unrighteousness, is no sin; an inward temper and disposition, though it be most Impious, Atheistical, Rebellious, Filthy, Treacherous, and Bloody, has no sin in it; an inclination to deny God, to speak all evil of him, to depose him, to advance Lusts and the Devil before him; an inclination to Adulteries and beastly uncleanness, to murder and barbarous cruelty, to the most prodigious wickedness against God or man, is no sin. Yea, though it be not transient, but constant and habitual, though it be strong and impetuous; though this corruption be reigning, not subdued or mortified; though it be active and fruitful in all the powers of the soul; though it hurry the lower faculties into rebellious commotions, and follow the superiour with frequent and strong impulses, and exert its power and malignancy both in thoughts and affections; yet if the inward motions have not *consent*, there is no more sin in their acts, than in their principles.

In all these evils *Papists* may live and dye, and in many more, which I purposely wave, least I be too tedious; and many more too, than I have taken notice of, even in plain violations of every part of the Divine Law, the rule of Righteousness and Holiness; and yet wipe their mouths, and say they have no sin at all, but are as holy as their Church requires them, and as sure of salvation as their doctrine, and the power of delusion can make them. Though any *Protestant*, who allows him-

(*) Qui ita est habitualiter dispositus, ut adveniente occasione, committeret peccatum mortale, non peccat mortaliter — non sufficit habitualis effectus ad peccandum — ut peccatum re ipsa contabatur, Bonaei. de peccat. di. 2. q. 3. p. 5. n. 3. il. i. ali. communiter.

self but in a very small part of these enormities; we will give them leave (or they may take it from Scripture) to count him an ungodly and unrighteous wretch, who can have no good Conscience towards God or man, nor any hopes of Heaven (continuing so) but such as will delude him.

Seci. 13. But if they have not legitimated wickedness enough already, they have expedients at hand to do it, for much more; they are furnished with devices to justify all the sin in the world, or at least in their Church, when they please to use them: Let us instance in two or three.

That power which they challenge for the Pope herein, is notorious. We heard *Bellarmin* tell us before, that if *the Pope should command Vice, the Church must practice Vice, or else sin against her Conscience.* And he says expressly elsewhere, that (m) in a good sense, *Christ gave to Peter a power to make that which is sin, to be no sin; and that which is no sin, to be sin:* and what he gave to *Peter*, they will have us believe he gave to Popes. So that it seems, *Christ hath given Peter, and consequently his Successors, the Popes, power to Authorize any sin and wickedness:* only we are to understand this in a good sense, which let any man do if he can. They declare, that he can dispense not only with positive but divine Laws, and so make the transgressions thereof to be no sin. To omit the many testimonys for this, produced by others (and which some of themselves count extravagant) let us hear *Sylvester* (who seems modest in comparison) (n) *the Pope has power in all things purely positive, and in some pertaining to divine Law, because he has all Laws in his own breast, as to interpretation and dispensation.* Where what in his assertion seems restrained, in the reason of it (fetch'd from the *Canon Law*) is unlimited, *he has all Laws in his own breast,* it seems to import that they are all in his power, and at his pleasure; so as he may either interpret them, or dispense with them,

(m) *In bono sensu Christus dedit Petro potestatem faciendi de peccato non peccatum; & de non peccato peccatum, in Barkla. c. 13.*

(n) *Sicut habet papa (potestatem) in omnibus pure positivis, & in quibusdam pertinentibus ad jus divinum, quomodo dicitur omnia jura habere in scrinio pectoris sui de const. licet. l. 6. quantum scilicet ad interpretationem & dispensationem. Sum. r. dispens.*

n. 7.

as he thinks fit. Some of them, in reference to natural and divine Laws, make shew of denying this in general; but then they grant in particular instances, what is sufficient to make good the general charge. There is no command of the first or second Table, wherein they do not hold the Pope may dispense, unless it be the first; and to question his power of dispensing there, is no great disparagement to him, since they deny it to God himself. There is no doubt amongst them, but he can dispense with (o) Oaths, and make it no sin to break them, though they acknowledge the (p) obligation of an Oath to be by divine Law. And no wonder it has been so ordinary a practice, since they hold that this condition is still presupposed in (q) the Oaths, *If it shall please the Pope*. And though they conclude Vows to be more obliging than Oaths, yet they (r) teach, the Pope may dispense with the accomplishment of *solemn promises* made to God, and so can make both Sacrilege and Perfidiousness to God lawful enough. The Pope can dispense not only with rash Oaths or Vows, but those that are best, and their obligation most unquestionable. If any (says Rosella, after others) *do Vow or Swear any thing, that may lawfully be observed, the Pope should not alter it, when there is no cause; yet if he do release such* (though without cause, *the release holds good, because he is above positive Law, and also can dispense against the divine Law, so that he dispense not against the Gospel, and Articles of Faith* (Sum. v. juram. 1. n. 4.) But if he do that too, he may stand to it; for many teach that the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, but only not to destroy the Gospel. (v. papa. n. 3.) and we must conceive (if we can) that he may take away the obligation of the rules of the Gospel, without destroying it.

However, as to Oaths and Vows, he can totally (they say) dissolve the Obligation, *Quem admodum potest ipse Deus, even as God himself can; because it is likely that God, as he had cause, gave his own power to*

(o) In votis autem & juramentis dispensat, ac poterat quidem, quod erat in edificatio-
nem. Canus. pars. 6. Relect. de pœnit. p. 371.

(p) Reddere vota, juramenta servare, juris est divini & naturalis, idem. ibid. p. 370.

(q) Subintelligitur---si placuerit papæ ut in D. C. Venientes. de jurjur. immo in omni
juramento excipit ut auctoritas superioris, Sylv. v. juram. 3. n. 1.

(r) Canus. *supra*.

his Vicar; etherwise he had not been a good Father of his Household, if he had left his Flock without a Shepherd, who could, as occasion serves, provide for them in all (even to license Perjury and Perfidiousness to God himself) as Pope Innocent argues, but whether with more reason or Blasphemy, let others judge. Whereupon, Hostiensis saith, *that seeing God and his Vicar have the same consistory, the Pope can do in a manner all that God can do, the Key not erring; for Christ says generally to Peter, Whatever thou shalt bind; and saying whatever, he excepts nothing.* *ibid. n. 1.*

There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their Vow of Religion; yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable, *Because Religion derived its being from the Authority of the Roman Bishop; he therefore who gave it, may take it away:* So P. Innocent and their Canonists generally, *ibid. n. 4.* Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly, when they say, the Pope can do as much in a manner as God himself: But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more; and more he can do, if he can make contradictions to be consistent. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the Pope can dispense with a Monk to have *secular propriety.* Rich. de S. Viatore says, it is essential to a Monk to want it; and so a contradiction to be a Monk, and have it: yet others say the Pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a Monk, while he is none. *Idem. ibid.*

So for Sanctifying of the Lords day, there can be no doubt of the Papal power herein, since they count the command for it *(s)* positive; for that he can dispense in all *(t)* positives, is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the Precept for Sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of *Mass*, and abstaining from *servile works*:

(s) *Dicimus omnia Christianorum festa, etiam dies dominicos solo humano jure — id quod etiam sentit, Turrecremata, Archidiaconus, S. Thomas, Waldensis, Navar. c. 13. n. 1.*

(t) *Quæ sunt de jure positivo, potest summus Pontifex, etiam sine causa tollere & abrogare, & quavis male faciat, factum tamen validum sit, Canus. ibid. p. 972. Sylvest. juxta mentem, S. Thom. v. papa. n. 15. vid. Angel. Sum. v. papa. n. 3. Universaliter potest dispensare — contra statum universalem Ecclesie.*

The Pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can Abrogate them. And since the people, by their Divinity, are not obliged to any other publick worship, but the Mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all Conscience of publick (*u*) worship, and disengage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dispense with the Mass. They make it indeed, sometimes, a character of Antichrist, to put down the Mass: But it is not fit the Pope should want power to be Antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already? since with them, herein, he may lawfully be Antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the Clergy and Monasticks: All the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their Canonical hours; but (*x*) the Pope can order that they shall not be obliged to say their Service. So Sylvester after others concludes; he adds indeed, that though the Pope can discharge them from this Service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompence to their Benefactors for not praying for them; but for this (he says) *they need not trouble themselves for the least prayer that can be, will suffice for that.* So an Ave Mary may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the Virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their Benefactors; they may be as well without it. And so others leave them determining without any reserve, that the Pope may dis-

(*u*) Sequitur posse pontificem in hoc præcepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum Ecclesiasticum sit, he adds only dispensare cum aliquo ut nunquam in toto vita missam audiat, etiam si possit, neque ulla rationabili causa impediatur, non potest esse expediens, Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 2. p. 1140. Hinc patet summum Pontificem posse dispensare in præcepto audiendi missam, Tom. 1. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 6. Bonacina. aiunt communiter Doctores posse consuetudine vel humana potestate abrogari, Idem. in 3. præcept. q. 5. n. 4.

(*x*) Quarta causa (a recitando divinum officium excusans) est dispensatio papæ juxta Cardinalem Turrecrematam, neque aliud sentit Cardinalis Florentinus. Navar. c. 25. n. 102.

utrum papa facere possit quod prædicti non teneantur ad horas? Laud. & Jo. de Lig. senserunt quod papa hoc potest, &c. Sum. v. hor. n. 9.

(*y*) Sed circa istam suppletionem non oportet esse multum scrupulosum, quia consurgit ex naturali lege potius quam Ecclesiæ præcepto; ut recompensetur benefactoribus: quod etiam per minimam orationem fieri potest, ibid. n. 5.

pense with their divine Service, and may do so validly, without any cause *ton*. So that the Pope, when he list, may leave no publick worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he *does* this, it will be no sin wholly to *neglect* it. He can dispense against the universal state of the Church, so the Law of their Church will have it. Only says *Panormitan*, he should not *deface* it; but there's no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed; they ascribe no power to him in this, but what he has given the world proof of *effectually*) for he cannot *deface* it, unless he change the universal state of it, *without reason*; and this he can never want, so long as his will is good *reason*, as they say it is.

He can as easily discharge them from all Righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a Son to calumniate his Father, or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea to attempt his life; and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief: this office he did for the Emperours heretofore, and is (*z*) commended for it. He can take away any (*a*) mans right, and dissolve all Bonds, Contracts, Obligations, whereby one man is bound to another (*b*); and so can make it lawful to act against all Faith, Truth, Justice, and common Honesty. Further, those whom God hath joyned together in lawful Matrimony, the Pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so, as to Marry others, and so live in Adultery without sin, as he did with the Son of the *Conde D'Olivares*.

If there have been no Carnal knowledge, they make no bones at all of the Popes dissolving Marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated: No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctancy. But there is one rarer feat that the Pope can do, he

(*) Bonacin. Divin. Offic. disp. 1. q. 6. p. 3. n. 1.

(*) Sum Rosell. v. papa.

(z) So the Emperour Henry 4. was used by his own Son, excired by the Pope; and *Baronius* will have it past denial, an eminent work of Piety, *Annal. tom. 12. an. 116. n. 14.*

(a) *Is omnibus & per omnia potest facere & dicere quicquid placet auferendo etiam jus suum cui cult.* Specul. Guliel. Durand. l. 1. par. 1. de legit. Sect. 6. n. 51. (b) *Utrum possit aliquem absolvere ab obligatione, qua tenitur alteri homini? & dico secundum Innocentium quod hoc potest, de plenitudine potestatis, Sylvest. v. papa. n. 13.*

has power to dispense with persons to Marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a Child, and then be Unmarried again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any Divorce or occasion for it. *Jo. Andreas* (a principle Rabbi of their Church *Talmud*) says, *he had disputed this question, whether the Pope might not dispense with a Kings only Son, being a Monk, to Marry for a while, till he could get a Boy, and after return to his Monastery and Unmarried condition?* He answers, *That the Pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear: but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good, (according to whom, the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before,) and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be Married for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, Bishop of Alexandria (in Millain) by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Torumala, Our Author will not grant, that the Pope cannot dispense with a Religious person to be Married a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him Marry during life (*).*

Moreover, he cannot only legitimate Adultery, but Incest; for they teach that he can dispense with Marriages in those degrees which Gods Law forbids, even such as are acknowledged to be against the dictate of Nature. They except no degree of Consanguinity, but only the first in a direct line, *viz.* Marriage betwixt Parent and Child; they say he can license it in the first degree in the collateral line, *viz.* betwixt Brother and Sister.

Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the Pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their, *St. Antoninus* will not be questioned, who tells us, that *Pope Martin the fifth, dispensed with one who had Married his own Sister.* Yea, he takes upon him to dispense

(*) Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. 3. & 4.

(*) *So Aquinas (in Dian. v. matrim. n. 56). Bonaventur, Scorus, Durand. Alensis, Richard. Augustinus Triumph. Cajetan, Rossensis, (in Victorell. ad Tol. l. 7. c. 9.)*

(c) *Ere omnes gradus Misaica lege prohibiti, sunt etiam prohibiti naturali, Sylv. v. papa. n. 17.*

(d) *Reperitur tamen Martinus s. ut Archiepiscopus, (viz. Antoninus) refert dispensasse cum eo, qui cum sua germana contraxerat, & consummaverat, habito consilio cum peritis theologis, & Canonistis. Idem. ibid. & Angelus. v. papa. n. 1.*

with Sodomy. *Sixtus* the Fourth, (e) gave License to the whole Family of Cardinal St. Lucy, that they should use Sodomy in the three hotter Months, *June, July, and August.* And *Alexander* the Sixth, (f) gave the Cardinal De Valentia leave to Buggar the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural Son.

The most modest opinion at first, blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the Popes power, in reference to the Laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, (g) *That the Pope can dispense with the divine Precepts, when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise,* says he, *God* (if he had not so impowered him) *would not seem to be a good Master of his Household* (not wise, say some; not diligent say others; for this is a common Argument for the Papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the Popes power herein, for if we do, they may question the Government of God. And herein he is followed by (h) Sylvester a Dominican, and Angelus (i) a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides Divines, (k) all the Canonists agree in it, if well understood. And this, the former (l) extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine Law, and the latter concludes it, (m) not only as to the Precepts of the second Table; but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament. All the question is, (n) how one may know when the reason of Gods Law ceaseth in any case? to which he answers, that this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his

(e) Vid Mysther iniquitatis 1310. (f) Ibid. 1328.

(g) Si occurreret casus particularis in quo deficeret ratio legis.—tunc papa posset dispensare aliter ut dicit Ricar. non videretur Deus fuisse bonus pater-familias. v. papa. n. 1.

(h) V. papa. n. 16. (i) Ibid.

(k) Et in prædicta opinione concurrunt omnes Canonistæ, si bene intelligantur. Idem. ibid.

(l) Potesť ea interpretari in dubio authoritative, scil. utrum in aliquo determinato casu, habeat locum ratio divini, aut naturalis statuti, vel non, Sylvest. ibid.

(m) Et quod dico de præceptis secundæ tabulæ, idem dic de omnibus præceptis veteris & novi Testamenti, Angelus. ibid.

(n) Sed quis poterit scire quando ratio legis deficit in aliquo casu? Resp. quod istud aliquando habemus ex exemplo Dei, qui multoties dispensavit in sua lege.

own Law. So that in such cases, it seems, the Pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the Popes turn. So he adds, (o) *When we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it* (that is, when the reason of the Law fails) *in any other case, belongs to the Pope alone.* Accordingly (p) *Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, Authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural Precept takes place.* The Pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein, desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine Law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the Pope might discern the reason of the Law for Marriage to cease, when *Olivares* had declared *Julian Valeasor* his Heir, & so gave him leave to Marry another Wife, when he had one already, lawfully Married: (yet his Holiness might be hastier herein than some Doctors would have him, who though they hold the Pope can dispense with one to have two, or more Wives at once; yet think it not so very fit to be done, whole Catholicks are so plentiful (*). And he would have seen something more in *Harry the Eighth* case, than he let the world know, if the *Emperour Charles the Fifth* had not stood in his light. And so in that against Perjury, *Clement the Seaventh* saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest, that *Francis the First* should break his Oath. And *Sixtus the Fourth* could well see that the reason of that Law against Sodomy, ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons.

But what if the Pope should mistake in his Declaration about the Law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? this must not easily be supposed. *I firmly believe* says *Angelus* (q) *that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the Law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations; do put himself simply into the Pope's hands, with a Declaration of his case: that God will not*

(o) Sed quum talis dispensationis vel similis non habemus exemplum in scriptura, tunc ad solum pnapm pertinet ipsius declaratio. Idem. ibid.

(p) Supra.

(*) Vid. Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. 5.

(q) Ibid. n. 2.

suffer his Vicar to err, in dispensing. Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the Pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case, before us: for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with, may be no sin to him, who has his holiness leave to commit it. (r) *I judge, says Navar, that though the dispenser may be in fault, yet he that is dispensed with, is excused; if relying honestly upon the Authority of his Superiour, he thinks it was granted upon just cause: till he be convinced, that it was not justly granted.* For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm, that no Catholick ever held, that the Pope could dispense any way, with the Divine commands; and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the Pope, when he says, by his Indulgencies, (s) *we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of Repentance?* These fruits are by their own account, all good works. And so in fine, the Pope can make it to be no sin, *to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good works, which respect either.*

Sett. 14. But they need not make use of the Pope's Authority for this purpose; there are other expedients nearer hand, will serve, to make any sin lawful. One is *probable ignorance*, and that, when upon a *probable ground*, error is conceived to be truth; and that which is sin indeed is taken to be no sin. When upon such a ground one ventures upon a crime, it will not be criminal. Now they give an account of several things, each of which will serve them herein for a *probable ground*.

First a *probable Reason*, (t) when there are Arguments *pro* and *con*, all probable in his judgment that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable; he sins not, though it lead him into sin.

(r) *Arbitror autem, quod licet dispensator peccet: tamen dispensatus, si bona fide nixus auctoritate superioris, putat eam iusta de causa esse datam, excusatur donec satis noverit, eam non fuisse sic datam. Ibid. prælud. 9. n. 13. 14.*

(s) *Indulgentiæ faciunt tamen, ut pro ijs pœnis, quæ nobis per indulgentiam condonantur, non teneamur præcepto illo de faciendis dignis pœnitentiæ fructibus. De pœnit. l. 4. c. 13. p. 1068.*

(t) *Quando homo concurrentibus rationibus in utramq; partem suo iudicio probabilibus, eligit eos quæ sibi videntur probabiliores quæ tamen vera sunt contra veritatem, cui ipse alias bene esset: tunc iste (licet contra veritatem erret, & sic laboret ignominia contraria) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores Communiter. Sancta Clara. Deus: nat. gr. problem. 15. p. 87.*

They lay great weight upon Authority, and think it safe to follow the herd, in a common opinion: yet one good reason (*u*) they say) is to be prefer'd, before the common judgment of their Writers; and one may venture against the stream, being back'd with it. Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; 'tis enough, if it seems but probable, to him that weighs it: yea (*x*) *though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it.* And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the Inquirer; and he may be his own Judge in the case, and act against the scruples of his Conscience, when he has *probable reason*. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us; since that is *safer*, and that which is safer is to be chosen according to the common Rule? no, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice, is (*y*) only a *Counsel*, not a precept: we are only enjoined to do what is *safe*, not to what is *safer*, and a practice upon a probable reason, is (*z*) safe enough.

Secd. 15. Secondly, *custom* is another *probable ground*, which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their *Casuists* to conclude a practice innocent, when there is custom for it; though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So *Navar* (*a*) determines, that if it were a custom, to observe the Lord's day only till noon, or till Mass were ended in the Morning: it would be no sin, to spend the rest of it in servile works. And that of *Cajetan* is observable, he takes notice that it is a practice in the Church of *Rome*, to sing to the Organ prophane and filthy Songs, when they are at Church for worship; This the Cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of Sacrilegious Superstition:

(*u*) Navar. cap. 3. n. 8.

(*x*) Ignorantia excusat---etiam cum quis in affectione ad suum Doctorem, judicat probabiliter ut sibi videtur, esse verum, quod est falsum. Sylvest. sum. v. opinio. n. 1.

(*y*) Navar. c. 27. n. 281.

(*z*) Hoc potest facere (viz. crebro contra scrupulos) tuta conscientia ex consilio proprio, quando habet probabilem rationem. Sylvest. v. scrupul. n. 3. Regul. 5.

(*a*) Cap. 13. n. 5.

yet.

yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it (b) excusable, upon the account of *custome*, and probable ignorance. (c) *Those who in dancing use Habit, Gesture, or Songs which are notoriously lascivious; as immodest women who wantonly lay open their Breasts; and men, who expose without due covering, their shameful parts; they sin mortally.* So de Grassijs had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself; (d) *yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgment, but must stand to the custom of the Country.* Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the *custome*; he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner (e) Sylvester determines of a *Habit, that will not suffice to hide their shame, if it be a custome, though not laudable, and without ill intention; no general rule, can be formed against it.* In (f) positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, *custom* will excuse. And so Fornication which in the judgment of (g) Durandus and some others, is of this nature: needs nothing but *custom*, to excuse it from being a sin. So much they ascribe to *custom*, that they will have the Scripture not to direct, and regulate it; but to follow it, and be conformed to it, even in its *changes*; so that the sense and obligation of the Divine Rule, shall be changed as the *Romanists* change fashions. This *Cardi-*

(b) Excusandos tamen illos crediderim, qui simplici corde credentes licere non turpia, sed vana, quasi pro recreatione pulsare, pro eo quod ubiq; sic vident fieri, erraverunt--- tales enim ex ignorantia probabili erraverunt. Sum. v. Organ.

(c) Qui habitu, gestu, cantu, notabiliter lascivo, in ludo chorearum utitur, sicut feminae inverecondæ pectora lascive nudant, viri partes inverecondas indecenter coopertas ostendunt, peccant mortaliter.

(d) Verum de hoc pro certo judicare non possumus, sed standum est consuetudini patriæ l. 2. c. p. 120. n. 16.

(e) Sum. v. Ornat. n. 7.

(f) In his quæ ideo sunt mala quia prohibita, ut communiter positiva præcepta, excusat consuetudo præscripta, quia tollit legem, & est legum interpretes: Imo hac ratione dico, quod excusat etiam si non sit præscripta, modo sit rationalis, & scienter tolerata, &c. Idem. ibid. v. scrupul. n. 4. reg. 5.

(g) Supra.

nal (b) *Cusanus* affirms, the Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time^o, and variably understood ; so that at one time, it is expounded according to the currant fashion of the Church : and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed ; and again no wonder if the practice of the Church, do take the Scripture, one time one way, and another time another ; for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice. This was urged in the Council of (k) *Trent*, and judged to be the meaning of the *Lateran-Council* ; when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the Doctors of the Church, or as custome has approved. Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin ; if it become the *Roman* practice, the Divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God, to deprive the people of the Cup in the Eucharist : but since it was the custome of *Rome*, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship Images, was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred ; but being once the practice of the *Romanists*, the Scripture renounced its former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing ; and the same thing which was Idolatry, is now no such matter. Of (l) the Law against Idolatry (says *Sylvester*) nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ, it is not in use. It is not in use, because it is their custome : it is not the same thing, that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custome has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other : when all sin is once the practice of that Church (as the worst is already) there will be no sin in it.

(b) *Scripturaeque esse ad tempus adaptatas, & varie intellectas, ita ut uno tempore secundum currentem universalem ritum exponerentur, mutato ritu iterum sententia mutaretur. Epist. 2. ad Bohem. de usu Com.*

Nec mirum si praxis ecclesiae uno tempore interpretatur scripturam uno modo, & alio tempore alio modo : intellectus enim currit cum praxi. Idem epist. 7.

(k) *History of Council of Trent. l. 2 .. 159.*

(l) *Queritur quid juris de idololatria ? Et dico supersedendum esse hic : quia jam per gratiam Christi, non est in usu v. Superstitio. n. 3.*

Señ. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable *Authority*, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgment of an able *Doctor*, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the *Jesuits*, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was current in the Church of *Rome*, before the *Fathers* of that *Society* where infants. *Panormitan* thus determines (m) *he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false.* In *Sylvester*, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n) removes what, by mistake, is alledged out of *Aquinas* against it; and shews, that both their great *Saint*, and their great *Abbot* agree with others, that this is *safe*, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, (o) one *Doctor* may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, (*) *a man may probably follow one Doctor: And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and be worse than the rest, may be preferr'd before many in some particular.* So (p) *he* and *Angelus* (q) before him, after others. They conclude (r) in reference to *Josachim*, who was not ac-

(m) *Panormitan. in C. Capillan. de feri. dicit quod sequens opinionem alicujus Doctoris non subtiliter investigatam, quæ postmodum apparet falsa, excusatur a peccato quamdiu non apparuerit falsa. Sylv. v. opinio. n. 1. & Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. 2. Ubi Glossa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, & alij.*

(n) *Ibid. secundum Antoninum.*

(o) *Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirmant boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navar. &c. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.*

(*) *Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neq; ex multitudine authorum quid melius & æquius est, judicatio; cum possit unus, & forte deterioris sententia multos in aliqua parte sapere.*

(p) *Ibid. n. 2.*

(q) *Ibid. n. 1.*

(r) *Multo magis excusatur sequens opinionem Doctoris non reprobata, cum voluntate non adherendi, si vera non apparet, uterq; ibid.*

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Counted a *Heretick* (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church : *that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it.* (s) Certainly (sayes *Angelus*) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable ; but they will not have us alwayes bound to follow that which is *more probable* : for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what (t) *is safest is to be followed holds* not (they tell us) but in points, *that are properly dubious ; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt.* Thus Navar also explains it, (u) having told us, (x) *that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners : for in other things, it is not so much as under Counsel, to follow the safest.* Accordingly Metina (in (y) *Lopez*) sayes, *the opinion of expert Divines, may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear, and more safe.* In thort, that an opinion which is less probable, may be followed ; is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part, and the graver sort of their Di-

(s) Certe in isto non potest esse contemptus, & sic nec peccatum inobedientie. Ibid.

(t) Nec obstat, quod in dubijs tutior pars est eligenda---ut videtur se exponere periculo, qui in diversitate opinionum non eligit tutiorem : quoniam hoc verum esset quoniam proprie dubium est, sed quum est opinio secus est, quia nec tunc sumus in dubio : nec consequenter exponit se quibz periculo. Angelus. ibid. n. 2. & Sylvest. n. 1.

(u) Rectius intellectus illius vulgati tutior pars est eligenda in dubio, nempe in eo quod est proprie dubium, quale non est, cum sufficiens auctoritate, aut ratione altera pars creditur, neq; cum ex multis opinionibus una pro vera eligitur. cap. 27. n. 184.

(x) Non semper esse necessarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia satis est quoad præcepti implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quæ ad fidem & mores pertinent : in alijs enim, nec de consilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem. n. 281. vll. Antoninum. Angel. Sylvest. Navar. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. disp. 42. n. 12.

(y) Dicit opinionem posse teneri sine peccato, quæ est peritorum virorum, licet contrarium sit : planius & securius. cap. 52. p. 171.

vines. (z) above Forty of their grave Doctors are alledged for it, and amongst them, *Martin Navar, Medina, Peter Navar, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius*, with others, besides *Jesuits*. At present take only the words of *Navar*, who speaks fully. (a) *In the Court of Conscience* (says he) *it is enough for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think, to be a man of sufficient knowledge, and Conscience*; and quotes their *Glosse* and *Panormitan* for it. To whom let me add *Sanctia Clara*, who, not only tells us (as we have heard before) (b) *that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their Schools and Doctors*; *that the people erring with their Teacher, or Pastor, are wholly excused from all fault*: but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does: (c) *as when a Countrey-man believes any thing to be lawful, induced thereto, by the testimony of the Parish-Priest, or of his Parents: although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin*; according to the rule in Law, *just and probable ignorance ought to be excused*. So that to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgment of a grave Doctor so determining, but of a Parish-Priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant); yea of Parents also (more ignorant than they.) will suffice, and herein (says he) *the Doctors generally*

(z) *Licetum esse sectari opinionem minus probabilem, relicta probabiliori, docent Mercado, Medina, Sairus, (naming 20 besides, and adding, & alij plures) Jo. Sanc. disp. 42. n. 12.*

Possumus ubiq; peccato sequi opinionem probabilem, relicta probabiliori, & tutiore. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punc. 5. n. 4. *Clavis Regia, & alij communiter.* ibid. n. 5. For this *Barnabas Gallego* a Dominican produces near Fifty of their Doctors, many of them of the same order, and says it is *sententia communior inter Thomistas. tract. de conscient. dubi. de consc. probabil.* So that if we may trust those whom who we see no reason to think partial to the Society, this is not a singular conceit of the Jesuits; but the opinion of their other Divines generally, and the more common Doctrine of *Aquinas* his Disciples, otherwise most opposite to the Society.

(a) *In foro tamen conscientie ad effectum non peccandi sufficit eligere pro vera ejus opinionem, quem merito censemus esse virum idonea & scientia & conscientia præditum.* cap. 27. n. 288.

(b) *Deus. nat. gr. probl. 15. p. 99. supra.*

(c) *Probabilis est quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid esse licitum, ductus testimonio sui parochi vel parentum - tunc ille (licet contra veritatem erret) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores communiter, secundum illud: ignorantia iusta & probabilis excusare debet.* ibid. p. 78.

concurr.

concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion, that *invincible* (as *Divines*) or *probable* ignorance (as the *Canonists* call it), is excused from all sin: and that it is an instance hereof, (d) when one is misled by a sufficient Authour; then this is the common *Doctrin*e of the *Romanists*, and not the extravagancy of some particular Sect, or Order amongst them.

If then this *principle* be so destructive to Religion, the Souls of men, and humane Societies, as some of the French *Romanists* brand it, in reference to the *Jesuits*: the charge falls upon the common *Doctrin*e of the *Roman-Church*; for there it is generally taught and received, and was so, before *Ignatius* had founded his Order. And this prevents their ordinary exception, against our alledging particular Authours against them; they cannot with reason or modesty make use of this shift longer: for a single Doctor is so far Authorized, by the common *Doctrin*e of their chief Writers (and so of their Church); that any, or all in their Church, have warrant to rely on him. And so, in producing a particular Author, in esteem with them; we do, in effect, alledge their common *Doctrin*e. And indeed by the premises, the opinion of a grave Doctor, is the *Doctrin*e of their Church so far, that any of their Church are allow'd to follow it, both as to belief, and practice. Their Church (if we know her sense, by the declaration of the generality of her approved Authors) does allow all *Romanists*, to follow the opinions I have charged them with; though they be plainly destructive, of worship, faith, and holiness, both of heart, and life. For I have charged them with nothing, without a considerable Authour; and what is so grounded, is with them probable, and what is probable is safe, and allowed both as to faith and manners. Or if there be any particular in the charge, in which there

(d) *Duvandus--cum excuset probabilis ignorantia, puta, si habet aliquem Doctorem authenticum & famosum, cujus opinioni nititur in Sylvest. v. concil. n. 2. Vervec. dubitans & consulens viros Doctos falso consulentes, laborat ignorantia invincibili. ibid. v. Ignor. n. 5. Justa ignorantia--qualis est, cum quis petat consilium a viris habitis pro prædictis scientia & conscientia in id sufficienti, qui falso ei consulunt, & hæc omnino excuset. Navar. c. 23. n. 46. Graff. l. 2. c. 131. n. 2. & l. 4. c. 9. n. 8. Sancta Clara. ibid. p. 96. Herrera & Faber. ibi. Bonacina. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 2 n. 9. & 16.*

is not a common concurrence, or which is contradicted, though by a multitude of their Writers: yet since there is at least one grave *Doct̃or* for it, it is in their account safe; and any *Romanist* has liberty by the Doctrine now insisted on to follow it (if he please); rather than that which upon the account of more Assertors may be thought safer.

But as to the purpose for which I now take notice of it, this *Principle* serves to rid their *Church* of all sin; that is, of all Conscience to avoid any. For if that be safe which is probable, and that will be probable, which is countenanced by the opinion of particular Doctors: then all the sins which they, or any of them, have already concluded to be no sins (and these are an infinite number) may be safely committed: and all that any of them hereafter may determine to be no crimes, may be practis'd with as little Conscience, and as much security. So that a Train is laid hereby to blow up the whole rule of Christianity, and all innocency and holiness, which consists in conformity thereto: It has done horrible execution already, and what has hitherto escaped, is at the mercy of it; being wholly under the Mine, and may be dispatch'd, when ever the Casuists (their Engineers) who are daily at work about it, shall think fit.

Sett. 17. Let me but add some of the *Rules* they lay down for the direction, and relief of scrupulous Consciences. They must (e) *persuade themselves that they sin not, though they break the Law in a strict sense, if they observe it, according to some complaisant interpretation. A benign sense, is rather to be put upon any precept, than that which is strict: for the precepts of God and the Church, are not against that pleasantness, which a scrupulous interpretation takes away. And that a person may the better be pleased, he may make the interpretation himself, and so make it as benign as he desires; and as favourable as*

(e) *Sexta (medicina) usus equitatis circa leges de qua S. Thom. persuadendo sibi non peccare--qui (legem) in sensu benigniori servet, quamvis in duriore violet. Navar. c. 27. n. 283. Ceteris paribus inter sententiam benignam & duram circa præcepta potius benigna interpretatio facienda est, secundum Jo. de Amb. Verc. & Archi. & ratio est, quia præcepta Dei & ecclesiæ non sunt ad tollendam dulcedinem, quam aufert interpretatio scrupulosa. Sylvest. v. Scrupul. n. 4.*

his inclination and interest would have it. (f) For though in other Courts, the interpretation belongs to him who makes the Law; yet according to their St. *Antoninus* in the Court of Conscience, it belongs to every one to do it for his own practice. Or if he will be so over cautious, as not to rest in his own sense, but inquire the opinion of others (and he may easily meet with those amongst them, who will either make that which he has a mind to, no sin; or will mince it for him so small, that it may go down without hurt) yet (g) he may choose that opinion which is most for his purpose (that which is most complaisant, and so will best serve his turn). And (h) if he thinks it probable, though he fear the contrary, and it be false indeed; yet he may act according to it, and sin without fault. Nor is he concerned, whether the Doctors opinion be true or no; for (i) though it be false, he may notwithstanding thereupon cast off all scruple, and break the Law without sin. Thus if either himself, or any other will give him liberty to sin, when the Law gives it not; yet he may take it, and his sin will be no sin.

Secondly, he must perswade himself he sins not, when he breaks the Law, not only if it be impossible, but if it be (k) very difficult to keep it; now it may be very difficult to avoid sin, when his employment leads, or when his complexion inclines him to it, or when he has got a habit of finning, or otherwise, when he is under Temptation; and if it will be no sin to break the Law in these, and the like cases; he may make wickedness his daily practice without danger of sinning. But

(f) Interpretando discrete præcepta non solum humana; sed & divina. maxime affirmativa: quæ interpretatio licet in foro contentioso ad eum spectet ad quem & editio legis: tamen secundum Archi. in foro conscientie, pertinet ad quilibet pro facto suo. Idem. ibid. n. 3.

(g) Septimum est eligere opinionem magis facientem ad propositum proprium. Ibid.

(h) Si credat probabiliter sic esse faciendum, etiamsi sit cum formidine alterius partis, non peccat illud agendo, etiamsi falsa esset ejus opinio. Sylvest. Antoninus. in Fill. tr. 21. n. 182 Sylv. ibid. n. 3. ad. ob. 2.

(i) Excusatur, etiamsi sequatur consilium falsum, quia fecit quod potuit. Sylv. ibid. n. 5.

(k) Non peccare---qui eam non servat, ubi & quando est impossibile aut valde difficile. Navar. ibid. Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad vix possibile alicui, secundum Jo. de Amb.---illud esse impossibile dicatur quod vix est possibile: nupur. nixiam habens difficultatem---Vid. supra. v. potent. Sylv. ibid.

thicy.

they seem to take difficult, or impossible in a great latitude, as though *it might be no more than incommodious*, and so Sylvester explains it in the place to which he here refers (1) us. Now it may be judged incommodious, to observe the commands of God, when they suit not his fancy, or humour, or inclination, or interest, that of his ease or advantage: and if then it will be no sin, not to obey the Divine commands; a man may go near to be excused from sinning all his life, though he do little or nothing else but sin. The obligation of the whole Law and Gospel too, will be superseded by our conveniencies, he may omit what is enjoined, or practise what is forbidden, and it will be no sin; if he judge the observance of the Rule too difficult or incommodious.

Thirdly, He must make account, that he sins not by breaking the Law, *when he may be thought a fool for keeping it, (m) or when the observance of it may be ridiculous*. Now when sin is general, and the common usage of the times and places where he is; it may be as ridiculous to avoid it, as to be out of the fashion, or to appear in an *Antick garb*. And those who reap pleasure and advantage by sin, will be ready to account them fools, who abstain from it.

As Nic. de Clemangis says, they did in his time (*) a blessed time when their could be no sin, because Piety and Vertue were grown ridiculous. He must not think he sins who observes the Law according to the common usage of good (Catholicks) (*) and makes that his example and rule, and what Conscience he is like to make of sin by this rule, we may understand by the Character which the Count of *Mirandula* gave of the good Catholicks (the chief of them) to Pope Leo. Amongst the most (says he) of the most eminent in our Religion, to whose example the silly multitude should be conformed,

(1) *Aliquid dicitur alicui possibile, quia potest illud commodè--eodem modo dicitur impotentia, scilicet quia non est aliquid possibile de jure, vel commodè vel bonèste. Idem. v. potentia.*

(m) *Neq; cum non servat, ut pro stulto non habeatur. Navar. ibid. Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad hoc, ut quis appareat fatuus, & ridiculo sit. Sylv. ibid. secundum Jo. de Amb. Gloss. Innocent. Antonium. v. Scrupul. n. 4.*

(*) *De corruptis stat. eccles. Cap. 15.*

(*) *Navar. ibid. Sylvest. ibid.*

there

there is either no worship of God, or certainly very little, no regard at all of good life, no shame, no modesty: righteousness is declined into hatred or favour, and Godliness even sunk into Superstition (*).

And if there be *danger*, it will be accounted folly indeed, to expose himself; and whether it be accounted so or not, *the apprehension of danger may excuse a man from sin in any case*, So Sylveſter (n) after others.

There's no need to insist upon their other Rules, as that the scrupulous ought to exercise himself, in choosing what is less safe (more dangerous) amongst probable opinions; and not to regard (though he cannot answer) the arguments against it; it is enough that he believe what another says. Or this, (o) *the Confessor may tell him, that he should count no sin mortal, but what is manifest to be such; and so manifest sometimes, that he cannot swear it is not: or any else, though they have store of like nature; the former are sufficient to leave no Conscience of sin amongst them in ordinary practice; and to encourage sinners commonly to venture upon any violation of the Divine Rule, with warrant from their Doctrine, that it will be no sin to them. Thus they take a course to ease mens Consciences; by leaving them none.* And what clearer way can there be to remove scruples, than to persuade them (who would retain some Conscience, if they would suffer them) that there is little or no sin to be scrupled at.

(*) Franciscus Picus Mirandula de reformand. moribus. Apud plerosq; religionis nostræ primores, ad quorum exemplum componi atq; formari plebs ignava debuisset, aut nullus aut certe exiguus Dei cultus, nulla bene viventis ratio, atq; institutio, nullus pudor, nulla modestia: Justitia vel in odium vel in gratiam declinavit: pietas in superstitionem pene procubuit.

Quamobrem dico & exclamo, (neq; enim meo homines, Deo fretus) neminem meæ ætate fuisse fidèlem dispensatorem, imò Papa ipse pacatis populis bella inferi, opes alienas fuit, & suas exorbitet, nulla sanctitas, nulla religio, nullus Dei timor, & quod horresco referens, omnium scelerum, impij homines à papa sumunt excusationem. Valla de donar. Constant.

(n) In quolibet casu pretermittens facere quod lex imponit. Excusari potest a peccato, si hoc facit per virtutem Epikeiæ, sine contemptu, ratione alicujus periculi considerati. Joh. de Amb. Antoninus. in Sylvest. ibid.

(o) Bonacin. de peccat. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 8. n. 3. ubi Sayrus. & alij & n. 4.

Secd. 18. This is abundantly sufficient, to make it apparent, that the *Papish* Doctrine is destructive to *holiness of life*: since they have warranty thereby, not only to neglect the proper acts and exercises of holiness; but to give up themselves to practices of all sorts, which are directly opposite thereto. 'Tis true they do not acknowledge those practices to be sins or dangerous; but they may with as good reason justify such acts, which they cannot but condemn for crimes, as they go about to excuse these from being criminal. *A son of Belial*, that has liv'd in the neglect of holiness, and in the practice of ungodliness and unrighteousness all his time, will scarce pass at the day of Judgment, for one that is *holy*, or innocent; because he has had the confidence to think so, or has found out some shift to support his presumption; or because others like himself, were of the same mind; nor is he like to escape, because he had wit enough, to cozen his Conscience, or boldness to stifle it, or wariness to keep out the light, which would have inform'd it, or self-love to believe those who flatter'd him, in what his corrupt inclination led him to; or facility to follow those blindfold who had no mind to see. Those devices which they have found out to justify innumerable Transgressions of the Divine Law (and may serve as well to justify them all): have no countenance from Scripture, nor from Antiquity faithfully following it. This is not only acknowledged, but charged home by some of the *French Romanists*, upon a supposition, that these pernicious Artifices are peculiarly the *Jesuits*: but since it is apparent that the *Divines* and *Casuits* of all Orders, and those of Universal repute, are no more excusable; the charge is justly fixed upon their Church, and practical Doctrine in general. Nor is their acknowledgment needful, it is plain in the Writings of those, who have the conduct of their Consciences, that they consult not with Scripture in these determinations, no more than with ancient Writers: you shall find them very rarely meddle with either. An allegation out of their *Canon Law*, is an authentick Authority that passes for the *Text*, a *Schoolman* or *Casuit* of note, that went before them, is a sufficient conduct; if there be a concurrence of Five or Six, it is then the common opinion, and they are as secure in it as if they marched with a *Caravan*; but if they have a mind to be singular, and have but something like a reason for it; they Supererogate, though the reason be such, that the next who examines

mines it, *puffs* it away as a trifle. Such are the foundations of their practical Divinity; the *Masters* of it (the *Casuits*) are follow'd by the Priests and Confessors, and the Priests are follow'd by the people: and so the blind follow the blind; and those that see not, those that will not see. But it may be, there was less need to be so long and particular, in shewing how unnecessary it is with them to forsake sin. It is manifest enough by their Doctrine of Repentance, before insisted on, that there's no necessity they should break off their sins, till they be obliged to be contrite: and their Doctors cannot agree upon any time for this (though some of them specify the point of death, though then indeed they do not account it indispensably necessary): the people may think themselves excused, if they do not resolve to leave their sins till their Teachers agree, that they must do so; and so live in them, till they can live no longer. If any particular Doctor fix a more early period, and bring some reason for it (though they may if they please, yet) they are not obliged to believe him, for no reason is brought by any of them; for a more timely turning from sin, but is confuted and rejected by some or other among them, as slight and insufficient: and 'tis no sin not to believe him, who proposes to them upon frivolous reasons; yea it would be an act of imprudence to do it, as (p) *Sancta Clara* assures us, out of *Aquinas* and *Victoria*, so they may hereupon go on in their sins, till the approach of death, and he, whom they worship as a *Saint*, and Reverence as the Angel of their Schools, may encourage them herein: since he declares, (q) that continuance in sin unto death, is not a special sin, but only a circumstance of sin. Nor need they be afraid of this circumstance, as though it would make their case worse; for by their Doctrine, to sin (and so to continue in sin) upon confidence, that they shall have pardon by Confession, is so far from aggravating sin, that it extenuates it. So *Cajetan* and

(p) Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur, ut rationibus frivolis--tunc enim credere est actus imprudentie, secundum D. Tho. 2. 2. q. 1. art. 4. Deus. Nat. Gr. Probl. 15. p. 87.

(q) Permanentiam in peccato usq; ad mortem, non esse speciale peccatum, sed quandam peccati circumstantiam. Aquinas. 2. 2. q. 14 a. 2.

Navar (r) after him. And that nothing may discourage them from continuing in wickedness, the *Council of Trent* declares (without excepting the sinners perseverant in sin unto death) that if he be *attrite*, the Sacrament of Confession will secure him; though *attrition* is confessed, not to import so much, as any pious or ingenuous purpose to forsake sin.

CHAP. X.

The Roman Doctrine makes good works to be unnecessary.

SECT. I.

But their *good works* possibly may satisfy for their other defects, and extravagancies, and in these they glory above all, and have the confidence to condemn us, upon a pretence (though utterly false and groundless) that we deny the necessity of good works. Is it imaginable, that after this, they themselves should hold them to be unnecessary; and so run into the Heresie, which they charge upon others? I will not desire any to believe this, unless I let him see it, but their Writings make it visible to any, who have a mind to see. They reduce all good works to *Fasting, Prayer, and acts of Mercy, or alms-Deeds*. For their fasting I shall only say this, *It is no fast, it is no good work, nor is it in their account necessary*. To the making of a Fast, there must (as they tell us) be the concurrence of these severals. First, there must be no more than once eating. *Gregory*(s) lyes (though both a Pope and a Saint with them) if this be not true, says *Cajetan*. Secondly, This eating must not be a Dinner. *Bellarmino* makes this

(r) Peccans ob fiduciam, quod postea pro confessionem veniam obtinebit, non tenetur de necessitate id confiteri: quia non est circumstantia adeo peccatum aggravans: imo potius minuit, ut inquit Cajetanus in 2. 2. q. 21. art. 2. Nav. cap. 6. n. 3. p. 98.

(s) unica domum comestio, nisi ad jejunium necessaria sit, mentitur Gregorius. Sum. v. jejunium. p. 344. unica comestio est de essentia jejunij. Navar. cap. 21. n. 14. Sane si in jejunio bis cibum capere fas esset; ecquæ hic abstinentiæ forma, vel species quidem foret? parvi enim refert, quo vescaris cibo, si modo te ad summum satiaveris. Polyd. Vergil. de Juvent. rer. lib. 6. cap. 16. p. 372.

good (t) by Scripture, a Troop of *Fathers*, and the perpetual custome of the faithful; concluding that it was never heard, in the ancient Church, that they did eat (either till night, or,) before Three at afternoon. Thirdly, what they take must be less nourishing, and delicious, than their ordinary fare. And so the Church forbids, that (u) which in its nature, and for the most part, is more nourishing and more pleasing, the end of fasting requires it, which is (says he out of St. Austin) to tame and subvert the concupiscence of the body. All these are necessary to the being of a Fast as they affirm; and yet not one of these is observed in their Fasting. For first they eat a *Dinner*, a full meal at Noon, or an hour or two sooner if they please at the same time, and in as great quantity, as they do any other day; yea if they eat to great excess at a fasting Dinner, yet they keep the fast. (x) As to the quantity (says another of their *Cardinals*, who can best tell what belongs to fasting) of a Dinner at a fast, there is no certain measure: but though one be very excessive, and transgress the Law of Sobriety, yet he fasts well enough; and adds, it is lawful to eat more than ordinary at Dinner upon a Fast day. Others not of the Society, may hit the sense of the Church herein more unquestionably, when they teach, that one who observing the quality of the meat, stuffs his Belly so full, as to be so far from any sense of the hardship of fasting, or from repressing the sins of the flesh; that he rather excites, and cherishes lust thereby: yet fulfils the precept for fasting. So Covarruvius, Abulensis, Medina, Cajetan, and others in

(t) unicam igitur refectorem, eamque cenam esse debere, nec prandium; cum jejunio datur opera, facile probari potest, extant enim exempla scripturarum, testimonia patrum, & perpetua consuetudo fidelium. De Jejun. l. 2. c. 2. p. 1034. Apud veteres inauditum est prorsus, ut ante horam nonam, quæ est tertia post meridiem, jejunium quodcumque solvatur. Quomodo etiam nulla est apud veteres mentio binæ refectiois, cum de jejunio agitur. ibid. p. 1035. vid. Vistorel. ad Tol. l. 6. c. 2. p. 992.

(u) Certum genus cibi prohibuit jejunaturis, illud videlicet quod ex genere suo, & ut plurimum magis nutrit & magis delectat. Idem. ibid. cap. 5. Nam finis jejunij est corporis concupiscentias edomare, & in servitatem redigere. Ibid. p. 1043.

(x) In continua autem quantitate prandij, non est certa mensura ratione jejunij: sed quamvis aliquis multum excedat, non ob id solvit jejunium, peccat tamen contra sobrietatem--licet tamen tempore jejunij, aliquid plus accipere in prandio. Instruct. l. 6. c. 2. p. 990. Qui intemperanter comedit, dum prandet Die jejunij--jatisit præcepto. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 11. punct. 9. n. 1.

Bonacii.

Bonacina and he after them (*) where by the help of a distinction or two, intemperance both in quality and quantity, is made perfectly consistent with the fast and temperance of holy Church.) So that they *Fast*, though they *Dine*, and that lustily; whatever the Scripture, or the Fathers, or all the faithful (in *Bellarmino*) say of the inconsistency of a *Dinner* with a *Fast*. But this is too little for a *Roman Fast* (though many that never dream they *Fast*, eat constantly less); they may eat a *Breakfast* too; and yet keep a *Fast* after they have *broke* it. They may drink *Ale* or *Wine*, and eat *Bread* after it, that the strong drink may not (y) hurt them; or if *Bread* will not serve them (though these together may make a *Breakfast* for a *Festival*) they may eat other things else after their *Mornings draught*, if it be not beyond measure and these both at their first and second *Breakfast*. O! but thus they eat twice, *that* the *Cardinal* was aware of, where's then their *Fast*? when it is (as they affirm) essential thereto, not to eat twice? why (says he (z)) a pious construction must be put upon it, it is that the drink may not hurt them; and so taken it seems, either they eat not twice, when they eat once and again, or they fast by a pious interpretation, when in the sense of the universal Church and the World too, they fast not. Thus, that they may be sure to afflict the flesh, with a severe abstinence, they may eat a *Supper* too. And no wonder, for if they can excuse the second eating, it will be (as they conclude a) no fault, to eat a *Third* or a *Fourth*, or a *Fifth* time, or as often as they please, but *Three* meals may serve them for a *Fast*; and so one *Supper* may suffice. Indeed they call it but *Cannula*, and will have it pass under a little name; though the quantity allowed be

(*) De præcept Eccles. ult. disp. q. 1. punct. 2. n. 6,

(y) Licitus est mane potus etiam vini sine fraude etiam licitum aliquid sumere pro frumento, potus ne obstat Sylv. v. jejun. n. 9. & hoc expresse tenet. S. Thomas.

Nec sumere in serotino ientaculo parum panis, frangit jejunium: quia ad hoc videtur serotinum ientaculum reductum ut non referat quid quisq;umat, si modum non excedat. Cajetan. Sum. jejun. it holds as well of a breakfast early as later.

(z) Sumere vero ientaculum serotinum ad sustentationem nature, est proculdubio iterum comedere. ibid. Pie interpretandum est: ut scilicet fiat ne potus noceat. ibid.

(a) Sola autem secunda comestio peccatum est: non autem tertia neq; quarta, vel ulterior: quia illa sola jejunium frangit secundum Durandum quam sequuntur recte Angelus, & Sylvester. Navar. c. 21. n. 14. Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. jejunium. p. 392.

great, even full as big as custome will make it, for that's their rule, for fasting-suppers^(b), not to eat by any certain measure, but so much as others are wont to do: if it be excessive great that which custome introduces, will justify it. And those that tell us custome is their rule, acquaint us also; (c) that it is the custome in diverse Countreys, to Sup with notorious excess. And so they may eat at Supper, *not only for hunger, but out of sensuality*, as *Panormitan* and others after him. And thus *sensuality*, and the severity of a *Popish* Fast, are perfectly reconciled.

Such a Supper these Fasters may eat in the Morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it (*): and they may the better fast after, upon a full Stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftner if they will, and when ever they drink, they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough.

For the quality of their fasting, meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious, that they can compass; the most curious sweet meats, the choicest Wines, the rarest Fish, and that dres'd after the most delicate mode, and this at *Dinner*, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. O how gladly would Thousands of our People be condemned to such a maceration of the Flesh, for more days in a year, than the *Romanists* are, thus pitifully mortified; and never trouble Pope or Prelate for a dispensation? nay they would purchase a licence to fast, if any would accommodate them

(b) *Quanta tamen debet esse, consideranda est consuetudo communis patriæ — non enim est peccatum mortale talem consuetudinem servare, licet quantitas sit aliquantum gravior. unde Armilla probat collationes, quæ fiunt Romæ secundum consuetudinem tenelli ob consuetudinem, & quia Pontifex tolerat, cum sciat: nec ego audeverem damnare, quamvis isti sunt abusus hominum parum timeratorum.* Tol. ibid.

(c) Navar. c. 21. n. 14. collatio notabiliter immoderata — frequenter præsertim in Lusitania.

(d) Immo etsi ex sensualitate — secundum mentem Panormitani, quia sufficit non exire terminos consuetudinis. Sylv. ibid. n. 10.

(*) Bonacin. de præcept. Eccles. q. 1. p. 3. n. 6. ibi. Angles. Naldus, & alii vid. p. 1. n. 8.

with expedients to do it at such a rate. Besides their meats, they may drink freely; not only (e) at meals, but before or after, though they need it not, and be not thirsty, the drinking of Wine out of sensuality, breaks not the fast says Sylvester (f). And thus they may drink, before the meat they fast on be digested: for though that be intemperance in other cases, as Navar (g) tells us, it breaks not the fast. (h) Sylvester thinks it possible, that intemperance in drinking may be a sin: however it is lawful for those that fast, to drink often, on the same day; for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after Dinner, so he after others. A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is Wine that they may drink so often when they fast; and yet they acknowledge that Wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though Wine (says De (i) Grassijs) be more nutritive, and the drinking of Wine do more provoke to concupiscence, than the eating of Flesh according to that, Proverbs 10. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. 5. Be not drunk with Wine in which is luxury: yet (says he) he that on a fast-day often drinks Wine or Water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.

(e) *utrum p'uries bibere vinum vel aquam frangit jejunium* Resp. Innocentius & Ricar. quod non, sive ante passum sive post. Angel. sum. v. jejun. n. 4. They may drink it and that often for hunger as well as thirst. Navar. cap. 21. n. 19.

(f) *Potus etiam vini & electuaria, &c. De quibus intelligitur, quod ex sensualitate sumpta, non frangunt jejunium.* Ibid. Sylvest.

(g) *Esto, quod venialiter peccaret, qui cepta & nondum finita digestionem biberet, non quidem quod jejunium frangat, sed quia actum inordinatum agit,* Navar. ibid.

(h) *Licetum est jejunantibus pluries intra diem unam potare, licet immoderantia circa hoc possit esse peccatum.* Sylv. ibid. n. 9. secundum S. Thom. idem dicit Albertus. Paludan. Richardus. quod potus non solvit jejunium sive post, sive ante prandium. ibid.

(i) *Etsi vinum sit nutritivum, & ad concupiscentiam magis provocet potus vini quam esus carnum, secundum illud Prov. 10. Luxuriosa res est vinum & ad Eph. 5. Nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, tamen qui die jejunij saepius biberent vinum, aut aquam, & mane & vespere, jejunium non frangunt, quamvis hoc facerent ad sustentandum se, & famem sedandam. ita D. Th. 2. 2. q. 147. art. 6. ad 2. qui inquit, quod bene possunt peccare & meritum jejunij perdere sicut si immoderate cibum sumerent; sed non ut jejunium frangatur; & ratio est quia jejunium est abstinencia a cibo tantum.* Grass. l. 2. c. 36. n. 21. p. 215.

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Thus as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the Doctrine of their chief Authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. *The Church-fast* (they tell us) *consists not in abstinence from drink;--- consequently be that drinks Wine, or other liquour before or after Dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively.* So Bonacina after Aquinas. Abulensis. Navar and others, telling us it is their common Doctrine (*).

I suppose this fast can never be broke, it will be a fast for ever, do what they can; if all they are allowed to do against it, cannot make it to be no fast: for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the antient Church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a Dinner; he would have been thought out of his wits: yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely, that this is fasting; and that they break not a fast, unless they (k) Dine twice on a fasting day. And indeed some of their Writers (l), seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their Church. But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them ἐν ἐρηστροφία (as Epiphanius (m) explains it) and so that they tasted nothing till Three a clock, or till evening, as of old: yet by the Roman Order, it would be no good work. That it may be such, there must be something Religious (for mere abstinence has no more goodness in it, than eating); it cannot be Religious, unless it be subservient to some Religious design or employment: but they disjoyn it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of

(*) Non violat præceptum jejuniij - quamvis peccet contra temperantiam, bibendo intemperanter. Tom. 2. p. 337. n. 7. & alij communiter.

(k) Innocent. & Richard. (dicunt) quod prandere pluries in Die jejuniij est contra consuetudinem probatam ecclesiæ. Angel. sum. ibid. n. 3. Semel esse in Die prandendum seu manucandum: qui vero pluries, solvit jejuniium. Tol. l. 6 c. 2. p. 985.

(l) Jejuniæ nostra, quæ in vini copia natan, & piscium varietate carnis delicias superant--- veteribus omnibus non modo fuisse incognita, sed & intolerabilia adeoque abhominanda, constat. Lindan. Panopl. l. 3. c. 11. inanem tantum veri jejuniij retinet umbram. Cassand. defens. lib. de Offic. viri. p. 119.

(m) ἐν ἐρηστροφία διατελεῖσι πάντες οἱ λαοὶ, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ καὶ ἀλλῇ καὶ ἑταῖρῳ τότε χρωμένοι πρὸς ἐσπέρας Compend. Doctrin. Cathol.

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their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their Souls for them, they need not so much as *pray* when they fast, either in publick or private: yea they are not obliged to hear (*n*) Mass, though that be the imployment of every day for worship; So that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise. They are discharged also from religious ends, two are commonly assigned, *the taming of the flesh*; and *the elevating of the mind* to God: but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they intirely fulfill the precept of their Church for fasting, as they commonly (*o*) conclude upon this ground, because *the end of the precept is not commanded*. So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by *Cajetan* (*p*) applying that of the Apostle to it, 1 Tim. 4. 8. *Bodily exercise profiteth little, &c.*

Where he denies it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast, nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine, there is any necessity, either of real fasting, or any good work. But indeed they declare their

If they sleep the whole day, yet they accomplish the precept. *Jo. Sanc. disp. 51. n. 2.*

(*n*) *Dixi festo: quia nemo ullo alio Die hoc præcepto (de audienda missa) tenetur, etiam clericus vel monachus, imo neq; Episcopus—Nullo inquam, alio Die etiam jejuniis & quadragesimæ, &c. Navar. cap. 21. n. 2. Rosel. v. miss. n. 13. Sylvest. v. miss. 2. n. 1.*

(*o*) *Lex quæ præcipit aliquid, non obligat ad finem, sed ad media tendentia ad finem D. Tho. 1. 2. q. 100. art. 9. & 10. unde lex non obligat ad carnis petulantiam compescendam, sed ad media quibus comprimi possit, sicuti est jejunium. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 20. Licet ecclesia nos quadragesimali observatione exenueare in carne intendat, ut liberior mens spiritualibus accommodetur, tamen finis ille non est in præcepto, sed tantum ciborum abstinentia Soto. de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57. Finis præcepti jejuniij est elevatio mentis: si tamen quis jejunat & non elevatur mente, non est transgressor præcepti. Cajetan. Sum. v. matrim. p. 430. Nec si lex jubet quadragesimæ jejunium ut, mens elevetur in Deum; astringimur proinde ex hujus præcepti vigore mentem in Deum elevare. Canus. Relect. de penit. pars. 4. p. 871. vid. Tol. instr. l. 4. c. 12. p. 623.*

(*p*) *Sum. v. jejunium. p. 348. opera utriusq; misericordiæ meliora sunt quam jejunii: juxta illud Apostoli, corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est: pietas autem ad omnia valet.*

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pretended Fasts needles; for their best Writers (q) conclude it to be but a Venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to Fast after their mode, than there is to avoyd a *Venial* sin, which is none at all. They have so many ways to excuse men from Fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast: If a man have tired himself with any employment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming; yea, or with excessive Whoreing; he is thereby exempted from the obligation to Fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose, that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery, which they call Fasting, has the glory given it, which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfy the Justice of God, and to merit by way of *condignity*, not only grace, but eternal glory. An opinion of such malignancy, as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two Dinners, or abstains for a day from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies, even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horror of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of Faith in that Church. And this surely is enough to cloy any man with their Fasting.

Señ. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is *Prayer*; this unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be *good praying*; but they are so far from judging it necessary to *pray well*, that they conclude it sufficient to employ themselves about this work, in such a manner, as cannot upon a just account, be called *praying at all*. The

(q) *Quantum est ex jure scripto nullum cognosco intervenire mortale peccatum in fractione jejuni; Ecclesie, si contemptus desit.* Cajetan. ibid. p. 352. *vid.* Aquin. Antoninum. Archidiacon. Paludan. Angelum. & alios in Sylvest. v. Jejun. n. 21. *Communis opinio.*

(*) So Jo. Sancijs after others; *Liberos a jejuni existimo, qui culpa sua ita defatigati redduntur — quod jejunare non valeant; ut qui defatigatus esset ludo pilæ, aut nimis esset deditus seminarum commissioni — docent Medina. Diana. Ledesma, Montefin, &c. disp. 54. n. 20. Nonnulli doctores extendunt ad eos qui defatigantur in lydis, aut in querenda meretrice, &c.* Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 16.

only publick prayers necessary for the people by the *Roman* orders, are those of the *Mass*, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them; now can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses, nor conceives any Petitions? they do it not themselves, they joyn not with the Priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words, or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the Priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The *Church of Rome* has made it not only needless, but impossible for the people to pray in their publick Service, they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their *Authors* give of this. *Sylveſter* proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lords Day, or any of their days, for publick worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. (r) *It ſuffices that they ſtand by the Priest praying in the Maſſ, and that's all that is requiſite, by vertue of this Precept.* So that the Church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an Image in the Church to pray: and if *this* would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the *other* should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship Images, as if they were God; to worship God, as if themselves were Images. Oh but they must concur with the Priest, (s) so far, as either actually or virtually to wish that his prayers may be heard. And if this be praying, a man may pray in the Church, while he is in his Bed at home; for actually he may wish this, if he be awake; and virtually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the *Maſſ*, is neither, they say nothing, nor do they understand any thing, nor need they mind any thing, of what is said; and it is much, if a mans mind can be employed about that, which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The

(r) unde ſufficit aſtare oranti ſacerdoti in miſſa, quantum eſt ex vi hujus præcepti. Sum: v. Dominic. n. 8.

(s) Cum nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, & minus intelligere verba ſacerdotis, quia ſatis eſt, vel ex longinquo miſſanti adeſſe, & ſurgendo, genua ſectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut ſacerdos qui pro omnibus orat & ſacrificat, a Deo exaudiatur. Navar. cap. 21. n. 8.

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mind must necessarily attend actually (t), in mental prayer; but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voice or mind. They know not *what* to mind, nor *whom*, person or thing: they understand not whether the Priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his *Lauds*; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see no more than hear the Priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a Creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the Mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient Council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an Angel or to a Saint; to a Man or to a Woman; to an Image or to a Crucifix; for they have addressees to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say *Amen* to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as (u). *Aquinas* himself assures us from the words of the *Apostle*.

But the Priest, who celebrates, seems to pray, though the people at Mass do not. He seems so, but the Church of *Rome* obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray, who only reads the words of a form, without minding any thing else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention, requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary, but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the Priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the Church requires, and fully satisfies the Precept of saying Mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray, who neither minds the *God* he should pray to, nor the *things* to be prayed for, no nor the *sense* of the words he uses; their Church requires not the Priests to pray, even when they are saying their Mass-Prayers. Nor is it more needful on the same account, in the *Canonical hours*, as we

(t) cum ipsa eadem attentio sit ipsissima oratio. Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 340.

(u) Quomodo enim dicit Amen cum quid orat nescit? quia non potest intelligere quid boni dicat. Comment. in 1 Cor. 14. Manifesta sunt verba Apostoli, cum qui eo imperitiam, quod dicitur, non intelligit, fieri non possit, ut ad alterius gratiarum actionem Amen respondeat. Cassand. Defens. lib. offic. p. 17. viii.

have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for Priest or people, in all the publick Service of the Romish Church, much less is it (x) needful in their private devotions, which are not enjoined; for there they declare it Lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer, than in publick. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer, do not pray indeed; they themselves will acknowledge, in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us, (y) *that if one be corporally present at Mass, but lets his mind considerably wander after other things, he satisfies not the Precept, because he is but so there, as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the Mass by voluntary sleeping, and by voluntary wandring, are both alike.* Hence it is clear, that Priest or people, whose minds *voluntarily wander* at Mass, do no more pray there than if they were *voluntarily asleep*; and consequently, if they *wander carelessly*, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were *carelessly asleep*: Yet many of them think the Church forbids not *voluntary wandrings*; he himself thinks, she forbids not *careless wandrings*; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do, who are fast asleep, one way or other: And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying. (z) *Bellarmino reckoning the several sorts of prayer, one, (says he) is mental, another is both mental and vocal. But when he would add that which is vocal only, he will not have that accounted prayer: a third member of the division ought not to be added, to wit, that which is Vocal only: and gives good reason, for that, says he, is of no use to please God, but rather to provoke him to anger, according to*

(x) ubi autem libere & citra obligationem oratur; sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare distractio, etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adstet, nunquam erit mortalis, Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341. fine. vid. Angel. Sum. v. hora. n. 27. Gabriel de Can. Miss. Lect. 22. Graff. l. 2. cap. 51. n. 11.

(y) Si quis corporaliter presens sit missæ, sed mentem advertenter a missa divertat ad alia, non satisfacit præcepto missæ: quoniam ita ibi est, ac si voluntarie ibi dormiret, paria namque sunt longe a missa fieri per voluntarium somnum, & per voluntariam diversionem mentis ad alia. Sum. v. fest. p. 305.

(z) Alia est oratio tantum mentalis, alia mentalis simul & vocalis, neque debet addi tertium membrum (id est) vocalis tantum. Ea siquidem non est utilis ad placandum Deum, sed magis ad provocandum ad iram, juxta illud, Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me, Isai. 29. De bonis oper. l. 1. cap. 2. p. 974.

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that Isaiah 29. *This people honour me with their lips, &c.* Yet such is the praying in the *Roman Church*, and no other needful in their divine Service, as the *Cardinal* himself declares sufficiently in the same Book. And if no other praying be needful, no prayer that is a good work is necessary by their doctrine.

Sec. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of Mercy, or Charity, comprized in Alms-deeds for the relief of the Indigent; and we can scarce discover, that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. *Cardinal Cajetan* (one represented as more favourable to these acts of Charity than divers others) tells us, (a) *that to omit them is no mortal sin*, (and therefore to do them, will not be necessary by any command) *but only in two cases*: First, *when one hath superfluities, both in respect of nature and state*; that is, more than either nature, or the quality of the person requires. Secondly, *When the Poor are in extreme necessity* (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary). And these two are so described to us, that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think, hardly ever; so that rarely, or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person (b) *may be judg'd to have any thing superfluous*, (without which he is not bound to relieve others) *it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expences of himself, his Children and Family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too; what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature.* Upon which he concludes, *it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have any thing superfluous.* And so very rarely, (if he had said never, the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously, to spare any thing for the poor. Less pride and vain-glory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without

(a) *Eleemosynam non facere est peccatum mortale in duobus solummodo casibus, primus est si quis habet de superfluo nature & persone — secundus est quum apparet pauper in extrema necessitate constitutus, juxta illud. Pisce fame morientem, Sum. v. Elemos. p. 134.*
 (b) *Superfluum in tali latitudine consistens, judicandum est consideratis sumtibus honorabilibus etiam filiorum, familie, status munificentia, magnificencia, communibus eventibus, hereditibus, & aliis ejusmodi: ita ne raro videatur contingere, ut homo secundum statum gloriose vivens, superfluum habeat. Idem. ibid.*

any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. *Navar* is of the same mind, and tells us, (c) *there are few rich men who have any thing superfluous, since neither Kings, nor great Princes can be thought to have superfluities*; having said a little before, *that it cannot easily be judg'd that any secular person hath more than is needful for his condition*. For he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher; and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts. He expresses it more fully (d) elsewhere, and concludes for all this, *he cannot be said to have any such superfluities, that he should be obliged by any command to give to the poor*. So that unless a man have so much as he neither has at present, nor may have for the future occasion to use; that is, unless he has so much, as no man will, or can believe he hath; an act of Charity will not be his duty. If he do but desire to have more than he now has; or do but design to rise any higher than he now is; though but in such a degree as is found in all, and may innocently be in any: at least, if he have but any thing of Covetousness or Ambition, though far less than they determine he may have, without any deadly guilt (and so without any considerable danger) he is discharged from all obligation to this good work.

The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in *extream* necessity; and this is (*) only when it is apparent

(c) *Sequitur item Rosellam sine justa ratione dixisse, paucos divitum confessarios salutem iri, si elemosyna in predictis duobus casibus de precepto foret; non enim tot sunt, quot putat, hujusmodi divites, quibus sit superfluum status, cum nec reges & magni principes — superflua habere censentur cap. 24. n. 6. Facile judicandum non esse, aliquem secularem plura, quam quæ suo statui necessaria sunt, habere. Cum etiam ille qui ad aliquod dominium emendum, & mutandum suum statum in alium majorem, ad quem idoneus est, pecunias congerit, non habet plus quam suum statum debeat, ibid.*

(d) *Cap. 23. n. 74. Nec ob id dicitur habere tale superfluum, quod de precepto pauperibus teneatur erogare.*

(*) *In sententiam Cajetan. & Navar. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Elemosinu. dub. 3. n. 20. Afferunt non esse precepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremæ necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturæ, sed statui etiam congruæ sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson — reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus.*

Durandus assevit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempus precepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne tot divites condemner, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elemosyna.

they will dye for want of necessities, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in publick places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not the judgment of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, (*) or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation (e) which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to (f) Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not

(*) Bonacin. 1. præcept. d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.

(e) Extreme egere dicitur, non solum qui jam animam agit vel spirat: sed etiam cum indicia probabilia apparent eo decenturum, nisi ei subveniatur, & non se essent nec expectatur probabiliter alius, qui ei subveniat, juxta S. Thom. & declarat Cajetan. Idem cap. 24. n. 5.

(f) Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum auferre sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navar, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in ur. genti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navar. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Ref. 29. Bannes in 2.2. q. 66. art. 7.

required to relieve the Neceffitous, (g) by giving them anything; but it is fufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navar concludes it lawful (h) to buy persons in extream Neceffity, and lawful for them to consent to it; his reasons among others, are, *because a Father in time of extream Hunger, may sell his Son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme Neceffity gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c.* So that if a man were in such extremity for want of Food, that he might sell his Son to get it, for the saving of his Life; yet no Christian, in that case, were bound to give him relief freely; by their doctrine it would suffice to let him have Money, or Meat by the sale of his Child. We cannot expect they will ever find it a duty, *To give to the Indigent*, if not in such circumstances, and 'tis a plain case, where there is no obligation to give, there's no necessity to give Alms.

But if they did make it necessary to give Alms, yet is it not needful by their doctrine to do it so, as it will be a *good work* (or so, to Fast, or Pray, or do any other act, which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it) so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a *right principle*, and for a *good end*; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there's no necessity, as they teach, to act out of (*) love to God; for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the Law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that *Tim. 5. Rom. 13.* yet they have a *maxim* generally received, *(i) the intention of the command is not commanded*; herein they follow *Aquinas*: and hence they

(g) Adrian 4. de restit. Navar. cap. 17. n. 61. & cap. 24. n. 6. *In quibus tamen duobus non est de præcepto subvenire donando, sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando.* Vid. Bellarm. de bon. operibus, l. 3. c. 8. *hec doctrina vera & non solum a S. Thom. sed etiam ab aliis Theologis communiter tradi solet.* Vid. plures in Vafq. ibid. dub. 6. n. 50.

(h) Licet eos emere & illis emptioni suæ consentire, c. 23. n. 75. *quia pater tempore famis extremæ si ium vendere potest — tum quia nemo tenetur ad gratis subveniendum, egentem etiam extreme, modo commodando, vel mutuando satis ei succurrat.* ibid.

(*) Alexander Alenfis. Petr. Lombard. Aquinas. Angelus. Sylvester. Canus. Soto. Jac. de Grassis, &c. *supra.*

(i) Ex D. Thom. & graviorum autorum sententia, ad finem legislatoris minime teneamus, sed ad media, &c. Canus. Relect. de pœnit. part. 4. Soto de nar. & gr. *supra.*

conclude that (k) *such a mode of acting out of love to God, is not required* in any command of the divine Law; but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, & sin avoyded; if (*) that which is required *be done*, though not out of Love to God at all. And particularly, Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of Piety, Mercy, or Charity, required on their days for worship; since there, they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was shew'd before.

'Tis no wonder therefore, (as to the second,) if they conclude it needless to act *for God*, in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the *Theory* indeed, they determine that an act is not good, unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal (as much in morals, as the form is in naturals); so that without (l) a good end, that act must be naught, and no end good where God is not chief; yet for *practice*, they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end; they conclude it lawful for a man to act (m) principally for his own advantage; yea, they account it but a Venial fault to do the best act, principally, for (n) a sinful end. Now to avoid a Venial sin, they hold it not necessary, by any command of God; and therefore it will not be needful to do any thing but principally for an end so far sinful; and consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow; when they design by what they do, to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a legg, while they attempt his Crown; and to offer him a *Rush*, with

(k) *Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub præcepto*, &c. Soto de just. & jur. lib. 2. q. 3. art. 10.

(*) *Hinc ergo patet adimplentem præceptum per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum satisfacere præcepto, etiamsi non adimpleat modum, aut etiam finem a legislatore intentum.* Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9.

(l) *Omne opus cujus finis est malus, ipsum quoque malum est*, Navar. cap. 12. n. 30.

(m) Sylvest. Sum. v. Charitas. n. 5. Navar. *supra*.

(n) Cajetan. Sylvest. Navar. *supra*. The precept may be fully accomplished where the manner and end is naught, Bonacin. *ibid.* & apud eum, Aquinas, Soto, Navar, Medina, & alij.

an intent thereby to invest themselves in his prerogative. They should shew us how it is possible such acts can be good before they pretend to account good works necessary.

Señ. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works, by vertue of any divine Precept ordinarily; yet they seem to make some when they will have the Priest to injoyne them for Penance; (and 'tis-like, in this, as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary.) But good works, being injoynd as penance, become punishments; and it signifies, the Church of Rome is no good friend to good works, when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered; and thus she will have good works neither to be good, nor to be done. To be sure, thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a Slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of Penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their Church, upon this account, and so no way. For first, the Priest (*a*) needs not injoyne good works as penance, he may injoyne (*p*) nothing at all if he pleases, or some (*q*) slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse; or (*r*) what the Confitent must have done if he had not sinned; or he may dismiss him with this general (*s*) *all the good thou doest, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction*; or he may commend something by way of (*t*) *Counsel*, without obliging him by any injunction; or he may require him only to a-

(*a*) *Vid.* Sylv. v. Confess. 4. n. 2. Suarez. 3. tom. 4. disp. 38. Sect. 6. n. 4.

(*p*) Cajetan. Navar. *ibid.* Sect. 3. n. 4. (*q*) D. Thomas, Soto. & alii *communitur*, *ibid.* Sect. 4. n. 4.

(*r*) *Ibid.* Sect. 6. n. 5. (*s*) S. Thom. Paludan. Petr. Soto. Navar. *ibid.* Sect. 6. n. 6.

(*t*) D. Thom. Paludan. Petr. Soto. Victoria. Ledesma. *ibid.* Sect. 3. n. 2.

voyd the sin he confesses for a while (*u*) (and when he shrives the woman that he has (*x*) sin'd with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way): Or Secondly, if he should injoya this, or any good work, the Conitent (*y*) need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief Doctors determine: Or Thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself. (*z*) *To omit it will be but a small fault* (such as he needs not regard, be the good work little or great), *if it be not out of contempt*. Or (*a*) another may undertake it, and satisfie by suffering it for him. Or a Priest may release him, either he that injoynd it, (*b*) or another. However, Indulgences will do it effectually; these serve to sweep away all good works, (all necessity of them), on this account, for ever. This is their special use, to release the Popes Subjects from the sad penalty of good works; for though they have dealt hardly with good works, to make them a punishment, yet they will not deal so hardly with Catholicks as to have it necessary that they should be thus punished. And therefore to ease them of this grievous suffering, of *doing good*, the Church in great tenderness has provided Indulgences, which they may have at easie rates; and thereby an acquittance discharging them from the *good works* they were to suffer. And if the Priest should be so rigorous as to injoya Sinner to be doing good all his life; or so impertinent, as to require it for a hundred years, he may meet with Indulgences, will quit him of it, every moment of his life, and if he will, many thousand years over and above. And if this cannot be had unless he pay

(*u*) Ibid. Sect. 6. n. 2. (*x*) *Vid.* Angel. sum. v. confess. 5. n. 8.

(*y*) Scotus, Gabriel. Hostiensis, Panormitan. Medina, Sylvester. Armilla. Navar. in Suar. ibid. Sect. 7. n. 1.

(*z*) *Omittere satisfactiorem est peccatum sed non mortale, si desit contemptus: quia non omittitur aliquid necessarium ad salutem*, Cajetan. Sum. v. satisfact. p. 520.

(*a*) *Communis sententia theologorum est, posse penitentem implere per alium satisfactiorem sibi impositam*. Ita D. Thom. Paludanus, Sylvester, Aliensis in Suar. ibid. Sect. 9. n. 1.

(*b*) *Opinio communis est quam tenet Sylvest. Angelus, Navar, Rosella, Victoria, Ledesma, Medina*. ibid. Sect. 10. n. 4.

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for it, yet for his encouragement, they teach (*) that it is better to lay out his money for an Indulgence, than in deeds of Charity. So that there is no such goodness, or necessity in the best work a Priest can injoin; but it may be better, and more necessary to give the Pope money; and this *done*, through his Indulgence, there may be no need to do any more.

(*) *An sit melius dare argentum in Eleemosynam, quam dare in subsidium ad consequendam indulgentiam?—loquendo ex genere censeo esse melius, subsidium facere ad consequendam indulgentiam, Idem. ibid. disp. 45. Sect. 5. n. 7. p. 633.*

The

The Conclusion.

BY the Premises, it is manifest that Popery by its practical principles, is destructive to *Christianity* and the *souls of men*. *As to Christianity*, whether we consider it in general, as Religion; or in its specialties, as the best Religion, it is both ways by the Popish doctrine ruined. This plucks up the *Fundamentals* of it, and dissolves the whole structure, and burys and confounds both the necessary materials, and the peculiar excellencies thereof in its rubbish. There can be no Religion in reality without real worship, this being essential to it; yet their doctrine declares it needless, either for Clergy or People to be real worshippers of God, being so far from ingaging them to be reverent or devout, or sincere, or affectionate towards God in Religious addressees; that it will not have them obliged so much as actually to mind God when they pretend to worship him. There needs not so much as one act of true and real worship to make them as Religious, and as much Christians, as is necessary by their Divinity. So that Christianity, as they form it, is a Religion regardless of God, even when, if ever, he should be most observed and honoured, and thereby sunk lower then Heathenism, and the notions of natural Religion retained by Infidels. Further, it discharges those acts and dutys of *Christianity* which are necessary and essential to it; and allows and encourages all that it forbids and condemns, even what is most repugnant to, and inconsistent with it. It makes all Christian acts and dutys needless, and all wickedness, opposite thereto, safe and practicable, without fear of condemnation, and there needs no more to ruine the Religion of Christ. A great part of those dutys are by this doctrine mere matter of *Counsel*, and thereby they are made no dutys, all obligation to perform them, being in that notion, quite dissolved. The remnant (all conscience of which is not swallowed up in Counsels) which they cannot but acknowledge to be dutys; yet they will have them to be so but sometimes, and that very rarely, and when that is they cannot tell; it is not certainly known when, and the observance thereof must be correspondent, *no body knows certainly when*.

Or if they guess at the time, and point some out as probable, yet when the time comes, the acts (though the life of Christianity consists therein, and the salvation of the persons depends thereon) need not to be done, something else will serve instead thereof, some natural act, or faint wish, or false conceit, something or other, though neither truly Christian nor Virtuous (with the Sacrament at least) will excuse them from all other Christian acts. It is not the Accessaries of Religion only that they make thus bold with; but thus they handle the very vitals of Christianity, and make them unnecessary for Christians. The very acts of Faith, and Hope, and Love, yea, Repentance it self, and all the rest with these, are thus made needless, and they may be true Christians (at their rate) and saved (in their conceit) without ever exerting in a whole life so little as one act of grace or Christian virtue. The world never saw Christianity, into what hands soever it fell, more clearly stript, not only of its lustre and ornament, but of its life and being. If this suffice not to make an end of all Religion truly Christian, they not only dismiss as more than needs, what the doctrine of the Gospel makes most necessary, but advance and encourage what is most opposite to it, not only ignorance, unbelief, disaffection to Christ, impenitency; but therewith all disobedience unto the Gospel. Instead of the holy rules thereof, they have formed a doctrine of licentious Maxims, which give security to the practice of any wickedness, and take away (when they had left no other restraint) the fears of Hell from those who live and dye in damning sins. Whatever it is that Christ forbids, it is with them either *no sin*, or not *dangerous*, or (the worst of all by vertue of some devices of their own) not *damning*. So that they may venture upon any wickedness freely, and persist therein securely till death, and yet by some evasions which they tell them of, escape the wrath to come (whatever Christ say to the contrary), without either the fruits or acts of Repentance. There are many sins, and amongst them horrid and enormous crimes condemned by the Law of God and natural light, and such as the practice of them is reproachful to the Christian name, which yet, with them, pass for *no sins*; and they are furnished with expedients to make any other so too, when they see occasion, and in these they will discern no shadow of danger. There is a world of wickedness, which by their doctrine is *Venial*, abundance more than enough, utterly to deface Christianity, and to make

make any (who takes but part of the liberty given by their Divines) to look more like an Athiest, or a Bruit, a person of no Religion, Conscience or Honesty, than a true Christian. They can gratifie any vicious disposition, which way soever it leads, with impiety and debauches enow to fill up a whole life; and yet (if he will be satished with any thing, but the highest degrees of wickedness) promise him security.

If he could swallow ten millions of their Venials, every minute at a gulp, they would not (by their divinity) indanger him, though one that will follow the rules of Christ, must choose death, rather than venture upon some one of them. There is with them *no danger* in thus sinning, though the Christian doctrine never discovered any thing else in sin. Or if their Catholicks will be outrageously wicked, and cannot be satished with less than the practice of the most mortal crimes, they will not disoblige them (the party must be kept up, though their souls sink) they shall have their liberty upon easie terms; deadly sins shall be as free for them, and in a manner as safe as their harmless Venials. That which makes Venial faults seem less dangerous than mortal; is because they will not damne a man, though he never repent of them; but even herein they have made venial and mortal alike safe; for by their doctrine, he may live in all sorts of deadly wickedness, & die therein without any act of true Repentance, and yet escape damnation. They commend to them several evasions to secure impenitent Sinners, how damnable soever their neglects or practices have been to the last. But that of the *Trent Council* must not be doubted of; *attrition* (which they confess alone to be no sufficient, no saving Repentance) with the Sacrament of confession will pass any Sinner into a saving state. This one device of their own, will serve instead of all that Christ hath prescribed; if this be observed, though they live and die in the neglect of all Christian virtues, and in the practice of all wickedness which Christ condemns; they need not fear, this alone will secure them. *The lest natural, or slavish remorse, and a Priest*, is all the Christianity that a Papist need trouble himself for: if he can but make sure of these at last gasp, he is safe, though all his life he be more like a Devil incarnate than a Christian. By this alone Christianity is utterly subverted, all the Laws of Christ in effect repealed, and their

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observance rendred needless, the whole Gospel made a Cypher, and a way to salvation opened by bold Impostors, not only without, but against the Gospel, and quite cross to the *Way, the Truth, and the Life*.

Sect. 2. No more is needful to manifest that the practical part of Popery (however it hath passed for more harmless than the other more insisted on) is *destructive to the souls of men*. It leads them out of the *way of salvation*, if real Christianity be the way. It obliges them to neglect as needless not only the lesser, but the principal parts of that way, without which Heaven is altogether inaccessible; They that have discovered another Hell, may as well fancy another Heaven: but the way to that Heaven, which Christ hath prepared for his people, lyes through the knowledge of Christ, Love to him, Faith in him, that Repentance from dead works, and exercise of Christian virtues, that Mortification of sin, Holiness of life, and real Worshipping of God; which by this doctrine is abandoned as unnecessary. It tempts them into the *way of destruction*, encourages them in such practice of wickedness as Christ hath declared to be the *broad way*. It promises safety therein, and hides the danger from their eyes; it covers the pits (whose descent is into that which is bottomless) with Spiders webbs, and persuades them it is firm ground. It leaves them no sense, nor notice of many sins; no Conscience of far the most; no fear of any, no not of the worst, such as themselves call deadly crimes. It gives as much security to such wickedness, as a heart that has *sold* it self to it, need wish. For what need he desire more than assurance, that after a whole life spent therein, there is a very easie way for him to be saved, so easie that he need not trouble himself so much as truly to repent? Such grace as any Priest can help a Sinner to (an impenitent Sinner) at last gasp, will bring him to Heaven, though he never once thought of the way to it all his life.

Such being the rules which *Roman Catholicks* have for the conduct of their hearts and lives; and the worst sort of them being as much approved by their Church, as any practical doctrine currant amongst them; let it be considered what regard that Church hath of *Religion or Salvation*, which leaves them to such doctrine as is so inconsistent with both, and what regard they have of their souls, who after notice hereof will trust them to such a conduct. It gratifies the lusts and corrupt

rupt inclinations of the seduced, and serves the interest of the contrivers (drawing the world into the bosom of the Popes Church, and intangling it there by all the charms of such a Religion as dissolute persons would make for themselves): but if the God of infinite Goodness & Truth, have given us any certain notice of the ways of eternal Life and Death, those that believe and practice it will certainly destroy their own Souls.

FINIS.

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